vinhtruong
02-23-2013, 04:31 AM
( theothermccain.com/2011/07/26/war-hero-who-attested-to-john-kerrys... )
by Vinh Truong
‘War Hero’ Who Attested to John Kerry’s Vietnam Heroism Turns Out to Be Liar and Kiddie Porn … Um, ‘Researcher’
As a result for Lam Son 719 News Summary, stirring war under pressure of the Axis of Evil''s scam
You may read some articles on Operation Lam Son 719 or hear about its controversial hindsight, because the real author of this operation is NSC [Permanent Government's masterminded] the following story is my witnessed from view of bird, on the gunship at treetop maneuver for 42 days in mission
What's the hell to deal honestly with ... What's the truth natural phenomenon of this operation? Why don't start sooner ... ?and wait for all the ammunition already moved to the southern on Harriman's Highway, completed cargo overwhelming over corridor ... then start operational search and destroy later? (Several NVA prisoners indeed disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to south corridor that The ARVN appeared not to be surprised at all; by contrast, Giap had been prepared and expecting our forces to come in. This led to the conclusion that several things concerning the enemy had eluded our collection capabilities)
This Vietnam War' largest battle considers as Korea War Inchon, and WWII Normandy, both were two amphibious operations whereas operation Lam Son 719 was an air-assault operation. Who knew since all three wars initiated by an U.S totalitarian WIB-Bones in War Industries Board'' masterminded. Meanwhile in this photo, the secret ''Pennsylvania-game'' players, it was the ultimate team effort laughingly faces, cold blood; and every member of the team had to have the skills of a quarterback: Kissinger. The grit of a linebacker: Helms. And the brains of a coach: Republican George H W Bush, a successor to the throne of the Skull and Bones Dynasty, Second generation, but a simple surrogate totalitarian as Democrat William A Harriman. Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war - but also one doomed to failure right from the start. Due to cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Americans all the written plans had to be translated and the translators was largely WIB'' antiwar-activist [counterespionage] as Lt John-F-Kerry via triple-cross mediator Pham-Xuan-An, and few Vietnamese double- cross translator-sympathies to General Giap who engaged to OSS by Agent-Number 19(Lucius Conein), in sanctuary Pat-Po in 1945 [photograph by Allan Squiers] Consequently, Hanoi had copies of the whole documentation in hands almost as soon as South Vietnamese and US Army commanders of participating units. Additionally, neither the Americans nor the South Vietnamese knew the terrain really well, while the NVA troops were well-prepared for defense. Meanwhile, the foreign media''s field reporters were particularly biased against the South Vietnamese, and were always ready to play up ARVN failures, and spread bad publicity. The media actually dwelt a detrimental role to the Operation of Lam Son 719. Even the BBC Radio ruined the ARVN" element of surprise by broadcasting that Tchepone had been invaded, [similarity BBC while been Saigon fall] when in reality, the ARVN had only achieved Phase-One i. e only half of the objective, due to President Thieu ordered early-out. Thus the NVA were forewarned of the possibility of our invading Tchepone. This forced the ARVN to hastily tactical carry through with the objectives in an attempt to save face ... touch down took picture and go home no deployment.
Operation Lam Son 719 in the early of February 1971 was theoretically planned to take and destroy sanctuary base located in Tchepone, a small town in southern of Laos. Intelligence analysts stated that the NVA-Corps 70B had built many large storages stocked with weapons ammunitions, logistic supplies and foods. Also this base was used as a resource for refreshing troop replacement and training on the operational spot for the NVA units after battled with ARVN troop, backed by this base the 70B forces crossed the Laos-Vietnam border to attack the Quang Tri province. In the south of base 604 closer to the border, there was base 611, and from this base the NVA could launch attacks into the city of Hue, Thua thien Province. This operation also carried an important political phenomenon in the so called "Vietnamization-Program," but in the reality was as a dumping ground for U.S and Soviet cast off out of date weapons. No American infantry soldier landed feet in the land of Laos all American advisors attached to the ARVN units were ordered to stay in land South Vietnam.
