Operation Lam-Son 719
By 18 March, by chance, the Giap’ forces had detected the withdrawal of ARVN units from the Route 9 area and directed his forces to surround, annihilate, and destroy those isolated units where they could, General Giap also told his people that some ARVN forces were rebelling against their leaders (the Axe of Evil via CIA, counterespionage-branch system, let him know; a meticulous staffs-researcher witch-hunt was a mediator between Pham Xuan An and Lt John F Kerry) that some were running away into the interior, and that the ARVN had been defeated. On the view of bird to close to the battle, it looks like to me a back-stiffening effort; also that this whole thing is one hell of a bloody battle. Certainly bloody it was. In one firefight after another the ARVN, while taking substantial casualties, inflicted disproportionately heavier ones on the Giap’ force – 37 versus 245, 85 versus 600, on and on (En route to Tchepone nine battalion commanders were killed or wounded)
In order to withdraw after President Thieu said to General Lam “let a small unit touched down and pissed at there a mess then go home” – the most ARVN forces had already left lower Laos. Unfortunately, the intended and desired goal to sustain combat until the onset of the rainy season in order to strangle the Giap’ supply route could not be accomplished. That was true, but it by no means conveyed an accurate impression of what had been achieved. Meanwhile in the earlier weeks of operation, some troop element had done conspicuously better than others. Typically, the ARVN armored units had been especially disappointing. Early in that Lam Son 719, the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Calvary had encountered NVA armored element in a fight at the feet bottom valley, southern Fire Support Base 31 and performed brilliantly, destroying 6 Giap T-54 tanks and 16 PT-76s without any friendly losses in the first major tank-to-tank engagement of the war but of course with the involvement of our Magic-Club 213th gun-ships loaded to the maximum with 2.75-inch antitank shorter-warhead in 19 rocket-pods each flank. After that, General Lam ordered ARVN forces to begin withdraw, though, the Armor floundered. Not only did they contribute little to offensive operations (basically, in the academic military institution the withdraw operation usually get to much trouble even having meticulously preparedness) Consequently the 1st Armored Brigade Cavalry came out of Laos with only a fraction of the equipment they took in, of 62 tanks only 25 tanks and of 162 armored personnel carriers only 64 were salvaged (the Axe of Evil schemed of a plan-arrangement obsolete military equipment become a rubbish, things that they does not want any more while need the new production one) The reason MACV knew these sorry statistics was that a U.S advisor intentioned met them at the border and made a personal count, an operation with plenty of scope for axe of evil original plans, had the losses been due to heavy combat, that would have been one thing, but in the main they were just vehicles that had broken down or run out of gas and been abandoned.
The 1st Armored Brigade floundered through a long wait for the ambushes. Additionally the Route 9 was constructed by French colonialist for long at best a narrow, nearly unimproved surface, twisting, or so it looked from the helicopter that Route some of those weather cuts that were in its route surface were couple feet deep. The reality was much worse in which they missed that in the readout of the aerial photography. As the result the poor condition of that Route, therefore the inability of ARVN forces to keep it secure, meant that virtually all re-supply and medical evacuation for our forces had to be done only by helicopters.
Along that Route 9, Giap’ force tried ARVN force fell right into his traps that were reorganized by interval stronghold points of each regiment. NVA troops make some huge obstacles to stop the convoy and called shelling 130mm and 152mm guns to pounding into them, meanwhile they used 120mm mortar burst of numerous shells onto ARVN troops. NVA have been living in the area secretly for quite long from 1962 in the commence building the Harriman Highway (Ho chi Minh trail) and recently in the last phase of bunker construction and there was also a huge cargo logistic-ammunitions (67,000 short tons meanwhile ARVN would essentially be out of ammunition according Cooper-Church amendment) “This force Giap to continue a protracted war strategy in the South Vietnam right in the axe of evil’s project as ‘axiom-1”.
Not too far from A-Loui Fire Support Base to the border, at northern flank was situated a 7th Squadron armored carriers and closer to A-Loui a platoon carriers, to western flank having two more carriers armored platoons. The 1st Armored Brigade commander Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat’ headquarters was encircled by armored carriers like iron shield.
