Operation lam son 719

**vinhtruong** · 12-02-2010, 04:57 PM

Why President Nixon so anxious?

… Being stunned into ‘War powers Act’, surrounded by Skull and Bones ‘witch-hunt’ haunts, unshakeable reputation glooming policy “Foe become Friend and Friend become Foe.”
What’s the hell to deal honestly with … What’s the truth natural phenomenon of this operation? Why don’t start sooner … and wait for all the ammunition already moved to the southern on Harriman’s Highway, completed cargo overwhelming over corridor … then start operational search and destroy later? (Several NVA prisoners indeed disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to south corridor that The ARVN appeared not to be surprised at all; by contrast, Giap had been prepared and expecting our forces to come in. This led to the conclusion that several things concerning the enemy had eluded our collection capabilities)
This Vietnam War’ largest battle considers as Korea War Inchon, and WWII Normandy, both were two amphibious operations whereas operation Lam Son 719 was an air-assault operation. Who knew since all three wars initiated by an U.S totalitarian WIB-Bones in War Industries Board’ masterminded. Meanwhile in this photo, the secret ‘Pennsylvania-game’ players, it was the ultimate team effort laughingly faces, cold blood; and every member of the team had to have the skills of a quarterback: Kissinger. The grit of a linebacker: Helms. And the brains of a coach: Republican George H W Bush, a successor to the throne of the Skull and Bones Dynasty, Second generation, but a simple surrogate totalitarian as Democrat William A Harriman. Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war - but also one doomed to failure right from the start. Due to cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Americans all the written plans had to be translated and the translators was largely WIB’ antiwar-activist [counterespionage] as Lt John-F-Kerry via triple-cross mediator Pham-Xuan-An, and few Vietnamese double-cross translator-sympathies to General Giap who engaged to OSS by Agent-Number 19, in sanctuary Pat-Po in 1945 [photograph by Allan Squiers] Consequently, Hanoi had copies of the whole documentation in hands almost as soon as South Vietnamese and US Army commanders of participating units. Additionally, neither the Americans nor the South Vietnamese knew the terrain really well, while the NVA troops were well-prepared for defense. Meanwhile, the foreign media's field reporters were particularly biased against the South Vietnamese, and were always ready to play up ARVN failures, and spread bad publicity. The media actually dwelt a detrimental role to the Operation of Lam Son 719. Even the BBC Radio ruined the ARVN” element of surprise by broadcasting that Tchepone had been invaded, [similarity BBC while been Saigon fall] when in reality, the ARVN had only achieved Phase-One i. e only half of the objective, due to President Thieu ordered early-out. Thus the NVA were forewarned of the possibility of our invading Tchepone. This forced the ARVN to hastily tactical carry through with the objectives in an attempt to save face…touch down took picture and go home no deployment.
Operation Lam Son 719 in the early of February 1971 was theoretically planned to take and destroy sanctuary base located in Tchepone, a small town in southern of Laos. Intelligence analysts stated that the NVA-Corps 70B had built many large storages stocked with weapons ammunitions, logistic supplies and foods. Also this base was used as a resource for refreshing troop replacement and training on the operational spot for the NVA units after battled with ARVN troop, backed by this base the 70B forces crossed the Laos-Vietnam border to attack the Quang Tri province. In the south of base 604 closer to the border, there was base 611, and from this base the NVA could launch attacks into the city of Hue, Thua thien Province. This operation also carried an important political phenomenon in the so called “Vietnamization-Program,” but in the reality was as a dumping ground for U.S and Soviet cast off out of date weapons. No American infantry soldier landed feet in the land of Laos all American advisors attached to the ARVN units were ordered to stay in land South Vietnam.
The so called a test of Vietnamization? By a secret order from Emperor-1 [Harriman] for several years ago in preplanned schedule agenda. The eastern part of the Laotian panhandle was just reserved to use by 559 Group [Giap’ troop] as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel and materials required to sustain its war efforts in South Vietnam and Cambodia which were untouchable. In addition to the Harriman’s Highway [Ho chi Minh Trail] the eastern panhandle contained many logistic installations and base areas. After the 18 March 1970 change of government in Cambodia which closed the seaport of Sihanoukville to the enemy [PM Lon-Nol changed, renamed Kompong Som Seaport] this trail-base area complex in lower Laos became even more and more important to North Vietnam in its prosecution of the war in the South. The real hub of this entire complex, where transportation and storage activities were coordinated, was Base Area 604 located west of the Demilitarized Zone and surrounding the district town of Tchepone. To disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies into South Vietnam, a ground attack was launched across the Laotian border against this enemy hub of activity on 8 February 1971. But too late due to every huge cargo were already moved to the South recently. Operation Lam Son 719 was conducted by I Corps with substantial U.S. support in firepower and airlift but without the participation of U.S. advisers with those ARVN units fighting in Laos. As a test by a political term such as Vietnamization, this operation was to demonstrate also the progress achieved in combat effectiveness by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, Lam Son 719 achieved the objective of forestalling a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971.
The so called Ho Chi Minh Trail was just Western named it, but Hanoi called Route 559, and I myself, named Harriman’s Highway. Recently, before 1959 that named Truong-Son Route range means West mountainous-chain Route. A byproduct of the French’s First Indochina War, 1946-1954, the footpath system that ran North-South along the Truong Son Mountain Range trail of Vietnam became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail since the Second period of Vietnam-Wars 1954-75. For a long time it had served the strategic purposes of the Viet Minh (Allies Forces) From its jungle redoubt of North Vietnam's highlands, the Viet Minh High Command was faced with the pressing need for a secure communication system that would enable it to direct the war effort in South Vietnam and support its subversive activities in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. National Route-1 which ran parallel to the coastline was not practicable because of French control. Sea routes were available but the risks of running into French naval patrols and foul weather were forbiddingly high. Besides, the Viet Minh did not have a reliable organized sea transportation fleet. Considering these circumstances, the heavily mountainous-jungle of the Truong Son Range lent themselves to the establishment of a secure line of communication generally free from observation and attacks. It was this footpath system that kept the Viet Minh resistance in South Vietnam alive with fresh troops, weapons and ammunition. By the end of the First Indochina War, the Truong-Son Trail had been well developed although it was only a system of jungle paths connected by local secondary roads and suitable only to movement by foot, animals and bicycles. Soldiers moved on foot but military Supplies, although usually carried by manpower, were sometimes transported on bicycles, oxcarts, horses or elephants. The narrow, steep pathways meandered through dense jungles, across streams and mountains and a journey on the trail was exhausting and slow. For a time after the Geneva Accords in 1954, the trail was practically abandoned since the war had ended. Then, when South Vietnam, under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, began restoring its stability and proving that it could stand on its own after repudiating reunification with North Vietnam. Also determined by President Diem’ attempted sent TASK Forces composed Ranger, Airborne, Armor, and engineering … Field-Commander Colonel Do Cao Tri to destroy a certain section of the trail, and now and then stayed in south Laos for couple months, Attopeu Province vicinity - So why President Diem must be murdered by WIB Bones order.

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 12-06-2010, 12:59 PM

Operation Lam-Son 719 (continued)

Unfortunately, by subject to stirring war under pressure of the Axis of Evil’s scam, The KGB oppressed the Central Committee of North Vietnam's Communist Party decided to stir on a new course of action against South Vietnam. Subsequently in May 1959, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) High Command activated Transportation Group 559, assigned Brigadier General Vo-Bam in charge as commander, under the direct control of its Rear Service (Logistics) Department. Group 559 was to be a special unit in charge of moving men and supplies into the South for the support of the insurgency effort which had just been initiated under the form of a "war of liberation." The trail's old pathways were rehabilitated and widened, and new ones were surveyed and projected. Group 559's task of enlarging this strategic axis of infiltration was pushed ahead with vigor and determination. The increase of subversive activities against South Vietnam was in almost direct proportion to the development of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, since the Communist war effort in the South was largely sustained by a constant flow of cadre and troops from the North. At this early stage, the flow was sporadic because the journey was harsh and long for the men and the means of transporting supplies still primitive. But as pathways were eventually enlarged into roads, the means of transportation were also improved. Prior to 1965, the Ho Chi Minh system was close to the Vietnam border, but after the United States became involved in the war and bombings increased, the Communists gradually shifted toward the west where they found the densely jungle areas of lower Laos and eastern Cambodia perfect sanctuaries for the movement or concentration of troops and the storage of weapons and war materials, but it seemed to me, there will a new Inter-Indochinese-Highway for next century – Also in the Harriman’s strategic scope, West Truong Son shall be the IIH [Indochina International Highway] for whether economical or military purpose and B-52 for mountain demolition plus C-123 “hot Tip” air defoliation for route tracking pathfinder, and along corridor scattered plants emit-sensors monitored NVA’ activities. But importantly the NVA troop was the very debut pioneer discovered and building the Route-I.I.H.
Surprisingly, by the end of 1960s, the Harriman Highway had become an elaborate system of nearly 2,000 miles of pathways and roads, including some natural waterway. It started at Vinh Province ran through the Mu-Gia Pass and other lesser passes such as Ban Karai Pass and Ban Raving Pass, penetrated into lower Laos and finally came out in northern Cambodia and the Tri-Border area of South Vietnam. In several areas, the trail system was so extensive that it could be compared to a cobweb of crisscrossing roads making up a corridor of from 20 to 40 miles wide, complete with rock-stone-bridges (over or under water photos by my Queen-Bee H-34) culverts, river crossing ramps, much of it concealed under dense jungle canopies. With the assistance of Pathet Lao guerrillas, the estimated 50,000 troops of NVA Group 559 and about 100,000 porters Vietnamese volunteers and forced laborers maintained these vital-arteries. To protect the corridor, the Communists established an elaborate defense and security system. The duty of Pathet Lao units was to intensify guerrilla activities and launch periodic attacks in order to keep the Royal Lao Army confined to the cities and towns along the Mekong River. The protection of the trail system and storage areas was performed by Group 559 itself. Augmented by infantry units and unattached militiamen, the group defense forces included AAA: [anti-aircraft artillery, the most’ cast off WW-II of Soviet weapons] units armed with all types of light and heavy weapons, from 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm and 23-mm heavy machineguns to 37-mm, 57-mm and 85 or 100-mm anti-aircraft cannons. Group 559 installed a forward headquarters in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam from where it controlled many 'binh trams' (literally troop Camp-stations) In 1970 there were about 40 such camp-stations, from Vinh Province to the Cambodian border, under the control of a number of intermediary headquarters. Each binh-tram was a self contained, logistical complex. During the cessation of bombings in North Vietnam, trucks moved by convoy from Vinh Province down the trail. Upon reaching the Laotian border, they formed units of five to eight vehicles and usually moved only at night in keeping under umbrella ROE stipulation of Axe of Evil’s craps or in foul weather in order to avoid the round the clock bombing by United States Air Force planes [US Pilots had no equipped with laser targeting pods or Smart bombs or night vision goggles] As a result, “Binh trams” were usually separated from one another by a day's journey and their parking areas were scattered and well concealed. [However, General Haig in Pentagon War-Room with sophisticated radar which could monitor-control in follow-up all those activities on Trail with synchronized help of sensors on spot] The vehicles moving on the trail only transported supplies and heavy materials. Light equipment was either carried on men's backs or by animals. Since troops had to march, they moved by day or night, using pathways different from those used by trucks. New recruits or replacements usually entered the system at Vinh Province in North Vietnam and often marched over 100 days to reach their final destination in South Vietnam. In view of this long journey, they had to rest and recuperate at way stations where they received food, medicine and indoctrinations. Combat units usually moved by battalions of 500- 600 men each and they often suffered substantial losses from disease and constant bombings by the U.S. Air Force.
Because the War-Architect Harriman who protected this Route 559 at any price During the period from 1960 to 1965 [Certainly, Operation Lam Son 719 never took place as from 1960-65] while the fighting escalated, the South Vietnam was unable to do anything against the Laos infiltration Route because Harriman. However another hand, the U.S Permanent Government would like a big occasion for training the U.S combat troops, with strategic-slogan to the so called “Everything worked but not worked enough.” Thereby made a significant contribution in 1961 when it helped organize the highlands Montagnards into combat units call-sign ‘CIDG’ and develop the Vietnamese Special Forces for the defense of the border areas [just for the craps to US combat training] The so called against Communist activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail [Harriman Highway] however, neither the U.S Army Special Forces nor their Vietnamese counterparts ever interdicted the Communist logistics system to a significant degree, even during the period of maximum effort. Also, the idea of building the “McNamara Line” with scattered sensors across the Harriman Highway corridor mountain range at the Southern boundary of the DMZ was never fully implemented as planned. The surveillance and interdiction of the trail, therefore, lay primarily in the hands of the U.S. Air Force whose reconnaissance planes covered the trail system around the clock by U-2, RF-101 Woodo and our helicopter H-34s Queen-Bee as well. Ground electronic sensors drop-planted along jungle pathways, river crossings, and mountain passes picked up vehicle and other man made noises, transmitted them to over flying planes which relayed the information to terminal stations to be analyzed and interpreted. The electronic monitoring of enemy activities on the trail system helped record the number of vehicles and men moving along the trail. Consequently, intelligence on Communist infiltration was remarkably reliable. In addition to surveillance, a major task for the United States Air Force was training exercise to interdict this infiltration. All types of aircraft were used including B-52 strategic bombers, sophisticated fighter-bombers and several types of EC-130B gun-ships. The U.S. Air Force claimed that its bombs and improved weapons systems inflicted heavy losses to the enemy in terms of personnel, vehicles and materiel moving down there? But in reality, it seemed to me that B-52 was on job mountainous demolition in “Rolling Thunder campaign” no kill, but created many ponds for NVA troops having swimming pool and laundry. And Air defoliation from C-123 “Hot Tip campaign” for ground pioneers build-road follow up tracking brownish clover path to the south.
At the beginning of 1970, the enemy's plan to rehabilitate Route 1036 was suspended for some time due to extensive United States bombing along the Laotian border. Nevertheless, he succeeded in opening Route 1039 through the Ban Raving Pass which connected with Route 913. This gave the enemy an additional route into Tchepone, the communications center for base area 604. In the meantime, Route 1032A in North Vietnam allowed NVA to move his trucks to the western edge of the DMZ. Here his supplies were usually floated on the Houay Nam Xepon River and then on the Xe Bang Hiang River southwesterly toward Tchepone where they were picked up before reaching the town. To the south, the enemy had already completed Route 616 which cut across the Xepon River and deep into South Vietnam. The existence of this east-west infiltration route was detected for the first time on 1 January 1970 but subsequent surveillance indicated that enemy activities on it were light. The heaviest traffic was always reported on the North-South axis, moving from base area 604 on Routes 96, 926 and 914 toward base area 611 to border. This appeared to indicate that the enemy wanted to project another infiltration route into the Khe Sanh area, west of Quang Tri but subsequent air reconnaissance showed that the enemy was using Route 616 for truck traffic and his activities were increasing substantially south of base area 611. Air reconnaissance and agent reports further confirmed the enemy's stepped up logistical activities and augmentation of combat forces at base areas 604 and 611 since the beginning of the lower Laos dry season. In October, 1970, an agent report revealed that a division size unit, approximately 10,000 strong, was leaving the Mu Gia Pass and moving south. It was believed at that time that this was the 320th NVA Division [Steel Division] with its three organic regiments, the 48th, 52nd, and 64th. Subsequent intelligence reports confirmed that the 52nd Regiment was located west of the DMZ and the 64th Regiment was building roads in Quang Binh Province, north of the DMZ. It was, therefore, probable that the 48th Regiment was the unit which was moving into base area 604. Other word, 320th NVA Division inaugurated a scheme for W. A Harriman Highway from the start
In the meantime operation Lam Son 719 preplanning, by January 1971, Route 1032A had been connected with Route 1032B which gave the enemy an additional roadway into lower Laos from North Vietnam; Recordings made by electronic sensors indicated that of every four trucks leaving North Vietnam, one always moved on this route regardless of the bombings by United States planes west of the DMZ. Aerial photos also revealed that the enemy had built several alternate bypass routes in this area in order to avoid concentrated bombings and ensure the flow of traffic. Reconnaissance planes further reported that East-West Route 925 had been widened but terminated approximately two and a half miles from the South Vietnam border. This appeared to indicate that the Hanoi wanted to project another infiltration route into the Khe Sanh area, west of Quang Tri but subsequent air reconnaissance showed that the NVA was using Route 616 for truck traffic and his activities were increasing substantially south of base area 611. All of these indications clearly confirmed the Hanoi's efforts to open additional infiltration roads, develop storage areas, load and unload transferred points and truck parks, and to make the entire area just west of Quang Tri Province an intricate logistical and transportation complex complete with POL pipelines and bypass roads. Furthermore, all these activities progressed with little interruption despite continuous bombings. The efforts were most conspicuous in base areas 604 and 611. On the other hand, to increase his protection capabilities, the NVA also moved additional anti-aircraft artillery and combat units into these areas. To the west beyond the Laotian border, the terrain was predominantly mountainous. The area of operation on this side of the border was characterized by three prominent features. The first of these was the Xepon River which ran south and then parallel to Route-9 until it reached Tchepone where it met the Xe Bang Hiang River, the primary North-South waterway in the area. During the rainy season, when most ground lines of communication were inundated, the enemy used the Xe Biang Hiang River to float supplies downstream. The second prominent terrain feature was the Mt Co Roc Highland adjacent to the Laotian border and just south of Route-9. This highland had several peaks with elevations ranging from 500 to 850 meters which dominated Route-9 to the east and west. It also provided excellent observation into the Khe Sanh area. The foliaged-vegetation in the Co Roc area consisted primarily of bamboo and brushwood, offering adequate cover and concealment. The third significant terrain feature was a high escarpment whose ridgeline extended all the way to Tchepone, parallel to and south of Route-9 and the Xepon River. Several peaks of this ridgeline were 600 to 700 meters high and offered excellent observation over Route-9 and the Tchepone are so much of the area was covered by dense jungle and thick brushwood except for a few places which had been cleared for farming. The terrain north of Route-9 was hilly and heavily vegetated against a backdrop of relatively high peaks which restricted operations in this area almost entirely to infantry. Around Tchepone, the terrain was much lower, sparsely vegetated and more appropriate for armor vehicles. Route-9 from Khe Sanh to Tchepone was a one lane, unevenly surfaced dirt road with destroyed bridges and culverts. Dominated by the high escarpment to the south, this road was easily interdicted. It also was difficult to prepare bypasses due to the river to the south and the hilly terrain to the north. In addition to Route-9 which was an old public road, the enemy had completed in the area west of the Laotian border an extensive, crisscrossing system of lines of communication. Most important of these was Route 1032 which connected with Route-92 and offered direct access from North Vietnam and the western DMZ area into base area 604, then base area 611, and from there into South Vietnam either by Route 92 or Route 616 or Route 922 further to the south, another route, designated area. Route 1039, also originating in North Vietnam passed through the Ban Raving Pass and offered access into Tchepone and base area 604 then connected with either Route 29 to go further south or with Route 914 which led into base area 611 and from there into South Vietnam. All these routes were well maintained two lane roads practicable for large trucks at least during the dry season. Due to extensive bombings, the enemy had built several alternate routes which were well concealed by vegetation and often under double and triple canopies. In addition to main routes, the enemy also built narrow pathways crisscrossing the entire area. These were difficult to observe from the air and were convenient for concealing troop movements and truck rest-areas in daytime break.