The so called a test of Vietnamization? By a secret order from Emperor-1 [Harriman] for several years ago in preplanned schedule agenda. The eastern part of the Laotian panhandle was just reserved to use by 559 Group [Giap'' troop] as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel and materials required to sustain its war efforts in South Vietnam and Cambodia which were untouchable. In addition to the Harriman''s Highway [Ho chi Minh Trail] the eastern panhandle contained many logistic installations and base areas. After the 18 March 1970 change of government in Cambodia which closed the seaport of Sihanoukville to the enemy [PM Lon-Nol changed, renamed Kompong Som Seaport] this trail-base area complex in lower Laos became even more and more important to North Vietnam in its prosecution of the war in the South. The real hub of this entire complex, where transportation and storage activities were coordinated, was Base Area 604 located west of the Demilitarized Zone and surrounding the district town of Tchepone. To disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies into South Vietnam, a ground attack was launched across the Laotian border against this enemy hub of activity on 8 February 1971. But too late due to every huge cargo were already moved to the South recently. Operation Lam Son 719 was conducted by I Corps with substantial U.S. support in firepower and airlift but without the participation of U.S. advisers with those ARVN units fighting in Laos. As a test by a political term such as Vietnamization, this operation was to demonstrate also the progress achieved in combat effectiveness by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, Lam Son 719 achieved the objective of forestalling a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971.
The so called Ho Chi Minh Trail was just Western named it, but Hanoi called Route 559, and I myself, named Harriman''s Highway. Recently, before 1959 that named Truong-Son Route range means West mountainous-chain Route. A byproduct of the French''s First Indochina War, 1946-1954, the footpath system that ran North- South along the Truong Son Mountain Range trail of Vietnam became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail since the Second period of Vietnam-Wars 1954-75. For a long time it had served the strategic purposes of the Viet Minh (Allies Forces) From its jungle redoubt of North Vietnam''s highlands, the Viet Minh High Command was faced with the pressing need for a secure communication system that would enable it to direct the war effort in South Vietnam and support its subversive activities in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. National Route-1 which ran parallel to the coastline was not practicable because of French control. Sea routes were available but the risks of running into French naval patrols and foul weather were forbiddingly high. Besides, the Viet Minh did not have a reliable organized sea transportation fleet. Considering these circumstances, the heavily mountainous-jungle of the Truong Son Range lent themselves to the establishment of a secure line of communication generally free from observation and attacks. It was this footpath system that kept the Viet Minh resistance in South Vietnam alive with fresh troops, weapons and ammunition. By the end of the First Indochina War, the Truong- Son Trail had been well developed although it was only a system of jungle paths connected by local secondary roads and suitable only to movement by foot, animals and bicycles. Soldiers moved on foot but military Supplies, although usually carried by manpower, were sometimes transported on bicycles, oxcarts, horses or elephants. The narrow, steep pathways meandered through dense jungles, across streams and mountains and a journey on the trail was exhausting and slow. For a time after the Geneva Accords in 1954, the trail was practically abandoned since the war had ended. Then, when South Vietnam, under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, began restoring its stability and proving that it could stand on its own after repudiating reunification with North Vietnam. Also determined by President Diem'' attempted sent TASK Forces composed Ranger, Airborne, Armor, and engineering ... Field-Commander Colonel Do Cao Tri to destroy a certain section of the trail, and now and then stayed in south Laos for couple months, Attopeu Province vicinity - So why President Diem must be murdered by WIB Bones order.
Unfortunately, by subject to stirring war under pressure of the Axis of Evil's scam, The KGB oppressed the Central Committee of North Vietnam''s Communist Party decided to stir on a new course of action against South Vietnam. Subsequently in May 1959, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) High Command activated Transportation Group 559, assigned Brigadier General Vo-Bam in charge as commander, under the direct control of its Rear Service (Logistics) Department. Group 559 was to be a special unit in charge of moving men and supplies into the South for the support of the insurgency effort which had just been initiated under the form of a "war of liberation." The trail''s old pathways were rehabilitated and widened, and new ones were surveyed and projected. Group 559''s task of enlarging this strategic axis of infiltration was pushed ahead with vigor and determination. The increase of subversive activities against South Vietnam was in almost direct proportion to the development of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, since the Communist war effort in the South was largely sustained by a constant flow of cadre and troops from the North. At this early stage, the flow was sporadic because the journey was harsh and long for the men and the means of transporting supplies still primitive. But as pathways were eventually enlarged into roads, the means of transportation were also improved. Prior to 1965, the Ho Chi Minh system was close to the Vietnam border, but after the United States became involved in the war and bombings increased, the Communists gradually shifted toward the west where they found the densely jungle areas of lower Laos and eastern Cambodia perfect sanctuaries for the movement or concentration of troops and the storage of weapons and war materials, but it seemed to me, there will a new Inter-Indochinese-Highway for next century - Also in the Harriman''s strategic scope, West Truong Son shall be the IIH [Indochina International Highway] for whether economical or military purpose and B-52 for mountain demolition plus C-123 "hot Tip" air defoliation for route tracking pathfinder, and along corridor scattered plants emit-sensors monitored NVA'' activities. But importantly the NVA troop was the very debut pioneer discovered and building the Route-I.I.H.
