My Spy pilot life
After President Kennedy’ assassination, according the secret orders, many U.S military build up increase in intensity, magnitude; Impatience was driving the program, Bone-man McNamara had called for the first OPLAN-34A raid by February 1, 1964, incredibly, just seven days after SOG’ founding. Such insistence instigated perhaps the strangest episode of Vietnam’s cover war. Each proposed OPLAN-34-A operation had to weave its way between Defense, State and the White House for approval due the conflict was still between government administrations (Kennedy and Johnson) and Harriman, with each stop liable to change, restrict or delay SOG plans. Colonel Russell found this “a tremendous operational handicap” and complained that, “By the time we got it back, we were out of implementation time and the restraints were too many and too frequent because the president wasn’t policymaker”
OPLAN-34A perplexed Russell, because deniable attacks on objectives having little military value did not make sense. ”I don’t feel that the objectives of OPLAN-34A were clearly spelled out”. Colonel Russell later explained” So we didn’t know exactly what we were trying to do”. But this was not his only problems and so all generals as well. The secret agreement with China and Soviet wasn’t military and industry targets that are not the objectives because their personnel in there.
After President Diem’ assassination, strange chaotic-event take place, a certain evening of summer 1964, suddenly U.S helicopters flew to pick-up all U.S advisors in three Camps: Buon Ho, Buon Mega, and Boun Sapa to Ba Me Thuoc, highland province for the so called ‘urgent-meeting’ and typically during that night all Vietnamese officers were killed by highland minority (Rhade-Montagnard) After that massacre, the tribe Rhade’s soldiers were equipped with Carbine M.2 (automatic-firing-weapon) for their self-controlled, while ARVN troops were still equipped M.1. I was angry about having sacrificed my youth, professional flight operation to the traitor of U.S Special Forces from this Project-Delta. I was so frustrated
(However after four decades, by chance I found-out by discovering in the internet: authors Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, “The Wise-Men” Six Friends and the World They Made, book published in 1986 coinciding the death of the last Wiseman W A .Harriman, a leader among Six-Friends and the world they made at July 26, 1986, and his deputy Prescott Bush (death in 1972) Finally, by way of conclusion, I will just state my conviction that the war in Vietnam was a just war created by these Six Friends for their conspiracy in the Old ‘Eurasian Great Game’ And now resumed by George H W Bush for the New Game)
To support OPLAN-34A’s hit-and-run coastal attacks, the CIA had replaced its old junks with 88-foot high-speed Norwegian Nasty-class PT boats, bringing in former Norwegian skippers to help SOG SEAL instruct the new Vietnamese crews. Developed for 47-knot runs from Norway’s fjords to nip at passing Russian ships, the Nasty PTF (Patrol Type, Fast) were light, heavily armed and bat-out-of-hell fast, the naval cigarette boats of the 1960s. Accustomed to tiny runabouts and junks, however, our Vietnamese simply couldn’t master the Nasty boat at a tricky high speed maneuvers.
Within SOG’ Naval Advisory Detachment- a dozen SEAL from Boat-Support-Unit-One at Coronado, California; and five Marine Force Recon men-were plenty of eager volunteers to crew the Nasty for raiding the North, but political deniability absolutely precluded using Americans; indeed, throughout the war no SEAL ever would be allowed north of the 17th Parallel.
But, a SOG staff officer shrewdly observed, the Norwegians weren’t Americans. However, any Caucasian at the throttles of a covert boat in Asian waters flew in the face of plausible denial; How could a Norwegian possibly explain his attacking the coast of North Vietnam? But in the rush to get the raids under way the absurd became the acceptable; thus, due to impatience, SOG’ first covert attacks on North Vietnam would be led by Norwegians.
