Operation lam son 719

[vinhtruong]

Preliminary: On the inauguration day, President Barrack-Obama stated a composed speech 2406 words separated 34 paragraph-sections dealing with two Vietnamese words KHE–SANH, some wise folks said the special psychological outpost faraway from US. The Khe-Sanh engraved in US military history, map for Operation Lam-Son 719; “Historical Atlas of the Vietnam-War, by Harry Summers Jr. Khe-Sanh which emerged in 3 periods: (1) the WIB-Bones forced the 1st Republic South Vietnam must evacuated all native people to the lowland, abandoned the highland Hương-Hóa County, for commencing build up the Harriman’s highway [Western: Ho Chi Minh Trail; North Vietnam: Route 559] parallel with it was POL which Russia should be take care about pipeline communicated maintenance. So (1) the Hương Hóa disappeared in Vietnam map (2) The supposition of US Marine in the trial-siege of Ðien Bien Phu? (3) But the ARVN must be subjected to a real Ðien Bien Phu’ under siege over 67.000 tons artillery-shells blood-shed in repeated showers; The ARVN troop continued to thrust into Laotian territories supposedly occupied by Pathet Lao, but in reality all was where the NVA had their strongholds and logistical bases. We didn’t know at all but Harriman knew it very well as 1962 our Queen-Bee H-34 dropped a STRATA team for detecting the presentation of 759 Group [stand for Pathet Lao] but only NVA troop stayed there [That’s in the Harriman’s objective scope] The city of Tchepone to Attopeu had been severely destroyed during the war between The National Laos and Pathet Laos, and was further reduced to rumble by American bombardments aimed at reducing enemy activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Their tactics were flexible, changing as necessary to suit the environment, rather than conform to set positions. However, the information gathered was still very indefinite. So this Operation was named Lam Son 719 [by CIA experts composer] because in took place in the year 71, around the region of Route 9 which connected Khe Sanh to Tchepone.
(You may read some articles on Operation Lam Son 719 or hear about its controversial hindsight, because the real author of this operation is NSC [Permanent Government’s masterminded] the following story is my witnessed from view of bird, on the gunship at treetop maneuver for 42 days in mission)
Operation Lam Son 719: In this traditional Lunar new-year Tet of “Monkey”, I have a special favor from my high commander unleashed me to joint celebrated holiday in Saigon even the immensity of the war at that time was too much for me to leave my 213th squadron. I’m enormously impressed by this excited traditional happiness with my family – In my ears frequently the short-lasting sound fire-crackers were exploded with a loud cracking noise that my children cried out overjoyed to see their exploded into laughter.
At the evening 5 February 1971, an airman of my 1st Air Division showed up given to me a message that my 51st Wing commander urged me to break off a Tet holiday leave at the highest point of family-happiness and return back to my squadron on the earlier flight to Danang air-base as soon as I can. My daughter had heard the reports on television about soldiers dying in this war, so she knew how dangerous, it was twelve, old enough to realize that I could be killed. When I got my orders to go, I remember that my wife seemed very subdued, and we didn’t say much about it to. In the pagoda hear mass, my daughter cried calmly through the entire service. In the early morning, I embraced my children before leaving because I had to use the farewell scenes since my long event marriage period. They observed me as a hero: strong, calm, always in charge in my own quiet way. They were worried they would never see me again. It is not easy to be the wife of a helicopter pilot in the war time.
When a woman falls in love with a spy-pilot or Project Delta pilot, she knows she’s in for a roller-coaster ride. Marry an Airborne, Marine, Ranger or any member of Special Forces and you can forget about counting on celebrating birthdays, holidays, or anniversaries together. Your mother might pass away and he won’t make the funeral. His mother might die, and you will have to watch him kneel at her graveside, stricken with remorse, long after she’s cold.
What the hell of war? I did not believe that the war was at a moral level sufficiently low to require civil resistance. The war, as I understood it then, was not in itself an evil; if there was evil. Our longest-young developed a deep, visceral disgust for war because of our – and our families’ – experiences in it. “All kind of wars were stupid!” That war destroyed our families with a terrifying, shocking and painful experience. The war had simply savaged; it turned the fathers and brothers and sisters upside down and sucked all the oxygen out of their smug and comfortable assumptions. Nowadays, after all that we experienced and lost in that war, we finally understand that there is nothing inevitable about us! Also, I thought it was in how ineptly it was being conducted and in the consequences of this ineptitude.
In the Tet-Offensive, once I had seen my HU1-H crewmembers return from battlefield. Four flight crewmembers, brave-men who had given their courage, their disciplined dedication, their blood to a cause now lost. Their remains had zipped shut in four black-bags filled with too many friends who had given their lives trying to win the Red-menace. I had acquired a sense of civic duty to my country that was not deterred by the vicissitudes of poor leadership. When I looked into myself, I knew that I would remain faithful to a code of personal honor attached to what I understood as the ideals of my country’s form of government rising above the confusions of political and military leadership. This became explicitly clear to me when I was interviewed by allies-officer in my class Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air University Alabama. They asked me “What I thought of the war”, and I recall telling them that I thought it make no sense to me to try to defend South Vietnam so long as the border areas of Cambodia and Laos were conceded to the Hanoi. I had no quarrel with resisting the spread of Red menace, but I could see no strategy being applied that had prospects of success. Nevertheless, I remember telling the allies-officer students that “my patriotism was stronger than my unhappiness about poor US intervention strategic policy!”
When I stepped down from a twice-engine transport C.119, a blue-air-force pick up truck had been waiting for picked me up to 1ts Division War-Room. I zipped up my flying-suit and flight jacket to prevent the chill and influenza when in this season fall to 45 degrees in the still darkness of the night, but this weather was another rough friend and foe in the northern I Corp region, and at the height of the monsoon when fog is heavy but usual patchy. The northeast monsoon blows a light, steady, cold rain its height called the ‘crachin’ (from the French word) for “drizzle”, the rain often lasts two or four days at the time and is frequently accompanied by a blanketing fog that stops close air support and also makes artillery hard to adjust when fog is thick enough. Northern I Corps happens to be place where the northeast monsoon is most intense it is the rainiest place in South Vietnam, the average rainfall for Hue, province is 120 inches compared to 77 inches for Saigon.
I opened a secret envelope that a message is as verbatim order assigned me as a field-chief-commander all VNAF units included two flights, one from Queen-bee 219th Squadron, another belonging King-Star 233rd Squadron and my entire Magic-Club 213th Squadron including 6 HU1-H Gun-ships for special air cover and ground support for Airborne Division. All flight crewmembers now have to standby at the Danang Air-base for in case scrambled over to operational area [Khe Sanh]. But firstly, I must bring my two gun-ships right away to the outpost of Airborne Field Headquarter located on top a mountain right south of DMZ for a short briefing. At 9:00 A.M this morning, where all standby-combat forces were already to scramble.
Particularly, my 213th Squadron was be chosen by General Dong, the Airborne commander as our perfect air ground support for airborne brigade to recent on rubber Chup Plantation in Cambodia last year 1970, as the same way now, General Abrams chosen General Tri with the nick-named Vietnamese Patton to a field commander for operation Lam Son 719. But Tri was killed while his helicopter took off and exploded when operation Lam Son 719 just started.
I prepare to land on a helipad the Camp-J.J.Carroll (named for a Marine captain who died to seize a nearby ridge) Camp Con Thien, and Rockpile, each dominated by one brigade) An airborne major Khoi came and guided me to the briefing room, a big bunker with abundance sand bags staged around.
At 9:00 A.M, at briefing room when I showed up General Du Quoc Dong hand shaken by implication for I should doing the best. He said: “I personally had had cable to President Thieu for your squadron worked with us because your squadron was the elite not only for the Vietnam War but the World War too…as you knew…I put my trust in you whereas US…they’re not deserve to be trusted!”
I wondered that Dong was just notorious a simple combat soldier he hatred politic but now his statement too much political in his hindsight. I took command of this 213th Squadron after graduated to US Air University. In 1970s, I brought one flight detachment to engage Cambodia War as air supply and medical evacuation support to an Airborne Brigade to cover rubber Chup-Plantation. Now this manipulated action exerted by General Lam I Corps commander, thinking first of his Corps own interests, needs, without concern for III Corps in alert; He complaint to President Thieu for his selfish reasons. “Why every Corps having their own-helicopter wing and there was never coming to reinforced us at the usually hot at DMZ not sharing what I Corps has with others” President Thieu responded “All priority for Cambodia War”
On the high relief of Carroll Camp looked down to route 9 reaching to western mountainous area, from this outpost spread along Route 9, which extended across the northern badlands from Dong Ha at the coast to Khe Sanh in the far western mountains, overlooking the Laos border. I found out a long like snack convoy of trucks heading to Khe Sanh maybe for this operation. Whereas to eastern flat terrain of the green plain and bushes I could find out some airborne soldiers appearing somewhat underneath the foliage for practical exercise. Major Khoi indicated his finger to down there and said: “Supposedly, our troops down there get trouble encircled by enemy they needed your guide how to protect them by your fire-power cover support…and the most important we never use color smokes on our location…but just a red color panel only!”
Two gun-ships were flying over 300 feet above an airborne battalion. I tried to contact on FM 42.5 friend called sign “Dong-Da” for identified target spot and strafing two 2.75 rockets right on target and turned sharply to the right now left mini-gun continued tracing on the target. Dong-Da ground force was very pleased but I radioed next pass-prep, we will made dived prep-approach parallel left side for avoiding fired remnant cartridges didn’t fall on the troop.
With my experience by almost as a quick reflex action I often don’t use the gun-sight instrument while firing. I trust my Sergeant Duc, he was a good gunner, sometimes his eyes were same my eyes on target. Two mini-guns were the big killer that recalled to me in the battle northwest of Chu-Lai, just only two gun-ships but killed a full battalion of NVA [lest than 150 men] which was crossing the Thu-Bon’s river. I also recalled once a smuggle boat belong to NVA Group 759 was been detected, this supplied boat was everyone on board get killed by mini-guns after 24 rockets missing by two new nervous rating-pilots prep. The ghost boat continued proceeding to the shore Phong Dien county Quang Tri province without pilot directed, a ghostly creature flitting on the surface of the sea to land at My Thuy beach; Marine Brigade 258th was welcome her with different kind of weapons, plus a platoon Tank M-48 in strafing into it with their canons. The typical of this ghost boat was carried a thousand to thousand ‘beacon pork-meat’ canned at China made, plus various supply categories of military materiel.
The NVA troops were screwed up for everything they had leaned how to react and shot to the airplanes. Because all fighters even helicopter Cobra when they started to fire they must dive to release their fire-powers. The NVA had instructed by US counterespionage– firing only at the time their fighter-bombers raised their head to sky, then stands and freely shot at them whatever you get in your hand. A platoon of antiaircraft artillery divided three points of three equilateral triangle angles; each angle established a stronghold AAA guns. Where they dug up land for individual holes 60 decrees inclination, these shaped hole for personnel sliding when fighter dived on their top as target; meanwhile two another strongholds kept firing but a stronghold was on the target, people must gliding under the 60-degree hole, and at once, while the fighter raised the head to sky, stands in fired at him. It’s strange they haven’t heard from this tactical was only harmful by our bullets 7.62 mm at 4,000 rounds per minutes by Gunship HU-1H model. So why NVA were only get killed by our monsters in that very-moment.
One captured AAA’ NVA officer told us, they were confident with these tactical offenses
They were never had casualty with this method of defense. If the battle lasts longer run that meant VNAF and US aircrafts having so many chance of being risked to shot-down than destroyed them and the most we used the “Snake-Eye” bombs, 250 or 500 pounds. He said these bombs exploded on the mountainous forest as southern Laos, likely the big fire-cracker celebrated in lunar New Year spell. That meant VNAF like F-5, A-37 AD-6 dropped bombs … their efforts to strike him were futile.
In the earlier of Lam Son operation, following the operation plan, one Airborne Brigade should take over a stronghold of a fire base with call-sign Hill-32, but Lieutenant John F Kerry of antiwar movement had let Hanoi known everything planning for this operation so why President Thieu ordered cancelled the last anticipated Hill-32 fire base support. However Hanoi skeptically if in doubt, don’t act unless allies forces in south DMZ are been certain, other word Hanoi was disregarded anything by Kerry had say, although he was a notorious antiwar activist showed up everyday in world TV. Kissinger and Yale graduated John Kerry were chosen by Harriman for his conspiracy, naturally Kerry was supported by Skull and Bone for his future presidency campaign; so coincidence with actor quarterback Kissinger in the play-game Pennsylvania meanwhile Kerry duty performance to accomplish axiom 1 – the anticipated of biggest-fiasco that I foresaw in my whole time there because it broke the back of the Saigon regime of Army forces, particularly irreplaceable were the dead ARVN “elite-officers”. I must say since ‘that’ the future leaders, they were all dead. Subsequently Skull and Bones turned in Saigon to Hanoi with a blood-leak battle instead of bloodbath one. This operation identified one of these strategy-goals. Furthermore this repeated “the bomb ends the war”: dropping the atomic bombs brought the war to a swift conclusion, saving many lives in the process, after a Big air-campaign: on the night of March 9-10, 1945, Permanent Government ordered 324 B-29s attacked right the heart of Tokyo as low level in the most destructive air raid in then history, ended by B-29s were used to drop the first atomic bombs on Japan. On August, 6, 1945 Colonel Paul Tibbets, aircraft commander B-29s, named “Enola Gay” dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima in saving many lives in prospect. War-history once again repeated – The B.52 has long been one of the main instruments of Permanent Government foreign-policy. During the Cold War it was the airborne warrior that would have dropped nuclear weapon onto the Soviet Union or maybe on China if Red China tried to overrun the southern states of Soviet Republic in its critical possibility be-collapsed-period. The special “Big Belly” B-52D could also carry a load of 108 conventional bombs, and during the Vietnam War in the “Pennsylvania’s” as Linebacker-II, 129 B-52s of several models carried out the 11 days and night attacked the so called “Christmas Bombing” which designed to force Hanoi to conference table in Paris.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

… Being stunned into ‘War powers Act’, surrounded by Skull and Bones ‘witch-hunt’ haunts, unshakeable reputation glooming policy “Foe become Friend and Friend become Foe.”
What’s the hell to deal honestly with … What’s the truth natural phenomenon of this operation? Why don’t start sooner … and wait for all the ammunition already moved to the southern on Harriman’s Highway, completed cargo overwhelming over corridor … then start operational search and destroy later? (Several NVA prisoners indeed disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to south corridor that The ARVN appeared not to be surprised at all; by contrast, Giap had been prepared and expecting our forces to come in. This led to the conclusion that several things concerning the enemy had eluded our collection capabilities)
This Vietnam War’ largest battle considers as Korea War Inchon, and WWII Normandy, both were two amphibious operations whereas operation Lam Son 719 was an air-assault operation. Who knew since all three wars initiated by an U.S totalitarian WIB-Bones in War Industries Board’ masterminded. Meanwhile in this photo, the secret ‘Pennsylvania-game’ players, it was the ultimate team effort laughingly faces, cold blood; and every member of the team had to have the skills of a quarterback: Kissinger. The grit of a linebacker: Helms. And the brains of a coach: Republican George H W Bush, a successor to the throne of the Skull and Bones Dynasty, Second generation, but a simple surrogate totalitarian as Democrat William A Harriman. Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war - but also one doomed to failure right from the start. Due to cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Americans all the written plans had to be translated and the translators was largely WIB’ antiwar-activist [counterespionage] as Lt John-F-Kerry via triple-cross mediator Pham-Xuan-An, and few Vietnamese double-cross translator-sympathies to General Giap who engaged to OSS by Agent-Number 19, in sanctuary Pat-Po in 1945 [photograph by Allan Squiers] Consequently, Hanoi had copies of the whole documentation in hands almost as soon as South Vietnamese and US Army commanders of participating units. Additionally, neither the Americans nor the South Vietnamese knew the terrain really well, while the NVA troops were well-prepared for defense. Meanwhile, the foreign media's field reporters were particularly biased against the South Vietnamese, and were always ready to play up ARVN failures, and spread bad publicity. The media actually dwelt a detrimental role to the Operation of Lam Son 719. Even the BBC Radio ruined the ARVN” element of surprise by broadcasting that Tchepone had been invaded, [similarity BBC while been Saigon fall] when in reality, the ARVN had only achieved Phase-One i. e only half of the objective, due to President Thieu ordered early-out. Thus the NVA were forewarned of the possibility of our invading Tchepone. This forced the ARVN to hastily tactical carry through with the objectives in an attempt to save face…touch down took picture and go home no deployment.
Operation Lam Son 719 in the early of February 1971 was theoretically planned to take and destroy sanctuary base located in Tchepone, a small town in southern of Laos. Intelligence analysts stated that the NVA-Corps 70B had built many large storages stocked with weapons ammunitions, logistic supplies and foods. Also this base was used as a resource for refreshing troop replacement and training on the operational spot for the NVA units after battled with ARVN troop, backed by this base the 70B forces crossed the Laos-Vietnam border to attack the Quang Tri province. In the south of base 604 closer to the border, there was base 611, and from this base the NVA could launch attacks into the city of Hue, Thua thien Province. This operation also carried an important political phenomenon in the so called “Vietnamization-Program,” but in the reality was as a dumping ground for U.S and Soviet cast off out of date weapons. No American infantry soldier landed feet in the land of Laos all American advisors attached to the ARVN units were ordered to stay in land South Vietnam.
The so called a test of Vietnamization? By a secret order from Emperor-1 [Harriman] for several years ago in preplanned schedule agenda. The eastern part of the Laotian panhandle was just reserved to use by 559 Group [Giap’ troop] as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel and materials required to sustain its war efforts in South Vietnam and Cambodia which were untouchable. In addition to the Harriman’s Highway [Ho chi Minh Trail] the eastern panhandle contained many logistic installations and base areas. After the 18 March 1970 change of government in Cambodia which closed the seaport of Sihanoukville to the enemy [PM Lon-Nol changed, renamed Kompong Som Seaport] this trail-base area complex in lower Laos became even more and more important to North Vietnam in its prosecution of the war in the South. The real hub of this entire complex, where transportation and storage activities were coordinated, was Base Area 604 located west of the Demilitarized Zone and surrounding the district town of Tchepone. To disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies into South Vietnam, a ground attack was launched across the Laotian border against this enemy hub of activity on 8 February 1971. But too late due to every huge cargo were already moved to the South recently. Operation Lam Son 719 was conducted by I Corps with substantial U.S. support in firepower and airlift but without the participation of U.S. advisers with those ARVN units fighting in Laos. As a test by a political term such as Vietnamization, this operation was to demonstrate also the progress achieved in combat effectiveness by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, Lam Son 719 achieved the objective of forestalling a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971.
The so called Ho Chi Minh Trail was just Western named it, but Hanoi called Route 559, and I myself, named Harriman’s Highway. Recently, before 1959 that named Truong-Son Route range means West mountainous-chain Route. A byproduct of the French’s First Indochina War, 1946-1954, the footpath system that ran North-South along the Truong Son Mountain Range trail of Vietnam became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail since the Second period of Vietnam-Wars 1954-75. For a long time it had served the strategic purposes of the Viet Minh (Allies Forces) From its jungle redoubt of North Vietnam's highlands, the Viet Minh High Command was faced with the pressing need for a secure communication system that would enable it to direct the war effort in South Vietnam and support its subversive activities in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. National Route-1 which ran parallel to the coastline was not practicable because of French control. Sea routes were available but the risks of running into French naval patrols and foul weather were forbiddingly high. Besides, the Viet Minh did not have a reliable organized sea transportation fleet. Considering these circumstances, the heavily mountainous-jungle of the Truong Son Range lent themselves to the establishment of a secure line of communication generally free from observation and attacks. It was this footpath system that kept the Viet Minh resistance in South Vietnam alive with fresh troops, weapons and ammunition. By the end of the First Indochina War, the Truong-Son Trail had been well developed although it was only a system of jungle paths connected by local secondary roads and suitable only to movement by foot, animals and bicycles. Soldiers moved on foot but military Supplies, although usually carried by manpower, were sometimes transported on bicycles, oxcarts, horses or elephants. The narrow, steep pathways meandered through dense jungles, across streams and mountains and a journey on the trail was exhausting and slow. For a time after the Geneva Accords in 1954, the trail was practically abandoned since the war had ended. Then, when South Vietnam, under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, began restoring its stability and proving that it could stand on its own after repudiating reunification with North Vietnam. Also determined by President Diem’ attempted sent TASK Forces composed Ranger, Airborne, Armor, and engineering … Field-Commander Colonel Do Cao Tri to destroy a certain section of the trail, and now and then stayed in south Laos for couple months, Attopeu Province vicinity - So why President Diem must be murdered by WIB Bones order.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