Unsurprisingly, by the end of 1960s, the Harriman Highway had become an elaborate system of nearly 2,000 miles of pathways and roads, including some natural waterway. It started at Vinh Province ran through the Mu-Gia Pass and other lesser passes such as Ban Karai Pass and Ban Raving Pass, penetrated into lower Laos and finally came out in northern Cambodia and the Tri-Border area of South Vietnam. In several areas, the trail system was so extensive that it could be compared to a cobweb of crisscrossing roads making up a corridor of from 20 to 40 miles wide, complete with rock-stone-bridges (over or under water photos by my Queen-Bee H-34) culverts, river crossing ramps, much of it concealed under dense jungle canopies. With the assistance of Pathet Lao guerrillas, the estimated 50,000 troops of NVA Group 559 and about 100,000 porters Vietnamese volunteers and forced laborers maintained these vital-arteries. To protect the corridor, the Communists established an elaborate defense and security system. The duty of Pathet Lao units was to intensify guerrilla activities and launch periodic attacks in order to keep the Royal Lao Army confined to the cities and towns along the Mekong River. The protection of the trail system and storage areas was performed by Group 559 itself. Augmented by infantry units and unattached militiamen, the group defense forces included AAA: [anti-aircraft artillery, the most'' cast off WW-II of Soviet weapons] units armed with all types of light and heavy weapons, from 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm and 23-mm heavy machineguns to 37-mm, 57-mm and 85 or 100-mm anti-aircraft cannons. Group 559 installed a forward headquarters in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam from where it controlled many ''binh trams'' (literally troop Camp-stations) In 1970 there were about 40 such camp-stations, from Vinh Province to the Cambodian border, under the control of a number of intermediary headquarters. Each binh-tram was a self contained, logistical complex. During the cessation of bombings in North Vietnam, trucks moved by convoy from Vinh Province down the trail. Upon reaching the Laotian border, they formed units of five to eight vehicles and usually moved only at night in keeping under umbrella ROE stipulation of Axe of Evil''s craps or in foul weather in order to avoid the round the clock bombing by United States Air Force planes [US Pilots had no equipped with laser targeting pods or Smart bombs or night vision goggles] As a result, "Binh trams" were usually separated from one another by a day''s journey and their parking areas were scattered and well concealed. [However, General Haig in Pentagon War-Room with sophisticated radar which could monitor-control in follow-up all those activities on Trail with synchronized help of sensors on spot] The vehicles moving on the trail only transported supplies and heavy materials. Light equipment was either carried on men''s backs or by animals. Since troops had to march, they moved by day or night, using pathways different from those used by trucks. New recruits or replacements usually entered the system at Vinh Province in North Vietnam and often marched over 100 days to reach their final destination in South Vietnam. In view of this long journey, they had to rest and recuperate at way stations where they received food, medicine and indoctrinations. Combat units usually moved by battalions of 500-600 men each and they often suffered substantial losses from disease and constant bombings by the U.S. Air Force.