Further south to the west and south west of Delta Base, the ARVN Marines were engaged in fighting that had lasted for some days. The battle was savage. The shelling was non-stop. All out units from the north to the south of Route-9 were targeted by their intimidating artillery. There were huge losses. It was impossible to receive supplies and medevac because of the intense anti-aircraft fire. Eventually, the Special Task Force [the combined 1st Armor and Airborne] was ordered to retreat back to Khe Sanh. This withdrawal was extremely difficult since the NVA had clearly expected our intentions. They intensified their attack. Under such pressure, the fighting spirit of the troops felt drastically, and the commanders had difficulty getting their orders fulfilled. Helicopters however had great trouble landing. Some panic stricken soldiers struggled with their brothers in arms to gain a spot on the helicopters which managed to land. Again this fact was grossly exaggerated by the foreign media, which never failed to harp on it whenever they had the chance.
On March 23/ 1971, at 8:00 PM, the proximate cause of these reverses was withdraw of the 7th Squadron and all platoons adjacent units surrounded gather to Route 9 at A-Loui, ordered by colonel Luat by secret order from General Lam. When all adjacent units reaching at A-Loui then the task-force headquarters was already left. Thereby those adjacent units must continued line up to the border. The bad new returned back to them, the first convoy was ambushed by NVA stronghold inflicted 17 Squadron commander and his deputy wounded and their vehicle was destroyed. The rest hurrying back reinforced with the 17 squadron and stayed on the spot to defense. Until at 8:P.M that night, the NVA regiment tried to overrun. Enemy having PT-76 fired support. But ARVN used Tank T-41 shoot destroyed two PT-76s. During the longest night AC-130 dropped flares illuminates the area, meanwhile NVA troops attacked many throng waves but failure. The friendly armored make a real good formation to counterattack killed a lot enemy by 50 calibers stopped them far out of them, although they would like engagement to ARVN force for less casualties. At dawn, 7: A.M the enemy remains were everywhere about this area created the unsurprising scenery to friendly forces; the enemy remnant retreat hidden in the virgin forest avoid tactical fighter bombers.
Fortunately that morning the weather was real good, no fog like usual and the tact air still bombing on the way enemy retreat by FAC, OV-10 Bronco spot light the targets. Two more armored carriers passed the ghost haunt A-Loui Camp by synchronized formation to self-protected; At last they encountered together with 11th Squadron. Colonel Luat joint in the Squadron ordered two platoons line up in the back of convoy. He explained to his subordinates that “in front of us the 17th Squadron was subjected a blooded attack by enemy, they stayed on the spot for counterattack and waiting two platoons advanced to reinforced. There was only one Route 9, passing through the area of operation. Bordering on both sides were continuous mountain ranges. Such terrain was difficult for heavy armored vehicles which easily became targets for ambushes. Thick forests on the mountain and hills impeded troop movements, especially in the south which was covered with huge bamboos. It was in the south that the 1st Regiment and Marine Brigade deployed. It was a disadvantage for the offensive force, which could not evolve far and wise. Instead, movement was limited to narrow trails. Observation was poor and loosing directions was a road hazard. Often, brothers in arms would mistake each other for the enemy at a distance, and would inadvertently shoot each other. Bombing and air power found it difficult to avoid hitting friendly troops. Furthermore, the terrain hampered delivery of supplies and evacuation of the wounded. Helicopters needed to facilitate these two crucial things could only land with relative case near Route 9. The strength of the troops was greatly taxed as they had to carry an additional load of food and ammunition to make up for the lack of supplies. All these factors had a significant negative effect on the morale of the troops. On the other hand, the terrain was very familiar to the enemy, as they actually lived and carried out military activities there; their personal gear was light, contrasting greatly with ARVN’ bulky loads. In summary,
In planning an operation, it is crucial to take the terrain into account.
