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Underwater Warfare
Sau khi Obama đi VN về tự nhiên có nhiều chuyện được tiết lộ.Từ đó mới thấy tại sao VC phải tuỳ thuộc hoàn toàn vào Mỹ và Nhật.
Khó có chuyện nói VC là con ngưạ thành Trojan xin võ khí cuả Mỹ để nộp cho TC .Đơn giản Mỹ không bao giờ ngu, thứ nhì Mỹ đã can thiệp quá sâu vào tổ chức quân đội VC. Thứ 3 nếu VC phản Mỹ VC mất VN vô tay TC không thể nào chống nổi vì kỷ thuật cuả VC quá thô sơ.
-Trong báo cáo mới nhất cuả Quốc hội ( 3/2016 ), TC đã canh tân sức mạnh hải quân đến mức nguy hiễm , đến 2030 TC có khả năng để đánh Mỹ. Hai vùng TC quyết chiếm là Biển Đông và biển Hoa Đông ( Nhât).
- Riêng Biển Đông , không phải chỉ Mỹ mà Nhật và Phi là 4 nước sẽ đánh lại A2AD cuả TC. Nhât đã và đang viện trợ quân sự cho VC và Phi với những thứ mới nhất . Phi sẽ nhận đưọc máy bay do thám chống taù ngầm mới nhật cuả Nhật. Những võ khi cuả Mỹ cho VC chỉ là đồ phế thải trong kho cuả Mỹ. Có lẽ chỉ là bưóc đầu.
- Nhưng chuyện không ai nghĩ ra là the underwater warfare. Mấy cái nầy là khoa học quá cao cấp :
1/ Seabed Mapping technolgy
2/Ocean Acoustics
3/ Naval Mines
VC không có khả năng gì học dược kỹ thuật nầy. Đây là cái vòng kim cô Mỹ niệt trên đầu VC. Tóm tắc là Hải quân là kỷ thật quá cao cấp .VC có thể có tàu ngầm tàu mặt nuớc Fighter chay khoi khơi thì được .Nhưng khi đánh với TC là chuyện khác. Trình độ kỷ thuật và chiến thuật làm sao bài binh bố trận 6 chiếc Kilo, làm sao tránh máy tím tàu ngầm cuả TC đặt dưới đánh biển chỉ Mỹ mới có. Chưa tính đến nay TC có 50 ngàn trái mìn có thể phong toả vịnh Bắc Việt ,cưả biển cảng Cam ranh. Chỉ có Mỹ mới gở được đòn chí tử nầy cho VC.
Đến năm 2030 TC có khả năng gài những space stations dưới 3 ngàn meters duới đánh biển. TC có thể đã gài hệ thống định vị tàu ngầm ngoài biển VN. Chắc chắn TC đã có seabed maps để cho tàu ngầm TC núp và phục kích tàu ngầm cuả VC. VC có thể lái tàu ngàm nhưng hành quân tàu ngầm chỉ có Mỹ mới biết
VC không thể phản thấy là chổ nầy.
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities ...
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
Federation of American Scientists
China Is Planning a Massive Sea Lab 10000 Feet ... - Bloomberg
www.bloomberg.com/.../china-pushes-plan-for-oceanic-space-station-...
Bloomberg L.P.
2 days ago - If implemented, station could go up to 3,000 meters deep ... China considers more than 80% of the South China Sea its sovereign territory.
You visited this page on 6/8/16.
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PLA(N) Submarine Force.