Because the War-Architect Harriman who protected this Route 559 at any price During the period from 1960 to 1965 [Certainly, Operation Lam Son 719 never took place as from 1960-65] while the fighting escalated, the South Vietnam was unable to do anything against the Laos infiltration Route because Harriman. However another hand, the U.S Permanent Government would like a big occasion for training the U.S combat troops, with strategic-slogan to the so called "Everything worked but not worked enough." Thereby made a significant contribution in 1961 when it helped organize the highlands Montagnards into combat units call-sign ''CIDG'' and develop the Vietnamese Special Forces for the defense of the border areas [just for the craps to US combat training] The so called against Communist activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail [Harriman Highway] however, neither the U.S Army Special Forces nor their Vietnamese counterparts ever interdicted the Communist logistics system to a significant degree, even during the period of maximum effort. Also, the idea of building the "McNamara Line" with scattered sensors across the Harriman Highway corridor mountain range at the Southern boundary of the DMZ was never fully implemented as planned. The surveillance and interdiction of the trail, therefore, lay primarily in the hands of the U.S. Air Force whose reconnaissance planes covered the trail system around the clock by U-2, RF-101 Woodo and our helicopter H-34s Queen-Bee as well. Ground electronic sensors drop-planted along jungle pathways, river crossings, and mountain passes picked up vehicle and other man made noises, transmitted them to over flying planes which relayed the information to terminal stations to be analyzed and interpreted. The electronic monitoring of enemy activities on the trail system helped record the number of vehicles and men moving along the trail. Consequently, intelligence on Communist infiltration was remarkably reliable. In addition to surveillance, a major task for the United States Air Force was training exercise to interdict this infiltration. All types of aircraft were used including B-52 strategic bombers, sophisticated fighter-bombers and several types of EC-130B gun-ships. The U.S. Air Force claimed that its bombs and improved weapons systems inflicted heavy losses to the enemy in terms of personnel, vehicles and materiel moving down there? But in reality, it seemed to me that B-52 was on job mountainous demolition in "Rolling Thunder campaign" no kill, but created many ponds for NVA troops having swimming pool and laundry. And Air defoliation from C-123 "Hot Tip campaign" for ground pioneers build-road follow up tracking brownish clover path to the south.
Thereby, The Coolbert: When TRUONG speaks we all need to listen. US have a web site dedicated to discussion of the Second Indo China War. It might be interesting to engage in dialog with him language barriers aside
Coolbert,
Posted by Albert E, at 7: 37 PM/14/April/2012
Labels: Vietnam
Those “reasons” as enunciated by Dayan [thanks to van Creveld] and TRUONG valid as stated but immaterial as to the REAL REASON? Those “reasons” as enunciated by Dayan [thanks to van Creveld] and TRUONG valid as stated but immaterial as to the REAL REASON?
by Vinh Truong
‘War Hero’ Who Attested to John Kerry’s Vietnam Heroism Turns Out to Be Liar and Kiddie Porn … Um, ‘Researcher’
As a result for Lam Son 719 News Summary, stirring war under pressure of the Axis of Evil''s scam
You may read some articles on Operation Lam Son 719 or hear about its controversial hindsight, because the real author of this operation is NSC [Permanent Government's masterminded] the following story is my witnessed from view of bird, on the gunship at treetop maneuver for 42 days in mission
What's the hell to deal honestly with ... What's the truth natural phenomenon of this operation? Why don't start sooner ... ?and wait for all the ammunition already moved to the southern on Harriman's Highway, completed cargo overwhelming over corridor ... then start operational search and destroy later? (Several NVA prisoners indeed disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to south corridor that The ARVN appeared not to be surprised at all; by contrast, Giap had been prepared and expecting our forces to come in. This led to the conclusion that several things concerning the enemy had eluded our collection capabilities)
This Vietnam War' largest battle considers as Korea War Inchon, and WWII Normandy, both were two amphibious operations whereas operation Lam Son 719 was an air-assault operation. Who knew since all three wars initiated by an U.S totalitarian WIB-Bones in War Industries Board'' masterminded. Meanwhile in this photo, the secret ''Pennsylvania-game'' players, it was the ultimate team effort laughingly faces, cold blood; and every member of the team had to have the skills of a quarterback: Kissinger. The grit of a linebacker: Helms. And the brains of a coach: Republican George H W Bush, a successor to the throne of the Skull and Bones Dynasty, Second generation, but a simple surrogate totalitarian as Democrat William A Harriman. Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war - but also one doomed to failure right from the start. Due to cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Americans all the written plans had to be translated and the translators was largely WIB'' antiwar-activist [counterespionage] as Lt John-F-Kerry via triple-cross mediator Pham-Xuan-An, and few Vietnamese double- cross translator-sympathies to General Giap who engaged to OSS by Agent-Number 19(Lucius Conein), in sanctuary Pat-Po in 1945 [photograph by Allan Squiers] Consequently, Hanoi had copies of the whole documentation in hands almost as soon as South Vietnamese and US Army commanders of participating units. Additionally, neither the Americans nor the South Vietnamese knew the terrain really well, while the NVA troops were well-prepared for defense. Meanwhile, the foreign media''s field reporters were particularly biased against the South Vietnamese, and were always ready to play up ARVN failures, and spread bad publicity. The media actually dwelt a detrimental role to the Operation of Lam Son 719. Even the BBC Radio ruined the ARVN" element of surprise by broadcasting that Tchepone had been invaded, [similarity BBC while been Saigon fall] when in reality, the ARVN had only achieved Phase-One i. e only half of the objective, due to President Thieu ordered early-out. Thus the NVA were forewarned of the possibility of our invading Tchepone. This forced the ARVN to hastily tactical carry through with the objectives in an attempt to save face ... touch down took picture and go home no deployment.