The northern column’s withdrawal by foot along the Route from Bandong to Lao Bao could not avoid heavy casualties either. The two columns consisting of the Airborne/1st Armor and 1st Regiment did succeed in retreating with minimal losses. That the 1st Regiment, however, lose one of its best officers, Lieutenant Colonel Le Huan, a battalion commander. Once these two columns had left the battleground, the enemy concentrated their forces to assault the 147th Marine Brigade around Delta Base. The 2nd and the 4th battalion which had previously deployed further west of the base, was forced slowly back towards its perimeter. The Brigade was well supported from lime-Mt-Coroc by the artillery of the 258th Marine Brigade, and also by air support. The Arc light B-52’s were particularly effective and accurate in the close range air support.
But the enemy stubbornly stayed in their hideouts and bunkers, and so resisted ARVN attacks. The fighting was protracted, and was unfavorable to the Marines in that supplies and medevac was unattainable. The enemy artillery, including recoilless 75mm guns were positioned in vantage points opposite to Delta Base, so they were able to fire directly at the TOC bunker of the Brigade Headquarter. The antennae was shot down neighbored bunkers were destroyed, and Marine’s Howitzers were damaged. In response, the Brigade gave the order to retreat south to block the apical line along with the enemy with could approach them. The 4th Battalion was to move north east to protect the retreating route of the Brigade that led eastwards towards the direction of the 258th Brigade. The Brigade Headquarters then requested I Corps permission to pull out from the base to continue fighting in the surrounding area, rather remain at base, only to be on the receiving end of the enemy artillery. However, the proposition was not applicable as the order to retreat was issued in the afternoon, and that very morning an unforeseen event occurred. A platoon of 70B sapper had successfully infiltrated through the defense line of the 5th Battalion and had managed to occupy one bunker located at the south entrance of the base, but they were stopped there and the 5th Battalion sent a company to dislodge them out. Many of the sappers were killed or wounded and the rest surrendered. On the interrogation, they revealed they belonged to 324B Division, and that their duty was to assault the 147th Brigade. Body searches revealed a piece of paper reading. “We dedicate our lives to the annihilation of the Crazy Buffaloes”
(continued)
By 18 March, by chance, the Giap’ forces had detected the withdrawal of ARVN units from the Route 9 area and directed his forces to surround, annihilate, and destroy those isolated units where they could, General Giap also told his people that some ARVN forces were rebelling against their leaders (the Axe of Evil via CIA, counterespionage-branch system, let him know; a meticulous staffs-researcher witch-hunt was a mediator between Pham Xuan An and Lt John F Kerry) that some were running away into the interior, and that the ARVN had been defeated. On the view of bird to close to the battle, it looks like to me a back-stiffening effort; also that this whole thing is one hell of a bloody battle. Certainly bloody it was. In one firefight after another the ARVN, while taking substantial casualties, inflicted disproportionately heavier ones on the Giap’ force – 37 versus 245, 85 versus 600, on and on (En route to Tchepone nine battalion commanders were killed or wounded)
In order to withdraw after President Thieu said to General Lam “let a small unit touched down and pissed at there a mess then go home” – the most ARVN forces had already left lower Laos. Unfortunately, the intended and desired goal to sustain combat until the onset of the rainy season in order to strangle the Giap’ supply route could not be accomplished. That was true, but it by no means conveyed an accurate impression of what had been achieved. Meanwhile in the earlier weeks of operation, some troop element had done conspicuously better than others. Typically, the ARVN armored units had been especially disappointing. Early in that Lam Son 719, the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Calvary had encountered NVA armored element in a fight at the feet bottom valley, southern Fire Support Base 31 and performed brilliantly, destroying 6 Giap T-54 tanks and 16 PT-76s without any friendly losses in the first major tank-to-tank engagement of the war but of course with the involvement of our Magic-Club 213th gun-ships loaded to the maximum with 2.75-inch antitank shorter-warhead in 19 rocket-pods each flank. After that, General Lam ordered ARVN forces to begin withdraw, though, the Armor floundered. Not only did they contribute little to offensive operations (basically, in the academic military institution the withdraw operation usually get to much trouble even having meticulously preparedness) Consequently the 1st Armored Brigade Cavalry came out of Laos with only a fraction of the equipment they took in, of 62 tanks only 25 tanks and of 162 armored personnel carriers only 64 were salvaged (the Axe of Evil schemed of a plan-arrangement obsolete military equipment become a rubbish, things that they does not want any more while need the new production one) The reason MACV knew these sorry statistics was that a U.S advisor intentioned met them at the border and made a personal count, an operation with plenty of scope for axe of evil original plans, had the losses been due to heavy combat, that would have been one thing, but in the main they were just vehicles that had broken down or run out of gas and been abandoned.