On the night of February 16, 1964, three Norwegian-piloted Nasty attempted to land Vietnamese frogmen to demolish a bridge, but heavy coastal fire drove them away, aborting the mission. A few nights later another swimmer demolition was attempted, but it, too, failed, with eight Sea-Commando swimmers lost (with my speculation, these are serious allegations U.S counterespionage in advance warning, because this concurrency scam)
By early summer the swashbuckling Scandinavian skippers began displaying a tad too much joie de vivre for their sedate SOG superiors. As one warned, “They were getting in trouble in Da-nang, so there were definite fears in Washington circles that the whole program would be blown, because these people were getting involved with Vietnamese girls and the police in Da-nang”. With new urgency, Vietnamese boat crews were prepared to take over from the Scandinavians, but not before the latter got in a final few licks.
By July, SOG’ Nasty and Vietnamese Sea Commandos had demolished five targets in North Vietnam, followed by two hit-and-run, over-the beach attacks on 9 and 25 July. On 30 July, SOG launched its biggest bombardment ever, employing five PT’ Nasty against radar sites so far north, they were closer to Haiphong than to Danang, an action SOG headquarters praised as “well executed and highly successful, with secondary explosions”
Two days later, when word came that North Vietnamese PT boats had attacked the U.S destroyer Maddox?, in what became known as the “Tonkin Gulf incident”. Although he made no reference to the SOG raids, of which he was informed, President Lyndon Johnson warned Hanoi that another high-seas attack would have dire consequences, and ordered the destroyer Turner Joy to reinforce the Maddox.
I will discuss the ‘Axiom-2’ “The U.S had no legitimate reason to be involved in Vietnamese affairs”, in the dominant interpretation of the U.S-Vietnam War that was produced by the Triumvirate, composing William A Harriman, Prescott Bush, and Robert A Lovett; and introduced to teachers at most schools and universities as the basis for explaining the war, subsequently taken up by the antiwar movement during the late 1960s.
So, Tonkin Gulf Incident was the good-reason for the U.S troop invasion and retaliation on Vietnam soil.
Although Hanoi still denied it had a single soldier in Laos, by October 1965 its security, engineer and logistics troops there numbered at least 30,000 not to mention an additional 4500 men passing through each month on their way to South Vietnam. About two hundred truckloads of supplies rolled down the Harriman’s Super Highway, parallel with its P.O.L pipe-lines (Ho Chi Minh Trail named by Western-countries with specific political purpose, in contrast Hanoi named it Route 559) monthly, and by the fall of 1965 the Air Force crews already knew Hanoi had spun its 900-miles road system the length of Laos, all the way to South Vietnam’s Central Highlands. On 2 October 1965, I flown on the treetops along Ho Chi Minh Trail, from Tchepone to Target D-1, only about 20 miles northwest of Kham Duc, and Master Sergeant Donald-Duncan hanging in the door side took the pictures; meanwhile RF-101 Woodo, and U-2 fresh photos disclosed new roads in Laos, while other aerial photos snapshots by H.34 showed new truck traffic.
SOG’ capabilities in North Vietnam had been expanding apace with the rest of the war. By 1966, SOG’ Nationalist Chinese aviators of the First Flight Detachment were penetrating North Vietnam’s night sky almost monthly. In addition to parachuting supplies and reinforcements to the five established agent teams, First Flight had inserted another three teams. Even the H.34 Queen-Bees got into the act, in November 1965, when they landed Team Romeo in the southern panhandle, near Mu-Gia Pass. The four new agent teams plus the five surviving ex-CIA teams- Bell, Easy, Remus, Tourbillon, and the singleton, Ares- gave SOG nine teams and 112 agents in the enemy’s heartland.
SOG had reinforced all the old CIA teams except Ares, with some so expanded that they were almost small platoons. SOG was planning to reinforce Ares by sea, the same way that I wrote on infiltration by sea; as he’d been infiltrated nearly five years earlier, but using high-speed Nasty boats. During the three years the CIA managed the agent team program, 18 of 23 teams were lost, mostly upon landing; by contrast, excluding the malingerers SOG purposely dumped into North Vietnam in the spring of 1964, SOG had lost not just one team, although a few individual team members had been lost in parachute accidents or clashed with NVA patrols. It was an impressive turnaround.