**vinhtruong** · 12-09-2010, 01:10 PM

Operation lam son 719

Now weather forecast for Operation Lam Son 719 started on February 1971 in the Tchepone area was the transitional period from the northeast to the southwest monsoons. The northeast monsoon, which brought rains and cloudiness to Central Vietnam above the Hai Van Pass from October to March, was the dominant weather factor. The Truong Son mountain range deflected much of this wet weather on the Laotian side but in the area of operation, the skies were generally covered. The amount of Cumulus-clouds buildup in this area depended on the strength and depth of the monsoon. Average temperature during February was 22C in the lowlands and about 18C in mountainous regions.
As of mid March, 1971 the southwest monsoon gradually picked up, resulting in a relative improvement of the weather and higher ceilings. The average temperature was warmer than in February but this was a period of showers during which the skies were temporarily covered. Beginning in May, however, rainfall became heavier over the Truong Son Range while in the eastern lowlands, the weather was dry and hot.
In general, during these periods considered for the operation, the weather was fairly good but quite unpredictable. From experience, it was estimated that the area of operations would be cloudy and hazy fog in the morning. The weather was favorable for air operations only from 10:00-12:00 hours until mid afternoon. The 2,500-feet ceiling in the low lands would allow only a 1,000 feet altitude' in the area of operation. This was recognized as a major handicap since all aircraft used in support missions would be located in the lowlands and would have to be flown first to the Khe Sanh airfield. Low ceilings and hazardous mountains would force our VNAF helicopters flying frontline support missions to follow natural avenues of approach such as valleys and rivers which the enemy could interdict with east. This handicap was going to be an important factor affecting the course of combat operations.
Of course, General Haig C&C at Pentagon already knew that all depend on U.S air-mobility-forces, so quite frankly I must say ARVN in the risky status: “Supplies and Medevacs in the mainstay of any operation, the large the operation, the greater demand” In this operation, preparations were relatively adequate, but did not meet the battlefield needs. In the planning, ARVN had absolutely relied upon the air power, namely helicopters from the Army Aviation for support, supplies, medevacs. For such a large-scale operation, it was impossible for supplies and medevacs to be accomplished by helicopters alone, especially in the presence of enemy antiaircraft firepower, from 14, 5 mm to 100 mm AAA. The crude facts of the operation demonstrated this. Once supplies were hampered, the fighting spirit of soldiers was naturally influenced: Lack of ammunition and guns caused the firepower to decrease [the journalist had to know that why written biased reports] Shortage of food and even the most water weakened the troops, the wounded died waiting for medevac. Thus the organization of logistic should be of primary concern, but this is in NSC’ scope, letting ARVN troop under siege to enemy for 67,000 tons shell-bombardment standby on spot. This implied ARVN troops were subjected to repeat the ferocious-artillery-bombardments. This is WIB Bones’ goal-plots purposely.
So why! “I died feeling we could have won that war. I still felt we were on top of it in that year 1970 then lost our nerve” Crucially important differences included wisdom and stability in the ambassadorial post: better field generalship; a more adept national leadership involving [isolated Nixon, has his hands tied, double knotted by Power Act and now Cooper Church amendment] Kissinger, and Helms – even given the vigorous internecine warfare they frequent waged against one another (acted-government contrasted sharply with permanent-government) – compared with LBJ and its WIB’ apparatus as Secretary of Defense McNamara who was a Vietnam War X.O like General Manager of the war, because of the practical costs of McNamara’s failed policies.
Because the Skull and Bones Dynasty was the only one policymaker, thereby a Skull planning session resulted in little agreement on composition of the next redeployment increment. US forces were already so greatly reduced that no one could see how to give up a single additional man. General Abrams listened to the agonized discussion and let his fellow comrade in arms know. “You know, gentlemen,” he begun, “this force withdrawal is not optional. We are going down and we will continue to go down till none of us are left. Now, we are going to do that, just as the Supreme Chief Commander of U.S forces ordered?” I don’t think so it’s the truth. It is almost unthinkable and surely unforgivable that a great nation should leave these helpless allies to the tender mercies of the North Vietnamese, but that is what the Permanent Government did; really they did a terrible thing to the South Vietnamese. Meanwhile from now on the North Vietnamese was receiving unprecedented levels support from its patrons. So, soon or later, South Vietnam was on the brink of collapse [axiom-1]
By way of conclusion, I must state my conviction that the war in Vietnam was a just war fought by the South Vietnamese and their allies for admirable purposes, that those who fought it did so with their mightiest hearts, and that in the process they came very close to succeeding in their purpose of enabling South Vietnam to sustain itself as a free and independent nation. The cause was indeed “noble” American fought it the wrong way under War Industries Board’s Bones masterminded and lost it in good part because of them.
According his Harriman’s stratagem, Vietnam War is a big military training strategy never had in the US history by a cunning stratagem “Everything worked but nothing worked enough” This signifies a sacrifice of casualties of personal and material for his scam. [Numerous of POW, aircraft crashed sacrificed their lives for WIB’ selfish interest]

Khe-Sanh in the past was the Huong-Hoa County of Quang Tri province. Because the name of “Harriman Highway” is essential for his stratagem, so US administration persuaded the GVN’ President Diem has to evacuated the tribe-ancient-native to the low land closed the sea-coast, abandoned it with a sheer named Khe Sanh on the map – No more Hương-Hóa County. And USMC had to ground there for familiar with combat training practice on the highland as seemed in the similarity of Dien Bien Phu under siege, but till 1971, operation Lam Son 719 should the damn-real Dien Bien Phu’ under-siege for ARVN troop subjected to repeated horrible artillery bombardments. Another word there’s main cause of “axiom-1” for donating Saigon to Hanoi not like a ‘Pebbly-City’. So you will see the cruel-battle happened at target 604.
Late General Vo-Nguyen Giap [engaged OSS 1945] plotted first against the French in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu and then against the Americans in the Tet Offensive of 1968. At Khe sanh in 1967, Giap commenced a siege of the US troops’ far western support base at Khe Sanh. He massed 4 infantry-divisions supported by 2 Armor and Artillery regiments at the heretofore largely unknown complex at the opposite end of Route 9, the farthest compound away from most US or ARVN troops principal enclaves. Giap purposefully made the presence of the more than 40,000 NVA troops highly visible to ARVN and US intelligence gatherers. North Vietnamese Army’ masterminded Headquarter immediately drew the attention of General Westmoreland, who had, a few months earlier, began development of the primitive Khe Sanh Outpost into a materiel support base for his proposed operations in Laos which was hated like poison in Harriman’ scope [don’t touch Ho Chi Minh Trail been building, Harriman don’t want Westmoreland destroy all cargo there though this time is best right time and right place you should noticed this]
The supreme commander of US forces in Vietnam had deployed a battalion of Marines and a team of US Navy Seabee to develop and defend the base. But for their security, one ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion was good shield outside its fence for their protection. They quickly turned to, bulldozing the ground and installing steel PSP matting for a primitive airfield and laying in stockpiles of ammunition and supplies for the proposed Laos operations? [but too soon that’s never happened right now ever]
Responding to the NVA actions, Operation Niagara in mind Westmoreland who ordered 6,000 additional USMC to distant and tactically unimportant outpost; in concert with the defense of Khe Sanh, Westmoreland also ordered commencement of massive air bombardment of the entire region that encircle the remote enclave, appropriately naming the aerial onslaught.
As the battle raged, President Johnson vowed the United States would not lose Khe Sanh. He said this despite the fact that he had already scrapped Westmoreland’s plan for border-crossing operations into Laos. His decision had thus rendered the Khe Sanh support base tactically useless, but his national security advisor, George Bundy, Skull and Bones 40 had to a real drawback! Westmoreland has his hands tied double knotted the incoming years, but after his be fired emerged “Cooper-Church and Case-Church Amendments in 1970 and 1973,” says that U.S forces must do nothing. No military equipment, no American forces, nada, zip… on stand point command and control, no choice, let him go home, become The Joint Chief of Staff.

Below was Pentagon War Room chart, General Haig, Head of Command and Control for Lam Son 719 operation – President Thieu decided to “Early-Out” sharply against Haig’ strategic-plot when Thieu found out the names all Landing-Zone were named by Hollywood famous movie stars such as that Bones played game: LOLObrigida, SOPHIAloren, LIZ-Taylor, and Bob-HOPE – and his military meditation urged him to reconsider why General Giap’ powerful-forces with couple hundred tanks and fourteen Artilleries Regiments wouldn’t attacked to US Base at Khe Sanh but at Tchepone? Immediately Thieu ordered to General Lam: “Touch down…pissed at there a mess…then goes back home!”
Moreover Thieu recalled last couple month ago, on November 21 1970, a movie star Jane Fonda was involved in the Project Cold-War – a job “political-espionage and counterespionage performer.” With the specific aims, she showed up at Michigan University and strongly stated to about 2,000 students: “If you understood what communism was, you would hope, you would pray on your knees that we would some day become communist!” The Communist doctrine eventually has been forced to modify to comfort in affecting the whole world or self-extinction for good! The United States shall be a real Super Communist adjustment in the coming day! Actually, then the U.S was an eventual Super-Finest-Communist country now in predominantly by totalitarian Skull and Bones pattern regime.
Donald Rumsfeld, Skull and Bones Chief-staff have drawn from fashioned Hollywood in slogan “Just make love, no make war!” at time of “Saigon Fall” was the end for long tragedy: What American actual encountered in Vietnam-War was an army in process of demoralization. After public opinion turned against the war since 1968, the antiwar movement penetrated the U.S army in Vietnam as Permanent Government anticipated their preplanned. All the stereotypical problems of drugs, racial conflict, atrocities, fragging, and insubordination were in evidence and were affecting the morale of the army, and these were, at least as one certain American understood it, related to the fact that, as a consequence of poor leadership, the country no longer supported the war, yet U.S were still being expected to fight it. Generals, political leaders, both-uniformed and civilian, realized the necessity to ‘redeploy’ the army out of Vietnam as rapidly as possible to prevent this spirit of disaffection from spreading to other commands around the world. Meanwhile, the G.I was being asked to take their chance at being the last man to die in Vietnam.
“History must be the final judge of that which US Permanent Government have done or left undone, in World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere… Let us calmly await its verdict!”

Continued

**vinhtruong** · 12-15-2010, 01:55 PM

Operation lam son 719

Thieu more honest, decent man than L.B. Johnson?
Based on above Thieu’ statements, the venal critical journalists on earlier occasions had bias-speculated that comparisons with American leadership of the time might have yielded interesting results. President Nguyen Van Thieu, for example, was arguably a more honest and decent man than Lyndon Johnson, and – given the differences in their respective circumstances – quite likely a more effective president of his country. At the time someone pointed out that Mr. Thieu also probably had more freedom to move about in his own country than hatred LBJ did in his? I’m on the side of US presidents, having full of pity on their curb-deprived decisions by Permanent Government. Here there were exerted some P.G’ unsavory habits, clues-for instants:
In time of President Eisenhower: Permanent Government didn’t want to hear: “We, Americans must heart-fully help to building a strong nationalist political party behind Diem. Now Diem has elected as a President, he ought to have his own party. (Ed. J .Lansdale, “In the mist of War” p, 342) Eisenhower solemn-welcome Diem to visit America in May, 1957 and had called Diem a miracle man of Asia. As for President Kennedy as always back of him until the coup have been underway scrambling as a hot message from Mc George Bundy to Cabot Lodge October 30, 1963 “We do not accept as a basic for US policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup….” And during World tour of Vice President, May 1961, had given Diem his boost in calling Diem a “Winston Churchill of Asia” In Johnson administrative, In March 1964, at the urging of the Joint Chiefs, McNamara requested authorization for “hot pursuit [by] only South Vietnamese forces over the Laotian line for border control” This was contentious for A Harriman of course due to military leadership SOP, but it was increasingly doubtful that he could prevent a change in U.S policy. Indeed you know…Who was U.S policymaker? Was LBJ a Big WIB’ drawback!? Though in this month March/1964, Harriman wasn’t close to Johnson right after Kennedy assassination, he was given charge of African affairs at the Department of State for out of his sight. [I seek to justify in Chapter 9 in Skull and Bones “revenge meditation” – Johnson killed Kennedy? – At Paris on Monday, October, 27, 2,003 on channel Canal: “JFK, autopsie d’un complot” by Bernard Nicolas and William Reymond, and a Flammarion book “JFK, le dernier témoin.” All reports were full of lies and prevarications. But I thought Bones lies only when they felt they had to] President Nixon, in writing of 1963 Coup which made Diem and his brother murdered quote: “1963 crisis that made us disgusting” That apparently was a disgraced US historically in front of its allies. Have pity on the unelected President of the United States and watch Saigon collapse, President Ford confessed: “It looked like we just quit and run. Yet I did all that I could for them!” because he was acting president.

Pragmatically in ‘Standard Operation Procedure’ Once the joint Chiefs Staff was building a case for “crossing fence” the McNamara and Mc George Bundy, the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, found convincing. Still, Harriman had to be dealt with, as Forrestal told Bundy in April. LBJ had been coaxed into supporting “hot pursuit,” and Bundy was felt logically about to send a telegram to Saigon authorizing it, Michael Forrestal of the National Security Council staff cautioned Bundy that “to send the telegram without Averell’s approval is just asking for trouble,” The telegram had already received presidential approval, but that was not enough. It still required an endorsement from A Harriman. Moreover Forrestal had learned from Sullivan that Harriman was placated and reluctantly agreed to “hot pursuit” in destroying his commencement build up his project super-highway but [due too soon, not right time and right place] he named that Ho Chi Minh Trail (meanwhile Hanoi named Route 559) And unsurprisingly why President Thieu was out of vulnerable, unharmed still in good shape … luckily because Harriman and George H.W Bush need the non chaotic, political stability for US forces progressively withdrawal safety.
So why throughout this operation deficiencies at high command levels continued to undermine the abilities and performance of South Vietnam’s troops. Consequently even General Abrams was a famous better war, but I must say with a nearly insuperable array of new challenges because he didn’t know the operation objective. For the first time he and his staff were working from a field command post distant from home country. Naturally they did not understand So, I must draw in conclusion “truly grasped the responsibilities inherent in attachment, the differences between a zone of action and an axis of advance, or the full meaning of the word ‘secure’

OPERATION LAM SON 719
Preliminary: On the inauguration day, President Barrack-Obama stated a composed speech 2406 words separated 34 paragraph-sections dealing with two Vietnamese words KHE –SANH, some wise folks said the special psychological outpost faraway from US. The Khe-Sanh engraved in US military history, map for Operation Lam-Son 719; “Historical Atlas of the Vietnam-War, by Harry Summers Jr. Khe-Sanh which emerged in 3 periods: (1) the WIB-Bones forced the 1st Republic South Vietnam must evacuated all native people to the lowland, abandoned the highland Hương-Hóa County, for commencing build up the Harriman’s highway [Western: Ho Chi Minh Trail; North Vietnam: Route 559] parallel with it was POL which Russia should be take care about pipeline communicated maintenance. So (1) the Hương Hóa disappeared in Vietnam map (2) The supposition of US Marine in the trial-siege of Ðien Bien Phu? (3) But the ARVN must be subjected to a real Ðien Bien Phu’ under siege over 67.000 tons artillery-shells blood-shed in repeated showers; The ARVN troop continued to thrust into Laotian territories supposedly occupied by Pathet Lao, but in reality all was where the NVA had their strongholds and logistical bases. We didn’t know at all but Harriman knew it very well as 1962 our Queen-Bee H-34 dropped a STRATA team for detecting the presentation of 759 Group [stand for Pathet Lao] but only NVA troop stayed there [That’s in the Harriman’s objective scope] The city of Tchepone to Attopeu had been severely destroyed during the war between The National Laos and Pathet Laos, and was further reduced to rumble by American bombardments aimed at reducing enemy activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Their tactics were flexible, changing as necessary to suit the environment, rather than conform to set positions. However, the information gathered was still very indefinite. So this Operation was named Lam Son 719 [by CIA experts composer] because in took place in the year 71, around the region of Route 9 which connected Khe Sanh to Tchepone.
In the preferences of ANSWERS.COM, W.A Harriman, from page 1 to page 3 which composed 4 books involving Vietnam War: (1) authors Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (1986) (2) Author George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia 1941-1946 (1973); (3) Two books same author William A Harriman, Peace with Russia (1959) and America and Russia in a Changing World (1971) Typically, these years coincided with the Axis of Evil such as Hanoi inaugurated Group 559, 759, and 959 (first digit means month, last two digit means years. And US first two digit means year and last means location) Operation Lam Son took place on year one thousand 71 at Route-9. Decided solution on January, 18/1971 for terminating war-game CIP/NLF [National Liberation Front/Counter Insurgency Plan] these three digit number for easier reference in US and Russia documental-archives
Even as the cumulative effect of the “clear and hold” tactical approach was reaching a peak. Congress proceeded to snatch defeat from the jaw of victory. Significantly, the “Cooper-Church” amendment influences were at work. The first volley in Congress came in 1970 when Idaho Democrat Senator Frank F. Church and Kentucky Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper authorized a bill that cut off funding of all military activity in Southeast Asia – shutting off air and ground combat support; that would eventually undermine much of what had been accomplished. In the Washington, this was “keyed time” for Permanent Government did the best influence that included further erosion of political support for the war, growing budgetary pressures on support for the US combat forces still in Indochina and for the South Vietnam alike, and the influence of both on the pace of safety withdrawal. Clearly on the time would come, and sooner rather than later, when all US ground forces no longer play any significant part in prosecution of the war according of Permanent Government strategy on “axiom 3” that all US universities as the basis for already explained the war in the beginning of the war 1960 [the US could not have won that war under any circumstances] When the Hanoi troops was in its weakest condition in over six years.
So why throughout of the earlier years of United States involvement in South Vietnam by seeking caused the so called “The Tonkin Gulf Incident” – officially created a formal legalized retaliation for US combat troop invasion; although Cambodia proclaimed a nonbelligerent, neutral status, it actually supported the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces by providing them refuge, primary in the Parrot’s Peak region along the Mekong River, hardly more than fifty kilometers west of Saigon. In this so called neutral territory, Communist forces successfully escaped American and South Vietnamese force pursuit (thank to CIA, counterespionage branch ‘warning’…I died feeling in my view of bird-conviction that Vietnam War was “an social scientists war” initiated by 1st emperor, A. Harriman of the Skull and Bones dynasty, and 2nd emperor George H W Bush was for “an intelligence war”) and rested and recuperated between commitments to combat operations. In that territory-haven in Cambodia, they also stashed large caches of weapons and supplies ferried over the notorious “Harriman Highway” [Ho Chi Minh trail] which crossed through Cambodia at several points in northeastern, existing into the Mekong region and the Central Highlands.
At year-1970s end, the application use of those forces still in Vietnam was further curtailed by what was known as the ‘Cooper-Church amendment’ to the defense appropriation bill, a very measure denying funds for US combat force operations in Cambodia and Laos. This left the Hanoi’s troop sanctuaries and lines of communication once again safe from US interference (the craps CIP and NLF applied in action by ROE) this ‘keyed-up-time’ before Congressional action was subjected to under pressure by Permanent Government. Meanwhile, the Hanoi was contemplating his next round of dry season operations.

I foresaw and believe that the South Vietnam was on “the brink of total military defeat”
From now on, Congress will seeking has dramatically cut aid to Saigon government, going against a long-standing commitment. As a result, my nation future falters because of a grievous lack of spare parts and replacement equipment. Meanwhile North Vietnam was receiving unprecedented levels of support from its patrons. Adversely, it is almost unthinkable and surely unforgivable that a great United States should leave these helpless allies to the tender mercies of the Communist North Vietnam but that is U.S Permanent Government did! Because the reduction to almost ‘below Zero’: Some Navy, A-4 Skyhaws few time, the so called faulted in mistake struck on POL dump located in the air bases, for reducing our ARVN’ operational activities and against under “Project Enhance,” a program to replace the heavy losses of war. The United States would replace on a one-for-one basis major combat system as was permitted by the Paris Accords of U.S support was the cause of final collapse. So why in the past, flatly President Diem did have to turn down U.S military involvement, he knew U.S will done a terrible thing [Axis of Evil’s scam] to his country in the future. The center of gravity was the people…and that winning hearts and minds was not just a slogan for pacification through by “the Rural Revolutionary Development Hamlet Program”
By way of conclusion, I will justified, stated in this book my certain conviction that the Vietnam War was a just war fought by the South Vietnamese and their allies for admirable purposes, that those who fought it did so with their mightiest hearts, and that in the process they came very close to succeeding in their purpose of enabling South Vietnam to sustain itself as a free and independent nation. Because the Eurasian Great Game stratagem, thereby after fifteen years, American have been encouraging the people of South Vietnam to self-defend against what American conceive to be an external danger, “Red-Menace” Now American stand on the brink of betraying that trust because WIB Bones.