Unfortunately, by subject to stirring war under pressure of the Axis of Evil’s scam, The KGB oppressed the Central Committee of North Vietnam's Communist Party decided to stir on a new course of action against South Vietnam. Subsequently in May 1959, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) High Command activated Transportation Group 559, assigned Brigadier General Vo-Bam in charge as commander, under the direct control of its Rear Service (Logistics) Department. Group 559 was to be a special unit in charge of moving men and supplies into the South for the support of the insurgency effort which had just been initiated under the form of a "war of liberation." The trail's old pathways were rehabilitated and widened, and new ones were surveyed and projected. Group 559's task of enlarging this strategic axis of infiltration was pushed ahead with vigor and determination. The increase of subversive activities against South Vietnam was in almost direct proportion to the development of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, since the Communist war effort in the South was largely sustained by a constant flow of cadre and troops from the North. At this early stage, the flow was sporadic because the journey was harsh and long for the men and the means of transporting supplies still primitive. But as pathways were eventually enlarged into roads, the means of transportation were also improved. Prior to 1965, the Ho Chi Minh system was close to the Vietnam border, but after the United States became involved in the war and bombings increased, the Communists gradually shifted toward the west where they found the densely jungle areas of lower Laos and eastern Cambodia perfect sanctuaries for the movement or concentration of troops and the storage of weapons and war materials, but it seemed to me, there will a new Inter-Indochinese-Highway for next century – Also in the Harriman’s strategic scope, West Truong Son shall be the IIH [Indochina International Highway] for whether economical or military purpose and B-52 for mountain demolition plus C-123 “hot Tip” air defoliation for route tracking pathfinder, and along corridor scattered plants emit-sensors monitored NVA’ activities. But importantly the NVA troop was the very debut pioneer discovered and building the Route-I.I.H.
Surprisingly, by the end of 1960s, the Harriman Highway had become an elaborate system of nearly 2,000 miles of pathways and roads, including some natural waterway. It started at Vinh Province ran through the Mu-Gia Pass and other lesser passes such as Ban Karai Pass and Ban Raving Pass, penetrated into lower Laos and finally came out in northern Cambodia and the Tri-Border area of South Vietnam. In several areas, the trail system was so extensive that it could be compared to a cobweb of crisscrossing roads making up a corridor of from 20 to 40 miles wide, complete with rock-stone-bridges (over or under water photos by my Queen-Bee H-34) culverts, river crossing ramps, much of it concealed under dense jungle canopies. With the assistance of Pathet Lao guerrillas, the estimated 50,000 troops of NVA Group 559 and about 100,000 porters Vietnamese volunteers and forced laborers maintained these vital-arteries. To protect the corridor, the Communists established an elaborate defense and security system. The duty of Pathet Lao units was to intensify guerrilla activities and launch periodic attacks in order to keep the Royal Lao Army confined to the cities and towns along the Mekong River. The protection of the trail system and storage areas was performed by Group 559 itself. Augmented by infantry units and unattached militiamen, the group defense forces included AAA: [anti-aircraft artillery, the most’ cast off WW-II of Soviet weapons] units armed with all types of light and heavy weapons, from 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm and 23-mm heavy machineguns to 37-mm, 57-mm and 85 or 100-mm anti-aircraft cannons. Group 559 installed a forward headquarters in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam from where it controlled many 'binh trams' (literally troop Camp-stations) In 1970 there were about 40 such camp-stations, from Vinh Province to the Cambodian border, under the control of a number of intermediary headquarters. Each binh-tram was a self contained, logistical complex. During the cessation of bombings in North Vietnam, trucks moved by convoy from Vinh Province down the trail. Upon reaching the Laotian border, they formed units of five to eight vehicles and usually moved only at night in keeping under umbrella ROE stipulation of Axe of Evil’s craps or in foul weather in order to avoid the round the clock bombing by United States Air Force planes [US Pilots had no equipped with laser targeting pods or Smart bombs or night vision goggles] As a result, “Binh trams” were usually separated from one another by a day's journey and their parking areas were scattered and well concealed. [However, General Haig in Pentagon War-Room with sophisticated radar which could monitor-control in follow-up all those activities on Trail with synchronized help of sensors on spot] The vehicles moving on the trail only transported supplies and heavy materials. Light equipment was either carried on men's backs or by animals. Since troops had to march, they moved by day or night, using pathways different from those used by trucks. New recruits or replacements usually entered the system at Vinh Province in North Vietnam and often marched over 100 days to reach their final destination in South Vietnam. In view of this long journey, they had to rest and recuperate at way stations where they received food, medicine and indoctrinations. Combat units usually moved by battalions of 500- 600 men each and they often suffered substantial losses from disease and constant bombings by the U.S. Air Force.
Because the War-Architect Harriman who protected this Route 559 at any price During the period from 1960 to 1965 [Certainly, Operation Lam Son 719 never took place as from 1960-65] while the fighting escalated, the South Vietnam was unable to do anything against the Laos infiltration Route because Harriman. However another hand, the U.S Permanent Government would like a big occasion for training the U.S combat troops, with strategic-slogan to the so called “Everything worked but not worked enough.” Thereby made a significant contribution in 1961 when it helped organize the highlands Montagnards into combat units call-sign ‘CIDG’ and develop the Vietnamese Special Forces for the defense of the border areas [just for the craps to US combat training] The so called against Communist activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail [Harriman Highway] however, neither the U.S Army Special Forces nor their Vietnamese counterparts ever interdicted the Communist logistics system to a significant degree, even during the period of maximum effort. Also, the idea of building the “McNamara Line” with scattered sensors across the Harriman Highway corridor mountain range at the Southern boundary of the DMZ was never fully implemented as planned. The surveillance and interdiction of the trail, therefore, lay primarily in the hands of the U.S. Air Force whose reconnaissance planes covered the trail system around the clock by U-2, RF-101 Woodo and our helicopter H-34s Queen-Bee as well. Ground electronic sensors drop-planted along jungle pathways, river crossings, and mountain passes picked up vehicle and other man made noises, transmitted them to over flying planes which relayed the information to terminal stations to be analyzed and interpreted. The electronic monitoring of enemy activities on the trail system helped record the number of vehicles and men moving along the trail. Consequently, intelligence on Communist infiltration was remarkably reliable. In addition to surveillance, a major task for the United States Air Force was training exercise to interdict this infiltration. All types of aircraft were used including B-52 strategic bombers, sophisticated fighter-bombers and several types of EC-130B gun-ships. The U.S. Air Force claimed that its bombs and improved weapons systems inflicted heavy losses to the enemy in terms of personnel, vehicles and materiel moving down there? But in reality, it seemed to me that B-52 was on job mountainous demolition in “Rolling Thunder campaign” no kill, but created many ponds for NVA troops having swimming pool and laundry. And Air defoliation from C-123 “Hot Tip campaign” for ground pioneers build-road follow up tracking brownish clover path to the south.
At the beginning of 1970, the enemy's plan to rehabilitate Route 1036 was suspended for some time due to extensive United States bombing along the Laotian border. Nevertheless, he succeeded in opening Route 1039 through the Ban Raving Pass which connected with Route 913. This gave the enemy an additional route into Tchepone, the communications center for base area 604. In the meantime, Route 1032A in North Vietnam allowed NVA to move his trucks to the western edge of the DMZ. Here his supplies were usually floated on the Houay Nam Xepon River and then on the Xe Bang Hiang River southwesterly toward Tchepone where they were picked up before reaching the town. To the south, the enemy had already completed Route 616 which cut across the Xepon River and deep into South Vietnam. The existence of this east-west infiltration route was detected for the first time on 1 January 1970 but subsequent surveillance indicated that enemy activities on it were light. The heaviest traffic was always reported on the North-South axis, moving from base area 604 on Routes 96, 926 and 914 toward base area 611 to border. This appeared to indicate that the enemy wanted to project another infiltration route into the Khe Sanh area, west of Quang Tri but subsequent air reconnaissance showed that the enemy was using Route 616 for truck traffic and his activities were increasing substantially south of base area 611. Air reconnaissance and agent reports further confirmed the enemy's stepped up logistical activities and augmentation of combat forces at base areas 604 and 611 since the beginning of the lower Laos dry season. In October, 1970, an agent report revealed that a division size unit, approximately 10,000 strong, was leaving the Mu Gia Pass and moving south. It was believed at that time that this was the 320th NVA Division [Steel Division] with its three organic regiments, the 48th, 52nd, and 64th. Subsequent intelligence reports confirmed that the 52nd Regiment was located west of the DMZ and the 64th Regiment was building roads in Quang Binh Province, north of the DMZ. It was, therefore, probable that the 48th Regiment was the unit which was moving into base area 604. Other word, 320th NVA Division inaugurated a scheme for W. A Harriman Highway from the start
In the meantime operation Lam Son 719 preplanning, by January 1971, Route 1032A had been connected with Route 1032B which gave the enemy an additional roadway into lower Laos from North Vietnam; Recordings made by electronic sensors indicated that of every four trucks leaving North Vietnam, one always moved on this route regardless of the bombings by United States planes west of the DMZ. Aerial photos also revealed that the enemy had built several alternate bypass routes in this area in order to avoid concentrated bombings and ensure the flow of traffic. Reconnaissance planes further reported that East-West Route 925 had been widened but terminated approximately two and a half miles from the South Vietnam border. This appeared to indicate that the Hanoi wanted to project another infiltration route into the Khe Sanh area, west of Quang Tri but subsequent air reconnaissance showed that the NVA was using Route 616 for truck traffic and his activities were increasing substantially south of base area 611. All of these indications clearly confirmed the Hanoi's efforts to open additional infiltration roads, develop storage areas, load and unload transferred points and truck parks, and to make the entire area just west of Quang Tri Province an intricate logistical and transportation complex complete with POL pipelines and bypass roads. Furthermore, all these activities progressed with little interruption despite continuous bombings. The efforts were most conspicuous in base areas 604 and 611. On the other hand, to increase his protection capabilities, the NVA also moved additional anti-aircraft artillery and combat units into these areas. To the west beyond the Laotian border, the terrain was predominantly mountainous. The area of operation on this side of the border was characterized by three prominent features. The first of these was the Xepon River which ran south and then parallel to Route-9 until it reached Tchepone where it met the Xe Bang Hiang River, the primary North-South waterway in the area. During the rainy season, when most ground lines of communication were inundated, the enemy used the Xe Biang Hiang River to float supplies downstream. The second prominent terrain feature was the Mt Co Roc Highland adjacent to the Laotian border and just south of Route-9. This highland had several peaks with elevations ranging from 500 to 850 meters which dominated Route-9 to the east and west. It also provided excellent observation into the Khe Sanh area. The foliaged-vegetation in the Co Roc area consisted primarily of bamboo and brushwood, offering adequate cover and concealment. The third significant terrain feature was a high escarpment whose ridgeline extended all the way to Tchepone, parallel to and south of Route-9 and the Xepon River. Several peaks of this ridgeline were 600 to 700 meters high and offered excellent observation over Route-9 and the Tchepone are so much of the area was covered by dense jungle and thick brushwood except for a few places which had been cleared for farming. The terrain north of Route-9 was hilly and heavily vegetated against a backdrop of relatively high peaks which restricted operations in this area almost entirely to infantry. Around Tchepone, the terrain was much lower, sparsely vegetated and more appropriate for armor vehicles. Route-9 from Khe Sanh to Tchepone was a one lane, unevenly surfaced dirt road with destroyed bridges and culverts. Dominated by the high escarpment to the south, this road was easily interdicted. It also was difficult to prepare bypasses due to the river to the south and the hilly terrain to the north. In addition to Route-9 which was an old public road, the enemy had completed in the area west of the Laotian border an extensive, crisscrossing system of lines of communication. Most important of these was Route 1032 which connected with Route-92 and offered direct access from North Vietnam and the western DMZ area into base area 604, then base area 611, and from there into South Vietnam either by Route 92 or Route 616 or Route 922 further to the south, another route, designated area. Route 1039, also originating in North Vietnam passed through the Ban Raving Pass and offered access into Tchepone and base area 604 then connected with either Route 29 to go further south or with Route 914 which led into base area 611 and from there into South Vietnam. All these routes were well maintained two lane roads practicable for large trucks at least during the dry season. Due to extensive bombings, the enemy had built several alternate routes which were well concealed by vegetation and often under double and triple canopies. In addition to main routes, the enemy also built narrow pathways crisscrossing the entire area. These were difficult to observe from the air and were convenient for concealing troop movements and truck rest-areas in daytime break.