SOG sought authority to establish a resistance movement in North Vietnam and combine it with a SAFE areas program.(SAFE was the acronym for Selected Areas For Evasion) The program evolved from a Strategic Air Command plan to recover nuclear bomber crews from remote regions of the Soviet Union, in turn an idea not without precedent. During WW II, the American OSS and British Special Operations Executive (SOE), working with Tito’s guerrillas, maintained enclaves deep in Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia for bailouts and emergency landings. Likewise, during the Korean War, the CIA had guerrilla bands on many offshore islands where crippled airplanes could ditch and fliers could bail out. Actually, SOG wanted similar SAFE areas west and north of Hanoi, where pilots could bail out and receive medical aid, food and protection, then be retrieved by helicopters from Laos; when properly armed and supported by tactical air for rescue.
**********************************
Short Term Road-watch And Target Acquisition (STRATA)
Although, at Honolulu meeting, William Colby trying to persuade with President Johnson for canceling to drop small teams in North Vietnam but in vain; yet in contrary Defense Secretary McNamara having secret ordered from…putting more teams along Laotian border, in the rugged mountain country above “Three Passes” were the target for infiltration. STRATA recruits received training similar to that of the long-term agents at SOG’ secret base, Long Thanh Camp, but were segregated for security purposes, then housed at Monkey Mountain FOB in Danang. To confuse the enemy analyst, the 14 STRATA teams were randomly numbered Team 90 through Team 122.
From OP 34’s Diversionary Program, other operations run by MACVSOG served to support the efforts aimed at convincing Hanoi that it had a serious internal security problem. One of these, the STRATA team program, which was also run by OP 34, did not have this as its primary mission, but reinforcing was a by-product of its operations. The original authority for the Strata project can be traced to a May 1967 Pacific-Command message. The first two Strata teams were inserted into North VN at the end of the year. The area of operations for Strata was South of the 20th parallel, approximately 150 miles North of the DMZ, where the teams were to collect intelligence on the road network leading to the Three Major Passes feeding into the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. While the long-term agent teams had been assigned a different task in 1966 to collect intelligence on these, the few that had survived in place had accomplished very little. Therefore, “It was believed that the emphasis on short stay-time and mobility in Strata team training would enable them to survive and to be successfully exhilarated”
Strata Teams were composed of 5-10 indigenous personnel transported by VNAF/ USAF helicopters… missions were to be for 15-30 days. 24 such Teams were sent North in 1968. The Strata Teams targets can be seen along the Laotian/Vietnam border. Beside their primary mission was to watch a road, a path, or whatever and the ability to find the ex-filtration-site. Strata Teams were assigned secondary mission that included planting mines, capturing prisoners, and distributing “Psyop-materials” [antenna censor]. In the enemy heartland, the agents were said to have rarely gotten close enough to a road to actually observe a truck or identify a target worthy of an air strike. They did, however leave psyop materials in the areas where they were inserted. These materials had to do with the phantom resistance operation, the “Sacred Sword of the Patriot League.” Typically, this involved leaving a leaflet that denigrated a particular cadre in the area. The idea was either to run him down or to convince NVN security that notional groups were real and operating in this area. It was diabolical, but SOG analyst, black propagandists and counterintelligence experts put their heads together and plotted to combine all SOG’ real and imaginary assets “ in an integrated effort to exploit Hanoi’s almost paranoid fear of any perceived threat to their control of the population” The result was Projects Urgency, Borden, and Oodles.
While the Strata Teams were not accomplishing, all their intended missions, the fact that they penetrated North Vietnam 24 times in 1968 obviously had a reinforcing effect in terms of the Diversionary Program such as: “To add credibility, personnel presence is implies by the par dropping of ice block-weighted personnel parachutes to be found after the ice melts, hanging in trees”
Again, the message to Hanoi’s Police Force or whoever else found the parachutes was, “You’re too late...You just missed them!”