Skull and Bones strategist staff: The basic foundation-method “Everything worked, but nothing worked enough for the goal of protracting the war.” That was one thing. But there was something else, much more extensive and perhaps more risky, on the minds of Washington [WSAG] planners – a thrust into Laos to the so called interrupt the Hanoi’s buildup of supplies and perhaps preempt is planned offensive. Much earlier in the war, when General Westmoreland still had an abundance of US combat troops and firepower, he had looked hungrily at the enemy’s cross-border base camps [binh-tram] – fighting over the goddamn caches. That would be the climax of the interdiction. But the State Department was closing ranks: A. Harriman emphasized that “favored sending non-US-patrols into Laos to try find out the size of Hanoi’ the military buildup.” Harriman also stood firmly against US advisers taking part in these patrols, even Vietnamese Ranger-task forces and that was a clever diversion-scam?
In the United States during almost nine decades (1917-to July 7/2003 Skull and Bones Graveyard see in Chapter-9) an emerged totalitarian Skull and Bones dynasty has severely restricted, stripped away most foreign policies of the acted governments. The US parliament of National assembly which is defined as the highest power of the nation, but it seemed to me like its power in hands of the two emperors: A. Harriman stands for 1917-1960 and overlapped in transition to an apprentice George H.W Bush to 1969. That year end 1969, Harriman and Johnson got out from political platform. [Johnson raised his hope too high pried off the Skull and Bones out of the unsavory totalitarian Permanent-Government accounting on to prosecute a claim for “The Trading with the-Enemy Act” of December 1941 as Union Banking Corporation which was closed in 1943 by the U.S Government for Trading with the Enemy, now at first in focusing on Zapata Offshore seized the alien property custodian assets; but his disappointed frustration was right after Robert Kennedy fell to an assassin’s bullet in 1968; whereas A Harriman due to LB Johnson’s confession in the assassination of President Diem could indicate some complicity on Harriman’s part [p.2, 3. http://www.ans-wers.com/topic/w-averell-harriman- page 4] this implication for Kennedy assassination’s by the Bones-men among the WIB (War Industries Board) members. Eventually, these Bones learning how to manipulate a plot for the future to LB Johnson “meditate-revenge”
Much earlier in the war to the resulted in the “neutralization” of Laos in Geneva on July 23, 1962, as a spy pilot I must fly across border to Laos with my camouflage painted helicopter H.34, no call-sign, no tail flag, unmarked, no serial number, unknown country (photo on the book-cover) I’m not permitted wore VNAF flying suit, but instead of black peasant garb, no US weapon even cigarette US made, no identification papers. Our crewmembers equipped with Swedish K submachine guns and Belgian-made Browning 9mm pistol, and a tiny pistol 6, 35.mm, all of which, of course, had been acquired clandestinely so a serial-number check would lead nowhere, and a unmarked SOG knife, an untraceable 6-inch-bladed weapon, designed on Okinawa by manufactured clandestinely in Japan. And the most importance in case if our helicopters would be in the status emergency forced landing, they must be destroyed at once by five pounds TNT, C-4 ignited in exploded, it located in the aircraft radio compartment.
That time cross-border operation were strictly limited to those “areas in Laos, between Route 9 and the 17 parallel DMZ [Provisional Military Demarcation Line] adjacent to the border, and the area east of Tchepone” That was a relatively small debut-part of the Harriman highway [Ho Chi Minh trail] but considered the critical entry point to South Vietnam, and as a spy-pilot I dared say, “That will be becoming an open-dumpster-area for US and Soviet Union of the wasted out of all out of date weapons and war-materiel in the future incoming year. It clear that the State Department, A Harriman, as number ‘three-position’, a founder of Skull and Bones, was still in the scam; He stood firmly against the Vietnamese recon-men and flight crewmembers that crossed the border were “not to wear GVN or others uniforms,” and we could engage the enemy only in just for the “self-defense.” Who was U.S policymaker?
Now, that was in the spring of 1971, eight years earlier, and a lot had changed since then. Actually “Cooper-Church” leashed the US ground forces that had in any case been drawn down by more than 200,000, and all the emphasis was on passing the burden of the war to the South Vietnamese soldiers. And now there was contemplated a corps-level cross-border operation conducted without accompanying US ground forces or advisors, along a single, poorly maintained route dominated by virtually impassable high ground on one the north-flank and a Xe pon’ River on the other, into long-established enemy base areas and without tactical surprise. It looked from the outset like a high-risk operation, not the kind of thing a soldier with the experience, tactical acumen, and terrain sense of an objective-observer would advocate. Thus a question should arise as to the origins of the plan for the raid into Laos.

(continued)

**vinhtruong** · 12-17-2010, 07:47 PM

Operation lam son 719

A year earlier 1970, since then South Vietnamese corps-level operation had been conducted in Cambodia, but in cooperation with accompanying US forces, US advisors, and of course US artillery and air power in support. That operation and simultaneous political development in Cambodia resulted in closing the seaport of Sihanoukville to the enemy. This craps was plotting by US counterespionage and Soviet Union warning the Hanoi troop moved to west all the cargo scattered along corridor: Earlier two dry season campaigns, in conclusion that, based on all available intelligence, the enemy had already succeeded in moving only 9,000 short tons of supplies through the Laotian panhandle into South Vietnam and Cambodia, just 15 percent of the 67,000 short tons he had input into the system and only 40 percent as much as the previous year’s throughput. The Permanent Government strategic staffs forced Hanoi to continue a protracted war strategy in the Southern Vietnam. Subsequently, the Hanoi’s forces had, by and large, withdrawn farther west during the allied incursion into Cambodia rather than stay and fight for their base areas and supplies. Two players of CIP and NLF wouldn’t yet to stop the game but protracted it.
With Market Time naval operations very effectively cutting off coastal deliveries as a method of re-supply, [no more supplies from Navy Group 759 to Seaport Sihanoukville] all enemy forces in the South were now dependent on what came down the Ho Chi-Minh trail from the North; the enemy could no longer afford to abandon his Binh-Tram [base areas] without a fight, lest his deployed forces be starved out as a result.
The so called “Vietnamization-Program” stemming from the strategist-staffs planner was implied an amount dispensable out of date war materiel must be inventory; for instant such like more than 7,000 helicopters HU-1 just a huge rubbish-dump on the spot, like forks, dishes, or napkins dispensable in the eve of combat training-picnic. They used literate-fashioned in political word Vietnamization in psychological warfare propaganda reinforced for South Vietnamese Air Force and became the rubbish later due to without spare-parts. But when the Saigon fall, they panic-fled out to emigrate in US theirs will pay-off back by real green dollars, jewel, diamond or transaction credit CD for these bullshit stuffs, cast-off WWII American weapons when they fled in search of a better life.
“When a new endeavor is launched,” we foresaw, “something has to give.” With US combat troops withdrawals continuing, and US support capability diminishing accordingly, there were not enough resources to go around.
The single Hanoi troops’ dependence on the logistic corridor through the Laos panhandle presents South Vietnam with an unprecedented challenge. There is little doubt, as to the damage which could be dealt to Hanoi’s aspiration by effectively blocking or even significantly hindering the southward movement of men and materiel. All were important, but the logistics-war of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, [COSVN] concluded MACV’ analysts “now stand as the critical conflict for the Viet Cong and North communist troops.” Every other supply route had been cut off, and the pacification process was reducing enemy ability to obtain supplies in Southern Vietnam. Thus the enemy must perforce expand and extend the Ho Chi Minh Trail if he was to support and sustain operations in northeast Cambodia. The target for ARVN operations was clear.
Yes, it must be a coincidence; it has to be a coincidence. It is fair to say that after the consequent effect of the “Cooper-Church” amendment, now increasingly threatening North Vietnamese air defenses brought the complex of “Rules Of Engagement”-(ROE) into even greater prominence. These prescriptions, or more often restrictions, governed where and under what circumstances aircraft could retaliate, what forces could be employed in the DMZ and for what purposes, and a range of other situations. Ridiculously, One bitter but insightful joke of the day was that the reason why the Air Force and Navy used two-seat fighter plane was so one man could fly and the other could read him the ROE strictly controlled by General Alexander Haig in the Washington, [Permanent Government Bones or George H.W Bush or Donald Rumsfeld WSAG’ Chief staff] On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the small group of young officers working under general Haig, maybe including Lieutenant anti-war movement John F Kerry; this part of Kissinger’s National Security Council staff, seems the likely source. Certainly Haig himself was the principal author, a prospect congruent with his later involvement in and reaction to the operation such as an invaded operation to northeast Cambodia recently.
General George Brown, noting that the ROE permitted his air crews to strike enemy installations from which they had taken fire. “We can always entice them into shooting at us” Brown affirmed. Sometimes, though, that proved too dangerous a tactic. Haig’ instructions were issued prohibiting operations within the SAM envelope. Unfortunately that action also ruled out strikes against the best interdiction point on Route 7, supplying route to the south.
When this was briefed to General Abrams, he reacted heatedly “The Air Force does not have the authority to attack that site, even when it’s fired at, right?” Abrams asked Brown.
“No, sir, we can’t attack that,” Brown confirmed.
“Under those circumstances,” said Abrams, “I just don’t see how you can call on people to go up there to work!”
That’s the whole points in this thing, the lack of authority to attack that damn site, or any other site up there in that area that opens up on you. Of course, we’re tried to get the authority, and I’ll be goddamned if I understand why we can’t, because the photo recon guys that go in North Vietnam – they can attack anybody that shoots at them from North Vietnam. Referring acidly to comment, all this crap about US flight personnel can take whatever action’s required to protect their crew, protective reaction – all kind of great patriotic speeches have been made about that! And if the principle of retaliation doesn’t apply in North Vietnam, the flight crewmembers will be damned. This is very difficult to understand. Controversy over the ROE and the application of those rules would continue throughout the remaining years of the war.
Permanent Government unleashed the scattering of the Hanoi’s troop’s logistical traffic along “Harriman Highway” corridor, the interdiction tactics of the past no longer seemed sufficient due to strategy “everything worked but nothing worked enough”– infeasible. As on an altitude view of bird by helicopter treetop snapshot, I should say: “The dispersal factor has been accomplished fantastic-beautifully,” and “Hanoi’s trucks move at night, they move to one place, stay and hide, unload, pick up another truck and move on down south, hiding below the thick canopy, so it’s just an extremely difficult problem. Obviously, their cargos were not ever subjected to horrible destroyed because the axe of evil warned them beforehand what, where, and when SAC will be B-52s carpet-struck. (MR. Ho-Si-Hai, NVA truck-driver diaries tell us much about southward infiltration. He has been ordered to drive at night with low beam and sleep at daytime for rest and relaxation. These order-regulations keep them safely in network)

One year earlier [spring 1970] there was also emphasized the importance of Highway Harriman, [Ho Chi Minh trail] the utmost Laotian corridor: the supplies stored by the various troop supply cargo-stations of Group 559 in the campaign’s area of operations had risen to 6,000 tons, which together with the High Command’s cargo-supply reserves was sufficient to support between 50,000 and 60,000 troops in combat for four or five months. In addition, more than 30,000 tons of supplies were stored in Group 559’s warehouses along the strategic transportation corridor – the most recent-cargo was already out of risk in the operational area, recently moving to farther south.
However the Haig’ war-room in Washington had not lost track of the importance of that lifeline by sophisticated sensors from satellite. When a truthfulness of George H W Bush as Director of Central Intelligence as Richard Helm visited Vietnam; Seven Air Force commander General Lucius Clay described his job of the moment as carrying out instructions given him by General Abrams but of course having some restrictions secretly notified in ROE stipulations.
For escaping from the Strategic Air Command bombardments, pretty soon the trail began to dry out and NVA’ logistics offensive moved into high gear by urging as fast as they can run away the striking area. Shortly before Operation Lam Son 719 started, Seven Air Force was devoting 89 percent of B.52 strikes to the so-called anti-infiltration boxes but too late and achieving record truck kills, just merely trucks were grounded by broken down in the parking lot, and the substantial numbers still got through. The targets always depended on CIA, Ted Shackley Station chief at Saigon decision. “So! But goddamn it” – either they’ve got enough that are well or something. But they seem to be able to work on the road, keep the Molotova-Trucks going, still fire the antiaircraft, still move the supplies and unload and load it, backpack it, and all that. So we should say they’re right on schedule…and we don’t think it means that somehow they’re going to screw it up!” They are motivated to seize South Vietnam by power according to ‘axiom-1’.
Before Lam Son 719 commenced, as the raid into Laos loomed, in Paris on 21 January 1971, the 100th session of the sterile peace negotiations was held, a meeting described as “devoted largely to reviews of known position”. Meanwhile drawdown of US combat troops continued unabated, 60,000 more departing during January-April 1971, then operation Lam Son 719. Strategically, President Thieu accounts on “a thrust into Laos, a safe for U.S troops withdrawn.” All US troops have got to be pulling in the same direction, and all together. We’d counseled “That’s always a neat trick to do under the most ideal circumstances. American is all different. They’re individualists and enthusiasts, optimist and pessimist, then a slight sprinkling of just screw-ups!”
Kissinger asked CIA, Ted Shackley to prepare a close hold estimate of probable enemy reaction to a large-scale South Vietnamese raid into the Tchepone area of Laos that would be backed by US air support but no US ground force involvement, the assessment, wrote Bruce Palmer, “was remarkably accurate with respect to the nature, pattern, and all-out intensity of the NVA reaction to Lam Son 719”
On 26 January the text of an intercepted NVA message was forwarded to McCain and Abrams. “It has been determined that the enemy [South Vietnam and US combat forces] may strike into our cargo carrier system in order to cut it off,” the document read “Prepare to mobilize and strike the enemy hard. Be vigilant!”
On 29 January, the NVA has detected indication of an imminent major operation in northern South Vietnam below DMZ. They recognize the possibility of a cross-border operation into Tchepone and the decisive effects such an attack could have on their 1970-1971, crash logistics program, as well as on their objectives in South Vietnam and Cambodia. But there was also a substantial element of enemy uncertainly as to just what the US and ARVN troops were going to do. Objective-observer noted concern about an invasion by sea, invasion by air from the aircraft carriers offshore, and so on. “There is waiting to figure out what’s going on”. In conclusion, subsequent intercepts indicated “a high state of alert in the southern provinces of North Vietnam” with one provincial unit reporting that “extensive preparations were being made against anticipated US and ARVN troop attacks in North Vietnam.

Operation Lam Son 719
In this traditional Lunar new-year, I have a special favor from my high commander unleashed me to joint celebrated holiday in Saigon even the immensity of the war at that time was too much for me to leave my 213th squadron. I’m enormously impressed by this excited traditional happiness with my family – In my ears frequently the short-lasting sound fire-crackers were exploded with a loud cracking noise that my children cried out overjoyed to see their exploded into laughter.
At the evening 5 February 1971, an airman of my 1st Air Division showed up given to me a message that my 51st Wing commander urged me to break off a Tet holiday leave at the highest point of family-happiness and return back to my squadron on the earlier flight to Danang air-base as soon as I can. My daughter had heard the reports on television about soldiers dying in this war, so she knew how dangerous, it was twelve, old enough to realize that I could be killed. When I got my orders to go, I remember that my wife seemed very subdued, and we didn’t say much about it to. In the pagoda hear mass, my daughter cried calmly through the entire service. In the early morning, I embraced my children before leaving because I had to use the farewell scenes since my long event marriage period. They observed me as a hero: strong, calm, always in charge in my own quiet way. They were worried they would never see me again. It is not easy to be the wife of a helicopter pilot in the war time.
When a woman falls in love with a spy-pilot or Project Delta pilot, she knows she’s in for a roller-coaster ride. Marry an Airborne, Marine, Ranger or any member of Special Forces and you can forget about counting on celebrating birthdays, holidays, or anniversaries together. Your mother might pass away and he won’t make the funeral. His mother might die, and you will have to watch him kneel at her graveside, stricken with remorse, long after she’s cold.
What the hell of war? I did not believe that the war was at a moral level sufficiently low to require civil resistance. The war, as I understood it then, was not in itself an evil; if there was evil. Our longest-young developed a deep, visceral disgust for war because of our – and our families’ – experiences in it. “All kind of wars were stupid!” That war destroyed our families with a terrifying, shocking and painful experience. The war had simply savaged; it turned the fathers and brothers and sisters upside down and sucked all the oxygen out of their smug and comfortable assumptions. Nowadays, after all that we experienced and lost in that war, we finally understand that there is nothing inevitable about us! Also, I thought it was in how ineptly it was being conducted and in the consequences of this ineptitude.
(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 12-21-2010, 05:25 PM

Operation lam son 719

In the Tet-Offensive, once I had seen my HU1-H crewmembers return from battlefield. Four flight crewmembers, brave-men who had given their courage, their disciplined dedication, their blood to a cause now lost. Their remains had zipped shut in four black-bags filled with too many friends who had given their lives trying to win the Red-menace. I had acquired a sense of civic duty to my country that was not deterred by the vicissitudes of poor leadership. When I looked into myself, I knew that I would remain faithful to a code of personal honor attached to what I understood as the ideals of my country’s form of government rising above the confusions of political and military leadership. This became explicitly clear to me when I was interviewed by allies-officer in my class Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air University Alabama. They asked me “What I thought of the war”, and I recall telling them that I thought it make no sense to me to try to defend South Vietnam so long as the border areas of Cambodia and Laos were conceded to the Hanoi. I had no quarrel with resisting the spread of Red menace, but I could see no strategy being applied that had prospects of success. Nevertheless, I remember telling the allies-officer students that “my patriotism was stronger than my unhappiness about poor US intervention strategic policy!”
When I stepped down from a twice-engine transport C.119, a blue-air-force pick up truck had been waiting for picked me up to 1ts Division War-Room. I zipped up my flying-suit and flight jacket to prevent the chill and influenza when in this season fall to 45 degrees in the still darkness of the night, but this weather was another rough friend and foe in the northern I Corp region, and at the height of the monsoon when fog is heavy but usual patchy. The northeast monsoon blows a light, steady, cold rain its height called the ‘crachin’ (from the French word) for “drizzle”, the rain often lasts two or four days at the time and is frequently accompanied by a blanketing fog that stops close air support and also makes artillery hard to adjust when fog is thick enough. Northern I Corps happens to be place where the northeast monsoon is most intense it is the rainiest place in South Vietnam, the average rainfall for Hue, province is 120 inches compared to 77 inches for Saigon.
I opened a secret envelope that a message is as verbatim order assigned me as a field-chief-commander all VNAF units included two flights, one from Queen-bee 219th Squadron, another belonging King-Star 233rd Squadron and my entire Magic-Club 213th Squadron including 6 HU1-H Gun-ships for special air cover and ground support for Airborne Division. All flight crewmembers now have to standby at the Danang Air-base for in case scrambled over to operational area [Khe Sanh]. But firstly, I must bring my two gun-ships right away to the outpost of Airborne Field Headquarter located on top a mountain right south of DMZ for a short briefing. At 9:00 A.M this morning, where all standby-combat forces were already to scramble.
Particularly, my 213th Squadron was be chosen by General Dong, the Airborne commander as our perfect air ground support for airborne brigade to recent on rubber Chup Plantation in Cambodia last year 1970, as the same way now, General Abrams chosen General Tri with the nick-named Vietnamese Patton to a field commander for operation Lam Son 719. But Tri was killed while his helicopter took off and exploded when operation Lam Son 719 just started.
I prepare to land on a helipad the Camp-J.J.Carroll (named for a Marine captain who died to seize a nearby ridge) Camp Con Thien, and Rockpile, each dominated by one brigade) An airborne major Khoi came and guided me to the briefing room, a big bunker with abundance sand bags staged around.
At 9:00 A.M, at briefing room when I showed up General Du Quoc Dong hand shaken by implication for I should doing the best. He said: “I personally had had cable to President Thieu for your squadron worked with us because your squadron was the elite not only for the Vietnam War but the World War too…as you knew…I put my trust in you whereas US…they’re not deserve to be trusted!”
I wondered that Dong was just notorious a simple combat soldier he hatred politic but now his statement too much political in his hindsight. I took command of this 213th Squadron after graduated to US Air University. In 1970s, I brought one flight detachment to engage Cambodia War as air supply and medical evacuation support to an Airborne Brigade to cover rubber Chup-Plantation. Now this manipulated action exerted by General Lam I Corps commander, thinking first of his Corps own interests, needs, without concern for III Corps in alert; He complaint to President Thieu for his selfish reasons. “Why every Corps having their own-helicopter wing and there was never coming to reinforced us at the usually hot at DMZ not sharing what I Corps has with others” President Thieu responded “All priority for Cambodia War”
On the high relief of Carroll Camp looked down to route 9 reaching to western mountainous area, from this outpost spread along Route 9, which extended across the northern badlands from Dong Ha at the coast to Khe Sanh in the far western mountains, overlooking the Laos border. I found out a long like snack convoy of trucks heading to Khe Sanh maybe for this operation. Whereas to eastern flat terrain of the green plain and bushes I could find out some airborne soldiers appearing somewhat underneath the foliage for practical exercise. Major Khoi indicated his finger to down there and said: “Supposedly, our troops down there get trouble encircled by enemy they needed your guide how to protect them by your fire-power cover support…and the most important we never use color smokes on our location…but just a red color panel only!”
Two gun-ships were flying over 300 feet above an airborne battalion. I tried to contact on FM 42.5 friend called sign “Dong-Da” for identified target spot and strafing two 2.75 rockets right on target and turned sharply to the right now left mini-gun continued tracing on the target. Dong-Da ground force was very pleased but I radioed next pass-prep, we will made dived prep-approach parallel left side for avoiding fired remnant cartridges didn’t fall on the troop.
With my experience by almost as a quick reflex action I often don’t use the gun-sight instrument while firing. I trust my Sergeant Duc, he was a good gunner, sometimes his eyes were same my eyes on target. Two mini-guns were the big killer that recalled to me in the battle northwest of Chu-Lai, just only two gun-ships but killed a full battalion of NVA [lest than 150 men] which was crossing the Thu-Bon’s river. I also recalled once a smuggle boat belong to NVA Group 759 was been detected, this supplied boat was everyone on board get killed by mini-guns after 24 rockets missing by two new nervous rating-pilots prep. The ghost boat continued proceeding to the shore Phong Dien county Quang Tri province without pilot directed, a ghostly creature flitting on the surface of the sea to land at My Thuy beach; Marine Brigade 258th was welcome her with different kind of weapons, plus a platoon Tank M-48 in strafing into it with their canons. The typical of this ghost boat was carried a thousand to thousand ‘beacon pork-meat’ canned at China made, plus various supply categories of military materiel.
The NVA troops were screwed up for everything they had leaned how to react and shot to the airplanes. Because all fighters even helicopter Cobra when they started to fire they must dive to release their fire-powers. The NVA had instructed by US counterespionage– firing only at the time their fighter-bombers raised their head to sky, then stands and freely shot at them whatever you get in your hand. A platoon of antiaircraft artillery divided three points of three equilateral triangle angles; each angle established a stronghold AAA guns. Where they dug up land for individual holes 60 decrees inclination, these shaped hole for personnel sliding when fighter dived on their top as target; meanwhile two another strongholds kept firing but a stronghold was on the target, people must gliding under the 60-degree hole, and at once, while the fighter raised the head to sky, stands in fired at him. It’s strange they haven’t heard from this tactical was only harmful by our bullets 7.62 mm at 4,000 rounds per minutes by Gunship HU-1H model. So why NVA were only get killed by our monsters in that very-moment.
One captured AAA’ NVA officer told us, they were confident with these tactical offenses
They were never had casualty with this method of defense. If the battle lasts longer run that meant VNAF and US aircrafts having so many chance of being risked to shot-down than destroyed them and the most we used the “Snake-Eye” bombs, 250 or 500 pounds. He said these bombs exploded on the mountainous forest as southern Laos, likely the big fire-cracker celebrated in lunar New Year spell. That meant VNAF like F-5, A-37 AD-6 dropped bombs … their efforts to strike him were futile.
In the earlier of Lam Son operation, following the operation plan, one Airborne Brigade should take over a stronghold of a fire base with call-sign Hill-32, but Lieutenant John F Kerry of antiwar movement had let Hanoi known everything planning for this operation so why President Thieu ordered cancelled the last anticipated Hill-32 fire base support. However Hanoi skeptically if in doubt, don’t act unless allies forces in south DMZ are been certain, other word Hanoi was disregarded anything by Kerry had say, although he was a notorious antiwar activist showed up everyday in world TV. Kissinger and Yale graduated John Kerry were chosen by Harriman for his conspiracy, naturally Kerry was supported by Skull and Bone for his future presidency campaign; so coincidence with actor quarterback Kissinger in the play-game Pennsylvania meanwhile Kerry duty performance to accomplish axiom 1 – the anticipated of biggest-fiasco that I foresaw in my whole time there because it broke the back of the Saigon regime of Army forces, particularly irreplaceable were the dead ARVN “elite-officers”. I must say since ‘that’ the future leaders, they were all dead. Subsequently Skull and Bones turned in Saigon to Hanoi with a blood-leak battle instead of bloodbath one. This operation identified one of these strategy-goals. Furthermore this repeated “the bomb ends the war”: dropping the atomic bombs brought the war to a swift conclusion, saving many lives in the process, after a Big air-campaign: on the night of March 9-10, 1945, Permanent Government ordered 324 B-29s attacked right the heart of Tokyo as low level in the most destructive air raid in then history, ended by B-29s were used to drop the first atomic bombs on Japan. On August, 6, 1945 Colonel Paul Tibbets, aircraft commander B-29s, named “Enola Gay” dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima in saving many lives in prospect. War-history once again repeated – The B.52 has long been one of the main instruments of Permanent Government foreign-policy. During the Cold War it was the airborne warrior that would have dropped nuclear weapon onto the Soviet Union or maybe on China if Red China tried to overrun the southern states of Soviet Republic in its critical possibility be-collapsed-period. The special “Big Belly” B-52D could also carry a load of 108 conventional bombs, and during the Vietnam War in the “Pennsylvania’s” as Linebacker-II, 129 B-52s of several models carried out the 11 days and night attacked the so called “Christmas Bombing” which designed to force Hanoi to conference table in Paris.