Operation Lam Son 719 in the early of February 1971 was theoretically planned to take and destroy sanctuary base located in Tchepone, a small town in southern of Laos. Intelligence analysts stated that the NVA-Corps 70B had built many large storages stocked with weapons ammunitions, logistic supplies and foods. Also this base was used as a resource for refreshing troop replacement and training on the operational spot for the NVA units after battled with ARVN troop, backed by this base the 70B forces crossed the Laos-Vietnam border to attack the Quang Tri province. In the south of base 604 closer to the border, there was base 611, and from this base the NVA could launch attacks into the city of Hue, Thua thien Province. This operation also carried an important political phenomenon in the so called "Vietnamization-Program," but in the reality was as a dumping ground for U.S and Soviet cast off out of date weapons. No American infantry soldier landed feet in the land of Laos all American advisors attached to the ARVN units were ordered to stay in land South Vietnam.
The so called a test of Vietnamization? By a secret order from Emperor-1 [Harriman] for several years ago in preplanned schedule agenda. The eastern part of the Laotian panhandle was just reserved to use by 559 Group [Giap'' troop] as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel and materials required to sustain its war efforts in South Vietnam and Cambodia which were untouchable. In addition to the Harriman''s Highway [Ho chi Minh Trail] the eastern panhandle contained many logistic installations and base areas. After the 18 March 1970 change of government in Cambodia which closed the seaport of Sihanoukville to the enemy [PM Lon-Nol changed, renamed Kompong Som Seaport] this trail-base area complex in lower Laos became even more and more important to North Vietnam in its prosecution of the war in the South. The real hub of this entire complex, where transportation and storage activities were coordinated, was Base Area 604 located west of the Demilitarized Zone and surrounding the district town of Tchepone. To disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies into South Vietnam, a ground attack was launched across the Laotian border against this enemy hub of activity on 8 February 1971. But too late due to every huge cargo were already moved to the South recently. Operation Lam Son 719 was conducted by I Corps with substantial U.S. support in firepower and airlift but without the participation of U.S. advisers with those ARVN units fighting in Laos. As a test by a political term such as Vietnamization, this operation was to demonstrate also the progress achieved in combat effectiveness by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, Lam Son 719 achieved the objective of forestalling a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971.
The so called Ho Chi Minh Trail was just Western named it, but Hanoi called Route 559, and I myself, named Harriman''s Highway. Recently, before 1959 that named Truong-Son Route range means West mountainous-chain Route. A byproduct of the French''s First Indochina War, 1946-1954, the footpath system that ran North- South along the Truong Son Mountain Range trail of Vietnam became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail since the Second period of Vietnam-Wars 1954-75. For a long time it had served the strategic purposes of the Viet Minh (Allies Forces) From its jungle redoubt of North Vietnam''s highlands, the Viet Minh High Command was faced with the pressing need for a secure communication system that would enable it to direct the war effort in South Vietnam and support its subversive activities in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. National Route-1 which ran parallel to the coastline was not practicable because of French control. Sea routes were available but the risks of running into French naval patrols and foul weather were forbiddingly high. Besides, the Viet Minh did not have a reliable organized sea transportation fleet. Considering these circumstances, the heavily mountainous-jungle of the Truong Son Range lent themselves to the establishment of a secure line of communication generally free from observation and attacks. It was this footpath system that kept the Viet Minh resistance in South Vietnam alive with fresh troops, weapons and ammunition. By the end of the First Indochina War, the Truong- Son Trail had been well developed although it was only a system of jungle paths connected by local secondary roads and suitable only to movement by foot, animals and bicycles. Soldiers moved on foot but military Supplies, although usually carried by manpower, were sometimes transported on bicycles, oxcarts, horses or elephants. The narrow, steep pathways meandered through dense jungles, across streams and mountains and a journey on the trail was exhausting and slow. For a time after the Geneva Accords in 1954, the trail was practically abandoned since the war had ended. Then, when South Vietnam, under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, began restoring its stability and proving that it could stand on its own after repudiating reunification with North Vietnam. Also determined by President Diem'' attempted sent TASK Forces composed Ranger, Airborne, Armor, and engineering ... Field-Commander Colonel Do Cao Tri to destroy a certain section of the trail, and now and then stayed in south Laos for couple months, Attopeu Province vicinity - So why President Diem must be murdered by WIB Bones order.