[vinhtruong]

Now weather forecast for Operation Lam Son 719 started on February 1971 in the Tchepone area was the transitional period from the northeast to the southwest monsoons. The northeast monsoon, which brought rains and cloudiness to Central Vietnam above the Hai Van Pass from October to March, was the dominant weather factor. The Truong Son mountain range deflected much of this wet weather on the Laotian side but in the area of operation, the skies were generally covered. The amount of Cumulus-clouds buildup in this area depended on the strength and depth of the monsoon. Average temperature during February was 22C in the lowlands and about 18C in mountainous regions.
As of mid March, 1971 the southwest monsoon gradually picked up, resulting in a relative improvement of the weather and higher ceilings. The average temperature was warmer than in February but this was a period of showers during which the skies were temporarily covered. Beginning in May, however, rainfall became heavier over the Truong Son Range while in the eastern lowlands, the weather was dry and hot.
In general, during these periods considered for the operation, the weather was fairly good but quite unpredictable. From experience, it was estimated that the area of operations would be cloudy and hazy fog in the morning. The weather was favorable for air operations only from 10:00-12:00 hours until mid afternoon. The 2,500-feet ceiling in the low lands would allow only a 1,000 feet altitude' in the area of operation. This was recognized as a major handicap since all aircraft used in support missions would be located in the lowlands and would have to be flown first to the Khe Sanh airfield. Low ceilings and hazardous mountains would force our VNAF helicopters flying frontline support missions to follow natural avenues of approach such as valleys and rivers which the enemy could interdict with east. This handicap was going to be an important factor affecting the course of combat operations.
Of course, General Haig C&C at Pentagon already knew that all depend on U.S air-mobility-forces, so quite frankly I must say ARVN in the risky status: “Supplies and Medevacs in the mainstay of any operation, the large the operation, the greater demand” In this operation, preparations were relatively adequate, but did not meet the battlefield needs. In the planning, ARVN had absolutely relied upon the air power, namely helicopters from the Army Aviation for support, supplies, medevacs. For such a large-scale operation, it was impossible for supplies and medevacs to be accomplished by helicopters alone, especially in the presence of enemy antiaircraft firepower, from 14, 5 mm to 100 mm AAA. The crude facts of the operation demonstrated this. Once supplies were hampered, the fighting spirit of soldiers was naturally influenced: Lack of ammunition and guns caused the firepower to decrease [the journalist had to know that why written biased reports] Shortage of food and even the most water weakened the troops, the wounded died waiting for medevac. Thus the organization of logistic should be of primary concern, but this is in NSC’ scope, letting ARVN troop under siege to enemy for 67,000 tons shell-bombardment standby on spot. This implied ARVN troops were subjected to repeat the ferocious-artillery-bombardments. This is WIB Bones’ goal-plots purposely.
So why! “I died feeling we could have won that war. I still felt we were on top of it in that year 1970 then lost our nerve” Crucially important differences included wisdom and stability in the ambassadorial post: better field generalship; a more adept national leadership involving [isolated Nixon, has his hands tied, double knotted by Power Act and now Cooper Church amendment] Kissinger, and Helms – even given the vigorous internecine warfare they frequent waged against one another (acted-government contrasted sharply with permanent-government) – compared with LBJ and its WIB’ apparatus as Secretary of Defense McNamara who was a Vietnam War X.O like General Manager of the war, because of the practical costs of McNamara’s failed policies.
Because the Skull and Bones Dynasty was the only one policymaker, thereby a Skull planning session resulted in little agreement on composition of the next redeployment increment. US forces were already so greatly reduced that no one could see how to give up a single additional man. General Abrams listened to the agonized discussion and let his fellow comrade in arms know. “You know, gentlemen,” he begun, “this force withdrawal is not optional. We are going down and we will continue to go down till none of us are left. Now, we are going to do that, just as the Supreme Chief Commander of U.S forces ordered?” I don’t think so it’s the truth. It is almost unthinkable and surely unforgivable that a great nation should leave these helpless allies to the tender mercies of the North Vietnamese, but that is what the Permanent Government did; really they did a terrible thing to the South Vietnamese. Meanwhile from now on the North Vietnamese was receiving unprecedented levels support from its patrons. So, soon or later, South Vietnam was on the brink of collapse [axiom-1]
By way of conclusion, I must state my conviction that the war in Vietnam was a just war fought by the South Vietnamese and their allies for admirable purposes, that those who fought it did so with their mightiest hearts, and that in the process they came very close to succeeding in their purpose of enabling South Vietnam to sustain itself as a free and independent nation. The cause was indeed “noble” American fought it the wrong way under War Industries Board’s Bones masterminded and lost it in good part because of them.
According his Harriman’s stratagem, Vietnam War is a big military training strategy never had in the US history by a cunning stratagem “Everything worked but nothing worked enough” This signifies a sacrifice of casualties of personal and material for his scam. [Numerous of POW, aircraft crashed sacrificed their lives for WIB’ selfish interest]

Khe-Sanh in the past was the Huong-Hoa County of Quang Tri province. Because the name of “Harriman Highway” is essential for his stratagem, so US administration persuaded the GVN’ President Diem has to evacuated the tribe-ancient-native to the low land closed the sea-coast, abandoned it with a sheer named Khe Sanh on the map – No more Hương-Hóa County. And USMC had to ground there for familiar with combat training practice on the highland as seemed in the similarity of Dien Bien Phu under siege, but till 1971, operation Lam Son 719 should the damn-real Dien Bien Phu’ under-siege for ARVN troop subjected to repeated horrible artillery bombardments. Another word there’s main cause of “axiom-1” for donating Saigon to Hanoi not like a ‘Pebbly-City’. So you will see the cruel-battle happened at target 604.
Late General Vo-Nguyen Giap [engaged OSS 1945] plotted first against the French in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu and then against the Americans in the Tet Offensive of 1968. At Khe sanh in 1967, Giap commenced a siege of the US troops’ far western support base at Khe Sanh. He massed 4 infantry-divisions supported by 2 Armor and Artillery regiments at the heretofore largely unknown complex at the opposite end of Route 9, the farthest compound away from most US or ARVN troops principal enclaves. Giap purposefully made the presence of the more than 40,000 NVA troops highly visible to ARVN and US intelligence gatherers. North Vietnamese Army’ masterminded Headquarter immediately drew the attention of General Westmoreland, who had, a few months earlier, began development of the primitive Khe Sanh Outpost into a materiel support base for his proposed operations in Laos which was hated like poison in Harriman’ scope [don’t touch Ho Chi Minh Trail been building, Harriman don’t want Westmoreland destroy all cargo there though this time is best right time and right place you should noticed this]
The supreme commander of US forces in Vietnam had deployed a battalion of Marines and a team of US Navy Seabee to develop and defend the base. But for their security, one ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion was good shield outside its fence for their protection. They quickly turned to, bulldozing the ground and installing steel PSP matting for a primitive airfield and laying in stockpiles of ammunition and supplies for the proposed Laos operations? [but too soon that’s never happened right now ever]
Responding to the NVA actions, Operation Niagara in mind Westmoreland who ordered 6,000 additional USMC to distant and tactically unimportant outpost; in concert with the defense of Khe Sanh, Westmoreland also ordered commencement of massive air bombardment of the entire region that encircle the remote enclave, appropriately naming the aerial onslaught.
As the battle raged, President Johnson vowed the United States would not lose Khe Sanh. He said this despite the fact that he had already scrapped Westmoreland’s plan for border-crossing operations into Laos. His decision had thus rendered the Khe Sanh support base tactically useless, but his national security advisor, George Bundy, Skull and Bones 40 had to a real drawback! Westmoreland has his hands tied double knotted the incoming years, but after his be fired emerged “Cooper-Church and Case-Church Amendments in 1970 and 1973,” says that U.S forces must do nothing. No military equipment, no American forces, nada, zip… on stand point command and control, no choice, let him go home, become The Joint Chief of Staff.

Below was Pentagon War Room chart, General Haig, Head of Command and Control for Lam Son 719 operation – President Thieu decided to “Early-Out” sharply against Haig’ strategic-plot when Thieu found out the names all Landing-Zone were named by Hollywood famous movie stars such as that Bones played game: LOLObrigida, SOPHIAloren, LIZ-Taylor, and Bob-HOPE – and his military meditation urged him to reconsider why General Giap’ powerful-forces with couple hundred tanks and fourteen Artilleries Regiments wouldn’t attacked to US Base at Khe Sanh but at Tchepone? Immediately Thieu ordered to General Lam: “Touch down…pissed at there a mess…then goes back home!”
Moreover Thieu recalled last couple month ago, on November 21 1970, a movie star Jane Fonda was involved in the Project Cold-War – a job “political-espionage and counterespionage performer.” With the specific aims, she showed up at Michigan University and strongly stated to about 2,000 students: “If you understood what communism was, you would hope, you would pray on your knees that we would some day become communist!” The Communist doctrine eventually has been forced to modify to comfort in affecting the whole world or self-extinction for good! The United States shall be a real Super Communist adjustment in the coming day! Actually, then the U.S was an eventual Super-Finest-Communist country now in predominantly by totalitarian Skull and Bones pattern regime.
Donald Rumsfeld, Skull and Bones Chief-staff have drawn from fashioned Hollywood in slogan “Just make love, no make war!” at time of “Saigon Fall” was the end for long tragedy: What American actual encountered in Vietnam-War was an army in process of demoralization. After public opinion turned against the war since 1968, the antiwar movement penetrated the U.S army in Vietnam as Permanent Government anticipated their preplanned. All the stereotypical problems of drugs, racial conflict, atrocities, fragging, and insubordination were in evidence and were affecting the morale of the army, and these were, at least as one certain American understood it, related to the fact that, as a consequence of poor leadership, the country no longer supported the war, yet U.S were still being expected to fight it. Generals, political leaders, both-uniformed and civilian, realized the necessity to ‘redeploy’ the army out of Vietnam as rapidly as possible to prevent this spirit of disaffection from spreading to other commands around the world. Meanwhile, the G.I was being asked to take their chance at being the last man to die in Vietnam.
“History must be the final judge of that which US Permanent Government have done or left undone, in World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere… Let us calmly await its verdict!”

Continued

[vinhtruong]

Thieu more honest, decent man than L.B. Johnson?
Based on above Thieu’ statements, the venal critical journalists on earlier occasions had bias-speculated that comparisons with American leadership of the time might have yielded interesting results. President Nguyen Van Thieu, for example, was arguably a more honest and decent man than Lyndon Johnson, and – given the differences in their respective circumstances – quite likely a more effective president of his country. At the time someone pointed out that Mr. Thieu also probably had more freedom to move about in his own country than hatred LBJ did in his? I’m on the side of US presidents, having full of pity on their curb-deprived decisions by Permanent Government. Here there were exerted some P.G’ unsavory habits, clues-for instants:
In time of President Eisenhower: Permanent Government didn’t want to hear: “We, Americans must heart-fully help to building a strong nationalist political party behind Diem. Now Diem has elected as a President, he ought to have his own party. (Ed. J .Lansdale, “In the mist of War” p, 342) Eisenhower solemn-welcome Diem to visit America in May, 1957 and had called Diem a miracle man of Asia. As for President Kennedy as always back of him until the coup have been underway scrambling as a hot message from Mc George Bundy to Cabot Lodge October 30, 1963 “We do not accept as a basic for US policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup….” And during World tour of Vice President, May 1961, had given Diem his boost in calling Diem a “Winston Churchill of Asia” In Johnson administrative, In March 1964, at the urging of the Joint Chiefs, McNamara requested authorization for “hot pursuit [by] only South Vietnamese forces over the Laotian line for border control” This was contentious for A Harriman of course due to military leadership SOP, but it was increasingly doubtful that he could prevent a change in U.S policy. Indeed you know…Who was U.S policymaker? Was LBJ a Big WIB’ drawback!? Though in this month March/1964, Harriman wasn’t close to Johnson right after Kennedy assassination, he was given charge of African affairs at the Department of State for out of his sight. [I seek to justify in Chapter 9 in Skull and Bones “revenge meditation” – Johnson killed Kennedy? – At Paris on Monday, October, 27, 2,003 on channel Canal: “JFK, autopsie d’un complot” by Bernard Nicolas and William Reymond, and a Flammarion book “JFK, le dernier témoin.” All reports were full of lies and prevarications. But I thought Bones lies only when they felt they had to] President Nixon, in writing of 1963 Coup which made Diem and his brother murdered quote: “1963 crisis that made us disgusting” That apparently was a disgraced US historically in front of its allies. Have pity on the unelected President of the United States and watch Saigon collapse, President Ford confessed: “It looked like we just quit and run. Yet I did all that I could for them!” because he was acting president.

Pragmatically in ‘Standard Operation Procedure’ Once the joint Chiefs Staff was building a case for “crossing fence” the McNamara and Mc George Bundy, the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, found convincing. Still, Harriman had to be dealt with, as Forrestal told Bundy in April. LBJ had been coaxed into supporting “hot pursuit,” and Bundy was felt logically about to send a telegram to Saigon authorizing it, Michael Forrestal of the National Security Council staff cautioned Bundy that “to send the telegram without Averell’s approval is just asking for trouble,” The telegram had already received presidential approval, but that was not enough. It still required an endorsement from A Harriman. Moreover Forrestal had learned from Sullivan that Harriman was placated and reluctantly agreed to “hot pursuit” in destroying his commencement build up his project super-highway but [due too soon, not right time and right place] he named that Ho Chi Minh Trail (meanwhile Hanoi named Route 559) And unsurprisingly why President Thieu was out of vulnerable, unharmed still in good shape … luckily because Harriman and George H.W Bush need the non chaotic, political stability for US forces progressively withdrawal safety.
So why throughout this operation deficiencies at high command levels continued to undermine the abilities and performance of South Vietnam’s troops. Consequently even General Abrams was a famous better war, but I must say with a nearly insuperable array of new challenges because he didn’t know the operation objective. For the first time he and his staff were working from a field command post distant from home country. Naturally they did not understand So, I must draw in conclusion “truly grasped the responsibilities inherent in attachment, the differences between a zone of action and an axis of advance, or the full meaning of the word ‘secure’

OPERATION LAM SON 719
Preliminary: On the inauguration day, President Barrack-Obama stated a composed speech 2406 words separated 34 paragraph-sections dealing with two Vietnamese words KHE –SANH, some wise folks said the special psychological outpost faraway from US. The Khe-Sanh engraved in US military history, map for Operation Lam-Son 719; “Historical Atlas of the Vietnam-War, by Harry Summers Jr. Khe-Sanh which emerged in 3 periods: (1) the WIB-Bones forced the 1st Republic South Vietnam must evacuated all native people to the lowland, abandoned the highland Hương-Hóa County, for commencing build up the Harriman’s highway [Western: Ho Chi Minh Trail; North Vietnam: Route 559] parallel with it was POL which Russia should be take care about pipeline communicated maintenance. So (1) the Hương Hóa disappeared in Vietnam map (2) The supposition of US Marine in the trial-siege of Ðien Bien Phu? (3) But the ARVN must be subjected to a real Ðien Bien Phu’ under siege over 67.000 tons artillery-shells blood-shed in repeated showers; The ARVN troop continued to thrust into Laotian territories supposedly occupied by Pathet Lao, but in reality all was where the NVA had their strongholds and logistical bases. We didn’t know at all but Harriman knew it very well as 1962 our Queen-Bee H-34 dropped a STRATA team for detecting the presentation of 759 Group [stand for Pathet Lao] but only NVA troop stayed there [That’s in the Harriman’s objective scope] The city of Tchepone to Attopeu had been severely destroyed during the war between The National Laos and Pathet Laos, and was further reduced to rumble by American bombardments aimed at reducing enemy activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Their tactics were flexible, changing as necessary to suit the environment, rather than conform to set positions. However, the information gathered was still very indefinite. So this Operation was named Lam Son 719 [by CIA experts composer] because in took place in the year 71, around the region of Route 9 which connected Khe Sanh to Tchepone.
In the preferences of ANSWERS.COM, W.A Harriman, from page 1 to page 3 which composed 4 books involving Vietnam War: (1) authors Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (1986) (2) Author George C. Herring, Jr., Aid to Russia 1941-1946 (1973); (3) Two books same author William A Harriman, Peace with Russia (1959) and America and Russia in a Changing World (1971) Typically, these years coincided with the Axis of Evil such as Hanoi inaugurated Group 559, 759, and 959 (first digit means month, last two digit means years. And US first two digit means year and last means location) Operation Lam Son took place on year one thousand 71 at Route-9. Decided solution on January, 18/1971 for terminating war-game CIP/NLF [National Liberation Front/Counter Insurgency Plan] these three digit number for easier reference in US and Russia documental-archives
Even as the cumulative effect of the “clear and hold” tactical approach was reaching a peak. Congress proceeded to snatch defeat from the jaw of victory. Significantly, the “Cooper-Church” amendment influences were at work. The first volley in Congress came in 1970 when Idaho Democrat Senator Frank F. Church and Kentucky Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper authorized a bill that cut off funding of all military activity in Southeast Asia – shutting off air and ground combat support; that would eventually undermine much of what had been accomplished. In the Washington, this was “keyed time” for Permanent Government did the best influence that included further erosion of political support for the war, growing budgetary pressures on support for the US combat forces still in Indochina and for the South Vietnam alike, and the influence of both on the pace of safety withdrawal. Clearly on the time would come, and sooner rather than later, when all US ground forces no longer play any significant part in prosecution of the war according of Permanent Government strategy on “axiom 3” that all US universities as the basis for already explained the war in the beginning of the war 1960 [the US could not have won that war under any circumstances] When the Hanoi troops was in its weakest condition in over six years.
So why throughout of the earlier years of United States involvement in South Vietnam by seeking caused the so called “The Tonkin Gulf Incident” – officially created a formal legalized retaliation for US combat troop invasion; although Cambodia proclaimed a nonbelligerent, neutral status, it actually supported the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces by providing them refuge, primary in the Parrot’s Peak region along the Mekong River, hardly more than fifty kilometers west of Saigon. In this so called neutral territory, Communist forces successfully escaped American and South Vietnamese force pursuit (thank to CIA, counterespionage branch ‘warning’…I died feeling in my view of bird-conviction that Vietnam War was “an social scientists war” initiated by 1st emperor, A. Harriman of the Skull and Bones dynasty, and 2nd emperor George H W Bush was for “an intelligence war”) and rested and recuperated between commitments to combat operations. In that territory-haven in Cambodia, they also stashed large caches of weapons and supplies ferried over the notorious “Harriman Highway” [Ho Chi Minh trail] which crossed through Cambodia at several points in northeastern, existing into the Mekong region and the Central Highlands.
At year-1970s end, the application use of those forces still in Vietnam was further curtailed by what was known as the ‘Cooper-Church amendment’ to the defense appropriation bill, a very measure denying funds for US combat force operations in Cambodia and Laos. This left the Hanoi’s troop sanctuaries and lines of communication once again safe from US interference (the craps CIP and NLF applied in action by ROE) this ‘keyed-up-time’ before Congressional action was subjected to under pressure by Permanent Government. Meanwhile, the Hanoi was contemplating his next round of dry season operations.

I foresaw and believe that the South Vietnam was on “the brink of total military defeat”
From now on, Congress will seeking has dramatically cut aid to Saigon government, going against a long-standing commitment. As a result, my nation future falters because of a grievous lack of spare parts and replacement equipment. Meanwhile North Vietnam was receiving unprecedented levels of support from its patrons. Adversely, it is almost unthinkable and surely unforgivable that a great United States should leave these helpless allies to the tender mercies of the Communist North Vietnam but that is U.S Permanent Government did! Because the reduction to almost ‘below Zero’: Some Navy, A-4 Skyhaws few time, the so called faulted in mistake struck on POL dump located in the air bases, for reducing our ARVN’ operational activities and against under “Project Enhance,” a program to replace the heavy losses of war. The United States would replace on a one-for-one basis major combat system as was permitted by the Paris Accords of U.S support was the cause of final collapse. So why in the past, flatly President Diem did have to turn down U.S military involvement, he knew U.S will done a terrible thing [Axis of Evil’s scam] to his country in the future. The center of gravity was the people…and that winning hearts and minds was not just a slogan for pacification through by “the Rural Revolutionary Development Hamlet Program”
By way of conclusion, I will justified, stated in this book my certain conviction that the Vietnam War was a just war fought by the South Vietnamese and their allies for admirable purposes, that those who fought it did so with their mightiest hearts, and that in the process they came very close to succeeding in their purpose of enabling South Vietnam to sustain itself as a free and independent nation. Because the Eurasian Great Game stratagem, thereby after fifteen years, American have been encouraging the people of South Vietnam to self-defend against what American conceive to be an external danger, “Red-Menace” Now American stand on the brink of betraying that trust because WIB Bones.