Phase-1 (1 Feb to 7 Feb) – On 1 February 1971, as U.S armor and mechanized forces were moving to open Route 9 west to the Laotian border in a preparatory stage of the Laotian incursion, after two weeks discussing plans for Lam Son 719 by NSC on January 18, 1971. One week later, 8 February, 1971 ARVN cross border. General Abrams cabled Admiral McCain to advise that the bulk of the enemy’s combat units in the region are located in the vicinity of Tchepone, the operation’s ultimate objective. Whatever else might happen, it was clear that the disposition and strength of enemy forces in and near the area of operations were not going to come as any surprise to the attackers.
Lieutenant General Armor Hoang Xuan Lam, I Corps, was in command of the thrust into Laos. The U.S counterpart in Military Region 1 was Lieutenant General James W.Sutherland, an armor officer who commanded the XXIV Corps. MACV depended heavily on Sutherland and his headquarters to advisor, support, and encourage General Lam and the Vietnamese during the operation. Lam had under his command for the operation the 1st Infantry Division, the Airborne Division, the Marine Division, the 1st Armored Brigade Task Forces and a Ranger group, the best troops South Vietnam possessed, attacked spearhead by eighteen acted combat battalions
Stated a later North Vietnamese history, “…our combat forces in the Route 9 – south Laos Front had reached 60,000 combat troops, consisting of five divisions such as 320th, 324th, 2nd, 304th, and 308th: two separate infantry regiments such as 278th, and 27th; eight regiments of artillery, three engineer regiments, three tank regiments, six anti-aircraft regiments, eight sapper battalions, plus rear service and transportation units. This campaign was our army’s greatest concentration of combined arms forces in its history up to that point.”
On the defensive in Laos, the enemy was going to be able to amass and sustain a much larger force than he could have projected into South Vietnam.
Phase-2 (8 Feb to 5 March) – On 8 February 1971 the ARVN forces began crossing the border into Laos and Operation Lam Son 719 had been under way. Alongside the route, a hundred yards before the border, was posted a sign that read: “Warning, No US personnel beyond this point.” This mission was to disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication and destroy stocks of war materiel – especially in Base Area 604, centered on Tchepone – thereby setting back the enemy’s timetable for aggression, protecting American forces during their progressively withdraw, and providing more time for South Vietnamese forces to develop. This ground thrust was an integral part of the larger effort to thwart enemy aggression by denying him the wherewithal to carry it out, a complement to the intensive air interdiction campaign along the entire line of communication in the Laotian panhandle and against the target box system that sought to block the entry points into the trail system.

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 12-24-2010, 03:41 PM

Operation lam son 719

From the outset it was hard going. Route 9 was at best a narrow, twisting, nearly unimproved surface, or so it looked from the air. The reality was much worse. In 1962 an occasion in alert for rescue STRATA infiltration, our Queen-Bee H.34 must standby there. I had chance strode along the route 9 to hunting the peacock, recognized the surface some of those weather cuts that were in that route were fifteen feet deep. A few days after the operation commenced. They missed that in the readout of the aerial photography. The area of operation extended from Khe Sanh, in Coroc highlands situated 12 kilometers east of the Laotian border, to the city of Tchepone, 45km inside Laos. The axial center of the operation was Route-9. Parallel to Route-9 was a small river. Thick jungles of thorny giant bamboo flanked both sides of Route 9 which was 200 to 500 meters above the sea level. Mt Coroc blocked longitudinally from the North to the South, leaving only a path for Route-9 to pierce. Movement troops were very difficult and limited in such topography. Everything depended on Route-9. The high relief crests on each side were ideal places in which to launch ambushes. Troops had to move over undulating terrains, covered with thick bamboo forests that greatly blocked observation and hindered maneuvers. There was very difficult for the offensive force to assault in such terrain even if it were fully supported by armor, air force and artillery. Another disadvantage was that the NVA knew very well this area like the back of their hands, whereas the ARVN troops were unfamiliar with the operational area. It was psychological disadvantage for South Vietnam troops to the must have to fight outside their country in completely unknown terrain and mountainous area.
In the operation plan, a trajectory called for an armor task force to drive was along route 9 toward Tchepone while – by occupying a string of fire support bases to be established paralleling on the right west mountainous flank. The 1st Infantry Division protected the southern flank, and the Marine Division constituted the reserve. Later the armor would link up with airborne elements to be airlifted to Tchepone. Leading the way into Laos was the ARVN 1st Armored Brigade Task Force, reinforced by two airborne battalions. Next an ARVN airborne brigade headquarters and one of its battalions moved into position, followed by another airborne brigade and then a Ranger battalion. Other units followed.
Unfortunately, the cuts will have an adverse effect on all operations to win the war. Given the restricting “Cooper-Church” amendment, no advisors accompanied ARVN troops into Laos, not like in the last year incursion to Cambodia, and of course no America units participated. Air support of all kinds was allowed – however, as was artillery and logistical support from the South Vietnamese side of the Laos/VN border. This generated a massive operation in support of the incursion. Early on, General Abrams visited the primary base for all this activity, a reopened Khe Sanh. “It’s hard to believe,” he marveled, “the helicopters, the trucks, the artillery, the amount of equipment that is in that whole thing up there. I’ll tell you, I’ve never seen anything like it in the time I’ve been here. It’s quite remarkable – fifty-three CH-47 Chinooks, really something.”
US heavy artillery lined up along the border to provide fire support including eighteen 155mm
Howitzers, sixteen 175mm guns, and eight 8-inch howitzers But the huge amounts of aviation support were the real story of U.S support for this operation Lam Son 719. Additionally, Seventh Air Force kept up its interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, during the first week of Lam Son 719 destroying a new second high number of trucks for the dry season (but trucks were broke-down in the parking area due to all targets the CIA made decision – everything worked but nothing worked enough on strategy for protracting the war) but that was now only part of its massive efforts.
General Lucius Clay said: “I’m flying roughly 12,000 support sorties a month in addition to this,” referring to the number of individual aircraft missions being launched for various purposes (demolished stony mountains for created a future International Indo China Highway and NVA should be ground cleared by the early pioneers, debut at Harriman Super-Highway)
Clay continued: “I’m flying 21,000 sorties a month in airlift. I’m flying roughly 850 – 900 sorties a month in recon. That’s all maintenance capability, whether you expend ordnance or not,” meaning that every one of these flights generated s maintenance requirement. “There’s a limit to what you can do in generating sorties.”
In the wake of a broadcast by President Thieu announcing this operation; Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma issued a formal statement of protest. The language of the statement, said a MACV analyst, suggested that “certainly the primary responsibility rests with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which, scornful of international law…began and continues to violate the neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.”
Meanwhile, on behalf of Viet Cong National Liberation Front, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh cabled an urgent message to sympathizers in the United States: “Earnestly call you mobilize peace forces your country…check United States dangerous venture Indochina!”
Alas! On 10 February 1971, I never seem to learn from my mistake, in the earliest of this operation, an echelon-formation of 4 UH1-Hs of my 213th squadron, but 2 were exploded in air by antiaircraft gun 14,5mm armed on PT-76 and 37mm AAA in the northeast of Tchepone for a mission reconnaissance. All crewmembers and passengers were killed including four journalists and I Corps staff officers at coordinate XD 563537 at 15:00.
The cold air spread so low on highland ground inflicted on my back while I’m on a military-cot inside the canvas tent; under a mosquito-net I meditate on the sufferings of that terrible shock to their families. “How can I prevent that wouldn’t happened again?” I couldn’t sleep for night long due to the U.S Long Tom 175 guns at Khe Sanh, strafing to now and then waking me up. This section on Ho Chi Minh trail, from Mu-Gia Pass via Tchepone to Attopeu was familiar with me; I could know how every scenery in my heart, every relief, peaks of high mountains, creeks, rivers, streams, the virgin forests, human activities in devastated by bombs, now I looked devastating with very impressive and effective. The spot LZ that Lieutenant Hue crashed when was infiltrated landing a STRATA team in 1963 due to engine lost-power now became clear red-earth soil instead of the green dark forest; I recalled I Had had put right wheel landing gear on his Queen-Bee hub-blades for rescue all flight crewmembers. Now everywhere filled by ware-houses and POL pipe-line parallel on its. And also the AAA from here shot-down our HUI-H when this early operation started.
After a longest night I rubbed my eyes and yawned broader, though sometimes caught an hour or two naps on the nearby duty watch’s cot, but mostly I got my shut-eye from dozing in a metal folding chair, and came out looked out across the darkness toward Dong Da stronghold base, as the token artillery fire sounded in the muffled way that artillery always seems to sound on battlefield at night and an occasional star shell from the batteries illuminated the sky.
How can sleep? I recalled nine years ago (1962) as same place Khe Sanh quiet and peaceful I awoke early morning to the sounds of the stream. It was shrouded in thick impenetrable pea-soup fog, but its murmur reached through inside my tent as I sipped my coffee. The only sounds were the awakening, chirping, singing birds and the babbling riffles as the stream split and wove around a highland directly in front of my tent-yard. Was I in the backwoods wild of Khe Sanh or some remote distant location out west to Tchepone?
I became obsessed with that accident. “What do I conclude from that, and what conclusions do I draw from that casualty prevention?” The most of my concerned was the new rating pilot attachment to my responsibility from brand new formed squadron 233rd King-Star. I am convinced myself from now on, I will handle a lead gunship as escorted combat formation to air cover every UH-1H slicks fly cross border to the operation area, and the rendezvous point should be a check point over the old-French-prison at Lao-Bao right on the frontier Laos where to their coming and leaving. By way of conclusion, I will having a short briefing to all ‘aircraft-commanders’ of squadron 213th, 233rd, and 219th, in the early tomorrow morning for the new tactical gunship air cover-escort with the hope ‘no one get killed’.
At the left side of the Route 9 to Tchepone was the Xe-Pon River, but in 1962 there was very cool, I recalled that aerial photo mission I made a stupid flight when detected a sampan camouflage covered with full becoming browned leaves, I surrounded over its in the air for funning picture, suddenly from those browned leaves the submachine gun fired to my H-34 chopper, while I came back to Khe Sanh, Captain Phu (now brigadier general commander 1st Infantry Division, the finest infantry unit) told me that your helicopter blades got hit three holes by Mat P.49 equipped to French Airborne, if your hear one by one that meant Mat-36, so I told him that Mat-49. Now Phu was still his looking shape pale and thin and always the cigarette sticking in his fingers but not French-Bastos heavy cigarette. This time his face appeared frequent worry and nervous because the B.52 took off from Utapao (tactical bombardment or strategic bombardment take off from Guam) let him the shortest time when B-52 flew “Arc-Light” missions attacking the so called communist hiding beneath the featureless jungle canopy but targets depended on CIA for protracted war or demolished stony-mountains; so you known they couldn’t be killed. But CIA’s goal was pushed pressure to ARVN troop hurry up on course trajectory on ‘keyed-up-time’ to the siege-target 604 – NVA’ base cargo supply.
In the TOC’ bunker I can hear loudly his order “Any directions clear enough for run away at once! Run away at once.” That meant pushing Colonel Diem regiment commander at southern flank to move quickly to Tchepone.
Strangely, the NVA thrust coming from north DMZ that I could understand they crossed by our three fire-base supports but B-52 didn’t strike on them at all, but only than on ARVN infantry regiment in southern flank? Why? Because General Giap (cooperated engagement with OSS before 1943) though was an indirect apparatus of Skull and Bones but Giap help them carrying out their strategy instead used all powerful forces attacked directly in to American Khe Sanh Base (so nowadays his sibling stayed in California, USA) This plot was imagined by your simple knowledge; why don’t attack closer easy-won but attack too far at open area-dumpster, Base 604, Tchepone?
On 10 February advance elements of the armor column linked up with an airborne battalion at A-Luoi Fire-Support Base, some twenty kilometers into Laos, despite truly miserable weather that had set in the previous day. On the same day ARVN I Corps Headquarters, already struggling with the complex tasks of coordinating a multi-division attack under difficult terrain and weather conditions, suffered a serious setback when 2 VNAF helicopters crash resulted in the deaths of two of its most important staff officers, the chief J-3 planner and the chief J-4 logistician. However the Chinooks CH-47 really something when they hook up the Howitzer 155 artillery to every FSB as Dong Da, Hill-30, 31 in the northern flank were great O.K. It’s hard to believe. In the two full days of February, two airborne brigades, one infantry regiment, Ranger, CH-47, CH-54 hanging in air heavy loads to every established Fire Support Bases back and forth; everything were fluently quite beautiful. But only 2 Huey were accident by ground fire belong to my Magic-Club 213th squadron and Colonel Diem regiment’s few slowed react soldiers were killed by our friendly B.52s bombardment from Guam, by preplanned road map in Pentagon.
From about 12 February on, ARVN forces more or less held in place and hunkered down, not a wise tactic in an operation of this kind. Later it was asserted, by the rumor that government not among permanent government, that President Thieu had issued secret orders to his commanders to halt the advance when 3,000 casualties had been sustained. Nguyen Tien Hung, a former special assistance to Thieu, later cast doubt on that claim, writing that “Thieu insists he never gave such an order!” The next day General Vien Chiefs Staffs invited General Abrams to meet with him. General Vien described President Thieu’s visit and briefings in I Corps on 12 February, and “said that after a thorough discussion of intelligence and dispositions, President Thieu directed that the ARVN forces not advance further at this time beyond the western positions they now hold.” General Vien thought this would be a hold of three to five days and affirmed that they still intended to go to Tchepone. Abrams in turn pointed out the disadvantages of remaining in static positions, “giving the enemy both time and opportunities to reorganize his reaction in a more effective way”
How can we know that war game between the axe of evil to its counterparts [Soviet Union and Skull and Bones] must coordinate their efforts in function together efficiently and in an organized way as ROE’ scam. I was understandably bitter about the outcome of the long years of struggle for free South Vietnam. That performance alone should serve to demonstrate that I was as stunned as any that the sometime American ally would, in a time of such crisis, turn its back on South Vietnam and of course on all the sacrifices my SOG fellows in arm had made there.
Here is a typical case for their craps. The G.I stayed in the Main Compound at Danang Air Force Base in 1972, a certain morning at breakfast time when the loud-speaker said something but our Airmen-housewife didn’t understand what the hell they say; but they wait until afternoon and come to check the Hospital Ship [Hope or Helgolan] of Germany disembarked not still anchorage in the pier of Han’s river. They hurried back and suddenly launched into a harangue to their husbands: “Tonight Viet Cong will launch rockets into our air base. I bring the kids to downtown for escaped…if you would die try stay on here…O.K!” Prophetically, they prophesied that at night when the loud speakers said: “All G.I must go into the bunker about five minutes rockets will strafing, it also clear announcement how many rockets will hit and TOT too and it repeat one more time before rockets hit.
In turn of ROE, on August 9, 1968 three box B.52 (nine aircrafts) “Arc-Light” took off from Guam to strike the Forward Base of 559 Group headquarters at Tam-Boi’ mountain, “Oscar Eight” call sign for SOG, northern Ashau-valley where mountain contained immense chambers hewn from solid rock and fitted with heavy iron door, so well constructed that they withstood B.52 strikes. However according to the ROE, the camouflage Soviet fishing boats nearby the Guam Island contacted with that headquarter 559 Group before long enough to TOT(Time On Target) for hidden chambers hewn escaped B.52 struck.
The raid began with three throngs B.52, a dawn Arc Light a thousand 500 and 750-pounds bombs walk across Oscar Eight, setting off 50 secondary explosions, witnessed by our recon team Master Sergeant Billy Waugh watched. Incredibly, the bombs had barely stopped falling when he could see NVA troops running from their shelters to roll fuel barrels away from a fire. Waugh radioed SOG Lt Col Harold Rose at Khe Sanh, “I’ve got people out here scurrying around. That sonva-bitch is loaded”. All NVA troops were secure even they couldn’t hear the sound of eight jet engines flown at high at 25,000 to 35,000 feet.