Unfortunately, by subject to stirring war under pressure of the Axis of Evil's scam, The KGB oppressed the Central Committee of North Vietnam''s Communist Party decided to stir on a new course of action against South Vietnam. Subsequently in May 1959, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) High Command activated Transportation Group 559, assigned Brigadier General Vo-Bam in charge as commander, under the direct control of its Rear Service (Logistics) Department. Group 559 was to be a special unit in charge of moving men and supplies into the South for the support of the insurgency effort which had just been initiated under the form of a "war of liberation." The trail''s old pathways were rehabilitated and widened, and new ones were surveyed and projected. Group 559''s task of enlarging this strategic axis of infiltration was pushed ahead with vigor and determination. The increase of subversive activities against South Vietnam was in almost direct proportion to the development of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, since the Communist war effort in the South was largely sustained by a constant flow of cadre and troops from the North. At this early stage, the flow was sporadic because the journey was harsh and long for the men and the means of transporting supplies still primitive. But as pathways were eventually enlarged into roads, the means of transportation were also improved. Prior to 1965, the Ho Chi Minh system was close to the Vietnam border, but after the United States became involved in the war and bombings increased, the Communists gradually shifted toward the west where they found the densely jungle areas of lower Laos and eastern Cambodia perfect sanctuaries for the movement or concentration of troops and the storage of weapons and war materials, but it seemed to me, there will a new Inter-Indochinese-Highway for next century - Also in the Harriman''s strategic scope, West Truong Son shall be the IIH [Indochina International Highway] for whether economical or military purpose and B-52 for mountain demolition plus C-123 "hot Tip" air defoliation for route tracking pathfinder, and along corridor scattered plants emit-sensors monitored NVA'' activities. But importantly the NVA troop was the very debut pioneer discovered and building the Route-I.I.H.
Unsurprisingly, by the end of 1960s, the Harriman Highway had become an elaborate system of nearly 2,000 miles of pathways and roads, including some natural waterway. It started at Vinh Province ran through the Mu-Gia Pass and other lesser passes such as Ban Karai Pass and Ban Raving Pass, penetrated into lower Laos and finally came out in northern Cambodia and the Tri-Border area of South Vietnam. In several areas, the trail system was so extensive that it could be compared to a cobweb of crisscrossing roads making up a corridor of from 20 to 40 miles wide, complete with rock-stone-bridges (over or under water photos by my Queen-Bee H-34) culverts, river crossing ramps, much of it concealed under dense jungle canopies. With the assistance of Pathet Lao guerrillas, the estimated 50,000 troops of NVA Group 559 and about 100,000 porters Vietnamese volunteers and forced laborers maintained these vital-arteries. To protect the corridor, the Communists established an elaborate defense and security system. The duty of Pathet Lao units was to intensify guerrilla activities and launch periodic attacks in order to keep the Royal Lao Army confined to the cities and towns along the Mekong River. The protection of the trail system and storage areas was performed by Group 559 itself. Augmented by infantry units and unattached militiamen, the group defense forces included AAA: [anti-aircraft artillery, the most'' cast off WW-II of Soviet weapons] units armed with all types of light and heavy weapons, from 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm and 23-mm heavy machineguns to 37-mm, 57-mm and 85 or 100-mm anti-aircraft cannons. Group 559 installed a forward headquarters in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam from where it controlled many ''binh trams'' (literally troop Camp-stations) In 1970 there were about 40 such camp-stations, from Vinh Province to the Cambodian border, under the control of a number of intermediary headquarters. Each binh-tram was a self contained, logistical complex. During the cessation of bombings in North Vietnam, trucks moved by convoy from Vinh Province down the trail. Upon reaching the Laotian border, they formed units of five to eight vehicles and usually moved only at night