Another ploy: Pseudo-agents being inserted from both the ‘Borden’ and ‘Urgency’ projects were led to believe they would be met at their designated drop zone by members from one of ‘Oodles’ phantom teams. While these pseudo-agents may have believed they were actually going to meet up with an established team, OP 34 intended simply that they would corroborate other evidence that the phantom teams were real. Finally, radios that sent messages out from these fake teams were air-dropped into North Vietnam. This completed the communications loop. Messages were coming in and answers were being sent out. Additionally, devices known in the trade as agent-harassing devices were air-dropped into North Vietnam to cause their security forces to react. The objective was for the enemy to search and find the device but not the agents using it.
In light of all above, what use were Strata operations? How did this affect Hanoi? That means to believe that it told the North Vietnamese, “We can come into your country at will…We can put flags and leaflets on the trees at will!”
In effect, it was real evidence of spy-commandos, as Hanoi referred to them. As with other MACV-SOG operations that involved physically crossing into North Vietnam, however, the Strata program came to an abrupt halt at the end of 1968. In 1969, Strata were refocused on Laos and Cambodia. The objective remained intelligence collections, not deception.
STRATA teams were launched clandestinely from Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand. They were delivered there by SOG C.130 Blackbirds and, like the American teams secretly staged there, stayed out of sight inside panel trucks or the SOG operations building. After changing into NVA uniforms, the STRATA men climbed into 21st SOS “Pony” helicopters then it was a half-hour flight across the 65-miles, narrow neck of Laos. The helicopter HH-3s had to climb to 10,000 feet to get out of range of antiaircraft gun concentrations, and then flew on instruments through the turbulent wall clouds above the Truong-Son mountain-chains, then penetrated North Vietnam at low level to avoid SAM sites and obscure their landing-zone approach. It was some of the trickiest helicopter flying in Southeast Asia.
(Continued)
After President Kennedy’ assassination, according the secret orders, many U.S military build up increase in intensity, magnitude; Impatience was driving the program, Bone-man McNamara had called for the first OPLAN-34A raid by February 1, 1964, incredibly, just seven days after SOG’ founding. Such insistence instigated perhaps the strangest episode of Vietnam’s cover war. Each proposed OPLAN-34-A operation had to weave its way between Defense, State and the White House for approval due the conflict was still between government administrations (Kennedy and Johnson) and Harriman, with each stop liable to change, restrict or delay SOG plans. Colonel Russell found this “a tremendous operational handicap” and complained that, “By the time we got it back, we were out of implementation time and the restraints were too many and too frequent because the president wasn’t policymaker”
OPLAN-34A perplexed Russell, because deniable attacks on objectives having little military value did not make sense. ”I don’t feel that the objectives of OPLAN-34A were clearly spelled out”. Colonel Russell later explained” So we didn’t know exactly what we were trying to do”. But this was not his only problems and so all generals as well. The secret agreement with China and Soviet wasn’t military and industry targets that are not the objectives because their personnel in there.