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 12-27-2010, 04:30 PM

Operation lam son 719

Venal Press-Corps’ Biased Reports: The nature of this operation was too stranger, “attack” was a maneuver much advantage than “defense,” but Giap’ forces don’t use this tactical for destroyed all U.S forces at Khe Sanh much closer and easier won the war, why not? And the must-fight at the ‘barbecue drill-oven’ as Base 604, Tchepone instead – this is a perfect value-plot of CIA counterespionage in collaboration between two counterparts was effect to separate the clique cadre communist Hanoi out of China- domination. B.52 killed General Nguyen Chi Thanh pro-China prior to helping Le Duan and Le Duc Tho carried out their scams by seizing the totalitarian-power at Hanoi’s regime.

Subsequently General Sutherland provided some further insight, cabling Abrams that the South Vietnamese had modified the original plan primarily because of heavy enemy contact by the Rangers and the Airborne forces on the northern flank of the penetration, and the demonstrated inability of the armor brigade to move rapidly along Route 9. For quite some time enemy forces had remained cautions and were, in fact, somewhat slow to reinforce. Their first serious counterattack came on the night of 18 February, when two NVA battalions struck the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion northeast of Ban Dong. This 39th Ranger has to retreat to South LZ to shake hands with 21st Ranger Battalion as pressure is too strong, encircled by armor PT-76 and tank T-54 of B-70 Corps. During that night, 7 AC-130 flare-ships and 6 EC-130B Gun-ships were covered, destroyed numerous NVA tanks and troops. Subsequently the major battles of the operation took place on that northern flank of the penetration, especially at Fire Support Base 31 and 30.
Venal Press-Corps’ Biased Reports
(You probably heard of the story BAT 21, or worse watch...the Movie Bat 21, if the US main stream media used to ignore the role of Ranger’s effort during the Lam Son 719. The following except-paragraph is credible enough to shed light on the scenario: Sergeant-Medic Fujii (Lam-Son 219) and Lieutenant Norris (BAT-21) what their differences in at work)
“Ask yourself, Lt Norris can’t located your bath-room when he was your first coming guest, and Sergeant Fujii was merely a man speak good English” That’s simple answer for you all.
Warning no U.S personal beyond this point: This sign-board showed-up 100 meter from border Laos/Vietnam. General Lam authorized these strike-newsmen on board of VNAF helicopter crossing border to Laos, of course dare theirs step down on the soil-land for intrigued to illuminate the situation and the times, consequently on 10th February, 15:00 hours at the coordinated XD 563537, meanwhile, near the area of operations of the 21st Ranger Battalion, our 213th Magic-Club Squadron flight a formation of four VNAF helicopters bound for Landing Zone Ranger South was hit by enemy 37-mm antiaircraft artillery and PT-76 machine guns fire at 3:00pm. Two helicopters were downed and all passengers were presumed killed. The first helicopter carried two ARVN colonels, the G3 and G4 of I Corps. The second helicopter reportedly carried a number of foreign correspondents [in 1998, all remains recovered were testified: -Keisaburo Shimamoto; -Henri Huet, AP; -Larry Burrows, Life and -Kent Potter, News Week, but specially, Pham Xuan An, Times/UPI, triple-cross-mediator, he was on board of helicopter H-21, landed at battle of Ap Bac 1963, but in this operation Lam Son he did know how what the hell, so why he never on airborne to Laos. However, on Route-9, a Japanese journalist Akihiro Okamura worked with Times magazine accompanied 1st Armor Brigade, his point of view was the same of mine: ARVN subjected to under siege at 604- fierce ambushed-battle by NVA’ stronghold underground defender of Steel 2nd NVA Division and surrounded by others four NVA divisions. Thereby B-52 had to destroy all of two crucial opponents for guaranty turn in Saigon to Hanoi not like A “Pebble-Capital” – carried out axiom-1 at just we guessed]
It was suspected that the I Corps G3 had carried with him an operational map of LAM SON 719 along with signal operating instructions and codes. A significant rumor that the loss of these documents to the General Giap’ hands would be extremely in viewer minds? A thorough search of the area for the downed helicopters produced no results. But in reality, Lieutenant John F Kerry, the so called “antiwar movement activist” showed it up to Hanoi via General Giap translated by Triple-Cross mediated translator, Pham Xuan An, so it seemed to me General Giap was seating side by side with General Alexander Haig in Pentagon [General Giap was OSS member recruited by Agent Number 19, Lucien Conein at Pat-Po sanctuary in 1945 photo by Allan Squiers]
Air Calvary crew, Sergeant Medic-Fujii, Hawaiian, his helicopter got hit by mortar 120mm (these accurate mortars which inflicted almost our helicopters grounded every Forward Fire Support Base) and forced landing on the spot LZ, and fortunately he stayed with Rangers, remember not volunteer, two Pilots, Brown got killed at once, Monteith serious wounded; Crew-chief Simpco light injury, and door-gun Costello was O.K, and the rest Fujii’ crews were picked up by another chopper, except him, because he was smart guy joint-up with Rangers for survive. Now so much biased reports from many prevaricated-newsmen. Medic-Fujii was real good Advisor, he is perfect Ranger Commander, operated some excellent movement troop-maneuvers, knowing how to kill Giap’s troops, volunteer stay for help Rangers … etc … [taking an except of Battle of Ap-Bac in 1963 as … The large, dark green silhouettes of the ‘Angle Worms’ as the Viet Cong-guerrillas called the bent-pipe H-21s, and the ‘Dippers’ their nickname for the Huey, would stand out clearly in the sunshine.
… Sgt 1st Class Arnold Bowers, 29 years old, from a Minnesota dairy farm and the 101 Airborne Division, heard the bullwhip crack of the first bullet burst through the aluminum skin of the helicopter while the machine was still 50 feet in the air, Bower’s helicopter was the second in the flight. Vietnam was his first war. During his previous eight and half months in the country he had experienced no combat beyond a few skirmishes with snipers. The whip cracked again and again over the din of the H-21 engines before the wheels of the machine settled into the paddy and Bower jumped out into the knee-high water with a squad of infantry and the ARVN first lieutenant commanding the company. His ears free of the clangor of engines, Bowers could hear a roaring of automatic weapons and rifles from the curtain of green foliage in front. The bullets were snapping all around, buzzing close by his ears and splitting the air overhead. He plunged forward the gray ooze sucking at the boots, in a reflex of his training that said the best hope for survival lay in moving and shooting until you could get on top of your opponent and kill him. The lieutenant that the ARVN infantrymen thought otherwise, they threw themselves down behind the first paddy dike they could reach about 15 yards from where the helicopter had landed.
Sgt Bowers yelled at the lieutenant that they had to return fire and maneuver to get out of the open or they would all die in the paddy. The lieutenant said that he couldn’t understand Bowers. Back at the airstrip the lieutenant had understood Bower’s English perfectly as they had waited to board the helicopters. The Vietnamese was a graduate of the company-level officers’ course at the Infantry School at Fort-Benning. Usually all Vietnamese officers disregarded Americans fighter-men due to lack combat experience (the advisers’ job was not to give the combat-experienced-Vietnamese tactical advice because they had more fighting experience than most Americans, and it was their country; rather, the obligation of the advisers was to apply American air and artillery firepower when that became necessary, which was frequently, and to provide American logistics, coordination with American units, and American intelligence. The Vietnamese fighter-men were weakest in these areas. The job of the advisers, in other words, was to make the ARVN system work. So why all Vietnamese officers considered US advisors following combat operation likewise a “Big Drawback” for them and this was according Harriman mastermind all was be for US combat training only)

But in fact Sergeant Fujii was solely an English-interpreter in inter-box relayed. The most these ugly-guy-writers who employ a tried-and-true methodology, firstly, they concoct an inflammatory that serves their political goals. “Are their lies pathological, or are they merely malicious for curious entertainment.” They try to push it into the mainstream media. All too often, they succeed. And we have to be more than vigilant … think about that. The 1st Ranger Group participated in the operation with two battalions, the 21st and the 39th, the 37th was in another operation in MR-I. The forward headquarters of the group moved in Ta-Bat, northwest of Khe Sanh, close to the Laos border. The 21st Ranger Battalion was airlifted into the LZ Rangers South, about 6km northeast of Fire Support Base (FSB) Hill-30. Three days later, the 39th Ranger Battalion was brought into the LZ Rangers North, 4km northeast of LZ Rangers South. The two Ranger-Battalions assignment was the sensor to detect the NVA movements and to delay the spearheads of attacks of the enemy toward FSB/Hill-30, Hill-31. If the NVA overran the two FSB’, they cut the retreating Route-9 of the ARVN forces.
After landing, the rangers established defensive positions in the areas surrounding of the landing zones (LZ) then Ranger Companies fanned out searching for the enemy's trails and activities in their area of responsibility. The 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions, which operated around Landing Zones “Ranger-North” and “Ranger South” respectively, were probably the units most frequently in contact with the enemy. At 18:25 hours on 11th February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged the enemy four kilometers northeast of its base killing 11 Communist troops, but later, at 22:00 hours suffered six wounded from an enemy attack by fire consisting of forty 120-mm mortar rounds. During the afternoon of 13th February, the 39th Battalion engaged a large enemy force at three kilometers west-southwest of Landing Zone “Ranger-North” killing 43 enemy personnel and seizing two 37-mm antiaircraft artillery guns, two 12.7-mm machineguns, a substantial amount of ammunition and assorted types of equipment. The 39th Battalion had only one killed and 10 wounded. Meanwhile, the 21st Ranger Battalion made sporadic contacts with the enemy throughout the day without significant results. Light contacts continued during the following days. All these activities were quickly eclipsed by reports of heavy enemy troop concentrations around the 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions. Both battalions were being subjected to attacks by fire and ground attacks and the fighting lasted all night while friendly artillery, tactical air and AC-130 flare-ships, EC-130B gun-ships responded quickly in support of the embattled rangers. The next morning, enemy pressure on the 21st Ranger Battalion gradually diminished but heavy pressure persisted on the 39th Battalion in the “Ranger North” area. The battle continued over 19th February. Enemy troops here were confirmed to be elements of the 102nd Regiment of the 308th Division, all with new weapons and clothing testified this training center on spot for battle. Before launching an assault, the rangers reported, the enemy made extensive use of recoilless rifles and mortars; his fire was very accurate. The strongest enemy attacks were directed at the eastern flank of the rangers which was their weakest spot. However, the 39th Ranger Battalion continued to hold its positions with support from 42 pieces of U.S. artillery and tactical air.
From northeast DMZ, enemy opposition grew stronger with each day around Ban Dong and the area of Route 1032B for which the rangers were responsible. On 10th February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged an element of the NVA' 88th Regiment. The next day, the 37th Ranger Battalion engaged a battalion size unit near FSB Phu Loc. The discovery of the command post of the NVA 308th Division on 18th February further confirmed reports that this division had joined in the fighting (the 308th Division had three regiments: 36th, 88th and 102nd) During the night of 19th February, the NVA forces continued to attack the 39th Ranger Battalion while launching uninterrupted attacks by fire to hold the 21st Ranger Battalion in check. Sergeant Medic Fujii did damn good job in communication between ground and air like Forward Air Controller officer for a longest night with Seven fixed wing EC-130B gun-ships and six AC-130 flare-ships were used in support of the 39th Ranger Battalion and, from 07:30 to 14:30 hours on 20th February, 32 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the rangers in daytime. Efforts to re-supply and evacuate their casualties were made with strong support from tactical air, gun-ships and artillery. Some helicopters managed to land in the area, ammunition was delivered and some wounded evacuated. But upon takeoff, two helicopters were damaged by enemy undirected fire. One had to land in the positions of the 21st Ranger Battalion (Ranger South) and the other managed to land at Fire Support Base Hill-30.
(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 12-31-2010, 03:36 AM

Operation lam son 719

In the afternoon, reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an estimated 400 to 500 enemy with most of the wounded of the 39th Ranger Battalion still stranded in the 21st Rangers' positions, this unit received intense attacks by fire, including 130, 152-mm artillery, on the night of 21st February. Plans were made to evacuate the wounded rangers the following day toward noon on 22nd February, the area around the battalion position was subjected to a heavy barrage of fire involving tactical air, air cavalry, aerial artillery and ground artillery for 45 minutes while 13 medical evacuation helicopters were airborne, ready to go in. All of them landed and successfully picked up122 wounded as well as one U.S. pilot who had been stranded there since his aircraft was shot down. The ranger force remaining in combat position at Ranger South numbered approximately 400 men including 100 from the 39th Battalion but two days later, on 24th February the battalion was ordered by the I Corps commander to withdraw to FSB 30. From there they were airlifted to FSB Phu Loc. While the 39th Ranger Battalion was holding out, numerous activities took place in other areas. U.S. air cavalry continued to search for and destroy pipelines. Units of the 1st Infantry Division moved further south, striking along Route-92 and finding a number of enemy installations, but also making numerous contacts and receiving attacks by fired The 8th Airborne Battalion and armored elements engaged the enemy two kilometers north of Ban Dong, destroying one T-34 tank and a 23-mm gun position. This was another strong indication of enemy armor involvement. On the friendly side, a number of U.S. helicopters were shot down while on supply, medical evacuation or support missions. The corps commander had concluded that the position held by the 21st Rangers and the survivors of the 39th was untenable. A maximum effort in air and artillery support was required for each re-supply and evacuation mission and he had other pressing demands for this support. The position was not an objective in itself and there was no military advantage in sacrificing a ranger battalion in a doomed attempt to hold it. The corps commander was looking toward his objectives in the west and he wished to conserve as much of his combat power as possible for the main mission.
Beginning the 14th February, leading platoons of the 39th started exchanging gun-fires with the enemy forces, forward artillery observer called for supports. In the operation, the rangers were supported directly from a company of the 64th Artillery Battalion from Phu Loc. Until 3:00 to 4:00pm all companies engaged in fighting with the surrounding NVA units/70B. The 64th Artillery Company with six 105mm guns could not keep up with the intensity of the battle. In desperate, the forward observer broke in the working frequency of the C/44th Artillery Company on FSB/Hill-30 and requested for support. With the effects of artillery supports, the NVA had to pull back, the rangers also fell back to defense the Battalion Command Post.
On the following days, the 39th Ranger Battalion sent its companies out on patrol in the area responsibilities – they killed 43 enemies and captured two 37mm AAA guns. The AAA guns indicated that the NVA had a large size of unit in the surrounding areas of the Ranger North. In the south, the paratroopers of 2nd Airborne Brigade, and Infantry discovered storages of foods, fuels, weapons... and dead NVA troops killed by EC-130B gun-ships strafing earlier in friendly protection. Yes we must accepted Medic Fujii was useful for contacting with Flare-ship AC-130 and Gun-ship EC-130B for air-cover, strafing during long night with 6 flare-ships and 7 gun-ships with strike accuracy to protect our forces in retreated to 21st Ranger Battalion. Finally, Medic Fujii was picked up by his Air Cavalry Huey but got hit, crashed again and forced landing near Hill-30 in LZ Ranger South responsibility.
Until the 18th, the NVA Corps 70B moved its divisions 308th, 304th, 320th, 324B together with 202 Tank Regiment, artillery regiment to counter-attack. Meanwhile 2nd Division was setting for ambush our troop at 604 Cargo Base. On this day, they concentrated to up-root the 39th Ranger Battalion with human wave tactic. The rangers fought gallantly and with artillery supports from Phu Loc and FSB/Hill-30, the communists attacks was repulsed, left hundreds of bodies in the battlefield, the rangers more than 500 weapons of all kinds. The next morning, the NVA troops returned to continue the attack. The battle soon turned into the killing ground. The ARVN’ Artillery from the 64th Battalion and the C/44th Company fired continuously supporting the rangers. The 39th Ranger Battalion hang on for another day, when the NVA pulled back for realignment spearhead for the attack, the slightly wounded rangers were bandaged quickly then returning to the trenches. The rangers probably knew their destiny, they prepared for the last fight... 20th/February, early in the morning, the NVA was mounted a new attack with more intensity. The battle lasted into afternoon and the rangers reaction weaken... then the 64th and the C/44th artillery companies did not hear any calls for helps from the forward observer of the 39th Ranger Battalion. The NVA already swamped into the rangers positions. Aerial photos showed at least 600 NVA bodies left in the battlefield. The survivors of the 39th ran back to the defensive line of the 21st Ranger Battalion and continued to fight side by side with brothers in arms of the 21st until this battalion was also evacuated.
During the night of 19th February, the enemy continued to attack the 39th Battalion while launching uninterrupted attacks by fire to hold the 21st Battalion in check. Seven fixed wing gun-ships EC-130B and six flare-ships AC-130 were used in support of the 39th Battalion and, from 07:30 to 14:30 hours on 20th February, 32 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the rangers. Efforts to re-supply and evacuate their casualties were made with strong support from tactical air, gun-ships and artillery. Some helicopters managed to land in the area, ammunition was delivered and some wounded evacuated. But upon takeoff, two helicopters were damaged by enemy fired One had to land in the positions of the 21st Ranger Battalion “Ranger South” and the other managed to land at Fire Support Base Hill-30, this Huey piloted by Lloyd and Nelson tried picked up Medic Fujii, just got hit and had to forced landing near FBS/Hill-30, about 4 kilometer from LZ South. In the afternoon, reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an estimated 400 to 500 enemy with most of the wounded of the 39th Ranger Battalion still stranded in the 21st Rangers' positions, this unit received intense attacks by fire, including 130-mm, 152mm artillery, on the night of 21st February. Plans were made to evacuate the wounded rangers the following day toward noon on 22nd February, the area around the battalion position was subjected to a heavy barrage of fire involving tactical air, air cavalry, aerial artillery and ground artillery for nearly an hour while 13 medical evacuation helicopters were airborne, ready to go in. All of them landed and successfully picked up 122 wounded as well as one U.S. pilot who had been stranded there since his aircraft was shot down. The Ranger force remaining in combat position at Ranger South numbered approximately 400 men including 100 from the 39th Battalion but two days later, on 24th February, the battalion was ordered by the I Corps commander to withdraw to FSB/Hill-30. From there they were airlifted to FSB Phu Loc. While the 39th Ranger Battalion was holding out, numerous activities took place in other areas. U.S. air cavalry continued to search for and destroy pipelines. Units of the 1st Infantry Division moved further south, striking along Route-92 and finding a number of enemy installations, but also making numerous contacts and receiving attacks by fired The 8th Airborne Battalion and armored elements engaged the enemy two kilometers north of Ban Dong, destroying one T-34 tank and a 23-mm gun position. This was another strong indication of enemy armor involvement. On the friendly side, a number of U.S. helicopters were shot down while on supply, medical evacuation or support missions. The corps commander had concluded that the position held by the 21st Ranger Battalion and the survivors of the 39th was untenable. A maximum effort in air and artillery support was required for each re-supply and evacuation mission and he had other pressing demands for this support. The position was not an objective in itself and there was no military advantage in sacrificing a ranger battalion in a doomed attempt to hold it. The corps commander was looking toward his objectives in the west and he wished to conserve as much of his combat power as possible for the main mission.
News of the 39th Ranger Battalion fought until the last bullets then dispersed instead of surrendering spread out rapidly. My air-cover over FSB/Hill-30 in operational area witnessing: “We could not re-supply for them for three days. When ammunitions were about to run out, they got out of their positions, counter-attacked then continued to fight with captured weapons."
After overran the 39th, the NVA’ Forces moved south and surrounded the 21st Ranger Battalion’s positions. In the night of the 20th February, AC-130 dropped flares lighted up the sky above the 21st Ranger Battalion location in the area of LZ Ranger South. It was the last outer shell which shielded the FSB/Hill-30 from the NVA advances from the northwest. The NVA began their attacks on the ranger’s positions since the 21st the rangers fought back and held their positions. The battle between the 21st and the survivors of the 39th with the NVA units lasted for four days and nights. When the NVA pulled back after many waves of attacks they pounded on the ranger’s positions with 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and mortar 120mm shells to weaken the ranger physicals and morals.
Fortunately, on 22nd March when morning fog was just disappeared, 13 UH1-Hs were covered by U.S/42 pieces Long Tom 175, 8 inch Howitzer, and 155mm from border. Suddenly the formation landed on LZ Ranger South under fierce strafing air-covered by gunship Cobra. His buddy Air Cavalry abruptly showed up and picked up Medic Fujii and another flight personal in his flight-unit, both was to fly back safety from FSB/Hill-30 to Khe Sanh, included 122 wounded, where 400 rangers include 100 rangers from 39th [Major Khang 39th said Fujii was real good but Major Hiep 21st Battalion Commander expressed Medic Fujii to much scared when reached LZ South, so contacted with American EC-130B gunship for air-cover in turn by Lieutenant Nguyen Son during two last days 21th and 22th February]
In preserving the Ranger Battalion, in the early morning of the 25th, the 21st Ranger Battalion Commander, Major Khang ordered his men cut fall trees in making a surprised landing zone, due to all LZs were preset-targeted by precision-accuracy of 120mm mortars and 152 delayed-guns preset coordinates XD 593537 and XD 550490 [120mm mortars that burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern that inflicted our choppers force-grounded at all FSB, can’t take off again due to tail rotor failure and particularly 152mm guns, the duds from these penetrated 4 feet into the earth which damaged almost friendly artillery, and maliciously, NVA hide the real guns, mortars and rocket-launchers in deep pits and in tunnels with cleverly in camouflage]
At Ham-Nghi, Corps Command was ordered to evacuate according to plan “Zulu-01” Again the 64th and C/44th Artilleries were directed to maximize fire-support for the rangers. About 10:00 am in the morning, four Cobra gun-ships circled above the ranger’s positions then a squadron of helicopters landed quickly in the LZ Rangers South to scoop up the rangers and brought them to FSB/Hill-30 where VNAF gun-ships responsibility for air-ground closed support to 2nd Airborne Brigade. Later another squadron arrived nearby FSB/Hill-30 picked up the rangers and transported them back to Phu Loc, accomplishing the commitment of the 1st Rangers Group in operation Lam-Son 719. However, one company of the 21st Rangers Battalion was left behind on FSB/Hill-30 – they fought together with the Airborne-men in the FSB/Hill-30 until this FSB was also forced to retreat.