Skull and Bones strategist staff: The basic foundation-method “Everything worked, but nothing worked enough for the goal of protracting the war.” That was one thing. But there was something else, much more extensive and perhaps more risky, on the minds of Washington [WSAG] planners – a thrust into Laos to the so called interrupt the Hanoi’s buildup of supplies and perhaps preempt is planned offensive. Much earlier in the war, when General Westmoreland still had an abundance of US combat troops and firepower, he had looked hungrily at the enemy’s cross-border base camps [binh-tram] – fighting over the goddamn caches. That would be the climax of the interdiction. But the State Department was closing ranks: A. Harriman emphasized that “favored sending non-US-patrols into Laos to try find out the size of Hanoi’ the military buildup.” Harriman also stood firmly against US advisers taking part in these patrols, even Vietnamese Ranger-task forces and that was a clever diversion-scam?
In the United States during almost nine decades (1917-to July 7/2003 Skull and Bones Graveyard see in Chapter-9) an emerged totalitarian Skull and Bones dynasty has severely restricted, stripped away most foreign policies of the acted governments. The US parliament of National assembly which is defined as the highest power of the nation, but it seemed to me like its power in hands of the two emperors: A. Harriman stands for 1917-1960 and overlapped in transition to an apprentice George H.W Bush to 1969. That year end 1969, Harriman and Johnson got out from political platform. [Johnson raised his hope too high pried off the Skull and Bones out of the unsavory totalitarian Permanent-Government accounting on to prosecute a claim for “The Trading with the-Enemy Act” of December 1941 as Union Banking Corporation which was closed in 1943 by the U.S Government for Trading with the Enemy, now at first in focusing on Zapata Offshore seized the alien property custodian assets; but his disappointed frustration was right after Robert Kennedy fell to an assassin’s bullet in 1968; whereas A Harriman due to LB Johnson’s confession in the assassination of President Diem could indicate some complicity on Harriman’s part [p.2, 3. http://www.ans-wers.com/topic/w-averell-harriman- page 4] this implication for Kennedy assassination’s by the Bones-men among the WIB (War Industries Board) members. Eventually, these Bones learning how to manipulate a plot for the future to LB Johnson “meditate-revenge”
Much earlier in the war to the resulted in the “neutralization” of Laos in Geneva on July 23, 1962, as a spy pilot I must fly across border to Laos with my camouflage painted helicopter H.34, no call-sign, no tail flag, unmarked, no serial number, unknown country (photo on the book-cover) I’m not permitted wore VNAF flying suit, but instead of black peasant garb, no US weapon even cigarette US made, no identification papers. Our crewmembers equipped with Swedish K submachine guns and Belgian-made Browning 9mm pistol, and a tiny pistol 6, 35.mm, all of which, of course, had been acquired clandestinely so a serial-number check would lead nowhere, and a unmarked SOG knife, an untraceable 6-inch-bladed weapon, designed on Okinawa by manufactured clandestinely in Japan. And the most importance in case if our helicopters would be in the status emergency forced landing, they must be destroyed at once by five pounds TNT, C-4 ignited in exploded, it located in the aircraft radio compartment.
That time cross-border operation were strictly limited to those “areas in Laos, between Route 9 and the 17 parallel DMZ [Provisional Military Demarcation Line] adjacent to the border, and the area east of Tchepone” That was a relatively small debut-part of the Harriman highway [Ho Chi Minh trail] but considered the critical entry point to South Vietnam, and as a spy-pilot I dared say, “That will be becoming an open-dumpster-area for US and Soviet Union of the wasted out of all out of date weapons and war-materiel in the future incoming year. It clear that the State Department, A Harriman, as number ‘three-position’, a founder of Skull and Bones, was still in the scam; He stood firmly against the Vietnamese recon-men and flight crewmembers that crossed the border were “not to wear GVN or others uniforms,” and we could engage the enemy only in just for the “self-defense.” Who was U.S policymaker?
Now, that was in the spring of 1971, eight years earlier, and a lot had changed since then. Actually “Cooper-Church” leashed the US ground forces that had in any case been drawn down by more than 200,000, and all the emphasis was on passing the burden of the war to the South Vietnamese soldiers. And now there was contemplated a corps-level cross-border operation conducted without accompanying US ground forces or advisors, along a single, poorly maintained route dominated by virtually impassable high ground on one the north-flank and a Xe pon’ River on the other, into long-established enemy base areas and without tactical surprise. It looked from the outset like a high-risk operation, not the kind of thing a soldier with the experience, tactical acumen, and terrain sense of an objective-observer would advocate. Thus a question should arise as to the origins of the plan for the raid into Laos.

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[vinhtruong]

A year earlier 1970, since then South Vietnamese corps-level operation had been conducted in Cambodia, but in cooperation with accompanying US forces, US advisors, and of course US artillery and air power in support. That operation and simultaneous political development in Cambodia resulted in closing the seaport of Sihanoukville to the enemy. This craps was plotting by US counterespionage and Soviet Union warning the Hanoi troop moved to west all the cargo scattered along corridor: Earlier two dry season campaigns, in conclusion that, based on all available intelligence, the enemy had already succeeded in moving only 9,000 short tons of supplies through the Laotian panhandle into South Vietnam and Cambodia, just 15 percent of the 67,000 short tons he had input into the system and only 40 percent as much as the previous year’s throughput. The Permanent Government strategic staffs forced Hanoi to continue a protracted war strategy in the Southern Vietnam. Subsequently, the Hanoi’s forces had, by and large, withdrawn farther west during the allied incursion into Cambodia rather than stay and fight for their base areas and supplies. Two players of CIP and NLF wouldn’t yet to stop the game but protracted it.
With Market Time naval operations very effectively cutting off coastal deliveries as a method of re-supply, [no more supplies from Navy Group 759 to Seaport Sihanoukville] all enemy forces in the South were now dependent on what came down the Ho Chi-Minh trail from the North; the enemy could no longer afford to abandon his Binh-Tram [base areas] without a fight, lest his deployed forces be starved out as a result.
The so called “Vietnamization-Program” stemming from the strategist-staffs planner was implied an amount dispensable out of date war materiel must be inventory; for instant such like more than 7,000 helicopters HU-1 just a huge rubbish-dump on the spot, like forks, dishes, or napkins dispensable in the eve of combat training-picnic. They used literate-fashioned in political word Vietnamization in psychological warfare propaganda reinforced for South Vietnamese Air Force and became the rubbish later due to without spare-parts. But when the Saigon fall, they panic-fled out to emigrate in US theirs will pay-off back by real green dollars, jewel, diamond or transaction credit CD for these bullshit stuffs, cast-off WWII American weapons when they fled in search of a better life.
“When a new endeavor is launched,” we foresaw, “something has to give.” With US combat troops withdrawals continuing, and US support capability diminishing accordingly, there were not enough resources to go around.
The single Hanoi troops’ dependence on the logistic corridor through the Laos panhandle presents South Vietnam with an unprecedented challenge. There is little doubt, as to the damage which could be dealt to Hanoi’s aspiration by effectively blocking or even significantly hindering the southward movement of men and materiel. All were important, but the logistics-war of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, [COSVN] concluded MACV’ analysts “now stand as the critical conflict for the Viet Cong and North communist troops.” Every other supply route had been cut off, and the pacification process was reducing enemy ability to obtain supplies in Southern Vietnam. Thus the enemy must perforce expand and extend the Ho Chi Minh Trail if he was to support and sustain operations in northeast Cambodia. The target for ARVN operations was clear.
Yes, it must be a coincidence; it has to be a coincidence. It is fair to say that after the consequent effect of the “Cooper-Church” amendment, now increasingly threatening North Vietnamese air defenses brought the complex of “Rules Of Engagement”-(ROE) into even greater prominence. These prescriptions, or more often restrictions, governed where and under what circumstances aircraft could retaliate, what forces could be employed in the DMZ and for what purposes, and a range of other situations. Ridiculously, One bitter but insightful joke of the day was that the reason why the Air Force and Navy used two-seat fighter plane was so one man could fly and the other could read him the ROE strictly controlled by General Alexander Haig in the Washington, [Permanent Government Bones or George H.W Bush or Donald Rumsfeld WSAG’ Chief staff] On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the small group of young officers working under general Haig, maybe including Lieutenant anti-war movement John F Kerry; this part of Kissinger’s National Security Council staff, seems the likely source. Certainly Haig himself was the principal author, a prospect congruent with his later involvement in and reaction to the operation such as an invaded operation to northeast Cambodia recently.
General George Brown, noting that the ROE permitted his air crews to strike enemy installations from which they had taken fire. “We can always entice them into shooting at us” Brown affirmed. Sometimes, though, that proved too dangerous a tactic. Haig’ instructions were issued prohibiting operations within the SAM envelope. Unfortunately that action also ruled out strikes against the best interdiction point on Route 7, supplying route to the south.
When this was briefed to General Abrams, he reacted heatedly “The Air Force does not have the authority to attack that site, even when it’s fired at, right?” Abrams asked Brown.
“No, sir, we can’t attack that,” Brown confirmed.
“Under those circumstances,” said Abrams, “I just don’t see how you can call on people to go up there to work!”
That’s the whole points in this thing, the lack of authority to attack that damn site, or any other site up there in that area that opens up on you. Of course, we’re tried to get the authority, and I’ll be goddamned if I understand why we can’t, because the photo recon guys that go in North Vietnam – they can attack anybody that shoots at them from North Vietnam. Referring acidly to comment, all this crap about US flight personnel can take whatever action’s required to protect their crew, protective reaction – all kind of great patriotic speeches have been made about that! And if the principle of retaliation doesn’t apply in North Vietnam, the flight crewmembers will be damned. This is very difficult to understand. Controversy over the ROE and the application of those rules would continue throughout the remaining years of the war.
Permanent Government unleashed the scattering of the Hanoi’s troop’s logistical traffic along “Harriman Highway” corridor, the interdiction tactics of the past no longer seemed sufficient due to strategy “everything worked but nothing worked enough”– infeasible. As on an altitude view of bird by helicopter treetop snapshot, I should say: “The dispersal factor has been accomplished fantastic-beautifully,” and “Hanoi’s trucks move at night, they move to one place, stay and hide, unload, pick up another truck and move on down south, hiding below the thick canopy, so it’s just an extremely difficult problem. Obviously, their cargos were not ever subjected to horrible destroyed because the axe of evil warned them beforehand what, where, and when SAC will be B-52s carpet-struck. (MR. Ho-Si-Hai, NVA truck-driver diaries tell us much about southward infiltration. He has been ordered to drive at night with low beam and sleep at daytime for rest and relaxation. These order-regulations keep them safely in network)

One year earlier [spring 1970] there was also emphasized the importance of Highway Harriman, [Ho Chi Minh trail] the utmost Laotian corridor: the supplies stored by the various troop supply cargo-stations of Group 559 in the campaign’s area of operations had risen to 6,000 tons, which together with the High Command’s cargo-supply reserves was sufficient to support between 50,000 and 60,000 troops in combat for four or five months. In addition, more than 30,000 tons of supplies were stored in Group 559’s warehouses along the strategic transportation corridor – the most recent-cargo was already out of risk in the operational area, recently moving to farther south.
However the Haig’ war-room in Washington had not lost track of the importance of that lifeline by sophisticated sensors from satellite. When a truthfulness of George H W Bush as Director of Central Intelligence as Richard Helm visited Vietnam; Seven Air Force commander General Lucius Clay described his job of the moment as carrying out instructions given him by General Abrams but of course having some restrictions secretly notified in ROE stipulations.
For escaping from the Strategic Air Command bombardments, pretty soon the trail began to dry out and NVA’ logistics offensive moved into high gear by urging as fast as they can run away the striking area. Shortly before Operation Lam Son 719 started, Seven Air Force was devoting 89 percent of B.52 strikes to the so-called anti-infiltration boxes but too late and achieving record truck kills, just merely trucks were grounded by broken down in the parking lot, and the substantial numbers still got through. The targets always depended on CIA, Ted Shackley Station chief at Saigon decision. “So! But goddamn it” – either they’ve got enough that are well or something. But they seem to be able to work on the road, keep the Molotova-Trucks going, still fire the antiaircraft, still move the supplies and unload and load it, backpack it, and all that. So we should say they’re right on schedule…and we don’t think it means that somehow they’re going to screw it up!” They are motivated to seize South Vietnam by power according to ‘axiom-1’.
Before Lam Son 719 commenced, as the raid into Laos loomed, in Paris on 21 January 1971, the 100th session of the sterile peace negotiations was held, a meeting described as “devoted largely to reviews of known position”. Meanwhile drawdown of US combat troops continued unabated, 60,000 more departing during January-April 1971, then operation Lam Son 719. Strategically, President Thieu accounts on “a thrust into Laos, a safe for U.S troops withdrawn.” All US troops have got to be pulling in the same direction, and all together. We’d counseled “That’s always a neat trick to do under the most ideal circumstances. American is all different. They’re individualists and enthusiasts, optimist and pessimist, then a slight sprinkling of just screw-ups!”
Kissinger asked CIA, Ted Shackley to prepare a close hold estimate of probable enemy reaction to a large-scale South Vietnamese raid into the Tchepone area of Laos that would be backed by US air support but no US ground force involvement, the assessment, wrote Bruce Palmer, “was remarkably accurate with respect to the nature, pattern, and all-out intensity of the NVA reaction to Lam Son 719”
On 26 January the text of an intercepted NVA message was forwarded to McCain and Abrams. “It has been determined that the enemy [South Vietnam and US combat forces] may strike into our cargo carrier system in order to cut it off,” the document read “Prepare to mobilize and strike the enemy hard. Be vigilant!”
On 29 January, the NVA has detected indication of an imminent major operation in northern South Vietnam below DMZ. They recognize the possibility of a cross-border operation into Tchepone and the decisive effects such an attack could have on their 1970-1971, crash logistics program, as well as on their objectives in South Vietnam and Cambodia. But there was also a substantial element of enemy uncertainly as to just what the US and ARVN troops were going to do. Objective-observer noted concern about an invasion by sea, invasion by air from the aircraft carriers offshore, and so on. “There is waiting to figure out what’s going on”. In conclusion, subsequent intercepts indicated “a high state of alert in the southern provinces of North Vietnam” with one provincial unit reporting that “extensive preparations were being made against anticipated US and ARVN troop attacks in North Vietnam.

Operation Lam Son 719
In this traditional Lunar new-year, I have a special favor from my high commander unleashed me to joint celebrated holiday in Saigon even the immensity of the war at that time was too much for me to leave my 213th squadron. I’m enormously impressed by this excited traditional happiness with my family – In my ears frequently the short-lasting sound fire-crackers were exploded with a loud cracking noise that my children cried out overjoyed to see their exploded into laughter.
At the evening 5 February 1971, an airman of my 1st Air Division showed up given to me a message that my 51st Wing commander urged me to break off a Tet holiday leave at the highest point of family-happiness and return back to my squadron on the earlier flight to Danang air-base as soon as I can. My daughter had heard the reports on television about soldiers dying in this war, so she knew how dangerous, it was twelve, old enough to realize that I could be killed. When I got my orders to go, I remember that my wife seemed very subdued, and we didn’t say much about it to. In the pagoda hear mass, my daughter cried calmly through the entire service. In the early morning, I embraced my children before leaving because I had to use the farewell scenes since my long event marriage period. They observed me as a hero: strong, calm, always in charge in my own quiet way. They were worried they would never see me again. It is not easy to be the wife of a helicopter pilot in the war time.
When a woman falls in love with a spy-pilot or Project Delta pilot, she knows she’s in for a roller-coaster ride. Marry an Airborne, Marine, Ranger or any member of Special Forces and you can forget about counting on celebrating birthdays, holidays, or anniversaries together. Your mother might pass away and he won’t make the funeral. His mother might die, and you will have to watch him kneel at her graveside, stricken with remorse, long after she’s cold.
What the hell of war? I did not believe that the war was at a moral level sufficiently low to require civil resistance. The war, as I understood it then, was not in itself an evil; if there was evil. Our longest-young developed a deep, visceral disgust for war because of our – and our families’ – experiences in it. “All kind of wars were stupid!” That war destroyed our families with a terrifying, shocking and painful experience. The war had simply savaged; it turned the fathers and brothers and sisters upside down and sucked all the oxygen out of their smug and comfortable assumptions. Nowadays, after all that we experienced and lost in that war, we finally understand that there is nothing inevitable about us! Also, I thought it was in how ineptly it was being conducted and in the consequences of this ineptitude.
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[vinhtruong]