After President Diem’ assassination, strange chaotic-event take place, a certain evening of summer 1964, suddenly U.S helicopters flew to pick-up all U.S advisors in three Camps: Buon Ho, Buon Mega, and Boun Sapa to Ba Me Thuoc, highland province for the so called ‘urgent-meeting’ and typically during that night all Vietnamese officers were killed by highland minority (Rhade-Montagnard) After that massacre, the tribe Rhade’s soldiers were equipped with Carbine M.2 (automatic-firing-weapon) for their self-controlled, while ARVN troops were still equipped M.1. I was angry about having sacrificed my youth, professional flight operation to the traitor of U.S Special Forces from this Project-Delta. I was so frustrated
(However after four decades, by chance I found-out by discovering in the internet: authors Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, “The Wise-Men” Six Friends and the World They Made, book published in 1986 coinciding the death of the last Wiseman W A .Harriman, a leader among Six-Friends and the world they made at July 26, 1986, and his deputy Prescott Bush (death in 1972) Finally, by way of conclusion, I will just state my conviction that the war in Vietnam was a just war created by these Six Friends for their conspiracy in the Old ‘Eurasian Great Game’ And now resumed by George H W Bush for the New Game)
To support OPLAN-34A’s hit-and-run coastal attacks, the CIA had replaced its old junks with 88-foot high-speed Norwegian Nasty-class PT boats, bringing in former Norwegian skippers to help SOG SEAL instruct the new Vietnamese crews. Developed for 47-knot runs from Norway’s fjords to nip at passing Russian ships, the Nasty PTF (Patrol Type, Fast) were light, heavily armed and bat-out-of-hell fast, the naval cigarette boats of the 1960s. Accustomed to tiny runabouts and junks, however, our Vietnamese simply couldn’t master the Nasty boat at a tricky high speed maneuvers.
Within SOG’ Naval Advisory Detachment- a dozen SEAL from Boat-Support-Unit-One at Coronado, California; and five Marine Force Recon men-were plenty of eager volunteers to crew the Nasty for raiding the North, but political deniability absolutely precluded using Americans; indeed, throughout the war no SEAL ever would be allowed north of the 17th Parallel.
But, a SOG staff officer shrewdly observed, the Norwegians weren’t Americans. However, any Caucasian at the throttles of a covert boat in Asian waters flew in the face of plausible denial; How could a Norwegian possibly explain his attacking the coast of North Vietnam? But in the rush to get the raids under way the absurd became the acceptable; thus, due to impatience, SOG’ first covert attacks on North Vietnam would be led by Norwegians.
On the night of February 16, 1964, three Norwegian-piloted Nasty attempted to land Vietnamese frogmen to demolish a bridge, but heavy coastal fire drove them away, aborting the mission. A few nights later another swimmer demolition was attempted, but it, too, failed, with eight Sea-Commando swimmers lost (with my speculation, these are serious allegations U.S counterespionage in advance warning, because this concurrency scam)
By early summer the swashbuckling Scandinavian skippers began displaying a tad too much joie de vivre for their sedate SOG superiors. As one warned, “They were getting in trouble in Da-nang, so there were definite fears in Washington circles that the whole program would be blown, because these people were getting involved with Vietnamese girls and the police in Da-nang”. With new urgency, Vietnamese boat crews were prepared to take over from the Scandinavians, but not before the latter got in a final few licks.
By July, SOG’ Nasty and Vietnamese Sea Commandos had demolished five targets in North Vietnam, followed by two hit-and-run, over-the beach attacks on 9 and 25 July. On 30 July, SOG launched its biggest bombardment ever, employing five PT’ Nasty against radar sites so far north, they were closer to Haiphong than to Danang, an action SOG headquarters praised as “well executed and highly successful, with secondary explosions”
Two days later, when word came that North Vietnamese PT boats had attacked the U.S destroyer Maddox?, in what became known as the “Tonkin Gulf incident”. Although he made no reference to the SOG raids, of which he was informed, President Lyndon Johnson warned Hanoi that another high-seas attack would have dire consequences, and ordered the destroyer Turner Joy to reinforce the Maddox.
I will discuss the ‘Axiom-2’ “The U.S had no legitimate reason to be involved in Vietnamese affairs”, in the dominant interpretation of the U.S-Vietnam War that was produced by the Triumvirate, composing William A Harriman, Prescott Bush, and Robert A Lovett; and introduced to teachers at most schools and universities as the basis for explaining the war, subsequently taken up by the antiwar movement during the late 1960s.
So, Tonkin Gulf Incident was the good-reason for the U.S troop invasion and retaliation on Vietnam soil.