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 01-07-2011, 01:14 AM

Operation lam son 719

POW-JUBILEE: The U.S/POW was publicly humiliated in propaganda campaign by put them in the oxen-cart go around Hanoi’s Hoang-Kiem Lake for Hanoi-residents seeing; But Hà Nội didn’t mean to hurt the United States, it was just a bit of fun?

Suddenly Hanoi played the game: In the earlier-transaction period (1970) and A Harriman challenged George H W Bush to asset his leadership, The U.S/POW was publicly humiliated in propaganda campaign by put them in the oxen-cart go around Hanoi’s Hoang-Kiem Lake for Hanoi-residents seeing. The evidence suggests that by the autumn of 1970 Communist forces had begun preparations for a spring offensive in Military Region 1, the northern provinces of South Vietnam once the dry season arrived. One indication was formation of a new corps-level headquarters, known as the 70B Front, sometime in October, 1970. Also at that time, General Abrams was told “a highly placed Viet Cong penetration agent reported on enemy plans to launch an offensive with up to four divisions to take and hold major portions of Quang Tri and Hue cities. Significantly, formation of the enemy’s new headquarters occurred well before any specific allied planning for a thrust into Laos had begun a situation that discounted the possibility that the new organization was intended primarily to conduct a defense against allied operations. However the Strategic Air Command don’t have the orders to destroy four crucial targets, each a rectangle measuring one by two kilometers and sited at one of the prime input areas used by the enemy – the Mu Gia Pass, the Ban Karai Pass, the Ban Raving Pass, and an area just west of the DMZ, Tchepone vicinity [where we’ll started Lam Son 719’s operation] Everything was safe and protected due to the goal protracted-war to the Axis of Evil craps via under umbrella Rules Of Engagement (ROE)
For concentrated all U.S POW to one place, reacted by another way. By 1970, the US had secured the names of over 500 Americans held in North Vietnam prisons. Many more were missing and presumed captured. Reports of the cruelty suffered by these men at the hands of their barbarous captors were received along with reports of resultant deaths from various sources. Anxiety, concern and anger among the next of kin, friends of the captives, commanders and government officials were very much in evidence throughout this country. What was being done to alleviate the growing concern? Negotiations were being conducted in Paris Talk on a sporadic basis depending on the mood of the North Vietnamese representatives. An attempt was made to reach an agreement whereby an exchange of prisoners of war could be made. After over two years of such negotiations, the results were ZERO
“The mood of the country demanded that something be done to help these suffering POWs. Was the time ripe for an initiative… feasible alternative?

Suddenly American forces launched a surprising raid on a prisoner of war camp in North Vietnam, an operation planned and controlled in Washington by Harriman successor, George H W Bush’ strategist staffs. It was known that the Son Tay Camp had held American prisoners. By the time the raid was launched in 20-21, November 1970, however, those people had been moved elsewhere, apparently as a result of a maybe flooding that made Son Tay untenable. Later it was revealed that last-minute intelligence had revealed that fact, but the decision was made to let the raid go anyway. The operation was successful in its own terms, although of course no prisoners were rescued because none were there. Clearly another objective was to let the Hanoi know their rear area – the camp was only 40 kilometers from Hanoi – was not as secure as they might have thought. Much later it was learned that the raid benefited the American still held captive, since the Hanoi subsequently consolidated them in better facilities and their treatment improved significantly, so Hoả-Lò should be POW’ concentration. Although no prisoners were rescued, the raid focused world attention on the plight of the prisoners of war (POWs) raised their morale and resulted in improved living conditions for all U.S prisoners of the North Vietnamese. Beside, the men of the Joint Task Force earned the admiration of their countrymen for risking their lives in an attempt to bring freedom to others.
This is the goal of Son Tay’ Operation and Hanoi Hilton appearing where the POWs sacrificed a good part of their young adulthood for their country, in pain, fear, and isolation but ironically for their greediest warlords of WIB Bones

All troop movements were accomplished without meeting any resistance. Aerial reconnaissance and intelligence activities noticed enemy movements north of the operation area. Aircraft sorties started bombarding suspected targets. Some days later, the two Ranger positions received continuous shelling from long range 130mm artillery shelling. The vanguard units of the NVA had approached the defense lines of the 39th Rangers Battalion and skirmishes broke out. The Ranger Artillery stationed at the Laotian border Phu Loc provided supporting fire day and night. Days later, under enemy artillery barrage, the NVA regulars assaulted the 39th Ranger Battalion. The 21st Ranger Battalion positioned in the south was also harassed, making it impossible to receive reinforcements.
The NVA' troop thrust was assisted by 202 Tank Regiment. The fighting became fiercer and fiercer, and both side suffered heavy casualties. The 39th Ranger Battalion bravely battled on, despite being low on ammunition. They resisted for one day and one night, before the position was lost. The unit had to retreat toward the 21st Ranger Battalion's position in the south. Having successfully occupied the hill, the NVA moved west and south-west to threaten the 21st Ranger Battalion and the 3rd Airborne Brigade. The 3rd Airborne Brigade was well-supported by tactical airpower and 213th VNAF/Gunship-Flight. Despite heavy losses, the NVA continued to storm FBS/Hill-31 in the face of long and short range heavy artillery. Although forewarned of enemy intentions, the 3rd Airborne Brigade failed to establish an effective defense with only 300 fighter -men/3rd Battalion, and shared the same fate of the 39th Ranger Battalion. It had fought with courage and bravado, but succumbed to the massive suicidal onslaught of the NVA. The Brigade Staff, including Colonel Tho was captured. Some evaded and ran southwards toward FSB/Hill-30 which was occupied by the brave 2nd Airborne Battalion. Even as they assaulted the 3rd Airborne Brigade Headquarters, the NVA pounded away at FSB/Hill-30 and A-Luoi Base where the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 1st Armor Brigade were positioned. These two units were unable to give assistance to the 3rd Airborne Brigade at FSB/Hill-31, although help was sought of them.

The crucial goal of WIB Bones’ objective was the ARVN attack on wrong time and wrong place, but so late, “because all the huge cargo-ammunitions were already moved to the southern corridor” (prisoners in fact disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to numerous ‘Binh-Trams’ south Laos by Molotowa-Trucks at Parking-1 that the ARVN appeared not to be surprised at all) So despite the intense air campaign to stop the North Vietnamese logistical flow along the Harriman Highway [Ho Chi Minh Trail] the Communists continued to reinforce their troops in South Vietnam, threatening to disrupt the Vietnamization program in processing, and the gradual withdrawal of the US forces. The WIB Bones and Pentagon in Washington then decided in February 1971 to launch a ground offensive to destroy the enemy logistical depots and to prevent a so called new offensive into South Vietnam. The plan became known as Lam Son 719. Whether, I think they had two options: if the North Vietnamese would fall back under the attack like they did under similar circumstances in Cambodia the ARVN would move along the Harriman Highway and destroy all the bases underway. If the North Vietnamese would put up resistance, the ARVN was to cause as much damage and inflict as many casualties as possible and then do a fighting withdrawal back into South Vietnam. Whatever the true motives behind this operation it involved only just three ARVN divisions that enough. As soon as 1967, the US responsibilities had already planned a ground offensive against Laos and had estimated that if it must succeed, it was badly needed to deploy between five and seven US-ARVN divisions. Now, Hanoi had deployed in southern Laos a full army 70B Corps with tanks, ready to repel any ARVN foray, according to Paris Peace Talk agreement, Hanoi was staying in South Vietnam 200,000 troops there. Saigon was to deploy a smaller force. But what anything WIB Bones wished in expectation to carried out axiom-1.
Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war - but also one doomed to failure right from the start because the WIB Bones had planned, just for the Axis of Evil dumping all rubbish out of date military materiel in a remote spot like Tchepone, south Laos. That’s their crucial goal, in the end, Lam Son 719 lasted for 45 days, and the airpower (I means at Pentagon, as Colonel James Vaught’s suggestion, General Alexander Haig changed from Rolling Thunder to Linebacker air campaign that saved ARVN was under siege due to this Axis of Evil craps) was the only thing that saved the ARVN from a complete defeat in Laos. The North Vietnamese nevertheless did not get off unpunished: their losses were indeed heavy to a degree where their planned invasion of South Vietnam had to be postponed for a full year.

On 19th February, eleven days into the attack, MACV J-2 was carrying just six enemy regiments committed against ARVN forces in the Lam Son 719 area of operations. Clearly that wasn’t going to last much longer. J-2 concluded that these could be reinforced immediately by three additional regiments from the south and within two days by three more regiments from the west and north. Actually the real significance of this Lam Son operation is the enemy has everything committed or en route, that he has, with the exception of the 325th Division and the 9th separated-Regiment out of the 304th. So if they’re hurt, he’s really going to be beat for long time. And to us: “Of course we’re trying to welcome them all, best we can” Meanwhile a new-rallied confirmed earlier intelligence by revealing the identity and location of a new headquarters – designated the 70B Front – controlling the NVA divisions in the Lam Son area of operations, the 304th, 308th, and 320th. This fresh 70B Front was established right after a founder Skull and Bones, A Harriman retired from public life with the election of President Richard Nixon in 1969 and gave ceded his throne dynasty to a son of his deputy Prescott Bush [George I] to succeeding his resumption of stratagem “Eurasian Great Game”. But George H.W Bush was as merely a ‘surrogate for A Harriman’ disguised and stuck away in China due he knew so well the Vietnam-War outcome.

On 20 February, 1971, MACV analysts counted eighteen battalion-size ARVN task forces in south Laos mostly involved in search destroyed and cleared operations, with the westernmost elements still about where they had been a week earlier, roughly halfway to Tchepone. The NVA Corps 70B moved its divisions 320th, 324B, 304th, 308th together with 202nd tanks regiment, artillery regiment to counterattack. On this day, they concentrated to up root the 39th Ranger Battalion with human wave tactic. The Rangers fought gallantly and with artillery support from Phu Loc and FSB 30, the NVA attacks was repulsed, left hundreds of bodies in the battlefield the rangers more than 500 weapons of all kinds. Enemy forces were massing to attack, thereby becoming rich targets for reprisals by allied air attacks. When NVA assaults drove ARVN’ 39th Ranger Battalion off their position, thank to tactical air fell upon the massed enemy forces, killing more than 600 in the one battle. At one point, seven fixed-wing gun-ships (EC-130B) and six flare-ships (AC-130) were supporting the Rangers – All this crap about we can take whatever action’s required to protect our own forces, protective reaction. And if the ROE principle doesn’t apply here, we’ll be damned. Daytime the TAC air had a field day with enemy tank, too, destroying the most tanks and one NVA regiment/70B Corps, practically wipe out an armored regiment. Having great powers of recuperation, the NVA mounted a new attack with more intensity. The battle last into afternoon and the ranger reaction weaken … then the 64th and the C/44th Artillery Company did not hear any calls for help from the forward observer of the 39th Ranger Battalion. The NVA already swamped into the ranger position. The survivors of the 39th ran back to the defense line of the 21st Ranger Battalion and continued to fight side by side with brothers in arms of the 21st until this battalion was also evacuated.
News of the 39th Ranger Battalion fought until the last bullets then dispersed instead of surrendering spread out rapidly. Our helicopters could not re-supply for them for 3 days. When ammunitions were about to run out, they got out of their positions, counter attacked then continued to fight with captured weapons. After overran the 39th, the NVA forces moved south and surrounded the 21st ranger position. At night, flares lighted up the sky above the 21st ranger location in the area of LZ “Ranger South.” The battle between the 39th Ranger Battalion and the survivors of the 21st Ranger Battalion with the NVA regiments lasted for 4 days and nights. When the NVA pulled back after waves of attacks they pounded on the ranger position with 122mm and 130mm shells to weaken the ranger morals and physicals.
In preserving the ranger battalion, in daytime of the 25th February, the 21st Ranger was ordered to evacuate. According to plan “tactical-retreat”, 42 U.S artilleries at border, 64th and C/44th artilleries were directed to maximize fire-support for ranger. TOT at 10:00 am, four Cobra gun-ship circled above the ranger positions for air-cover then a formation helicopters of 20 HU-1 landed quickly in the LZ Ranger South to scoop up the rangers and brought them to FSB 30. Later another formation helicopters arrived at FSB 30 pickup the rangers and transported them back to Phu Loc. However, one company of the 21st Ranger Battalion was left behind on FSB 30, and they fought together with airborne men in the FSB 30 until this FSB was also force to retreat.

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 01-17-2011, 08:28 PM

Operation lam son 719

On 23 February 1971 was the longest day not because my gunship was shot down by the enemy P.T-76 but of heavy enemy contact by the Rangers and the Airborne forces on the most northern flank of penetration, and the most U.S Army aviation support for Lam Son 719 having big problem to cause Vice President Huong cried out on TV “Earnestly, U.S stop flying supplied for our troops in the state thirsty water and ammunition for small arms”
On same day 23 February, further south, nearest Cambodia/Vietnam border, a VNAF helicopter UHI-H carrying M.R-III Corps commander Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri – then 1970 directing the operation of some 17,000 ARVN troops in Cambodia – crashed and burned, killing him and his staff-officers; General Tri performed so well in Cambodia that U.S Permanent Government would hate like hell to think that Tri destroyed all NVA supplies cargo for protracted war and violated ROE’ craps. Said General Bill Rosson, “was a damn fine field commander. His idea was to get up where the action was” His flamboyance and bravery led one newsman to the extreme of calling Tri “the Patton of the Parrot’s Beak” General Tri was considered a fine field commander, scarce enough in the upper reaches of ARVN leadership, which made this a very serious loss. It turned out to be even more of one when it was learned that he had been slated to move almost immediately to I Corps to replace General Lam, who was proving inadequate to his heavy new responsibilities in command of Lam Son 719. General Tri was killed because he was just a great soldier, destroyer all COSVN’ cargo, a great spearhead against to CIP’s drawback.

A pretentious Permanent Government to being on the subject:
In the aftermath of Sihanouk’s ouster there had been a good bit of dithering in the White House about whether to mount such an operation and, if one were launched, what its dimensions ought to be, especially whether United States combat troops should cross the border. MACV was asked for ideas and submitted them. Chief of Staff, General Wheeler cabled fed-back that “Higher Authority” – He meant “High Authority,” the transparent euphemism for the President Nixon or the second generation of Skull and Bones, emperor-II [George H W Bush] – “has noted that each option involves considerable US participation.” General Wheeler then called for a detailed alternate plan for attacks into the Cambodia sanctuaries conducted entirely by South Vietnamese forces. Wheeler cable, dispatched at 2:49 PM, Washington time, closed by saying that “a preliminary outline plan submitted here tomorrow would be invaluable” After further consideration in Washington it was decided that U.S forces would participate, but only after the South Vietnamese had led off by themselves on the first day of the operation.
In Washington, some fairly novel command arrangements surfaced. A presidential blue ribbon commission later reported that “as was widely noted by the press at the time… Defense Secretary Laird [a Bone-Man, you’d discovered at picture “discussing plans for Lam Son 719 above and seeing all Skull and Bones men encircled president and Rogers] had been bypassed by the Joint Chiefs in advising the White House on preparations to intervene in Cambodia in April and May 1970?” Clearly that had been done on orders from the Permanent Government in Washington. There were other problems, including conflicting guidance from Washington that led Abrams to state some ground rules. “I should add,” he said in a message to Wheeler and McCain, “that in these delicate times I respond only to the direction of the Chairman, CINCPAC, and the Ambassador. My staff will not respond to direction from staffs in Washington or Hawaii,”
There were then 14 enemy sanctuaries along the borders of South Vietnam/Cambodia, 10 of them contiguous to IV and III Corps Tactical Zones in the South. The raid was going after those facilities, informed by the belief that “no guerrilla war has ever been able to reach a ‘victorious’ end without sanctuary” – This against Harriman’s standpoint, the axiom-1: “There was never a legitimate non-communist government in Saigon that was explained at all universities in 1960. Allied columns – ARVN forces on 29 April and then a combined U.S/ARVN force on 1 May – pushed into the Parrot’s Beak and Fishhook areas of Cambodia, thus targeting two of the enemy’s most important border sanctuaries. Within a few days numerous other base areas were entered, ten distinct operations in all by both U.S and South Vietnamese forces.
Even given the restrictions imposed, the operation was for the South Vietnamese a very significant undertaking. At its peak 50,000 men were committed, the first time in history that such numbers of their troops had operated as a single force. It was a challenging new departure, radically different from the role of pacification support to which most ARVN forces had until recently been relegated. At MACV, President Nixon’s speech announcement the incursion to the nation was played on tape at a 1 May update for Abrams, who must have cringed when he heard the President say that “tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam.” Everyone at MACV knew that COSVN was a shadowy, mobile, and widely dispersed complex that would be very difficult to locate and even more difficult to put out of action. In fact, queried before the fact about prospects for capturing it, MACV had replied that “major COSVN elements are dispersed over approximately 110 square kilometers of jungle” and “the feasibility of capturing major elements appears remote at this time.” Nixon’s characterization of the incursion’s purposes shifted attention from the far more important goals of disrupting the enemy’s lines of communication and cleaning out his base areas, achievements that could set back his timetable for further aggression to the advantage of both RVNAF improvement and U.S withdrawals.
To a surprising degree the incursion was unopposed. “When facing enemy forces,” read a typewritten directive issued by the B-3 Front Headquarters on 17 March 1970 and captured a week into the incursion, Communist forces in Cambodia “should attempt to break away and avoid shooting back. Our purposes are to conserve forces as much as we can” General Brown exulted that the enemy had “a hell of a problem.” Abrams agreed, but only to a point. “Well, that’s right, George” he responded. “But you see, he’s used to a hell of a problem. He lives in an environment where he’s got a hell of a problem. I get a certain amount of enjoyment, I must say, out of seeing the problem get complicated. But it isn’t worth much. He’s a pretty determined chap, when you get tight down to it. As a soldier, “What we need right now is another division or more – going in deep” in the wake of the initial penetrations. “We need to go west from where we are, we need to go north and east from where we are. And we need to do it now. It’s moving. And goddamn, goddamn.” This last was said wistfully, with great sorrow and regret.
Unsurprisingly, at Pentagon the delegated author of command and control of ROE was General Haig having secret order from emperor-II to investigate the so called Power Act violation. But those at MACV had their own concerns about ambiguity, voicing an implied indecisiveness, ineffectiveness, pretentiousness. MACV have two of Haig messages. One of them says “go get them” and the other one says “hurry up and get out”. “Ah what the hell Haig really wanted?” Haig responded “It’d go get them until the end of the period.” “Well, it’s still ambiguous” (supposedly, the Permanent Government’s take on charge the whole war by stratagem ‘Everything worked, but nothing worked enough’)
The scandal broke: became known to the public in March of 1970, Cambodian Marshal Lon Nol led a pro-Western coup, supposedly engineered by CIA operatives and military advisors, and ousted Cambodia’s recognized leader, Sihanouk who then fled to Paris, French and openly accused the United States of his ouster. The coup created the Khmer Republic, led by Lon Nol. In less than a month, South Vietnamese and U.S forces launched a clearing operation into the Parrot’s Beak and some areas of Cambodia that served as sanctuaries for Hanoi troop and Viet Cong forces; This operation also helped to bolster Lon Nol’ government against the Khmer Communists, who became known as the Khmer-Rouge.
Antiwar movement activist, Lieutenant John F Kerry urged that Media press reports of the United States, led aerial bombing and ground combat operation in Cambodia territories, addressed the issue in a nationally televised speech. President Nixon directly stated that the United States had no advisors on the ground in Cambodia, and had no American military forces involved in any actions in Cambodia, and had no American military air assets supporting any action in Cambodia. This is an insane desire of Permanent Government in which the so called her named “Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form” violated Power Act in U.S constitution.