China has long regarded its submarine force as a critical element of regional deterrence, particularly when conducting “counter-intervention” against modern adversary. The large, but poorly equipped force of the 1980s has given way to a more modern submarine force, optimized primarily for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major sea lines of communication. Currently, the submarine force consists of five nuclear attack submarines, four nuclear ballistic missile submarines, and 53 diesel attack submarines. In reference to the submarine force, the term “modern” applies to second generation submarines, capable of employing anti-ship cruise missiles or submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. By 2015 approximately 70 percent of China’s entire submarine force will be modern. By 2020, 75 percent of the conventional force will be modern and 100 percent of the SSN force will be modern. Currently, most of the force is conventionally powered, without towed arrays, but equipped with increasingly long range ASCMs. Submarine launched ASCMs with ranges well in excess of 100nm not only enhance survivability of the shooter, but also enable a small number of units to hold a large maritime area at risk. A decade ago, only a few of China’s submarines were equipped to launch a modern anti-ship cruise missile. Given the rapid pace of acquisition, well over half of China’s nuclear and conventional attack submarines are now ASCM equipped, and by 2020, the vast majority of China’s submarine force will be armed with advanced, long-range ASCMs. China’s small nuclear attack submarine force is capable of operating further from the Chinese mainland, conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as ASuW missions. Currently, China’s submarines are not optimized for either antisubmarine warfare or land attack missions. Like the surface force, China’s submarine force is trending towards a more streamlined mix of units, suggesting the PLA(N) is relatively satisfied with recent designs. For its diesel-electric force alone, between 2000 and 2005, China constructed MING SS, SONG SS, the first YUAN SSP, and purchased 8 KILO SS from Russia. While all of these classes remain in the force, only the YUAN SSP is currently in production. Reducing the number of different classes in service helps streamline maintenance, training and interoperability. The YUAN SSP is China’s most modern conventionally powered submarine. Eight are currently in service, with as many as 12 more anticipated. Its combat capability is similar to the SONG SS, as both are capable of launching Chinese-built anti-ship cruise missiles, but the YUAN SSP also possesses an air independent power (AIP) system and may have incorporated quieting technology from the Russian-designed KILO SS. The AIP system provides a submarine a source of power other than battery or diesel engines while still submerged, increasing its underwater endurance, thereby reducing its vulnerability to detection. The remainder of the conventional submarine force is a mix of SONG SS, MING SS, and Russian-built KILO SS. Of these, only the MING SS and four of the older KILO SS lack China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Congressional Research Service 81 an ability to launch ASCMs. Eight of China’s 12 KILO SS are equipped with the SS-N- 27 ASCM, which provides a long-range anti-surface capability out to approximately 120nm. Although China’s indigenous YJ-82 ASCM has a much shorter range, trends in surface and air-launched cruise missiles suggest that a future indigenous submarinelaunched ASCM will almost certainly match or exceed the range of the SS-N-27. China is now modernizing its relatively small nuclear-powered attack submarine force, following a protracted hiatus. The SHANG SSN’s initial production run stopped after just two launches in 2002 and 2003. After nearly 10 years, China resumed production with four additional hulls of an improved variant, the first of which was launched in 2012. These six submarines will replace the aging HAN SSN on nearly a 1-for-1 basis over the next several years. Following the completion of the improved SHANG SSN, the PLA(N) will likely progress to the Type 095 SSN, which may provide a generational improvement in many areas such as quieting and weapon capacity, to include a possible land-attack capability. Perhaps the most anticipated development in China’s submarine force is the expected operational deployment of the JIN SSBN in 2014, which would mark China’s first credible at-sea second-strike nuclear capability. With a range in excess of 4000nm, the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), will enable the JIN to strike Hawaii, Alaska, and possibly western portions of CONUS from East Asian waters. The three JIN SSBNs currently in service would be insufficient to maintain a constant at-sea presence for extended periods of time, but if the PLA Navy builds five units as some sources suggest, a continuous peacetime presence may become a viable option for the PLA(N). Historically, the vast majority of Chinese submarine operations have been limited in duration. In recent years however, leadership emphasis on more realistic training and operational proficiency across the PLA appears to have catalyzed an increase in submarine patrol activity. Prior to 2008, the PLA(N) typically conducted a very small number of extended submarine patrols, typically fewer than 5 or 6 in a given year. Since that time, it has become common to see more than 12 patrols in a given year. This trend suggests the PLA(N) seeks to build operational proficiency, endurance, and training in ways that more accurately simulate combat missions.
Naval Mines
China has a robust mining capability and currently maintains a varied inventory estimated at over 50,000 mines. China also has developed a robust infrastructure for naval mine related research, development, testing, evaluation, and production. During the past few years China has gone from an obsolete mine inventory, consisting primarily of pre-WWII vintage moored contact and basic bottom influence mines, to a robust mine inventory consisting of a large variety of mine types including moored, bottom, drifting, rocket propelled and intelligent mines. China will continue to develop more advanced mines in the future, possibly including extended-range propelled-warhead mines, anti-helicopter mines, and bottom influence mines equipped to counter minesweeping efforts.