Although Hanoi still denied it had a single soldier in Laos, by October 1965 its security, engineer and logistics troops there numbered at least 30,000 not to mention an additional 4500 men passing through each month on their way to South Vietnam. About two hundred truckloads of supplies rolled down the Harriman’s Super Highway, parallel with its P.O.L pipe-lines (Ho Chi Minh Trail named by Western-countries with specific political purpose, in contrast Hanoi named it Route 559) monthly, and by the fall of 1965 the Air Force crews already knew Hanoi had spun its 900-miles road system the length of Laos, all the way to South Vietnam’s Central Highlands. On 2 October 1965, I flown on the treetops along Ho Chi Minh Trail, from Tchepone to Target D-1, only about 20 miles northwest of Kham Duc, and Master Sergeant Donald-Duncan hanging in the door side took the pictures; meanwhile RF-101 Woodo, and U-2 fresh photos disclosed new roads in Laos, while other aerial photos snapshots by H.34 showed new truck traffic.
SOG’ capabilities in North Vietnam had been expanding apace with the rest of the war. By 1966, SOG’ Nationalist Chinese aviators of the First Flight Detachment were penetrating North Vietnam’s night sky almost monthly. In addition to parachuting supplies and reinforcements to the five established agent teams, First Flight had inserted another three teams. Even the H.34 Queen-Bees got into the act, in November 1965, when they landed Team Romeo in the southern panhandle, near Mu-Gia Pass. The four new agent teams plus the five surviving ex-CIA teams- Bell, Easy, Remus, Tourbillon, and the singleton, Ares- gave SOG nine teams and 112 agents in the enemy’s heartland.
SOG had reinforced all the old CIA teams except Ares, with some so expanded that they were almost small platoons. SOG was planning to reinforce Ares by sea, the same way that I wrote on infiltration by sea; as he’d been infiltrated nearly five years earlier, but using high-speed Nasty boats. During the three years the CIA managed the agent team program, 18 of 23 teams were lost, mostly upon landing; by contrast, excluding the malingerers SOG purposely dumped into North Vietnam in the spring of 1964, SOG had lost not just one team, although a few individual team members had been lost in parachute accidents or clashed with NVA patrols. It was an impressive turnaround.
SOG sought authority to establish a resistance movement in North Vietnam and combine it with a SAFE areas program.(SAFE was the acronym for Selected Areas For Evasion) The program evolved from a Strategic Air Command plan to recover nuclear bomber crews from remote regions of the Soviet Union, in turn an idea not without precedent. During WW II, the American OSS and British Special Operations Executive (SOE), working with Tito’s guerrillas, maintained enclaves deep in Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia for bailouts and emergency landings. Likewise, during the Korean War, the CIA had guerrilla bands on many offshore islands where crippled airplanes could ditch and fliers could bail out. Actually, SOG wanted similar SAFE areas west and north of Hanoi, where pilots could bail out and receive medical aid, food and protection, then be retrieved by helicopters from Laos; when properly armed and supported by tactical air for rescue.
**********************************
Short Term Road-watch And Target Acquisition (STRATA)
Although, at Honolulu meeting, William Colby trying to persuade with President Johnson for canceling to drop small teams in North Vietnam but in vain; yet in contrary Defense Secretary McNamara having secret ordered from…putting more teams along Laotian border, in the rugged mountain country above “Three Passes” were the target for infiltration. STRATA recruits received training similar to that of the long-term agents at SOG’ secret base, Long Thanh Camp, but were segregated for security purposes, then housed at Monkey Mountain FOB in Danang. To confuse the enemy analyst, the 14 STRATA teams were randomly numbered Team 90 through Team 122.