In the Tet-Offensive, once I had seen my HU1-H crewmembers return from battlefield. Four flight crewmembers, brave-men who had given their courage, their disciplined dedication, their blood to a cause now lost. Their remains had zipped shut in four black-bags filled with too many friends who had given their lives trying to win the Red-menace. I had acquired a sense of civic duty to my country that was not deterred by the vicissitudes of poor leadership. When I looked into myself, I knew that I would remain faithful to a code of personal honor attached to what I understood as the ideals of my country’s form of government rising above the confusions of political and military leadership. This became explicitly clear to me when I was interviewed by allies-officer in my class Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air University Alabama. They asked me “What I thought of the war”, and I recall telling them that I thought it make no sense to me to try to defend South Vietnam so long as the border areas of Cambodia and Laos were conceded to the Hanoi. I had no quarrel with resisting the spread of Red menace, but I could see no strategy being applied that had prospects of success. Nevertheless, I remember telling the allies-officer students that “my patriotism was stronger than my unhappiness about poor US intervention strategic policy!”
When I stepped down from a twice-engine transport C.119, a blue-air-force pick up truck had been waiting for picked me up to 1ts Division War-Room. I zipped up my flying-suit and flight jacket to prevent the chill and influenza when in this season fall to 45 degrees in the still darkness of the night, but this weather was another rough friend and foe in the northern I Corp region, and at the height of the monsoon when fog is heavy but usual patchy. The northeast monsoon blows a light, steady, cold rain its height called the ‘crachin’ (from the French word) for “drizzle”, the rain often lasts two or four days at the time and is frequently accompanied by a blanketing fog that stops close air support and also makes artillery hard to adjust when fog is thick enough. Northern I Corps happens to be place where the northeast monsoon is most intense it is the rainiest place in South Vietnam, the average rainfall for Hue, province is 120 inches compared to 77 inches for Saigon.
I opened a secret envelope that a message is as verbatim order assigned me as a field-chief-commander all VNAF units included two flights, one from Queen-bee 219th Squadron, another belonging King-Star 233rd Squadron and my entire Magic-Club 213th Squadron including 6 HU1-H Gun-ships for special air cover and ground support for Airborne Division. All flight crewmembers now have to standby at the Danang Air-base for in case scrambled over to operational area [Khe Sanh]. But firstly, I must bring my two gun-ships right away to the outpost of Airborne Field Headquarter located on top a mountain right south of DMZ for a short briefing. At 9:00 A.M this morning, where all standby-combat forces were already to scramble.
Particularly, my 213th Squadron was be chosen by General Dong, the Airborne commander as our perfect air ground support for airborne brigade to recent on rubber Chup Plantation in Cambodia last year 1970, as the same way now, General Abrams chosen General Tri with the nick-named Vietnamese Patton to a field commander for operation Lam Son 719. But Tri was killed while his helicopter took off and exploded when operation Lam Son 719 just started.
I prepare to land on a helipad the Camp-J.J.Carroll (named for a Marine captain who died to seize a nearby ridge) Camp Con Thien, and Rockpile, each dominated by one brigade) An airborne major Khoi came and guided me to the briefing room, a big bunker with abundance sand bags staged around.
At 9:00 A.M, at briefing room when I showed up General Du Quoc Dong hand shaken by implication for I should doing the best. He said: “I personally had had cable to President Thieu for your squadron worked with us because your squadron was the elite not only for the Vietnam War but the World War too…as you knew…I put my trust in you whereas US…they’re not deserve to be trusted!”
I wondered that Dong was just notorious a simple combat soldier he hatred politic but now his statement too much political in his hindsight. I took command of this 213th Squadron after graduated to US Air University. In 1970s, I brought one flight detachment to engage Cambodia War as air supply and medical evacuation support to an Airborne Brigade to cover rubber Chup-Plantation. Now this manipulated action exerted by General Lam I Corps commander, thinking first of his Corps own interests, needs, without concern for III Corps in alert; He complaint to President Thieu for his selfish reasons. “Why every Corps having their own-helicopter wing and there was never coming to reinforced us at the usually hot at DMZ not sharing what I Corps has with others” President Thieu responded “All priority for Cambodia War”
On the high relief of Carroll Camp looked down to route 9 reaching to western mountainous area, from this outpost spread along Route 9, which extended across the northern badlands from Dong Ha at the coast to Khe Sanh in the far western mountains, overlooking the Laos border. I found out a long like snack convoy of trucks heading to Khe Sanh maybe for this operation. Whereas to eastern flat terrain of the green plain and bushes I could find out some airborne soldiers appearing somewhat underneath the foliage for practical exercise. Major Khoi indicated his finger to down there and said: “Supposedly, our troops down there get trouble encircled by enemy they needed your guide how to protect them by your fire-power cover support…and the most important we never use color smokes on our location…but just a red color panel only!”
Two gun-ships were flying over 300 feet above an airborne battalion. I tried to contact on FM 42.5 friend called sign “Dong-Da” for identified target spot and strafing two 2.75 rockets right on target and turned sharply to the right now left mini-gun continued tracing on the target. Dong-Da ground force was very pleased but I radioed next pass-prep, we will made dived prep-approach parallel left side for avoiding fired remnant cartridges didn’t fall on the troop.
With my experience by almost as a quick reflex action I often don’t use the gun-sight instrument while firing. I trust my Sergeant Duc, he was a good gunner, sometimes his eyes were same my eyes on target. Two mini-guns were the big killer that recalled to me in the battle northwest of Chu-Lai, just only two gun-ships but killed a full battalion of NVA [lest than 150 men] which was crossing the Thu-Bon’s river. I also recalled once a smuggle boat belong to NVA Group 759 was been detected, this supplied boat was everyone on board get killed by mini-guns after 24 rockets missing by two new nervous rating-pilots prep. The ghost boat continued proceeding to the shore Phong Dien county Quang Tri province without pilot directed, a ghostly creature flitting on the surface of the sea to land at My Thuy beach; Marine Brigade 258th was welcome her with different kind of weapons, plus a platoon Tank M-48 in strafing into it with their canons. The typical of this ghost boat was carried a thousand to thousand ‘beacon pork-meat’ canned at China made, plus various supply categories of military materiel.
The NVA troops were screwed up for everything they had leaned how to react and shot to the airplanes. Because all fighters even helicopter Cobra when they started to fire they must dive to release their fire-powers. The NVA had instructed by US counterespionage– firing only at the time their fighter-bombers raised their head to sky, then stands and freely shot at them whatever you get in your hand. A platoon of antiaircraft artillery divided three points of three equilateral triangle angles; each angle established a stronghold AAA guns. Where they dug up land for individual holes 60 decrees inclination, these shaped hole for personnel sliding when fighter dived on their top as target; meanwhile two another strongholds kept firing but a stronghold was on the target, people must gliding under the 60-degree hole, and at once, while the fighter raised the head to sky, stands in fired at him. It’s strange they haven’t heard from this tactical was only harmful by our bullets 7.62 mm at 4,000 rounds per minutes by Gunship HU-1H model. So why NVA were only get killed by our monsters in that very-moment.
One captured AAA’ NVA officer told us, they were confident with these tactical offenses
They were never had casualty with this method of defense. If the battle lasts longer run that meant VNAF and US aircrafts having so many chance of being risked to shot-down than destroyed them and the most we used the “Snake-Eye” bombs, 250 or 500 pounds. He said these bombs exploded on the mountainous forest as southern Laos, likely the big fire-cracker celebrated in lunar New Year spell. That meant VNAF like F-5, A-37 AD-6 dropped bombs … their efforts to strike him were futile.
In the earlier of Lam Son operation, following the operation plan, one Airborne Brigade should take over a stronghold of a fire base with call-sign Hill-32, but Lieutenant John F Kerry of antiwar movement had let Hanoi known everything planning for this operation so why President Thieu ordered cancelled the last anticipated Hill-32 fire base support. However Hanoi skeptically if in doubt, don’t act unless allies forces in south DMZ are been certain, other word Hanoi was disregarded anything by Kerry had say, although he was a notorious antiwar activist showed up everyday in world TV. Kissinger and Yale graduated John Kerry were chosen by Harriman for his conspiracy, naturally Kerry was supported by Skull and Bone for his future presidency campaign; so coincidence with actor quarterback Kissinger in the play-game Pennsylvania meanwhile Kerry duty performance to accomplish axiom 1 – the anticipated of biggest-fiasco that I foresaw in my whole time there because it broke the back of the Saigon regime of Army forces, particularly irreplaceable were the dead ARVN “elite-officers”. I must say since ‘that’ the future leaders, they were all dead. Subsequently Skull and Bones turned in Saigon to Hanoi with a blood-leak battle instead of bloodbath one. This operation identified one of these strategy-goals. Furthermore this repeated “the bomb ends the war”: dropping the atomic bombs brought the war to a swift conclusion, saving many lives in the process, after a Big air-campaign: on the night of March 9-10, 1945, Permanent Government ordered 324 B-29s attacked right the heart of Tokyo as low level in the most destructive air raid in then history, ended by B-29s were used to drop the first atomic bombs on Japan. On August, 6, 1945 Colonel Paul Tibbets, aircraft commander B-29s, named “Enola Gay” dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima in saving many lives in prospect. War-history once again repeated – The B.52 has long been one of the main instruments of Permanent Government foreign-policy. During the Cold War it was the airborne warrior that would have dropped nuclear weapon onto the Soviet Union or maybe on China if Red China tried to overrun the southern states of Soviet Republic in its critical possibility be-collapsed-period. The special “Big Belly” B-52D could also carry a load of 108 conventional bombs, and during the Vietnam War in the “Pennsylvania’s” as Linebacker-II, 129 B-52s of several models carried out the 11 days and night attacked the so called “Christmas Bombing” which designed to force Hanoi to conference table in Paris.

Phase-1 (1 Feb to 7 Feb) – On 1 February 1971, as U.S armor and mechanized forces were moving to open Route 9 west to the Laotian border in a preparatory stage of the Laotian incursion, after two weeks discussing plans for Lam Son 719 by NSC on January 18, 1971. One week later, 8 February, 1971 ARVN cross border. General Abrams cabled Admiral McCain to advise that the bulk of the enemy’s combat units in the region are located in the vicinity of Tchepone, the operation’s ultimate objective. Whatever else might happen, it was clear that the disposition and strength of enemy forces in and near the area of operations were not going to come as any surprise to the attackers.
Lieutenant General Armor Hoang Xuan Lam, I Corps, was in command of the thrust into Laos. The U.S counterpart in Military Region 1 was Lieutenant General James W.Sutherland, an armor officer who commanded the XXIV Corps. MACV depended heavily on Sutherland and his headquarters to advisor, support, and encourage General Lam and the Vietnamese during the operation. Lam had under his command for the operation the 1st Infantry Division, the Airborne Division, the Marine Division, the 1st Armored Brigade Task Forces and a Ranger group, the best troops South Vietnam possessed, attacked spearhead by eighteen acted combat battalions
Stated a later North Vietnamese history, “…our combat forces in the Route 9 – south Laos Front had reached 60,000 combat troops, consisting of five divisions such as 320th, 324th, 2nd, 304th, and 308th: two separate infantry regiments such as 278th, and 27th; eight regiments of artillery, three engineer regiments, three tank regiments, six anti-aircraft regiments, eight sapper battalions, plus rear service and transportation units. This campaign was our army’s greatest concentration of combined arms forces in its history up to that point.”
On the defensive in Laos, the enemy was going to be able to amass and sustain a much larger force than he could have projected into South Vietnam.
Phase-2 (8 Feb to 5 March) – On 8 February 1971 the ARVN forces began crossing the border into Laos and Operation Lam Son 719 had been under way. Alongside the route, a hundred yards before the border, was posted a sign that read: “Warning, No US personnel beyond this point.” This mission was to disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication and destroy stocks of war materiel – especially in Base Area 604, centered on Tchepone – thereby setting back the enemy’s timetable for aggression, protecting American forces during their progressively withdraw, and providing more time for South Vietnamese forces to develop. This ground thrust was an integral part of the larger effort to thwart enemy aggression by denying him the wherewithal to carry it out, a complement to the intensive air interdiction campaign along the entire line of communication in the Laotian panhandle and against the target box system that sought to block the entry points into the trail system.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

From the outset it was hard going. Route 9 was at best a narrow, twisting, nearly unimproved surface, or so it looked from the air. The reality was much worse. In 1962 an occasion in alert for rescue STRATA infiltration, our Queen-Bee H.34 must standby there. I had chance strode along the route 9 to hunting the peacock, recognized the surface some of those weather cuts that were in that route were fifteen feet deep. A few days after the operation commenced. They missed that in the readout of the aerial photography. The area of operation extended from Khe Sanh, in Coroc highlands situated 12 kilometers east of the Laotian border, to the city of Tchepone, 45km inside Laos. The axial center of the operation was Route-9. Parallel to Route-9 was a small river. Thick jungles of thorny giant bamboo flanked both sides of Route 9 which was 200 to 500 meters above the sea level. Mt Coroc blocked longitudinally from the North to the South, leaving only a path for Route-9 to pierce. Movement troops were very difficult and limited in such topography. Everything depended on Route-9. The high relief crests on each side were ideal places in which to launch ambushes. Troops had to move over undulating terrains, covered with thick bamboo forests that greatly blocked observation and hindered maneuvers. There was very difficult for the offensive force to assault in such terrain even if it were fully supported by armor, air force and artillery. Another disadvantage was that the NVA knew very well this area like the back of their hands, whereas the ARVN troops were unfamiliar with the operational area. It was psychological disadvantage for South Vietnam troops to the must have to fight outside their country in completely unknown terrain and mountainous area.
In the operation plan, a trajectory called for an armor task force to drive was along route 9 toward Tchepone while – by occupying a string of fire support bases to be established paralleling on the right west mountainous flank. The 1st Infantry Division protected the southern flank, and the Marine Division constituted the reserve. Later the armor would link up with airborne elements to be airlifted to Tchepone. Leading the way into Laos was the ARVN 1st Armored Brigade Task Force, reinforced by two airborne battalions. Next an ARVN airborne brigade headquarters and one of its battalions moved into position, followed by another airborne brigade and then a Ranger battalion. Other units followed.
Unfortunately, the cuts will have an adverse effect on all operations to win the war. Given the restricting “Cooper-Church” amendment, no advisors accompanied ARVN troops into Laos, not like in the last year incursion to Cambodia, and of course no America units participated. Air support of all kinds was allowed – however, as was artillery and logistical support from the South Vietnamese side of the Laos/VN border. This generated a massive operation in support of the incursion. Early on, General Abrams visited the primary base for all this activity, a reopened Khe Sanh. “It’s hard to believe,” he marveled, “the helicopters, the trucks, the artillery, the amount of equipment that is in that whole thing up there. I’ll tell you, I’ve never seen anything like it in the time I’ve been here. It’s quite remarkable – fifty-three CH-47 Chinooks, really something.”
US heavy artillery lined up along the border to provide fire support including eighteen 155mm
Howitzers, sixteen 175mm guns, and eight 8-inch howitzers But the huge amounts of aviation support were the real story of U.S support for this operation Lam Son 719. Additionally, Seventh Air Force kept up its interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, during the first week of Lam Son 719 destroying a new second high number of trucks for the dry season (but trucks were broke-down in the parking area due to all targets the CIA made decision – everything worked but nothing worked enough on strategy for protracting the war) but that was now only part of its massive efforts.
General Lucius Clay said: “I’m flying roughly 12,000 support sorties a month in addition to this,” referring to the number of individual aircraft missions being launched for various purposes (demolished stony mountains for created a future International Indo China Highway and NVA should be ground cleared by the early pioneers, debut at Harriman Super-Highway)
Clay continued: “I’m flying 21,000 sorties a month in airlift. I’m flying roughly 850 – 900 sorties a month in recon. That’s all maintenance capability, whether you expend ordnance or not,” meaning that every one of these flights generated s maintenance requirement. “There’s a limit to what you can do in generating sorties.”
In the wake of a broadcast by President Thieu announcing this operation; Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma issued a formal statement of protest. The language of the statement, said a MACV analyst, suggested that “certainly the primary responsibility rests with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which, scornful of international law…began and continues to violate the neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.”
Meanwhile, on behalf of Viet Cong National Liberation Front, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh cabled an urgent message to sympathizers in the United States: “Earnestly call you mobilize peace forces your country…check United States dangerous venture Indochina!”
Alas! On 10 February 1971, I never seem to learn from my mistake, in the earliest of this operation, an echelon-formation of 4 UH1-Hs of my 213th squadron, but 2 were exploded in air by antiaircraft gun 14,5mm armed on PT-76 and 37mm AAA in the northeast of Tchepone for a mission reconnaissance. All crewmembers and passengers were killed including four journalists and I Corps staff officers at coordinate XD 563537 at 15:00.
The cold air spread so low on highland ground inflicted on my back while I’m on a military-cot inside the canvas tent; under a mosquito-net I meditate on the sufferings of that terrible shock to their families. “How can I prevent that wouldn’t happened again?” I couldn’t sleep for night long due to the U.S Long Tom 175 guns at Khe Sanh, strafing to now and then waking me up. This section on Ho Chi Minh trail, from Mu-Gia Pass via Tchepone to Attopeu was familiar with me; I could know how every scenery in my heart, every relief, peaks of high mountains, creeks, rivers, streams, the virgin forests, human activities in devastated by bombs, now I looked devastating with very impressive and effective. The spot LZ that Lieutenant Hue crashed when was infiltrated landing a STRATA team in 1963 due to engine lost-power now became clear red-earth soil instead of the green dark forest; I recalled I Had had put right wheel landing gear on his Queen-Bee hub-blades for rescue all flight crewmembers. Now everywhere filled by ware-houses and POL pipe-line parallel on its. And also the AAA from here shot-down our HUI-H when this early operation started.
After a longest night I rubbed my eyes and yawned broader, though sometimes caught an hour or two naps on the nearby duty watch’s cot, but mostly I got my shut-eye from dozing in a metal folding chair, and came out looked out across the darkness toward Dong Da stronghold base, as the token artillery fire sounded in the muffled way that artillery always seems to sound on battlefield at night and an occasional star shell from the batteries illuminated the sky.
How can sleep? I recalled nine years ago (1962) as same place Khe Sanh quiet and peaceful I awoke early morning to the sounds of the stream. It was shrouded in thick impenetrable pea-soup fog, but its murmur reached through inside my tent as I sipped my coffee. The only sounds were the awakening, chirping, singing birds and the babbling riffles as the stream split and wove around a highland directly in front of my tent-yard. Was I in the backwoods wild of Khe Sanh or some remote distant location out west to Tchepone?
I became obsessed with that accident. “What do I conclude from that, and what conclusions do I draw from that casualty prevention?” The most of my concerned was the new rating pilot attachment to my responsibility from brand new formed squadron 233rd King-Star. I am convinced myself from now on, I will handle a lead gunship as escorted combat formation to air cover every UH-1H slicks fly cross border to the operation area, and the rendezvous point should be a check point over the old-French-prison at Lao-Bao right on the frontier Laos where to their coming and leaving. By way of conclusion, I will having a short briefing to all ‘aircraft-commanders’ of squadron 213th, 233rd, and 219th, in the early tomorrow morning for the new tactical gunship air cover-escort with the hope ‘no one get killed’.
At the left side of the Route 9 to Tchepone was the Xe-Pon River, but in 1962 there was very cool, I recalled that aerial photo mission I made a stupid flight when detected a sampan camouflage covered with full becoming browned leaves, I surrounded over its in the air for funning picture, suddenly from those browned leaves the submachine gun fired to my H-34 chopper, while I came back to Khe Sanh, Captain Phu (now brigadier general commander 1st Infantry Division, the finest infantry unit) told me that your helicopter blades got hit three holes by Mat P.49 equipped to French Airborne, if your hear one by one that meant Mat-36, so I told him that Mat-49. Now Phu was still his looking shape pale and thin and always the cigarette sticking in his fingers but not French-Bastos heavy cigarette. This time his face appeared frequent worry and nervous because the B.52 took off from Utapao (tactical bombardment or strategic bombardment take off from Guam) let him the shortest time when B-52 flew “Arc-Light” missions attacking the so called communist hiding beneath the featureless jungle canopy but targets depended on CIA for protracted war or demolished stony-mountains; so you known they couldn’t be killed. But CIA’s goal was pushed pressure to ARVN troop hurry up on course trajectory on ‘keyed-up-time’ to the siege-target 604 – NVA’ base cargo supply.
In the TOC’ bunker I can hear loudly his order “Any directions clear enough for run away at once! Run away at once.” That meant pushing Colonel Diem regiment commander at southern flank to move quickly to Tchepone.
Strangely, the NVA thrust coming from north DMZ that I could understand they crossed by our three fire-base supports but B-52 didn’t strike on them at all, but only than on ARVN infantry regiment in southern flank? Why? Because General Giap (cooperated engagement with OSS before 1943) though was an indirect apparatus of Skull and Bones but Giap help them carrying out their strategy instead used all powerful forces attacked directly in to American Khe Sanh Base (so nowadays his sibling stayed in California, USA) This plot was imagined by your simple knowledge; why don’t attack closer easy-won but attack too far at open area-dumpster, Base 604, Tchepone?
On 10 February advance elements of the armor column linked up with an airborne battalion at A-Luoi Fire-Support Base, some twenty kilometers into Laos, despite truly miserable weather that had set in the previous day. On the same day ARVN I Corps Headquarters, already struggling with the complex tasks of coordinating a multi-division attack under difficult terrain and weather conditions, suffered a serious setback when 2 VNAF helicopters crash resulted in the deaths of two of its most important staff officers, the chief J-3 planner and the chief J-4 logistician. However the Chinooks CH-47 really something when they hook up the Howitzer 155 artillery to every FSB as Dong Da, Hill-30, 31 in the northern flank were great O.K. It’s hard to believe. In the two full days of February, two airborne brigades, one infantry regiment, Ranger, CH-47, CH-54 hanging in air heavy loads to every established Fire Support Bases back and forth; everything were fluently quite beautiful. But only 2 Huey were accident by ground fire belong to my Magic-Club 213th squadron and Colonel Diem regiment’s few slowed react soldiers were killed by our friendly B.52s bombardment from Guam, by preplanned road map in Pentagon.
From about 12 February on, ARVN forces more or less held in place and hunkered down, not a wise tactic in an operation of this kind. Later it was asserted, by the rumor that government not among permanent government, that President Thieu had issued secret orders to his commanders to halt the advance when 3,000 casualties had been sustained. Nguyen Tien Hung, a former special assistance to Thieu, later cast doubt on that claim, writing that “Thieu insists he never gave such an order!” The next day General Vien Chiefs Staffs invited General Abrams to meet with him. General Vien described President Thieu’s visit and briefings in I Corps on 12 February, and “said that after a thorough discussion of intelligence and dispositions, President Thieu directed that the ARVN forces not advance further at this time beyond the western positions they now hold.” General Vien thought this would be a hold of three to five days and affirmed that they still intended to go to Tchepone. Abrams in turn pointed out the disadvantages of remaining in static positions, “giving the enemy both time and opportunities to reorganize his reaction in a more effective way”
How can we know that war game between the axe of evil to its counterparts [Soviet Union and Skull and Bones] must coordinate their efforts in function together efficiently and in an organized way as ROE’ scam. I was understandably bitter about the outcome of the long years of struggle for free South Vietnam. That performance alone should serve to demonstrate that I was as stunned as any that the sometime American ally would, in a time of such crisis, turn its back on South Vietnam and of course on all the sacrifices my SOG fellows in arm had made there.
Here is a typical case for their craps. The G.I stayed in the Main Compound at Danang Air Force Base in 1972, a certain morning at breakfast time when the loud-speaker said something but our Airmen-housewife didn’t understand what the hell they say; but they wait until afternoon and come to check the Hospital Ship [Hope or Helgolan] of Germany disembarked not still anchorage in the pier of Han’s river. They hurried back and suddenly launched into a harangue to their husbands: “Tonight Viet Cong will launch rockets into our air base. I bring the kids to downtown for escaped…if you would die try stay on here…O.K!” Prophetically, they prophesied that at night when the loud speakers said: “All G.I must go into the bunker about five minutes rockets will strafing, it also clear announcement how many rockets will hit and TOT too and it repeat one more time before rockets hit.
In turn of ROE, on August 9, 1968 three box B.52 (nine aircrafts) “Arc-Light” took off from Guam to strike the Forward Base of 559 Group headquarters at Tam-Boi’ mountain, “Oscar Eight” call sign for SOG, northern Ashau-valley where mountain contained immense chambers hewn from solid rock and fitted with heavy iron door, so well constructed that they withstood B.52 strikes. However according to the ROE, the camouflage Soviet fishing boats nearby the Guam Island contacted with that headquarter 559 Group before long enough to TOT(Time On Target) for hidden chambers hewn escaped B.52 struck.
The raid began with three throngs B.52, a dawn Arc Light a thousand 500 and 750-pounds bombs walk across Oscar Eight, setting off 50 secondary explosions, witnessed by our recon team Master Sergeant Billy Waugh watched. Incredibly, the bombs had barely stopped falling when he could see NVA troops running from their shelters to roll fuel barrels away from a fire. Waugh radioed SOG Lt Col Harold Rose at Khe Sanh, “I’ve got people out here scurrying around. That sonva-bitch is loaded”. All NVA troops were secure even they couldn’t hear the sound of eight jet engines flown at high at 25,000 to 35,000 feet.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