The 1st Armored Brigade floundered through a long wait for the ambushes. Additionally the Route 9 was constructed by French colonialist for long at best a narrow, nearly unimproved surface, twisting, or so it looked from the helicopter that Route some of those weather cuts that were in its route surface were couple feet deep. The reality was much worse in which they missed that in the readout of the aerial photography. As the result the poor condition of that Route, therefore the inability of ARVN forces to keep it secure, meant that virtually all re-supply and medical evacuation for our forces had to be done only by helicopters.
Along that Route 9, Giap’ force tried ARVN force fell right into his traps that were reorganized by interval stronghold points of each regiment. NVA troops make some huge obstacles to stop the convoy and called shelling 130mm and 152mm guns to pounding into them, meanwhile they used 120mm mortar burst of numerous shells onto ARVN troops. NVA have been living in the area secretly for quite long from 1962 in the commence building the Harriman Highway (Ho chi Minh trail) and recently in the last phase of bunker construction and there was also a huge cargo logistic-ammunitions (67,000 short tons meanwhile ARVN would essentially be out of ammunition according Cooper-Church amendment) “This force Giap to continue a protracted war strategy in the South Vietnam right in the axe of evil’s project as ‘axiom-1”.
Not too far from A-Loui Fire Support Base to the border, at northern flank was situated a 7th Squadron armored carriers and closer to A-Loui a platoon carriers, to western flank having two more carriers armored platoons. The 1st Armored Brigade commander Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat’ headquarters was encircled by armored carriers like iron shield.
Further south to the west and south west of Delta Base, the ARVN Marines were engaged in fighting that had lasted for some days. The battle was savage. The shelling was non-stop. All out units from the north to the south of Route-9 were targeted by their intimidating artillery. There were huge losses. It was impossible to receive supplies and medevac because of the intense anti-aircraft fire. Eventually, the Special Task Force [the combined 1st Armor and Airborne] was ordered to retreat back to Khe Sanh. This withdrawal was extremely difficult since the NVA had clearly expected our intentions. They intensified their attack. Under such pressure, the fighting spirit of the troops felt drastically, and the commanders had difficulty getting their orders fulfilled. Helicopters however had great trouble landing. Some panic stricken soldiers struggled with their brothers in arms to gain a spot on the helicopters which managed to land. Again this fact was grossly exaggerated by the foreign media, which never failed to harp on it whenever they had the chance.
On March 23/ 1971, at 8:00 PM, the proximate cause of these reverses was withdraw of the 7th Squadron and all platoons adjacent units surrounded gather to Route 9 at A-Loui, ordered by colonel Luat by secret order from General Lam. When all adjacent units reaching at A-Loui then the task-force headquarters was already left. Thereby those adjacent units must continued line up to the border. The bad new returned back to them, the first convoy was ambushed by NVA stronghold inflicted 17 Squadron commander and his deputy wounded and their vehicle was destroyed. The rest hurrying back reinforced with the 17 squadron and stayed on the spot to defense. Until at 8:P.M that night, the NVA regiment tried to overrun. Enemy having PT-76 fired support. But ARVN used Tank T-41 shoot destroyed two PT-76s. During the longest night AC-130 dropped flares illuminates the area, meanwhile NVA troops attacked many throng waves but failure. The friendly armored make a real good formation to counterattack killed a lot enemy by 50 calibers stopped them far out of them, although they would like engagement to ARVN force for less casualties. At dawn, 7: A.M the enemy remains were everywhere about this area created the unsurprising scenery to friendly forces; the enemy remnant retreat hidden in the virgin forest avoid tactical fighter bombers.