From OP 34’s Diversionary Program, other operations run by MACVSOG served to support the efforts aimed at convincing Hanoi that it had a serious internal security problem. One of these, the STRATA team program, which was also run by OP 34, did not have this as its primary mission, but reinforcing was a by-product of its operations. The original authority for the Strata project can be traced to a May 1967 Pacific-Command message. The first two Strata teams were inserted into North VN at the end of the year. The area of operations for Strata was South of the 20th parallel, approximately 150 miles North of the DMZ, where the teams were to collect intelligence on the road network leading to the Three Major Passes feeding into the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. While the long-term agent teams had been assigned a different task in 1966 to collect intelligence on these, the few that had survived in place had accomplished very little. Therefore, “It was believed that the emphasis on short stay-time and mobility in Strata team training would enable them to survive and to be successfully exhilarated”
Strata Teams were composed of 5-10 indigenous personnel transported by VNAF/ USAF helicopters… missions were to be for 15-30 days. 24 such Teams were sent North in 1968. The Strata Teams targets can be seen along the Laotian/Vietnam border. Beside their primary mission was to watch a road, a path, or whatever and the ability to find the ex-filtration-site. Strata Teams were assigned secondary mission that included planting mines, capturing prisoners, and distributing “Psyop-materials” [antenna censor]. In the enemy heartland, the agents were said to have rarely gotten close enough to a road to actually observe a truck or identify a target worthy of an air strike. They did, however leave psyop materials in the areas where they were inserted. These materials had to do with the phantom resistance operation, the “Sacred Sword of the Patriot League.” Typically, this involved leaving a leaflet that denigrated a particular cadre in the area. The idea was either to run him down or to convince NVN security that notional groups were real and operating in this area. It was diabolical, but SOG analyst, black propagandists and counterintelligence experts put their heads together and plotted to combine all SOG’ real and imaginary assets “ in an integrated effort to exploit Hanoi’s almost paranoid fear of any perceived threat to their control of the population” The result was Projects Urgency, Borden, and Oodles.
While the Strata Teams were not accomplishing, all their intended missions, the fact that they penetrated North Vietnam 24 times in 1968 obviously had a reinforcing effect in terms of the Diversionary Program such as: “To add credibility, personnel presence is implies by the par dropping of ice block-weighted personnel parachutes to be found after the ice melts, hanging in trees”
Again, the message to Hanoi’s Police Force or whoever else found the parachutes was, “You’re too late...You just missed them!”
Another ploy: Pseudo-agents being inserted from both the ‘Borden’ and ‘Urgency’ projects were led to believe they would be met at their designated drop zone by members from one of ‘Oodles’ phantom teams. While these pseudo-agents may have believed they were actually going to meet up with an established team, OP 34 intended simply that they would corroborate other evidence that the phantom teams were real. Finally, radios that sent messages out from these fake teams were air-dropped into North Vietnam. This completed the communications loop. Messages were coming in and answers were being sent out. Additionally, devices known in the trade as agent-harassing devices were air-dropped into North Vietnam to cause their security forces to react. The objective was for the enemy to search and find the device but not the agents using it.
In light of all above, what use were Strata operations? How did this affect Hanoi? That means to believe that it told the North Vietnamese, “We can come into your country at will…We can put flags and leaflets on the trees at will!”
In effect, it was real evidence of spy-commandos, as Hanoi referred to them. As with other MACV-SOG operations that involved physically crossing into North Vietnam, however, the Strata program came to an abrupt halt at the end of 1968. In 1969, Strata were refocused on Laos and Cambodia. The objective remained intelligence collections, not deception.
STRATA teams were launched clandestinely from Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand. They were delivered there by SOG C.130 Blackbirds and, like the American teams secretly staged there, stayed out of sight inside panel trucks or the SOG operations building. After changing into NVA uniforms, the STRATA men climbed into 21st SOS “Pony” helicopters then it was a half-hour flight across the 65-miles, narrow neck of Laos. The helicopter HH-3s had to climb to 10,000 feet to get out of range of antiaircraft gun concentrations, and then flew on instruments through the turbulent wall clouds above the Truong-Son mountain-chains, then penetrated North Vietnam at low level to avoid SAM sites and obscure their landing-zone approach. It was some of the trickiest helicopter flying in Southeast Asia.
(Continued)

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