Venal Press-Corps’ Biased Reports: The nature of this operation was too stranger, “attack” was a maneuver much advantage than “defense,” but Giap’ forces don’t use this tactical for destroyed all U.S forces at Khe Sanh much closer and easier won the war, why not? And the must-fight at the ‘barbecue drill-oven’ as Base 604, Tchepone instead – this is a perfect value-plot of CIA counterespionage in collaboration between two counterparts was effect to separate the clique cadre communist Hanoi out of China- domination. B.52 killed General Nguyen Chi Thanh pro-China prior to helping Le Duan and Le Duc Tho carried out their scams by seizing the totalitarian-power at Hanoi’s regime.

Subsequently General Sutherland provided some further insight, cabling Abrams that the South Vietnamese had modified the original plan primarily because of heavy enemy contact by the Rangers and the Airborne forces on the northern flank of the penetration, and the demonstrated inability of the armor brigade to move rapidly along Route 9. For quite some time enemy forces had remained cautions and were, in fact, somewhat slow to reinforce. Their first serious counterattack came on the night of 18 February, when two NVA battalions struck the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion northeast of Ban Dong. This 39th Ranger has to retreat to South LZ to shake hands with 21st Ranger Battalion as pressure is too strong, encircled by armor PT-76 and tank T-54 of B-70 Corps. During that night, 7 AC-130 flare-ships and 6 EC-130B Gun-ships were covered, destroyed numerous NVA tanks and troops. Subsequently the major battles of the operation took place on that northern flank of the penetration, especially at Fire Support Base 31 and 30.
Venal Press-Corps’ Biased Reports
(You probably heard of the story BAT 21, or worse watch...the Movie Bat 21, if the US main stream media used to ignore the role of Ranger’s effort during the Lam Son 719. The following except-paragraph is credible enough to shed light on the scenario: Sergeant-Medic Fujii (Lam-Son 219) and Lieutenant Norris (BAT-21) what their differences in at work)
“Ask yourself, Lt Norris can’t located your bath-room when he was your first coming guest, and Sergeant Fujii was merely a man speak good English” That’s simple answer for you all.
Warning no U.S personal beyond this point: This sign-board showed-up 100 meter from border Laos/Vietnam. General Lam authorized these strike-newsmen on board of VNAF helicopter crossing border to Laos, of course dare theirs step down on the soil-land for intrigued to illuminate the situation and the times, consequently on 10th February, 15:00 hours at the coordinated XD 563537, meanwhile, near the area of operations of the 21st Ranger Battalion, our 213th Magic-Club Squadron flight a formation of four VNAF helicopters bound for Landing Zone Ranger South was hit by enemy 37-mm antiaircraft artillery and PT-76 machine guns fire at 3:00pm. Two helicopters were downed and all passengers were presumed killed. The first helicopter carried two ARVN colonels, the G3 and G4 of I Corps. The second helicopter reportedly carried a number of foreign correspondents [in 1998, all remains recovered were testified: -Keisaburo Shimamoto; -Henri Huet, AP; -Larry Burrows, Life and -Kent Potter, News Week, but specially, Pham Xuan An, Times/UPI, triple-cross-mediator, he was on board of helicopter H-21, landed at battle of Ap Bac 1963, but in this operation Lam Son he did know how what the hell, so why he never on airborne to Laos. However, on Route-9, a Japanese journalist Akihiro Okamura worked with Times magazine accompanied 1st Armor Brigade, his point of view was the same of mine: ARVN subjected to under siege at 604- fierce ambushed-battle by NVA’ stronghold underground defender of Steel 2nd NVA Division and surrounded by others four NVA divisions. Thereby B-52 had to destroy all of two crucial opponents for guaranty turn in Saigon to Hanoi not like A “Pebble-Capital” – carried out axiom-1 at just we guessed]
It was suspected that the I Corps G3 had carried with him an operational map of LAM SON 719 along with signal operating instructions and codes. A significant rumor that the loss of these documents to the General Giap’ hands would be extremely in viewer minds? A thorough search of the area for the downed helicopters produced no results. But in reality, Lieutenant John F Kerry, the so called “antiwar movement activist” showed it up to Hanoi via General Giap translated by Triple-Cross mediated translator, Pham Xuan An, so it seemed to me General Giap was seating side by side with General Alexander Haig in Pentagon [General Giap was OSS member recruited by Agent Number 19, Lucien Conein at Pat-Po sanctuary in 1945 photo by Allan Squiers]
Air Calvary crew, Sergeant Medic-Fujii, Hawaiian, his helicopter got hit by mortar 120mm (these accurate mortars which inflicted almost our helicopters grounded every Forward Fire Support Base) and forced landing on the spot LZ, and fortunately he stayed with Rangers, remember not volunteer, two Pilots, Brown got killed at once, Monteith serious wounded; Crew-chief Simpco light injury, and door-gun Costello was O.K, and the rest Fujii’ crews were picked up by another chopper, except him, because he was smart guy joint-up with Rangers for survive. Now so much biased reports from many prevaricated-newsmen. Medic-Fujii was real good Advisor, he is perfect Ranger Commander, operated some excellent movement troop-maneuvers, knowing how to kill Giap’s troops, volunteer stay for help Rangers … etc … [taking an except of Battle of Ap-Bac in 1963 as … The large, dark green silhouettes of the ‘Angle Worms’ as the Viet Cong-guerrillas called the bent-pipe H-21s, and the ‘Dippers’ their nickname for the Huey, would stand out clearly in the sunshine.
… Sgt 1st Class Arnold Bowers, 29 years old, from a Minnesota dairy farm and the 101 Airborne Division, heard the bullwhip crack of the first bullet burst through the aluminum skin of the helicopter while the machine was still 50 feet in the air, Bower’s helicopter was the second in the flight. Vietnam was his first war. During his previous eight and half months in the country he had experienced no combat beyond a few skirmishes with snipers. The whip cracked again and again over the din of the H-21 engines before the wheels of the machine settled into the paddy and Bower jumped out into the knee-high water with a squad of infantry and the ARVN first lieutenant commanding the company. His ears free of the clangor of engines, Bowers could hear a roaring of automatic weapons and rifles from the curtain of green foliage in front. The bullets were snapping all around, buzzing close by his ears and splitting the air overhead. He plunged forward the gray ooze sucking at the boots, in a reflex of his training that said the best hope for survival lay in moving and shooting until you could get on top of your opponent and kill him. The lieutenant that the ARVN infantrymen thought otherwise, they threw themselves down behind the first paddy dike they could reach about 15 yards from where the helicopter had landed.
Sgt Bowers yelled at the lieutenant that they had to return fire and maneuver to get out of the open or they would all die in the paddy. The lieutenant said that he couldn’t understand Bowers. Back at the airstrip the lieutenant had understood Bower’s English perfectly as they had waited to board the helicopters. The Vietnamese was a graduate of the company-level officers’ course at the Infantry School at Fort-Benning. Usually all Vietnamese officers disregarded Americans fighter-men due to lack combat experience (the advisers’ job was not to give the combat-experienced-Vietnamese tactical advice because they had more fighting experience than most Americans, and it was their country; rather, the obligation of the advisers was to apply American air and artillery firepower when that became necessary, which was frequently, and to provide American logistics, coordination with American units, and American intelligence. The Vietnamese fighter-men were weakest in these areas. The job of the advisers, in other words, was to make the ARVN system work. So why all Vietnamese officers considered US advisors following combat operation likewise a “Big Drawback” for them and this was according Harriman mastermind all was be for US combat training only)

But in fact Sergeant Fujii was solely an English-interpreter in inter-box relayed. The most these ugly-guy-writers who employ a tried-and-true methodology, firstly, they concoct an inflammatory that serves their political goals. “Are their lies pathological, or are they merely malicious for curious entertainment.” They try to push it into the mainstream media. All too often, they succeed. And we have to be more than vigilant … think about that. The 1st Ranger Group participated in the operation with two battalions, the 21st and the 39th, the 37th was in another operation in MR-I. The forward headquarters of the group moved in Ta-Bat, northwest of Khe Sanh, close to the Laos border. The 21st Ranger Battalion was airlifted into the LZ Rangers South, about 6km northeast of Fire Support Base (FSB) Hill-30. Three days later, the 39th Ranger Battalion was brought into the LZ Rangers North, 4km northeast of LZ Rangers South. The two Ranger-Battalions assignment was the sensor to detect the NVA movements and to delay the spearheads of attacks of the enemy toward FSB/Hill-30, Hill-31. If the NVA overran the two FSB’, they cut the retreating Route-9 of the ARVN forces.
After landing, the rangers established defensive positions in the areas surrounding of the landing zones (LZ) then Ranger Companies fanned out searching for the enemy's trails and activities in their area of responsibility. The 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions, which operated around Landing Zones “Ranger-North” and “Ranger South” respectively, were probably the units most frequently in contact with the enemy. At 18:25 hours on 11th February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged the enemy four kilometers northeast of its base killing 11 Communist troops, but later, at 22:00 hours suffered six wounded from an enemy attack by fire consisting of forty 120-mm mortar rounds. During the afternoon of 13th February, the 39th Battalion engaged a large enemy force at three kilometers west-southwest of Landing Zone “Ranger-North” killing 43 enemy personnel and seizing two 37-mm antiaircraft artillery guns, two 12.7-mm machineguns, a substantial amount of ammunition and assorted types of equipment. The 39th Battalion had only one killed and 10 wounded. Meanwhile, the 21st Ranger Battalion made sporadic contacts with the enemy throughout the day without significant results. Light contacts continued during the following days. All these activities were quickly eclipsed by reports of heavy enemy troop concentrations around the 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions. Both battalions were being subjected to attacks by fire and ground attacks and the fighting lasted all night while friendly artillery, tactical air and AC-130 flare-ships, EC-130B gun-ships responded quickly in support of the embattled rangers. The next morning, enemy pressure on the 21st Ranger Battalion gradually diminished but heavy pressure persisted on the 39th Battalion in the “Ranger North” area. The battle continued over 19th February. Enemy troops here were confirmed to be elements of the 102nd Regiment of the 308th Division, all with new weapons and clothing testified this training center on spot for battle. Before launching an assault, the rangers reported, the enemy made extensive use of recoilless rifles and mortars; his fire was very accurate. The strongest enemy attacks were directed at the eastern flank of the rangers which was their weakest spot. However, the 39th Ranger Battalion continued to hold its positions with support from 42 pieces of U.S. artillery and tactical air.
From northeast DMZ, enemy opposition grew stronger with each day around Ban Dong and the area of Route 1032B for which the rangers were responsible. On 10th February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged an element of the NVA' 88th Regiment. The next day, the 37th Ranger Battalion engaged a battalion size unit near FSB Phu Loc. The discovery of the command post of the NVA 308th Division on 18th February further confirmed reports that this division had joined in the fighting (the 308th Division had three regiments: 36th, 88th and 102nd) During the night of 19th February, the NVA forces continued to attack the 39th Ranger Battalion while launching uninterrupted attacks by fire to hold the 21st Ranger Battalion in check. Sergeant Medic Fujii did damn good job in communication between ground and air like Forward Air Controller officer for a longest night with Seven fixed wing EC-130B gun-ships and six AC-130 flare-ships were used in support of the 39th Ranger Battalion and, from 07:30 to 14:30 hours on 20th February, 32 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the rangers in daytime. Efforts to re-supply and evacuate their casualties were made with strong support from tactical air, gun-ships and artillery. Some helicopters managed to land in the area, ammunition was delivered and some wounded evacuated. But upon takeoff, two helicopters were damaged by enemy undirected fire. One had to land in the positions of the 21st Ranger Battalion (Ranger South) and the other managed to land at Fire Support Base Hill-30.
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[vinhtruong]