Fortunately that morning the weather was real good, no fog like usual and the tact air still bombing on the way enemy retreat by FAC, OV-10 Bronco spot light the targets. Two more armored carriers passed the ghost haunt A-Loui Camp by synchronized formation to self-protected; At last they encountered together with 11th Squadron. Colonel Luat joint in the Squadron ordered two platoons line up in the back of convoy. He explained to his subordinates that “in front of us the 17th Squadron was subjected a blooded attack by enemy, they stayed on the spot for counterattack and waiting two platoons advanced to reinforced. There was only one Route 9, passing through the area of operation. Bordering on both sides were continuous mountain ranges. Such terrain was difficult for heavy armored vehicles which easily became targets for ambushes. Thick forests on the mountain and hills impeded troop movements, especially in the south which was covered with huge bamboos. It was in the south that the 1st Regiment and Marine Brigade deployed. It was a disadvantage for the offensive force, which could not evolve far and wise. Instead, movement was limited to narrow trails. Observation was poor and loosing directions was a road hazard. Often, brothers in arms would mistake each other for the enemy at a distance, and would inadvertently shoot each other. Bombing and air power found it difficult to avoid hitting friendly troops. Furthermore, the terrain hampered delivery of supplies and evacuation of the wounded. Helicopters needed to facilitate these two crucial things could only land with relative case near Route 9. The strength of the troops was greatly taxed as they had to carry an additional load of food and ammunition to make up for the lack of supplies. All these factors had a significant negative effect on the morale of the troops. On the other hand, the terrain was very familiar to the enemy, as they actually lived and carried out military activities there; their personal gear was light, contrasting greatly with ARVN’ bulky loads. In summary,
In planning an operation, it is crucial to take the terrain into account.
The northern column’s withdrawal by foot along the Route from Bandong to Lao Bao could not avoid heavy casualties either. The two columns consisting of the Airborne/1st Armor and 1st Regiment did succeed in retreating with minimal losses. That the 1st Regiment, however, lose one of its best officers, Lieutenant Colonel Le Huan, a battalion commander. Once these two columns had left the battleground, the enemy concentrated their forces to assault the 147th Marine Brigade around Delta Base. The 2nd and the 4th battalion which had previously deployed further west of the base, was forced slowly back towards its perimeter. The Brigade was well supported from lime-Mt-Coroc by the artillery of the 258th Marine Brigade, and also by air support. The Arc light B-52’s were particularly effective and accurate in the close range air support.
But the enemy stubbornly stayed in their hideouts and bunkers, and so resisted ARVN attacks. The fighting was protracted, and was unfavorable to the Marines in that supplies and medevac was unattainable. The enemy artillery, including recoilless 75mm guns were positioned in vantage points opposite to Delta Base, so they were able to fire directly at the TOC bunker of the Brigade Headquarter. The antennae was shot down neighbored bunkers were destroyed, and Marine’s Howitzers were damaged. In response, the Brigade gave the order to retreat south to block the apical line along with the enemy with could approach them. The 4th Battalion was to move north east to protect the retreating route of the Brigade that led eastwards towards the direction of the 258th Brigade. The Brigade Headquarters then requested I Corps permission to pull out from the base to continue fighting in the surrounding area, rather remain at base, only to be on the receiving end of the enemy artillery. However, the proposition was not applicable as the order to retreat was issued in the afternoon, and that very morning an unforeseen event occurred. A platoon of 70B sapper had successfully infiltrated through the defense line of the 5th Battalion and had managed to occupy one bunker located at the south entrance of the base, but they were stopped there and the 5th Battalion sent a company to dislodge them out. Many of the sappers were killed or wounded and the rest surrendered. On the interrogation, they revealed they belonged to 324B Division, and that their duty was to assault the 147th Brigade. Body searches revealed a piece of paper reading. “We dedicate our lives to the annihilation of the Crazy Buffaloes”
(continued)
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