What was the cause of “Cooper-Church” and “Case-Church” amendments? For WIB Bones’ original purpose, Senator Frank F Church and other members of Congress were so angered by President Nixon openly lying about U.S military involvement in Cambodia that they immediately took action to begin cutting funding for the war, as a shirttail amendment to the defense authorization bill, a watered down version of the measure finally passed. That version of the amendment only barred the introduction of American ground forces in Southeast Asia. The first volley in Congress came 1970 when Senator Church and Kentucky Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper authorized a bill that cut off funding of all military activity in Southeast Asia.
Long ago, under the watch of President Richard Nixon, American political interests had already written off South Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords stood testimony to that fact, virtually selling the highly United States-dependent nation down the proverbial river. The Case-Church
Amendment of 1973, specially banning all bombing in Cambodia and further banning all American military intervention by land, sea, or air anywhere in Southeast Asia, underscored that write-off. The WIB’ Bones had simply engineered a so-called Decent-Interval to distance America from its South Vietnam commitment. Given an adequate passage of time, the world would not hold America accountable. Unfortunately, the WIB’ Decent-Interval had not nearly run its course.

Some troop elements had done conspicuously better than others. The ARVN armored units had been especially early in the operation the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry had encountered NVA elements in a fight at southern Fire Base 31 and performed brilliantly, destroying six enemy T-54 tanks and sixteen PT-76s without any friendly losses in the first major tank-to-tank engagement of the war, but of course with our gunship air cover supported joint-strafing with the both flank-side equipped two a 19-shot 2.75-inch antitank rocket pods. Today by chance we got the record shooting into the POL pipe-line at random burned all of them for a while right after NVA shut-off the pipes. The fact that I would like to train in released a new gunship pilot check-ride for operational purpose. He was so nervous pushed the button microphone instead of fired arm. This miracle button hit the rockets on the targets [pipe-lines] let our ground troops more confident to our gunship air supported.
But unfortunately in the evening that same day, when I flied back to home base for refuel, I crossed low on the convoy that I thought those were our friendly M-113 but when I discovered their noses curb-higher like a canoe, NVA PT-76 that was too late, my gunship got many hits by 14.5 mm from gun turret with an automatic weapon and crashed half mile far away and my wingman pick all my crews up immediately. My commander at Danang Air Base would like Major Ky my squadron deputy to replace me so I could having time for R and R, but I cabled to him, “I need stay here for save our peoples!” I don’t want any our aircrews get killed again.
We are underground of the huge bunker for the morning briefing after I got have not too bad breakfast at the field Chow-Tent. As usual General Lam and Sutherland in the front seats, second one for Division commanders, I always saw only brigadier general Phu, Colonel Ray Battreall, a very experienced officer who watched most of this firsthand from I Corps Forward at Khe Sanh, Colonel Sam Cockerham was acting commander of the 1st Aviation Brigade. And the third row for regiment commander that was my row-seat.
I have had a sorrow meeting looked I never got before. The bad-news that the number of helicopters in commission so low 25% cast a deep gloom over the whole briefing room. A couple of weeks into the thing there wasn’t a lot of flying going on, including CH-54, Sky-crane sling to every Fire Support Base the bulldozers D-4, Howitzer 155s, water containers, either, at least not compared with the huge requirements the operation was generating. By about 23 February it became apparent that U.S Army aviation support for Lam Son 719 was having some problems. Not only was the intense and well-sited enemy antiaircraft weaponry making operations extremely difficult – every mission, even [dust-off] medical evacuations, had to be planned and executed like a full-scale combat assault – but maintenance problems were causing many helicopters to be out of service just when they were needed most. How can I do for covered support our troop, my helicopter forces was just enough for supplied or medical evacuation missions in case emergency only, we couldn’t hook artillery, water trailer container, but small arms ammunition, meanwhile NVA have had 67,000 tons of various shell ammunition was already on the operation spot-area. Thereby hangs a tale that our VNAF helicopters were shot down by indirect artillery every Fire Support Base, such as Hill 31: 2 H.34s, 1 UH1-H; Hong Ha: 2 UH1-Hs; Hill-30: 2 UH1-Hs; A-loui: 3 UH1-Hs – by direct guns: 1 gunship and 3 UH1-Hs in operational area. There was happened just a couple of weeks earlier into this operation.

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 01-29-2011, 01:58 PM

Operation lam son 719

I must have leaving the briefing room to go fly right away because air-support to Airborne was VNAF gunship responsibility, in having heavy contacts so tough with enemy at southern Fire Support Base 30, in emergency alert for air cover protection. The pea soup fog just beginning disappeared somehow so slow due to day and night the smoke of bombs, forest burned still clinging haunted around increased so much humidity hazy not so easy cleared the environment. Here there was always hearing pounding explosion from the enemy artillery melee with 42 U.S artilleries in Lao Bao. Colonel Sam Cockerham told me let try the new 2.75-inch rocket with 5,000 arrow nails that help prevent the enemy throng in attack to friend forces.
Meanwhile we are facing the possible disappearance of most of ground-fog forests. I gather all aircraft commanders to a short briefing about armament. We change the properly tactical prep, because prejudice of destroy enemy tank I carried 38 rockets and 6,000 rounds 7, 62. This maximum load armament created so much problem when strafing approach to the target sometimes the wingman could passed over the leader; so now I made decision “loading full ammunition 12,000 round 7, 62 and 14 rockets such as: 6 nail arrow-rockets, 4 high explosive 17 pounds, and 4 antitank rockets. However the wingman equipped only antitank rockets. Reminding spared some ammunition for air cover to our choppers, escorted them to security area. The most in the west flank was the free-risk-area, NVA stationed on west shield-flank for avoiding U.S artillery pounding. All shells were only reached-impact on east flank. However cast your eyes on the parallel PT-76 armored tank red-earth tracks, a terrible mobile antiaircraft not to hard detecting them. When get them, the lead try surrounding used both-mini-guns for neutralized-strafing the gunner killers and the wingman used antitank rocket grilled them.
The weather is much better, now I take off first and Captain Tien’ formation for rejoining us at second ride and right on the operational-spot. The thin stratus was still clinging on the crest mountain. Every time rushing to operation zone in various trajectory flight-path but not different altitude just treetop usual flight, the NVA troop was never get a chance for shooting at us down when we were airborne but we get so much trouble when landing on the helipad and get hit by more than a thousand incoming rounds more than from such indirect fire weapons as mortars and artillery of different kind of artillery that NVA having so abundance right in their dump-cargo. So why every friend Fire Support Bases you could see VNAF’ helicopters subjected to ground-remained there – meanwhile US Army Aviation inflicted so much casualty, because they flied too many formations and the must need smoothly in control maneuvers and altitude [SOG’ information, American be killed 219 and MIA 38, respectively were aircrews] Scattering in front of me in this zone, I witnessed few helicopters were shooting down. Just last two week ago when I flown with Airborne division commander, General Dong onboard to Hill 31, the mountain scenery was quite natural, now this scenery causing my feeling of fear and eerie strange “the longest and bloodiest siege of the war will happened” that I was justified in my conviction that Vietnam-War was “an intelligence war” specialized by Bushes background heritage.
I didn’t believe that why I Corps staffs operation planner chosen the Hill-30 and 31 like in a wide bowl surrounded by jungle-high ground as same as a siege of Dien Bien Phu containing antiaircraft guns and bunkered NVA infantry. NVA knew the terrain intimately, not because General Giap was cooperated, informed by CIA’ counterespionage recently but because they had been living in this area secretly for quite a while during the last phase of bunker construction. All U.S artillery fire power was target on impact the most only East flank let them feel in security on other flanks like West side. Batteries of 175mm guns to install in the Khe Sanh, the “Long Tom” could throw a 147-pound shell 28 kilometers, covering beyond almost the operation area in Laos, but NVA hidden operational flank-west scurrying about. Those “strongpoint obstacle system,” which explained in my memoirs, were “designed to channel the enemy into well-defined corridors where we might bring air and artillery to bear and then hit them with mobile ground reserves.” The Marine Division was standby at Khe Sanh like a ‘rapid-deployment-force.’
When landed, I followed General Dong for inspection our fellows scurrying about digging the foxholes and carrying armfuls of sand-bags. I guessed that this strongpoint was not stronger than the PT-76s can overrun, because from the hollow with slop was not deep enough against the natural obstacle, the PT-76 could climbed up so easy. Over here sometimes I could hear their sound exploded shell Katyusha rockets 122mm orientation-adjustment, and readjustments.
Suddenly, my sergeant Duc shooting mini-gun tracing at a slop of a hill to NVA carrying the big pots and pans, every two NVA troops hanging the big pan in the middle on their shoulders by a bamboo stick, [these pans when I was in Communist jail, recognized that had a big pan with 4 feet diameter, used for cooking food, steaming rice, vegetable soup and good shelter too for any case bombardment prevent burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern]
Every helicopter crew must familiar with smelling the rotten remain, so now I have been the ability to sense things liked dogs have an excellent sense of smell it stinks. Over here from the started operation until now there was never got hit by B-52, I means in the northern flank of Route 9, but today I’m still smelling the taste of swollen, rotten of human remain too low altitude underneath of insulated in the womb-like cockpit, the corpses had deteriorated and bloated; which device killed them? Maybe from A.C-130B gunship [Pentagon plan EC-130B neutralized interdiction in northern flank as I experienced] that remind me the last week, here was the battle in the first serious counterattack came on the night of 18, 19, and 20 February, when one NVA regiment struck the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion northeast of Ranger LZ, Ban Dong. There was northern flank of the penetration, especially at Fire Support Base 30 toward west Fire Support Base 31; subsequently the major battles of the operation took place with six NVA regiments committed against Airborne and Ranger forces. TOC/ J-2 concluded that these could be reinforced immediately by three additional regiments from the south and within two days by three more regiments from the west and north. They used tactical separated regiment among division for predominantly fierce attacks on ARVN one by one and step by step, that tactical method sound like breaking every chop-stick instead of whole bundle for one time. Thereby Hill-31 the first tested target.
I concluded that no clue bomb hole of B-52 carpeted was took place over here for the commencement until now that testified the stinky smell from human remain being by strafing from EC-130B on the night of 18, 19 February.
Now two gun-ships were on the operational zone to air cover for 2nd battalion/3rd Airborne Brigade. Our friend forces so confident to dispatch so many targets in front of them; the attack approach was the spot yesterday we destroyed enemy’s POL depot, now the scenery looked very cool. NVA regiment scared engagement with only one airborne-battalion? I guess they gathered to retreat a concentration zone for fierce attack Hill 31?
Suddenly, I heard in my helmet in the faint voice “Magic-Club-1…this King-Star-3 …over?”
I answered “Go ahead”
I recognized the new pilot in 233rd Squadron. In fact I ordered their mission just merely in the southern flank, the LZ in that area little bit lower for specially air support to 1st Division but now northern flank was so much serious counterattacks they badly needed medical evacuation right beside my support operational zone, meanwhile U.S air-cavalier gave up due too many crashed, little bit to the north for 1st Battalion/2nd Airborne Brigade. Two battalions would like joint together for counterattack against so heavy enemy pressure but hard to reach meanwhile Ranger 39th Battalion needed reinforcement with 1stairborne battalion.
I read my heart reserve all priorities air-cover and fire power for this fresh new formed 233rd squadron.
Again I repeat where your location …King-Star-3 over?
Reacted quickly “Magic-Club-1, King-Star-3 now at the rendezvous point, over” [a rendezvous point stand for Lao Bao, right at border]
“Surrounding over there about four minutes I will reach you…King-Star-3 did you read me over” I will guided him to the spot for medical evacuation. I contact to friend force, left now and came back 20 minutes later. 2nd battalion radioed back to me and to stop proceeding for a while for relaxation.
Two gun-ships leaving the operational zone, heading to the southeast, still on the treetop, King-Star-3 flying higher than us so couldn’t see us.
“King-Star-3 turn right at 4 o’clock and descending… we will joint in about two minutes … how doing you read me over”
Now we are in combat formation, behind us about 300 yard was dust-off King-Star-3.
“Now we are on the target… King-Star-3 gains altitude to view-bird your LZ…at 12’ o’clock orange panel … We will prep in front underneath of your approach ….be patient”
Meanwhile at high altitude I heard the conversation between OV-10 and operation officer 2nd Airborne Brigade at Hill 30 by Vietnamese language on board of OV-10 Bronco, Vietnamese observer for FAC (forward Air Control) Two Phantom F.4 dropped napalm; they passed over of me so I could identified the kind of aircraft. Now from East, Seven Fleet, the Navy A-4 Sky-haws and F-8 Crusaders precision-dive-bombed, and A-6 Intruders bombers. But the NVA built “phony gun position” for the interpreters of the aerial photographs to find [at Washington surely Haig did care the phony gun position, know that by sophisticated sensors on satellite but he also did care about, his principal author, a prospect congruent with his later involvement in and reaction to the most ROE’ operation] NVA troop set off harmless explosion charges to simulate muzzle flashes for the air observer. They hid the real guns and mortars and rocket launchers in deep pits and in tunnels, fired if necessary. But how can they hide them without my own eyes witnessed. At last the fighter-bombers struck on enemy phony gun position. Haig didn’t care, just practiced exercise combat training
General Giap gave instructed orders regardless the harmful of US artillery at the border, because he was informed by the so called antiwar movement like John F Kerry instead of CIA counterespionage, Russell Flynn Miller. Putting them in vain as built stronghold at west flank; all U.S fire power at border was out of effect, included 16 “Long-Tom” 175mm, 18 Howitzer 155mm, and 8-inch Howitzer just solely reach at east flank.
I repeat “King-Star-3 make approach right ahead of you at 12 o’clock…very safe I will prep on the hill crest at your right side” I speak very slow for calming him, but I did feel there was a damn hot LZ, because our friend didn’t having time for clear the spot LZ . I was been meditate abruptly I waken smart-up due to my gunner played maximum round strafing on the hill crest seeing enemy scurrying down to slop.
Sergeant Duc yelled “Enemy crowded in the middle slop I shot 6,000 rounds per minutes to kill all of them.” I order the wingman shot anti-throng rockets [nail arrows] to the bald hill at right side. I make a hard tough turn to left for second pass, meanwhile Duc pressed the trigger, knowing those six-barrels were going to work just perfectly and spew thousands of rounds into the crowded enemy as the barrels on both flanks of the cockpit spat flame and buzzed like chain saws, their heavy bullets punching into the hot target. Now I could see my wingman a red-orange smoke behind him two by two rockets roaring in over the target, peppering it with his own mini-guns as I rolled in behind him for second run. But on this run I took my time, lining it up, making sure that we’d hammer that hostility enemy
I glanced down at the target “Everything is been cool now.”
King-Star-3 had seen the orange panel in the middle of LZ on the clipped-wood was a real hassle. The spot inclined little bite in left slop. I still ordered the gunners continued strafing less 2,000 round per minutes for neutralized interdiction back and forth evenly on the hill. We understood because the friendly force wouldn’t like created lousy noises when tree cutting for prevention enemy pounding artillery to it.
I contact “Quang Trung…Quang Trung are you in hurry the wounded and remain ready, we will land a couple minutes”
This is worst terrible LZ with the struggle facing a brand new rating pilot; I’m so worry for his landing. However he was trained with “Black Cat” Army Aviation Company at Marble Mountain, Danang. I am so nervous without patient glancing down the LZ the mountainous area was always having turbulence, the up and down drafts. How can he hold his helicopter in stable for hover; His hovering too long caused me increasing the heart beat but I must keep patiently, I dare not disturb him at all; Why he would able land …isn’t something wrong, but I still kept quiet let himself made decision, maybe the LZ couldn’t permit to touch down due to some trees still not cut yet. I flown over and check our troops trying to put in the wounded in cabin because the helicopter wouldn’t able touch on ground. I also saw two black poncho-bags scurrying by a flock of soldiers throw on the board of chopper.
Suddenly the enemy running down to slop standing bold strafing into the chopper, instantly my gunner react by 4,000 rounds into them killed all of them and my wingman continued strafing, in the haze of light fog I could see the tracers at the ratio of one tracer for every fourteen standard rounds scattered evenly on the hot spot, but at the rate those mini-guns fired, the spaced tracers would look like heavy raindrops.
I yelled “That’s enough…all bad guys were already died…stop it” I must spare the fire power for escort him back to Khe Sanh. King-Star-3 still hover in a strange and eerie silence, abruptly I see his main rotor blade trimmed few high-trees underneath; at this point, I knew I was no longer invincible. I could feel my heart thumping in my chest. In the space of few seconds, I had gone from feeling, but keeping so calm wait his reaction.
In my helmet I heard a voice utter faint word, and tried very hard not to groan or cry out with the incredible incident, “Magic-Club-1… my helo’ main rotor chopped the trees, now so hard tough shaken vibration… but I tried to take off…Magic followed escort to me…over”
I firmly respond in conforming voice “tried your best… we always behind you!”
His chopper flying like an untamed horse with so many vertical jerks in every turned cycle, I let him fly any altitude, heading, whatever reaching the home base as soon as he can.
“Easy your airspeed…never passed over 70 knots…O.K”
But fortunately he flies not too high for easy fired target to various kind of antiaircraft artillery; thank to my recent briefing he avoid the west flank of the highest ridge forming the crest and also the terrible AAA’ mobile of PT-76. That’s Okay now we are on low altitude flirting along east flank. I contact US fire power at border pounding cover in front of us. Now we flied over or in the smoke of “Long Tom” residue with confident none bastards underneath. Farther in front of us some vertical column smoke brought the patience of mind, we do feel the burned wood much favorable with somewhat security

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 02-07-2011, 12:11 AM

Operation lam son 719

At last, three helicopters landed at their home base safely. This afternoon had become hotter now toward the end of the rainy season, and the corpses in cabin had deteriorated and bloated enveloped the highland earth-dusted among the bursts of U.S artillery depart.
We must reload fire armament, and refuel right away to continue air cover support for the 2nd Airborne Battalion. I headed back for the largest site at full load fire power, running right along the treetop. We were going to provide fire support for the strayed ground airborne elements. Now two Airborne-compapanies/8th Battalion/3 Brigadier, were ambushed by one separated NVA regiment/320/Div. We’re scrambled over the battle. Two recon/companies just left from high elevated relief to down a stream to get water and be in a state of siege.
Now we advised the Airborne must defense themselves on the hiding spot. We start prep along the creek, on the declined stone slop where NVA standing bold shoot down the stream water. Our experience top-gun performed an accuracy air ground support moderated the rhythm 2,000 rounds per minute to smooth the gun-barrel in preventing jammed fired. First we destroyed in neutralization the hot area by 17pds rockets explosives fire power, in strafing, seeing the tracers at the ratio rounds scattered evenly on the bare rocks and bushes. The spaced tracers would like heavy raindrops. Suddenly, in my helmet I hear a Vietnamese voice on OV-10 Bronco: “Get out the operational area immediately …over here designed for three boxes B-52… but … in five minutes, 42 U.S artilleries from the border will strike cover to Airborne …don’t come back this area … this is a strict order”