In the afternoon, reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an estimated 400 to 500 enemy with most of the wounded of the 39th Ranger Battalion still stranded in the 21st Rangers' positions, this unit received intense attacks by fire, including 130, 152-mm artillery, on the night of 21st February. Plans were made to evacuate the wounded rangers the following day toward noon on 22nd February, the area around the battalion position was subjected to a heavy barrage of fire involving tactical air, air cavalry, aerial artillery and ground artillery for 45 minutes while 13 medical evacuation helicopters were airborne, ready to go in. All of them landed and successfully picked up122 wounded as well as one U.S. pilot who had been stranded there since his aircraft was shot down. The ranger force remaining in combat position at Ranger South numbered approximately 400 men including 100 from the 39th Battalion but two days later, on 24th February the battalion was ordered by the I Corps commander to withdraw to FSB 30. From there they were airlifted to FSB Phu Loc. While the 39th Ranger Battalion was holding out, numerous activities took place in other areas. U.S. air cavalry continued to search for and destroy pipelines. Units of the 1st Infantry Division moved further south, striking along Route-92 and finding a number of enemy installations, but also making numerous contacts and receiving attacks by fired The 8th Airborne Battalion and armored elements engaged the enemy two kilometers north of Ban Dong, destroying one T-34 tank and a 23-mm gun position. This was another strong indication of enemy armor involvement. On the friendly side, a number of U.S. helicopters were shot down while on supply, medical evacuation or support missions. The corps commander had concluded that the position held by the 21st Rangers and the survivors of the 39th was untenable. A maximum effort in air and artillery support was required for each re-supply and evacuation mission and he had other pressing demands for this support. The position was not an objective in itself and there was no military advantage in sacrificing a ranger battalion in a doomed attempt to hold it. The corps commander was looking toward his objectives in the west and he wished to conserve as much of his combat power as possible for the main mission.
Beginning the 14th February, leading platoons of the 39th started exchanging gun-fires with the enemy forces, forward artillery observer called for supports. In the operation, the rangers were supported directly from a company of the 64th Artillery Battalion from Phu Loc. Until 3:00 to 4:00pm all companies engaged in fighting with the surrounding NVA units/70B. The 64th Artillery Company with six 105mm guns could not keep up with the intensity of the battle. In desperate, the forward observer broke in the working frequency of the C/44th Artillery Company on FSB/Hill-30 and requested for support. With the effects of artillery supports, the NVA had to pull back, the rangers also fell back to defense the Battalion Command Post.
On the following days, the 39th Ranger Battalion sent its companies out on patrol in the area responsibilities – they killed 43 enemies and captured two 37mm AAA guns. The AAA guns indicated that the NVA had a large size of unit in the surrounding areas of the Ranger North. In the south, the paratroopers of 2nd Airborne Brigade, and Infantry discovered storages of foods, fuels, weapons... and dead NVA troops killed by EC-130B gun-ships strafing earlier in friendly protection. Yes we must accepted Medic Fujii was useful for contacting with Flare-ship AC-130 and Gun-ship EC-130B for air-cover, strafing during long night with 6 flare-ships and 7 gun-ships with strike accuracy to protect our forces in retreated to 21st Ranger Battalion. Finally, Medic Fujii was picked up by his Air Cavalry Huey but got hit, crashed again and forced landing near Hill-30 in LZ Ranger South responsibility.
Until the 18th, the NVA Corps 70B moved its divisions 308th, 304th, 320th, 324B together with 202 Tank Regiment, artillery regiment to counter-attack. Meanwhile 2nd Division was setting for ambush our troop at 604 Cargo Base. On this day, they concentrated to up-root the 39th Ranger Battalion with human wave tactic. The rangers fought gallantly and with artillery supports from Phu Loc and FSB/Hill-30, the communists attacks was repulsed, left hundreds of bodies in the battlefield, the rangers more than 500 weapons of all kinds. The next morning, the NVA troops returned to continue the attack. The battle soon turned into the killing ground. The ARVN’ Artillery from the 64th Battalion and the C/44th Company fired continuously supporting the rangers. The 39th Ranger Battalion hang on for another day, when the NVA pulled back for realignment spearhead for the attack, the slightly wounded rangers were bandaged quickly then returning to the trenches. The rangers probably knew their destiny, they prepared for the last fight... 20th/February, early in the morning, the NVA was mounted a new attack with more intensity. The battle lasted into afternoon and the rangers reaction weaken... then the 64th and the C/44th artillery companies did not hear any calls for helps from the forward observer of the 39th Ranger Battalion. The NVA already swamped into the rangers positions. Aerial photos showed at least 600 NVA bodies left in the battlefield. The survivors of the 39th ran back to the defensive line of the 21st Ranger Battalion and continued to fight side by side with brothers in arms of the 21st until this battalion was also evacuated.
During the night of 19th February, the enemy continued to attack the 39th Battalion while launching uninterrupted attacks by fire to hold the 21st Battalion in check. Seven fixed wing gun-ships EC-130B and six flare-ships AC-130 were used in support of the 39th Battalion and, from 07:30 to 14:30 hours on 20th February, 32 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the rangers. Efforts to re-supply and evacuate their casualties were made with strong support from tactical air, gun-ships and artillery. Some helicopters managed to land in the area, ammunition was delivered and some wounded evacuated. But upon takeoff, two helicopters were damaged by enemy fired One had to land in the positions of the 21st Ranger Battalion “Ranger South” and the other managed to land at Fire Support Base Hill-30, this Huey piloted by Lloyd and Nelson tried picked up Medic Fujii, just got hit and had to forced landing near FBS/Hill-30, about 4 kilometer from LZ South. In the afternoon, reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an estimated 400 to 500 enemy with most of the wounded of the 39th Ranger Battalion still stranded in the 21st Rangers' positions, this unit received intense attacks by fire, including 130-mm, 152mm artillery, on the night of 21st February. Plans were made to evacuate the wounded rangers the following day toward noon on 22nd February, the area around the battalion position was subjected to a heavy barrage of fire involving tactical air, air cavalry, aerial artillery and ground artillery for nearly an hour while 13 medical evacuation helicopters were airborne, ready to go in. All of them landed and successfully picked up 122 wounded as well as one U.S. pilot who had been stranded there since his aircraft was shot down. The Ranger force remaining in combat position at Ranger South numbered approximately 400 men including 100 from the 39th Battalion but two days later, on 24th February, the battalion was ordered by the I Corps commander to withdraw to FSB/Hill-30. From there they were airlifted to FSB Phu Loc. While the 39th Ranger Battalion was holding out, numerous activities took place in other areas. U.S. air cavalry continued to search for and destroy pipelines. Units of the 1st Infantry Division moved further south, striking along Route-92 and finding a number of enemy installations, but also making numerous contacts and receiving attacks by fired The 8th Airborne Battalion and armored elements engaged the enemy two kilometers north of Ban Dong, destroying one T-34 tank and a 23-mm gun position. This was another strong indication of enemy armor involvement. On the friendly side, a number of U.S. helicopters were shot down while on supply, medical evacuation or support missions. The corps commander had concluded that the position held by the 21st Ranger Battalion and the survivors of the 39th was untenable. A maximum effort in air and artillery support was required for each re-supply and evacuation mission and he had other pressing demands for this support. The position was not an objective in itself and there was no military advantage in sacrificing a ranger battalion in a doomed attempt to hold it. The corps commander was looking toward his objectives in the west and he wished to conserve as much of his combat power as possible for the main mission.
News of the 39th Ranger Battalion fought until the last bullets then dispersed instead of surrendering spread out rapidly. My air-cover over FSB/Hill-30 in operational area witnessing: “We could not re-supply for them for three days. When ammunitions were about to run out, they got out of their positions, counter-attacked then continued to fight with captured weapons."
After overran the 39th, the NVA’ Forces moved south and surrounded the 21st Ranger Battalion’s positions. In the night of the 20th February, AC-130 dropped flares lighted up the sky above the 21st Ranger Battalion location in the area of LZ Ranger South. It was the last outer shell which shielded the FSB/Hill-30 from the NVA advances from the northwest. The NVA began their attacks on the ranger’s positions since the 21st the rangers fought back and held their positions. The battle between the 21st and the survivors of the 39th with the NVA units lasted for four days and nights. When the NVA pulled back after many waves of attacks they pounded on the ranger’s positions with 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and mortar 120mm shells to weaken the ranger physicals and morals.
Fortunately, on 22nd March when morning fog was just disappeared, 13 UH1-Hs were covered by U.S/42 pieces Long Tom 175, 8 inch Howitzer, and 155mm from border. Suddenly the formation landed on LZ Ranger South under fierce strafing air-covered by gunship Cobra. His buddy Air Cavalry abruptly showed up and picked up Medic Fujii and another flight personal in his flight-unit, both was to fly back safety from FSB/Hill-30 to Khe Sanh, included 122 wounded, where 400 rangers include 100 rangers from 39th [Major Khang 39th said Fujii was real good but Major Hiep 21st Battalion Commander expressed Medic Fujii to much scared when reached LZ South, so contacted with American EC-130B gunship for air-cover in turn by Lieutenant Nguyen Son during two last days 21th and 22th February]
In preserving the Ranger Battalion, in the early morning of the 25th, the 21st Ranger Battalion Commander, Major Khang ordered his men cut fall trees in making a surprised landing zone, due to all LZs were preset-targeted by precision-accuracy of 120mm mortars and 152 delayed-guns preset coordinates XD 593537 and XD 550490 [120mm mortars that burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern that inflicted our choppers force-grounded at all FSB, can’t take off again due to tail rotor failure and particularly 152mm guns, the duds from these penetrated 4 feet into the earth which damaged almost friendly artillery, and maliciously, NVA hide the real guns, mortars and rocket-launchers in deep pits and in tunnels with cleverly in camouflage]
At Ham-Nghi, Corps Command was ordered to evacuate according to plan “Zulu-01” Again the 64th and C/44th Artilleries were directed to maximize fire-support for the rangers. About 10:00 am in the morning, four Cobra gun-ships circled above the ranger’s positions then a squadron of helicopters landed quickly in the LZ Rangers South to scoop up the rangers and brought them to FSB/Hill-30 where VNAF gun-ships responsibility for air-ground closed support to 2nd Airborne Brigade. Later another squadron arrived nearby FSB/Hill-30 picked up the rangers and transported them back to Phu Loc, accomplishing the commitment of the 1st Rangers Group in operation Lam-Son 719. However, one company of the 21st Rangers Battalion was left behind on FSB/Hill-30 – they fought together with the Airborne-men in the FSB/Hill-30 until this FSB was also forced to retreat.


(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

POW-JUBILEE: The U.S/POW was publicly humiliated in propaganda campaign by put them in the oxen-cart go around Hanoi’s Hoang-Kiem Lake for Hanoi-residents seeing; But Hà Nội didn’t mean to hurt the United States, it was just a bit of fun?

Suddenly Hanoi played the game: In the earlier-transaction period (1970) and A Harriman challenged George H W Bush to asset his leadership, The U.S/POW was publicly humiliated in propaganda campaign by put them in the oxen-cart go around Hanoi’s Hoang-Kiem Lake for Hanoi-residents seeing. The evidence suggests that by the autumn of 1970 Communist forces had begun preparations for a spring offensive in Military Region 1, the northern provinces of South Vietnam once the dry season arrived. One indication was formation of a new corps-level headquarters, known as the 70B Front, sometime in October, 1970. Also at that time, General Abrams was told “a highly placed Viet Cong penetration agent reported on enemy plans to launch an offensive with up to four divisions to take and hold major portions of Quang Tri and Hue cities. Significantly, formation of the enemy’s new headquarters occurred well before any specific allied planning for a thrust into Laos had begun a situation that discounted the possibility that the new organization was intended primarily to conduct a defense against allied operations. However the Strategic Air Command don’t have the orders to destroy four crucial targets, each a rectangle measuring one by two kilometers and sited at one of the prime input areas used by the enemy – the Mu Gia Pass, the Ban Karai Pass, the Ban Raving Pass, and an area just west of the DMZ, Tchepone vicinity [where we’ll started Lam Son 719’s operation] Everything was safe and protected due to the goal protracted-war to the Axis of Evil craps via under umbrella Rules Of Engagement (ROE)
For concentrated all U.S POW to one place, reacted by another way. By 1970, the US had secured the names of over 500 Americans held in North Vietnam prisons. Many more were missing and presumed captured. Reports of the cruelty suffered by these men at the hands of their barbarous captors were received along with reports of resultant deaths from various sources. Anxiety, concern and anger among the next of kin, friends of the captives, commanders and government officials were very much in evidence throughout this country. What was being done to alleviate the growing concern? Negotiations were being conducted in Paris Talk on a sporadic basis depending on the mood of the North Vietnamese representatives. An attempt was made to reach an agreement whereby an exchange of prisoners of war could be made. After over two years of such negotiations, the results were ZERO
“The mood of the country demanded that something be done to help these suffering POWs. Was the time ripe for an initiative… feasible alternative?

Suddenly American forces launched a surprising raid on a prisoner of war camp in North Vietnam, an operation planned and controlled in Washington by Harriman successor, George H W Bush’ strategist staffs. It was known that the Son Tay Camp had held American prisoners. By the time the raid was launched in 20-21, November 1970, however, those people had been moved elsewhere, apparently as a result of a maybe flooding that made Son Tay untenable. Later it was revealed that last-minute intelligence had revealed that fact, but the decision was made to let the raid go anyway. The operation was successful in its own terms, although of course no prisoners were rescued because none were there. Clearly another objective was to let the Hanoi know their rear area – the camp was only 40 kilometers from Hanoi – was not as secure as they might have thought. Much later it was learned that the raid benefited the American still held captive, since the Hanoi subsequently consolidated them in better facilities and their treatment improved significantly, so Hoả-Lò should be POW’ concentration. Although no prisoners were rescued, the raid focused world attention on the plight of the prisoners of war (POWs) raised their morale and resulted in improved living conditions for all U.S prisoners of the North Vietnamese. Beside, the men of the Joint Task Force earned the admiration of their countrymen for risking their lives in an attempt to bring freedom to others.
This is the goal of Son Tay’ Operation and Hanoi Hilton appearing where the POWs sacrificed a good part of their young adulthood for their country, in pain, fear, and isolation but ironically for their greediest warlords of WIB Bones

All troop movements were accomplished without meeting any resistance. Aerial reconnaissance and intelligence activities noticed enemy movements north of the operation area. Aircraft sorties started bombarding suspected targets. Some days later, the two Ranger positions received continuous shelling from long range 130mm artillery shelling. The vanguard units of the NVA had approached the defense lines of the 39th Rangers Battalion and skirmishes broke out. The Ranger Artillery stationed at the Laotian border Phu Loc provided supporting fire day and night. Days later, under enemy artillery barrage, the NVA regulars assaulted the 39th Ranger Battalion. The 21st Ranger Battalion positioned in the south was also harassed, making it impossible to receive reinforcements.
The NVA' troop thrust was assisted by 202 Tank Regiment. The fighting became fiercer and fiercer, and both side suffered heavy casualties. The 39th Ranger Battalion bravely battled on, despite being low on ammunition. They resisted for one day and one night, before the position was lost. The unit had to retreat toward the 21st Ranger Battalion's position in the south. Having successfully occupied the hill, the NVA moved west and south-west to threaten the 21st Ranger Battalion and the 3rd Airborne Brigade. The 3rd Airborne Brigade was well-supported by tactical airpower and 213th VNAF/Gunship-Flight. Despite heavy losses, the NVA continued to storm FBS/Hill-31 in the face of long and short range heavy artillery. Although forewarned of enemy intentions, the 3rd Airborne Brigade failed to establish an effective defense with only 300 fighter -men/3rd Battalion, and shared the same fate of the 39th Ranger Battalion. It had fought with courage and bravado, but succumbed to the massive suicidal onslaught of the NVA. The Brigade Staff, including Colonel Tho was captured. Some evaded and ran southwards toward FSB/Hill-30 which was occupied by the brave 2nd Airborne Battalion. Even as they assaulted the 3rd Airborne Brigade Headquarters, the NVA pounded away at FSB/Hill-30 and A-Luoi Base where the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 1st Armor Brigade were positioned. These two units were unable to give assistance to the 3rd Airborne Brigade at FSB/Hill-31, although help was sought of them.

The crucial goal of WIB Bones’ objective was the ARVN attack on wrong time and wrong place, but so late, “because all the huge cargo-ammunitions were already moved to the southern corridor” (prisoners in fact disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to numerous ‘Binh-Trams’ south Laos by Molotowa-Trucks at Parking-1 that the ARVN appeared not to be surprised at all) So despite the intense air campaign to stop the North Vietnamese logistical flow along the Harriman Highway [Ho Chi Minh Trail] the Communists continued to reinforce their troops in South Vietnam, threatening to disrupt the Vietnamization program in processing, and the gradual withdrawal of the US forces. The WIB Bones and Pentagon in Washington then decided in February 1971 to launch a ground offensive to destroy the enemy logistical depots and to prevent a so called new offensive into South Vietnam. The plan became known as Lam Son 719. Whether, I think they had two options: if the North Vietnamese would fall back under the attack like they did under similar circumstances in Cambodia the ARVN would move along the Harriman Highway and destroy all the bases underway. If the North Vietnamese would put up resistance, the ARVN was to cause as much damage and inflict as many casualties as possible and then do a fighting withdrawal back into South Vietnam. Whatever the true motives behind this operation it involved only just three ARVN divisions that enough. As soon as 1967, the US responsibilities had already planned a ground offensive against Laos and had estimated that if it must succeed, it was badly needed to deploy between five and seven US-ARVN divisions. Now, Hanoi had deployed in southern Laos a full army 70B Corps with tanks, ready to repel any ARVN foray, according to Paris Peace Talk agreement, Hanoi was staying in South Vietnam 200,000 troops there. Saigon was to deploy a smaller force. But what anything WIB Bones wished in expectation to carried out axiom-1.
Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war - but also one doomed to failure right from the start because the WIB Bones had planned, just for the Axis of Evil dumping all rubbish out of date military materiel in a remote spot like Tchepone, south Laos. That’s their crucial goal, in the end, Lam Son 719 lasted for 45 days, and the airpower (I means at Pentagon, as Colonel James Vaught’s suggestion, General Alexander Haig changed from Rolling Thunder to Linebacker air campaign that saved ARVN was under siege due to this Axis of Evil craps) was the only thing that saved the ARVN from a complete defeat in Laos. The North Vietnamese nevertheless did not get off unpunished: their losses were indeed heavy to a degree where their planned invasion of South Vietnam had to be postponed for a full year.