Sau khi Obama đi VN về tự nhiên có nhiều chuyện được tiết lộ.Từ đó mới thấy tại sao VC phải tuỳ thuộc hoàn toàn vào Mỹ và Nhật.
Khó có chuyện nói VC là con ngưạ thành Trojan xin võ khí cuả Mỹ để nộp cho TC .Đơn giản Mỹ không bao giờ ngu, thứ nhì Mỹ đã can thiệp quá sâu vào tổ chức quân đội VC. Thứ 3 nếu VC phản Mỹ VC mất VN vô tay TC không thể nào chống nổi vì kỷ thuật cuả VC quá thô sơ.
-Trong báo cáo mới nhất cuả Quốc hội ( 3/2016 ), TC đã canh tân sức mạnh hải quân đến mức nguy hiễm , đến 2030 TC có khả năng để đánh Mỹ. Hai vùng TC quyết chiếm là Biển Đông và biển Hoa Đông ( Nhât).
- Riêng Biển Đông , không phải chỉ Mỹ mà Nhật và Phi là 4 nước sẽ đánh lại A2AD cuả TC. Nhât đã và đang viện trợ quân sự cho VC và Phi với những thứ mới nhất . Phi sẽ nhận đưọc máy bay do thám chống taù ngầm mới nhật cuả Nhật. Những võ khi cuả Mỹ cho VC chỉ là đồ phế thải trong kho cuả Mỹ. Có lẽ chỉ là bưóc đầu.
- Nhưng chuyện không ai nghĩ ra là the underwater warfare. Mấy cái nầy là khoa học quá cao cấp :
1/ Seabed Mapping technolgy
2/Ocean Acoustics
3/ Naval Mines
VC không có khả năng gì học dược kỹ thuật nầy. Đây là cái vòng kim cô Mỹ niệt trên đầu VC. Tóm tắc là Hải quân là kỷ thật quá cao cấp .VC có thể có tàu ngầm tàu mặt nuớc Fighter chay khoi khơi thì được .Nhưng khi đánh với TC là chuyện khác. Trình độ kỷ thuật và chiến thuật làm sao bài binh bố trận 6 chiếc Kilo, làm sao tránh máy tím tàu ngầm cuả TC đặt dưới đánh biển chỉ Mỹ mới có. Chưa tính đến nay TC có 50 ngàn trái mìn có thể phong toả vịnh Bắc Việt ,cưả biển cảng Cam ranh. Chỉ có Mỹ mới gở được đòn chí tử nầy cho VC.
Đến năm 2030 TC có khả năng gài những space stations dưới 3 ngàn meters duới đánh biển. TC có thể đã gài hệ thống định vị tàu ngầm ngoài biển VN. Chắc chắn TC đã có seabed maps để cho tàu ngầm TC núp và phục kích tàu ngầm cuả VC. VC có thể lái tàu ngàm nhưng hành quân tàu ngầm chỉ có Mỹ mới biết
VC không thể phản thấy là chổ nầy.
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities ...
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
Federation of American Scientists
China Is Planning a Massive Sea Lab 10000 Feet ... - Bloomberg
www.bloomberg.com/.../china-pushes-plan-for-oceanic-space-station-...
Bloomberg L.P.
2 days ago - If implemented, station could go up to 3,000 meters deep ... China considers more than 80% of the South China Sea its sovereign territory.
You visited this page on 6/8/16.
PLA(N) Submarine Force.