The matter was that General Sutherland had apparently been slow to recognize and report those problems much less act aggressively to deal with them. Another senior officer present on the ground judged him to be “very passive,” really “a negative factor” in the operation. Until 23 February, a MACV staff officer told Abrams, “I think it’s fair to say we had no feel that his helicopter situation was quite as acute.” This news precipitated intense reaction at MACV. “The way this thing is supposed to work,” erupted General Abrams, “is that, once I said what the priorities were and what was going to be done around here, goddamn it, then these – USARV’ responsible to have maintenance people up there, keeping track of this, goddamn it! And they should know what’s happened! That’s what hasn’t been done.”
Abrams asked his assistance deputy, General Fred Weyand, how it looked to him. “Well,” he began, focusing on General Sutherland, “I guess I’m not too forgiving on Jock [Sutherland] I recognize the truth of what you’re saying, but goddamn it, you’ve got a corps commander up there who’s supposed to be keeping track of every fucking bird in the place every hour of the day. There’s something wrong there. You’ve got an organizational problem of some kind. He just doesn’t know what the hell’s going on.” Weyand recalled that there had been a battalion on Route 914 for two days before Sutherland was aware of it, even though they knew it…”That tells me that the coordination and tie-in…headquarters and General Lam’s is not fully effective.”
There followed a long pause, several heavy minutes in silence, then he said, “I guess I’d better go up and talk with General McCaffrey now. I just feel we’ve got to get some people up there today who can be feeding the facts back. Move the goddamn men and the tools and the stuff and get with it.” In contrast Abrams recalled enemy side “But goddamn it! –about the maintenance, either they’ve got enough that are well or something. But enemy seem to be to able to work on the roads, keep the trucks going, still fire the antiaircraft, still move the supplies, and unload and load it, backpack it, and all that. So I’d say they’re right on schedule table. I don’t think it means that somehow they’re going to screw it up.
Colonel Sam Cockerham was acting commander of the 1st Aviation Brigade when he got orders to fly north immediately in an aircraft provided by General Abrams. When Cockerham arrived, Abrams was already there, slumped down on the leather sofa in Sutherland’s office.
“Worst fucking OR [Operational Readiness] rate I’ve seen in U.S Army aviation history!”
He exploded by way of conversational openers.
“The entire concept, the entire national strategic concept, is at stake here!” he thundered at Sutherland. Abrams said he was going to give Col Cockerham all theater resources in Vietnam to get the operationally ready rate up to USARV standards. That was 80 percent, 5 percent higher than worldwide Army standards.
Abrams asked Cockerham how long that would take. It was then Monday at about 1:00 pm “By Wednesday night I’ll have it up to standard,” Cockerham replied, perhaps not realizing how bad things were. The UHI-C gunship OR rate, for example, then stood at 25 percent.
“I want a back channel from you to me every twenty-four hour,” Abrams told Cockerham as he left. The meeting made a deep impression on Cockerham, and not just because of the massive task that had been dumped in his lap. “General Sutherland was like a dog with his tail tucked under,” he recalled. “I thought the job was beyond him. He wasn’t prepared. Abrams worked around him.”
Shortly, Brigadier General Sid Berry, then assistant deputy division commander of the 101st Airborne, also played a pivotal role in restoring order to the realm of Army aviation in the operation he went in harm’s way over and over again to make things happen. Said an advisor who was there at the time, “General Sid Berry flew to the most critical areas and got things done that sync – When Lieutenant General Julian Well, unsavory figure pro-Permanent Government visiting Vietnam from this assignment with the U.S negotiation team in Paris, (maybe must be violated ROE for less harmful) went up to Khe Sanh to have a fresh-look around, he was impressed. “Their OR rate when I was up there Sunday was 79 percent,” he said “which I considered astronomical.” What the hell few NVA regiments were destroyed by B-52 carpets. Ironically, when fierce fighting erupted in the Lam Son 719 area of operations, virtually all B-52 took off from Utapao Thailand; those tactical sorties were diverted from interdiction to close air support for less aircrew casualty. “Speed of execution is essential to the success of this operation. An operation dependent solely on air mobility would be subjected to the vagaries of the weather and the considerable enemy antiaircraft artillery (all conventional AAAs) threat in the objective area.” It was also known that formidable air defenses were deployed along the Harriman Highway (Ho Chi Minh trail) and were particularly dense in the Tchepone area [eventually where will the “open-dumpster” of Soviet and U.S out of date weaponry and war materiel]

Pentagon’s traitorous behavior
Neutralization and Interdiction: Pentagon divided airpower to neutralize threat interdict by steady bombardments in three distinctive targets for getting both enemy [NVA] and friend [ARVN]: Northern Flank from Route-9 was responsibility by EC-130B Gun-ship; Southern Flank from Route-9 was Arc Light B-52; and on main-front Route-9 was Sky-spot (tactical fighter aircraft) for this war-game craps. As for my 42 days and night stayed at Airborne Forward Operation Base at Ham Nghi, Khe Sanh, I had been witnessed covered everywhere in the operational area by on treetop skimming maneuver. In the early operational days, General Haig played the battle-game inside the air-conditioner chamber in Pentagon, just followed up on the charts and road-maps. This play game created so much trouble to the 1st ARVN division. He used Arc light B-52 took off from Guam to preplanned strike on schedule that inflicted some casualty to friendly force in southern flank of 1st Infantry Division responsible. Every morning briefing, General Phu 1st division commander must cry-out in radio pushed their men hurry out the area for B-52 carpeted in the next couple hours. And 1st Armor Cavalier Task forces with 8th Airborne Battalion protected them, when they tried to spot on location on Route-9 for recuperated from their operation. Suddenly, the Pentagon staff under General Haig, due to ARVN’ main front force has moved so slowly, not right by the Pentagon road-map preplanned. As the result, an aircraft with a called-sign “Sky-Spot” was scrambled to this area and dropped a CBU-24 Bomb, which containing 600 small bombs like golf-grenade sized. Each golf results when explosion launched the 300 small pieces of steel in injuring vice commander of 8th Airborne Battalion and others numerous soldiers of both Armor 11th /Squadron and Airborne get wounded. As always our flights for air cover tactic low over our friend troop, also lucky day for our gun-ships, if Sky-spot drop bomb explosive “snack-eyes” our gun-ships should be absorbed all of their goddamn fragments. All long night of 5th March I heard intermitted throngs of B-52 ferocious onslaught around Tchepone and early 6th March MC-130 dropped bomb BLU-82AL [Aluminum is a silvery white and ductile member of the boron group of chemical elements, it has the symbol AL; it atomic number 13 … power and polystyrene (FAE) consist only of an agent and a dispersing mechanism and take their oxidizers from the oxygen in the air]
After 25th February, so many casualties of ARVN and U.S Air cavalier, General Haig assigned Colonel James Vaught to the so called ARVN Airborne Division Advisor, but in reality Vaught should be Haig’s eyes on the operational spot. He will wear monitoring error, and closed to General Phu 1st Division Commander. Particularly, where Landing Zone LoLo, the U.S helicopters was shot down to describe the falling leaves, Colonel James Vaught what to do to reduce, slow down the suffering? He began to manage B-52 campaign from “Rolling Thunder” to “Linebacker” means access to air ground closed support and protect friend troop from 300 meters, thereby no more NVA ambush near our troop. From now on, Vaught has to react and kill some thousands NVA troops thank to B-52 access support, artillery Long-tom 175 and 16 tactical aircrafts F-8 Crusader, A-6 Intruder from 7th Fleet. Typically, for short period to campaign medical evacuation, supply by renew tactical: Such as B-52 carpeted on front West, U.S artillery was strike on front East, and tactical aircraft pounded alternately to the North fence; Leave now South of the approach gate in and out for 20 helicopters Huey in exclusive, air assault two airborne companies move to LZ, whether to unload small ammunition and supplies, small quantity gasoline to full set cavalry. Three UH1-Hs got hit but still accomplished mission; continues to fly 3 consecutive lifts back and forth, we called Horse-shoes tactic.

[General Phu committed suicide for the betrayal a trusted friend, General Vaught: At the time damage, was change, in the time Saigon Fall, the new information brought to the week of General Phu for the betrayal of United States ally. Extract a paragraph in the document: Furthermore, General Phu Lam Son 719’s friend, General James Vaught, an American buddy asked him for advice, General had refused because he claimed that the Paris Accords prohibited lending him such help. Not even advice from an old and trusted friend. Who would have known? It was only the two of them, yet General Vaught, still, had said no!]

But right now, this moment, Colonel James Vaught was an Airborne advisor, his first command shows the prestige, guaranty, confidence of his interference with military operations to less casualty necessity; The lest retreat trajectory withdrawal in security. When the 1st Armor Brigade retreat to the branch of Xepon River together with two airborne battalions; How their crossing the river, Colonel Vaught gave some instructions to Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, 1st Brigade Commander and also for counter balance of dispensary destroyed-trucks: “Let all truck rolling by wheels, stayed remains for B-52 destroyed as similar to B-52 was destroyed all NVA trucks on the Parking No-2, in the early day SAC bombardment”

(Continued)

**vinhtruong** · 02-14-2011, 01:56 AM

Operation lam son 719

FIRE SUPPORT BASE, HILL-31 WAS IN DESPERATE: The NVA’ thrust was assisted by tanks. The fighting became fiercer and fiercer, and both side suffered heavy casualties. The 39th ranger battalion bravely battled on despite being low on ammunition. They resisted for one day and one night, before the position was lost. The battalion had to retreat toward the 21st ranger battalion’s position in the south. Having successfully occupied the hill, the NVA moved west and south west to threaten the 21st and the 3rd Airborne Brigade was well-supported by tactical air power. Despite heavy lost, the NVA continued to storm FSB 31 in the face of long and short range heavy Long Tom 175 artilleries. Although forewarned of enemy intentions, the 3rd Airborne Brigade failed to establish an effective defense, and shared the same fate of the 39th Ranger battalion. It had fought with courage and bravado, but succumbed to the massive suicidal onslaught of the NVA. The Brigade Staff, including Colonel Tho was captured. Some evaded and ran southwards toward FSB 30 which was occupied by the 2ndAirborne battalion. Even as they assaulted the 3rd Airborne Brigade Headquarter, the NVA pounded away at FSB 30 and A-loui FSB where the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 1st Armor Brigade were positioned. These two units were unable to give assistance to the 3rd Airborne Brigade at FSB 31, although help was sought of them.
As late as 27 February, three weeks into the operation, MACV J-2 was carrying only seven enemy regiments in the Lam Son area of operations, up from six with the arrival of the 324B Division’s, and separated 29th Regiment. Of the twenty-one enemy battalions then committed, five were assessed as having been rendered combat ineffective due to casualties. Nevertheless, fierce fighting was in progress all along Route 9 and at the positions ARVN had staked out north and south of it, especially at Fire Support Base 31 to the north. There an enemy attack that included tanks and armored PT-76 overran a brigade headquarters of the Airborne Division and captured the brigade commander, Colonel Tho and his staff-officers. As same as the 39th Ranger Battalion was also pressured into abandoning its position, joining the nearby 21st Ranger Battalion, after which both were evacuated from Laos.
At the Hill 31, thirteen days after General Dong and Colonel Tho commander 3rd Brigade, stationed on Fire Support Base 31 had have a short briefing for imminent “Hill-Fights”. A squad of 3th Battalion/3rd Airborne Brigade forward observer party from Hill-31 was ambushed in a grove of bamboo, often clever bunkers tunneled under thick bamboo clumps, providing NVA with a natural cover; on Hill 875 northwest of the Hill-31. There was clusters of intertwining ridges, the highest ridge forming the crest that gave the hill mass its designation by height in meters. Four airborne soldiers survived. This was the first and the cruelest struggle at Hill-31 vicinity, the “Hill Fights” began.
General Dong had been right that to hold this Hill-31 the airborne would have to garrison the hill-ranges that dominated the valley. The NVA understood this and seized the hills. A regiment from the NVA’ 320 Division marched in through the pea-soup fog and under the low clouds clinging over the crests of the monsoon and occupied Hill 875 and the two hills beyond it – 888 south and 888 North. A second regiment from this division hid itself in a reserve position behind the hills. It was subsequently discovered that NVA combat engineer troops had probably been at work on the three hills for long months without being detected by the ARVN Joint Staff Headquarters before the main body of general’s infantry arrived. Dong wanted to keep this Hill-31 less-vulnerable. The Airborne 3rd Brigade therefore had to drive the NVA from the heights. They did not know the strength of the enemy they faced, nor did they suspect the nature of the battleground the General Giap’ troops had prepared.
For four days two airborne battalions – initially the battalion stationed at Hill-31, quickly followed by the 6th Airborne Battalion under a Brigade/J-3 Command Group sent to take charge – attempted to clear Hill 875. The word “Hill” is field shorthand for what is properly called a “hill-mass” in military terminology. Hill 875 and Hill 888 South and 888 North were clusters of intertwining ridges, the highest ridge forming the crest that gave the hill mass its designation by height in meters. Hills 888 South and 888 North happened to be the same height and so were differentiated by the fact that one was north of the other.
The NVA troops on Hill 875 let the 6th Battalion Airborne climb the ridges to within fifteen to twenty meters, then raked the Airborne with fusillades from positions concealed in the undergrowth. Shells hurled by 82, and 120mm mortars which burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern, from unseen pits somewhere back in the ridgelines crashed into the Airborne, killing and wounding more of them. Counter-fired by the Airborne mortars, salvos of high explosive and white phosphorous from the howitzers 155 at the Fire Support Base 31, 30 strafing and rocket runs by our UHI-H gun-ships, and bombs and napalm from the tactical fighter jet from Thailand and Navy, Marine in of shore Pacific interrupted but did not silence the enemy mortars or discourage the Giap’ infantry. When the 6th Battalion Airborne tried to disengage, The NVA would not let go. They followed the Airborne, harrying them with automatic-weapons fire. The Airborne could not evacuate their wounded. Whenever they called in our helicopter for medical evacuation would plaster the landing zone with mortar 120mm shells. That missions must aborted due to so heavy enemy pressure in fire power.
The two Airborne-battalions were subjected to separate. Two Airborne/Rec/Companies of the 8th Airborne Battalion were on the northwest side of Hill 875, the battalion with the Brigade J-3 command and control told the 6th Airborne Battalion to link up with the 8th Airborne Battalion which he was attached. The Lieutenant Colonel J-3 leading the 6th Battalion replied that after four days of combat he did not have enough able-bodied men left to carry the dead and wounded that far. Airborne abhor abandoning their dead because of the mystical comradeship of the traditional Airborne Division. Leave the dead, the Brigade- Commander ordered. The Lt Col answered that he still would not have enough able-bodied Airborne to carry out the wounded, and wounded Airborne cannot be abandoned under any circumstances. He said he was pulling into a nearby bank of fog to hide from the mortars fragmentations and “fight until it was over” against the Giap’ infantry he was certain would follow.
The artillery officer back at the Hill-31 had his batteries walk shells to the battalion through the fog. He circled the beleaguered men with shrapnel, as Sergeant Hung had done to save Nguyen’s lost platoon. Litters for the wounded were improvised out of ponchos; the dead were slung in ponchos to be carried too; and the Airborne gathered up all of the riffles and equipment. When the column set out to march back through the darkness and rain and a pea-soup-fog that thickened with the lowering temperatures of the night, only the men at the point and the rear guard walked without burdens –the periodic downpours turned the dirt of the trails into slippery red-mud. The days had become hotter now toward the end of the rainy season, and the corpses had deteriorated and bloated. Many times during the night the Airborne carrying one of the dead stumbled and the body fell out of the poncho and rolled down the slope. The column halted. The body was retrieved and laid in the poncho again, and the march resumed. When the Airborne reached safety at dawn they had left none of their comrades behind.
The 8th Battalion also disengaged with the help of Armor unit 11th and 17th for the approach- reinforcements. The two depleted battalions (6th and 8th Airborne Battailions) were reorganized by one thrust attack-front still below the Hill-30, and the Airborne built up their forces at the highest ridge to two battalions under at 3rd Brigade command post at Hill-31 while the 105s of Airborne, the 155s of B/44th Artillery Battalion, U.S artillery at Khe Sanh’ 175 firing from one of the strongpoint back across the mountains, the fighter-bombers battered and burned Hill 888 for a full day and night. A combined airborne force then assaults the hill. But Giap’ troop was gone. They had apparently withdrawn to the next hill close nearby Hill-31 maybe they changed the tactical maneuvers? 888 South, possibly soon after the fight with the two Airborne 8th and 6th Battalions and before the worst of the bombardment had begun Giap’ troop left many of their dead behind; Otherwise, as the Airborne combined force after-action report noted, “the battle area was extremely well policed by the Giap’ troop; virtually no equipment or information of intelligence value remained.” The Airborne did count twenty-eight bunkers on Hill 888, and they found 300 foxholes on and around it and mortar pits on the back slopes. The overhead cover on a number of the bunkers was six feet high in layers of bamboo and packed earth and grass, [of course they had plenty time for these establishments] thick enough to protect the NVA troops inside from a direct hit by the artillery. The bunkers should have made the Airborne combined brigadier-force and battalion commanders suspicious.
The Airborne that launched another headlong assault against Hill 888 South after another day and night of battering and burning attacked right into a man trap. The NVA held fire once more until the lead squads were fifteen to twenty meters from the bunkers in the undergrowth and the opening volley would have maximum killing effect. Sniper hidden in trees not yet knocked down by bombs and shells picked out radio operators and machine gunners and killed them carefully with a single accuracy shot through the head or the chest. At the same moment, salvos of 120mm mortar shells again exploded among the Airborne. The NVA didn’t seem to mind calling mortar fire so close that they were, in effect, bringing it down on their own positions. In this moment, our gunship was contacted with airborne lead platoons putting on their heads and shoulders the ‘orange panel’ to easier identification friend and foe and also we can count on to air close-support in front of them 100 meters on spewing mini-guns 4,000 round per minutes that I was convinced in neutralization every snipers being killed, though the rockets detonated on the branches that help killing snipers too. Obviously we made flight circus so lower above friendly troops for security.
Airborne are unsurpassed as assault troops, and these Airborne pressed forward with the classic aggressiveness instilled by the Airborne tradition-motto. They discovered that the farther they fought their way into the NVA position, the more resistance they encountered and the worse their situation became. Soon those men still capable of fighting were unable to go forward or back. The fire from the bunkers, foxholes, and trenches in front was withering. Meanwhile, NVA in bunkers the Airborne had fought their way past were back in action behind them and had cut off their retreat.
I did know so well that the North Vietnam Communist anted “violent, close-quarters combat” because it “tends to diminish the effectiveness” of air and artillery was turning out to be something of an understatement; so our gunship with accuracy fire support encouraged the Airborne’ morale. The Airborne-men on 888 South were feeling the extent of the diminishment. While General Dong, Air Borne Division commander had been thinking about ports and warehouses for his attrition machine, the NVA had been learning better ways to fight the Airborne. There were not twice as many bunkers on 888-South as the Airborne troops had found on Hill 875, there were eight times as many, and the approximately 260 bunkers on this hill were astonishingly rugged. The smaller ones, apparently two or three-man affairs had been constructed with roof consisting of two layers of logs topped by five feet of dirt. Larger four-man bunkers had still better protection overhead and, before the battle, had served as fairly comfortable living quarters. They were fitted with storage shelves, bamboo-mat floors, and a drainage system to keep them dry. The largest bunkers, clearly the command posts, had roof with four to eight layers of logs and then four feet of packed earth above the logs. Field telephone wire had been strung throughout the bunker complex so that the NVA battalion, company, and platoon commanders could talk to each other during the battle and they and the forward observers could adjust the mortars by calling instructions to the crews in the pits on the rear slopes.
After long day-and-night bombardment of the hill that had seemed so awesomely destructive to the watching Airborne had been mainly celebrated holiday-fireworks. The rockets detonated on the branches or the overhead cover of the bunkers, and the machine-gun bullets and 20mm cannon shells didn’t penetrate anything either. Most of the napalm burned in the trees. The howitzer shells 105s, 155s, 175s and even 8-inch gun did give the Giap’ troops in the bunkers headaches. The bombs were more frightening, extremely difficult to bear. The concussion from them gave some of the NVA troops bleeding noses and ears, but the bombs usually did not kill or disable either.
Prior to the assault on the morning of February 21, the fighter-bombers had dropped no 750-pounders and only a small number of 1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs on Hill 888 South. Almost all of the bombs had been the 250- and 500-pound “Snake-eye” type preferred by the Marine pilots and their Navy and Air Force counterparts. Snake-eye bombs have large tail fins that unfold after released to retard descent so that the bomb can be launched from low altitude in a slow, parabolic trajectory that allows the aircraft time to fly clear of the blast and fragmentation. Jets can bomb accurately from a low, relatively flat approach and the weather over here also encouraged the use of Snake-eyes. The U.S pilots had to be prepared to fly anywhere. With one part of the Vietnam’s weather or the other always in a monsoon, they frequently encountered low cloud ceilings. At Khe Sanh in late February and early March 1971, the ceiling was often 1,000 feet or less-melee with fog. To drop the heavier 750-, 1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs accurately and escape the blast and fragments, a pilot had to take a high-angle approach akin to dive-bombing and pull away at a good height. An approach like this was dangerous when the clouds were down and the air space around a target was crowded. The NVA had also observed this practice of the U.S pilots. The bunkers were sturdy enough to withstand anything but a direct or close hit by a 250- or 500-pound Snake-eye bomb, infrequent in practice.

(Continued)

Operation lam son 719

Operation lam son 719

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