in keeping under umbrella ROE stipulation of Axe of Evil''s craps or in foul weather in order to avoid the round the clock bombing by United States Air Force planes [US Pilots had no equipped with laser targeting pods or Smart bombs or night vision goggles] As a result, "Binh trams" were usually separated from one another by a day''s journey and their parking areas were scattered and well concealed. [However, General Haig in Pentagon War-Room with sophisticated radar which could monitor-control in follow-up all those activities on Trail with synchronized help of sensors on spot] The vehicles moving on the trail only transported supplies and heavy materials. Light equipment was either carried on men''s backs or by animals. Since troops had to march, they moved by day or night, using pathways different from those used by trucks. New recruits or replacements usually entered the system at Vinh Province in North Vietnam and often marched over 100 days to reach their final destination in South Vietnam. In view of this long journey, they had to rest and recuperate at way stations where they received food, medicine and indoctrinations. Combat units usually moved by battalions of 500-600 men each and they often suffered substantial losses from disease and constant bombings by the U.S. Air Force.
Because the War-Architect Harriman who protected this Route 559 at any price During the period from 1960 to 1965 [Certainly, Operation Lam Son 719 never took place as from 1960-65] while the fighting escalated, the South Vietnam was unable to do anything against the Laos infiltration Route because Harriman. However another hand, the U.S Permanent Government would like a big occasion for training the U.S combat troops, with strategic-slogan to the so called "Everything worked but not worked enough." Thereby made a significant contribution in 1961 when it helped organize the highlands Montagnards into combat units call-sign ''CIDG'' and develop the Vietnamese Special Forces for the defense of the border areas [just for the craps to US combat training] The so called against Communist activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail [Harriman Highway] however, neither the U.S Army Special Forces nor their Vietnamese counterparts ever interdicted the Communist logistics system to a significant degree, even during the period of maximum effort. Also, the idea of building the "McNamara Line" with scattered sensors across the Harriman Highway corridor mountain range at the Southern boundary of the DMZ was never fully implemented as planned. The surveillance and interdiction of the trail, therefore, lay primarily in the hands of the U.S. Air Force whose reconnaissance planes covered the trail system around the clock by U-2, RF-101 Woodo and our helicopter H-34s Queen-Bee as well. Ground electronic sensors drop-planted along jungle pathways, river crossings, and mountain passes picked up vehicle and other man made noises, transmitted them to over flying planes which relayed the information to terminal stations to be analyzed and interpreted. The electronic monitoring of enemy activities on the trail system helped record the number of vehicles and men moving along the trail. Consequently, intelligence on Communist infiltration was remarkably reliable. In addition to surveillance, a major task for the United States Air Force was training exercise to interdict this infiltration. All types of aircraft were used including B-52 strategic bombers, sophisticated fighter-bombers and several types of EC-130B gun-ships. The U.S. Air Force claimed that its bombs and improved weapons systems inflicted heavy losses to the enemy in terms of personnel, vehicles and materiel moving down there? But in reality, it seemed to me that B-52 was on job mountainous demolition in "Rolling Thunder campaign" no kill, but created many ponds for NVA troops having swimming pool and laundry. And Air defoliation from C-123 "Hot Tip campaign" for ground pioneers build-road follow up tracking brownish clover path to the south.
Thereby, The Coolbert: When TRUONG speaks we all need to listen. US have a web site dedicated to discussion of the Second Indo China War. It might be interesting to engage in dialog with him language barriers aside
Coolbert,
Posted by Albert E, at 7: 37 PM/14/April/2012
Labels: Vietnam
Those “reasons” as enunciated by Dayan [thanks to van Creveld] and TRUONG valid as stated but immaterial as to the REAL REASON? Those “reasons” as enunciated by Dayan [thanks to van Creveld] and TRUONG valid as stated but immaterial as to the REAL REASON?