China has long regarded its submarine force as a critical element of regional deterrence, particularly when conducting “counter-intervention” against modern adversary. The large, but poorly equipped force of the 1980s has given way to a more modern submarine force, optimized primarily for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major sea lines of communication. Currently, the submarine force consists of five nuclear attack submarines, four nuclear ballistic missile submarines, and 53 diesel attack submarines. In reference to the submarine force, the term “modern” applies to second generation submarines, capable of employing anti-ship cruise missiles or submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. By 2015 approximately 70 percent of China’s entire submarine force will be modern. By 2020, 75 percent of the conventional force will be modern and 100 percent of the SSN force will be modern. Currently, most of the force is conventionally powered, without towed arrays, but equipped with increasingly long range ASCMs. Submarine launched ASCMs with ranges well in excess of 100nm not only enhance survivability of the shooter, but also enable a small number of units to hold a large maritime area at risk. A decade ago, only a few of China’s submarines were equipped to launch a modern anti-ship cruise missile. Given the rapid pace of acquisition, well over half of China’s nuclear and conventional attack submarines are now ASCM equipped, and by 2020, the vast majority of China’s submarine force will be armed with advanced, long-range ASCMs. China’s small nuclear attack submarine force is capable of operating further from the Chinese mainland, conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as ASuW missions. Currently, China’s submarines are not optimized for either antisubmarine warfare or land attack missions. Like the surface force, China’s submarine force is trending towards a more streamlined mix of units, suggesting the PLA(N) is relatively satisfied with recent designs. For its diesel-electric force alone, between 2000 and 2005, China constructed MING SS, SONG SS, the first YUAN SSP, and purchased 8 KILO SS from Russia. While all of these classes remain in the force, only the YUAN SSP is currently in production. Reducing the number of different classes in service helps streamline maintenance, training and interoperability. The YUAN SSP is China’s most modern conventionally powered submarine. Eight are currently in service, with as many as 12 more anticipated. Its combat capability is similar to the SONG SS, as both are capable of launching Chinese-built anti-ship cruise missiles, but the YUAN SSP also possesses an air independent power (AIP) system and may have incorporated quieting technology from the Russian-designed KILO SS. The AIP system provides a submarine a source of power other than battery or diesel engines while still submerged, increasing its underwater endurance, thereby reducing its vulnerability to detection. The remainder of the conventional submarine force is a mix of SONG SS, MING SS, and Russian-built KILO SS. Of these, only the MING SS and four of the older KILO SS lack China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Congressional Research Service 81 an ability to launch ASCMs. Eight of China’s 12 KILO SS are equipped with the SS-N- 27 ASCM, which provides a long-range anti-surface capability out to approximately 120nm. Although China’s indigenous YJ-82 ASCM has a much shorter range, trends in surface and air-launched cruise missiles suggest that a future indigenous submarinelaunched ASCM will almost certainly match or exceed the range of the SS-N-27. China is now modernizing its relatively small nuclear-powered attack submarine force, following a protracted hiatus. The SHANG SSN’s initial production run stopped after just two launches in 2002 and 2003. After nearly 10 years, China resumed production with four additional hulls of an improved variant, the first of which was launched in 2012. These six submarines will replace the aging HAN SSN on nearly a 1-for-1 basis over the next several years. Following the completion of the improved SHANG SSN, the PLA(N) will likely progress to the Type 095 SSN, which may provide a generational improvement in many areas such as quieting and weapon capacity, to include a possible land-attack capability. Perhaps the most anticipated development in China’s submarine force is the expected operational deployment of the JIN SSBN in 2014, which would mark China’s first credible at-sea second-strike nuclear capability. With a range in excess of 4000nm, the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), will enable the JIN to strike Hawaii, Alaska, and possibly western portions of CONUS from East Asian waters. The three JIN SSBNs currently in service would be insufficient to maintain a constant at-sea presence for extended periods of time, but if the PLA Navy builds five units as some sources suggest, a continuous peacetime presence may become a viable option for the PLA(N). Historically, the vast majority of Chinese submarine operations have been limited in duration. In recent years however, leadership emphasis on more realistic training and operational proficiency across the PLA appears to have catalyzed an increase in submarine patrol activity. Prior to 2008, the PLA(N) typically conducted a very small number of extended submarine patrols, typically fewer than 5 or 6 in a given year. Since that time, it has become common to see more than 12 patrols in a given year. This trend suggests the PLA(N) seeks to build operational proficiency, endurance, and training in ways that more accurately simulate combat missions.
Naval Mines
China has a robust mining capability and currently maintains a varied inventory estimated at over 50,000 mines. China also has developed a robust infrastructure for naval mine related research, development, testing, evaluation, and production. During the past few years China has gone from an obsolete mine inventory, consisting primarily of pre-WWII vintage moored contact and basic bottom influence mines, to a robust mine inventory consisting of a large variety of mine types including moored, bottom, drifting, rocket propelled and intelligent mines. China will continue to develop more advanced mines in the future, possibly including extended-range propelled-warhead mines, anti-helicopter mines, and bottom influence mines equipped to counter minesweeping efforts.