On 19th February, eleven days into the attack, MACV J-2 was carrying just six enemy regiments committed against ARVN forces in the Lam Son 719 area of operations. Clearly that wasn’t going to last much longer. J-2 concluded that these could be reinforced immediately by three additional regiments from the south and within two days by three more regiments from the west and north. Actually the real significance of this Lam Son operation is the enemy has everything committed or en route, that he has, with the exception of the 325th Division and the 9th separated-Regiment out of the 304th. So if they’re hurt, he’s really going to be beat for long time. And to us: “Of course we’re trying to welcome them all, best we can” Meanwhile a new-rallied confirmed earlier intelligence by revealing the identity and location of a new headquarters – designated the 70B Front – controlling the NVA divisions in the Lam Son area of operations, the 304th, 308th, and 320th. This fresh 70B Front was established right after a founder Skull and Bones, A Harriman retired from public life with the election of President Richard Nixon in 1969 and gave ceded his throne dynasty to a son of his deputy Prescott Bush [George I] to succeeding his resumption of stratagem “Eurasian Great Game”. But George H.W Bush was as merely a ‘surrogate for A Harriman’ disguised and stuck away in China due he knew so well the Vietnam-War outcome.

On 20 February, 1971, MACV analysts counted eighteen battalion-size ARVN task forces in south Laos mostly involved in search destroyed and cleared operations, with the westernmost elements still about where they had been a week earlier, roughly halfway to Tchepone. The NVA Corps 70B moved its divisions 320th, 324B, 304th, 308th together with 202nd tanks regiment, artillery regiment to counterattack. On this day, they concentrated to up root the 39th Ranger Battalion with human wave tactic. The Rangers fought gallantly and with artillery support from Phu Loc and FSB 30, the NVA attacks was repulsed, left hundreds of bodies in the battlefield the rangers more than 500 weapons of all kinds. Enemy forces were massing to attack, thereby becoming rich targets for reprisals by allied air attacks. When NVA assaults drove ARVN’ 39th Ranger Battalion off their position, thank to tactical air fell upon the massed enemy forces, killing more than 600 in the one battle. At one point, seven fixed-wing gun-ships (EC-130B) and six flare-ships (AC-130) were supporting the Rangers – All this crap about we can take whatever action’s required to protect our own forces, protective reaction. And if the ROE principle doesn’t apply here, we’ll be damned. Daytime the TAC air had a field day with enemy tank, too, destroying the most tanks and one NVA regiment/70B Corps, practically wipe out an armored regiment. Having great powers of recuperation, the NVA mounted a new attack with more intensity. The battle last into afternoon and the ranger reaction weaken … then the 64th and the C/44th Artillery Company did not hear any calls for help from the forward observer of the 39th Ranger Battalion. The NVA already swamped into the ranger position. The survivors of the 39th ran back to the defense line of the 21st Ranger Battalion and continued to fight side by side with brothers in arms of the 21st until this battalion was also evacuated.
News of the 39th Ranger Battalion fought until the last bullets then dispersed instead of surrendering spread out rapidly. Our helicopters could not re-supply for them for 3 days. When ammunitions were about to run out, they got out of their positions, counter attacked then continued to fight with captured weapons. After overran the 39th, the NVA forces moved south and surrounded the 21st ranger position. At night, flares lighted up the sky above the 21st ranger location in the area of LZ “Ranger South.” The battle between the 39th Ranger Battalion and the survivors of the 21st Ranger Battalion with the NVA regiments lasted for 4 days and nights. When the NVA pulled back after waves of attacks they pounded on the ranger position with 122mm and 130mm shells to weaken the ranger morals and physicals.
In preserving the ranger battalion, in daytime of the 25th February, the 21st Ranger was ordered to evacuate. According to plan “tactical-retreat”, 42 U.S artilleries at border, 64th and C/44th artilleries were directed to maximize fire-support for ranger. TOT at 10:00 am, four Cobra gun-ship circled above the ranger positions for air-cover then a formation helicopters of 20 HU-1 landed quickly in the LZ Ranger South to scoop up the rangers and brought them to FSB 30. Later another formation helicopters arrived at FSB 30 pickup the rangers and transported them back to Phu Loc. However, one company of the 21st Ranger Battalion was left behind on FSB 30, and they fought together with airborne men in the FSB 30 until this FSB was also force to retreat.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

On 23 February 1971 was the longest day not because my gunship was shot down by the enemy P.T-76 but of heavy enemy contact by the Rangers and the Airborne forces on the most northern flank of penetration, and the most U.S Army aviation support for Lam Son 719 having big problem to cause Vice President Huong cried out on TV “Earnestly, U.S stop flying supplied for our troops in the state thirsty water and ammunition for small arms”
On same day 23 February, further south, nearest Cambodia/Vietnam border, a VNAF helicopter UHI-H carrying M.R-III Corps commander Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri – then 1970 directing the operation of some 17,000 ARVN troops in Cambodia – crashed and burned, killing him and his staff-officers; General Tri performed so well in Cambodia that U.S Permanent Government would hate like hell to think that Tri destroyed all NVA supplies cargo for protracted war and violated ROE’ craps. Said General Bill Rosson, “was a damn fine field commander. His idea was to get up where the action was” His flamboyance and bravery led one newsman to the extreme of calling Tri “the Patton of the Parrot’s Beak” General Tri was considered a fine field commander, scarce enough in the upper reaches of ARVN leadership, which made this a very serious loss. It turned out to be even more of one when it was learned that he had been slated to move almost immediately to I Corps to replace General Lam, who was proving inadequate to his heavy new responsibilities in command of Lam Son 719. General Tri was killed because he was just a great soldier, destroyer all COSVN’ cargo, a great spearhead against to CIP’s drawback.

A pretentious Permanent Government to being on the subject:
In the aftermath of Sihanouk’s ouster there had been a good bit of dithering in the White House about whether to mount such an operation and, if one were launched, what its dimensions ought to be, especially whether United States combat troops should cross the border. MACV was asked for ideas and submitted them. Chief of Staff, General Wheeler cabled fed-back that “Higher Authority” – He meant “High Authority,” the transparent euphemism for the President Nixon or the second generation of Skull and Bones, emperor-II [George H W Bush] – “has noted that each option involves considerable US participation.” General Wheeler then called for a detailed alternate plan for attacks into the Cambodia sanctuaries conducted entirely by South Vietnamese forces. Wheeler cable, dispatched at 2:49 PM, Washington time, closed by saying that “a preliminary outline plan submitted here tomorrow would be invaluable” After further consideration in Washington it was decided that U.S forces would participate, but only after the South Vietnamese had led off by themselves on the first day of the operation.
In Washington, some fairly novel command arrangements surfaced. A presidential blue ribbon commission later reported that “as was widely noted by the press at the time… Defense Secretary Laird [a Bone-Man, you’d discovered at picture “discussing plans for Lam Son 719 above and seeing all Skull and Bones men encircled president and Rogers] had been bypassed by the Joint Chiefs in advising the White House on preparations to intervene in Cambodia in April and May 1970?” Clearly that had been done on orders from the Permanent Government in Washington. There were other problems, including conflicting guidance from Washington that led Abrams to state some ground rules. “I should add,” he said in a message to Wheeler and McCain, “that in these delicate times I respond only to the direction of the Chairman, CINCPAC, and the Ambassador. My staff will not respond to direction from staffs in Washington or Hawaii,”
There were then 14 enemy sanctuaries along the borders of South Vietnam/Cambodia, 10 of them contiguous to IV and III Corps Tactical Zones in the South. The raid was going after those facilities, informed by the belief that “no guerrilla war has ever been able to reach a ‘victorious’ end without sanctuary” – This against Harriman’s standpoint, the axiom-1: “There was never a legitimate non-communist government in Saigon that was explained at all universities in 1960. Allied columns – ARVN forces on 29 April and then a combined U.S/ARVN force on 1 May – pushed into the Parrot’s Beak and Fishhook areas of Cambodia, thus targeting two of the enemy’s most important border sanctuaries. Within a few days numerous other base areas were entered, ten distinct operations in all by both U.S and South Vietnamese forces.
Even given the restrictions imposed, the operation was for the South Vietnamese a very significant undertaking. At its peak 50,000 men were committed, the first time in history that such numbers of their troops had operated as a single force. It was a challenging new departure, radically different from the role of pacification support to which most ARVN forces had until recently been relegated. At MACV, President Nixon’s speech announcement the incursion to the nation was played on tape at a 1 May update for Abrams, who must have cringed when he heard the President say that “tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam.” Everyone at MACV knew that COSVN was a shadowy, mobile, and widely dispersed complex that would be very difficult to locate and even more difficult to put out of action. In fact, queried before the fact about prospects for capturing it, MACV had replied that “major COSVN elements are dispersed over approximately 110 square kilometers of jungle” and “the feasibility of capturing major elements appears remote at this time.” Nixon’s characterization of the incursion’s purposes shifted attention from the far more important goals of disrupting the enemy’s lines of communication and cleaning out his base areas, achievements that could set back his timetable for further aggression to the advantage of both RVNAF improvement and U.S withdrawals.
To a surprising degree the incursion was unopposed. “When facing enemy forces,” read a typewritten directive issued by the B-3 Front Headquarters on 17 March 1970 and captured a week into the incursion, Communist forces in Cambodia “should attempt to break away and avoid shooting back. Our purposes are to conserve forces as much as we can” General Brown exulted that the enemy had “a hell of a problem.” Abrams agreed, but only to a point. “Well, that’s right, George” he responded. “But you see, he’s used to a hell of a problem. He lives in an environment where he’s got a hell of a problem. I get a certain amount of enjoyment, I must say, out of seeing the problem get complicated. But it isn’t worth much. He’s a pretty determined chap, when you get tight down to it. As a soldier, “What we need right now is another division or more – going in deep” in the wake of the initial penetrations. “We need to go west from where we are, we need to go north and east from where we are. And we need to do it now. It’s moving. And goddamn, goddamn.” This last was said wistfully, with great sorrow and regret.
Unsurprisingly, at Pentagon the delegated author of command and control of ROE was General Haig having secret order from emperor-II to investigate the so called Power Act violation. But those at MACV had their own concerns about ambiguity, voicing an implied indecisiveness, ineffectiveness, pretentiousness. MACV have two of Haig messages. One of them says “go get them” and the other one says “hurry up and get out”. “Ah what the hell Haig really wanted?” Haig responded “It’d go get them until the end of the period.” “Well, it’s still ambiguous” (supposedly, the Permanent Government’s take on charge the whole war by stratagem ‘Everything worked, but nothing worked enough’)
The scandal broke: became known to the public in March of 1970, Cambodian Marshal Lon Nol led a pro-Western coup, supposedly engineered by CIA operatives and military advisors, and ousted Cambodia’s recognized leader, Sihanouk who then fled to Paris, French and openly accused the United States of his ouster. The coup created the Khmer Republic, led by Lon Nol. In less than a month, South Vietnamese and U.S forces launched a clearing operation into the Parrot’s Beak and some areas of Cambodia that served as sanctuaries for Hanoi troop and Viet Cong forces; This operation also helped to bolster Lon Nol’ government against the Khmer Communists, who became known as the Khmer-Rouge.
Antiwar movement activist, Lieutenant John F Kerry urged that Media press reports of the United States, led aerial bombing and ground combat operation in Cambodia territories, addressed the issue in a nationally televised speech. President Nixon directly stated that the United States had no advisors on the ground in Cambodia, and had no American military forces involved in any actions in Cambodia, and had no American military air assets supporting any action in Cambodia. This is an insane desire of Permanent Government in which the so called her named “Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form” violated Power Act in U.S constitution.

What was the cause of “Cooper-Church” and “Case-Church” amendments? For WIB Bones’ original purpose, Senator Frank F Church and other members of Congress were so angered by President Nixon openly lying about U.S military involvement in Cambodia that they immediately took action to begin cutting funding for the war, as a shirttail amendment to the defense authorization bill, a watered down version of the measure finally passed. That version of the amendment only barred the introduction of American ground forces in Southeast Asia. The first volley in Congress came 1970 when Senator Church and Kentucky Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper authorized a bill that cut off funding of all military activity in Southeast Asia.
Long ago, under the watch of President Richard Nixon, American political interests had already written off South Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords stood testimony to that fact, virtually selling the highly United States-dependent nation down the proverbial river. The Case-Church
Amendment of 1973, specially banning all bombing in Cambodia and further banning all American military intervention by land, sea, or air anywhere in Southeast Asia, underscored that write-off. The WIB’ Bones had simply engineered a so-called Decent-Interval to distance America from its South Vietnam commitment. Given an adequate passage of time, the world would not hold America accountable. Unfortunately, the WIB’ Decent-Interval had not nearly run its course.

Some troop elements had done conspicuously better than others. The ARVN armored units had been especially early in the operation the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry had encountered NVA elements in a fight at southern Fire Base 31 and performed brilliantly, destroying six enemy T-54 tanks and sixteen PT-76s without any friendly losses in the first major tank-to-tank engagement of the war, but of course with our gunship air cover supported joint-strafing with the both flank-side equipped two a 19-shot 2.75-inch antitank rocket pods. Today by chance we got the record shooting into the POL pipe-line at random burned all of them for a while right after NVA shut-off the pipes. The fact that I would like to train in released a new gunship pilot check-ride for operational purpose. He was so nervous pushed the button microphone instead of fired arm. This miracle button hit the rockets on the targets [pipe-lines] let our ground troops more confident to our gunship air supported.
But unfortunately in the evening that same day, when I flied back to home base for refuel, I crossed low on the convoy that I thought those were our friendly M-113 but when I discovered their noses curb-higher like a canoe, NVA PT-76 that was too late, my gunship got many hits by 14.5 mm from gun turret with an automatic weapon and crashed half mile far away and my wingman pick all my crews up immediately. My commander at Danang Air Base would like Major Ky my squadron deputy to replace me so I could having time for R and R, but I cabled to him, “I need stay here for save our peoples!” I don’t want any our aircrews get killed again.
We are underground of the huge bunker for the morning briefing after I got have not too bad breakfast at the field Chow-Tent. As usual General Lam and Sutherland in the front seats, second one for Division commanders, I always saw only brigadier general Phu, Colonel Ray Battreall, a very experienced officer who watched most of this firsthand from I Corps Forward at Khe Sanh, Colonel Sam Cockerham was acting commander of the 1st Aviation Brigade. And the third row for regiment commander that was my row-seat.
I have had a sorrow meeting looked I never got before. The bad-news that the number of helicopters in commission so low 25% cast a deep gloom over the whole briefing room. A couple of weeks into the thing there wasn’t a lot of flying going on, including CH-54, Sky-crane sling to every Fire Support Base the bulldozers D-4, Howitzer 155s, water containers, either, at least not compared with the huge requirements the operation was generating. By about 23 February it became apparent that U.S Army aviation support for Lam Son 719 was having some problems. Not only was the intense and well-sited enemy antiaircraft weaponry making operations extremely difficult – every mission, even [dust-off] medical evacuations, had to be planned and executed like a full-scale combat assault – but maintenance problems were causing many helicopters to be out of service just when they were needed most. How can I do for covered support our troop, my helicopter forces was just enough for supplied or medical evacuation missions in case emergency only, we couldn’t hook artillery, water trailer container, but small arms ammunition, meanwhile NVA have had 67,000 tons of various shell ammunition was already on the operation spot-area. Thereby hangs a tale that our VNAF helicopters were shot down by indirect artillery every Fire Support Base, such as Hill 31: 2 H.34s, 1 UH1-H; Hong Ha: 2 UH1-Hs; Hill-30: 2 UH1-Hs; A-loui: 3 UH1-Hs – by direct guns: 1 gunship and 3 UH1-Hs in operational area. There was happened just a couple of weeks earlier into this operation.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

I must have leaving the briefing room to go fly right away because air-support to Airborne was VNAF gunship responsibility, in having heavy contacts so tough with enemy at southern Fire Support Base 30, in emergency alert for air cover protection. The pea soup fog just beginning disappeared somehow so slow due to day and night the smoke of bombs, forest burned still clinging haunted around increased so much humidity hazy not so easy cleared the environment. Here there was always hearing pounding explosion from the enemy artillery melee with 42 U.S artilleries in Lao Bao. Colonel Sam Cockerham told me let try the new 2.75-inch rocket with 5,000 arrow nails that help prevent the enemy throng in attack to friend forces.
Meanwhile we are facing the possible disappearance of most of ground-fog forests. I gather all aircraft commanders to a short briefing about armament. We change the properly tactical prep, because prejudice of destroy enemy tank I carried 38 rockets and 6,000 rounds 7, 62. This maximum load armament created so much problem when strafing approach to the target sometimes the wingman could passed over the leader; so now I made decision “loading full ammunition 12,000 round 7, 62 and 14 rockets such as: 6 nail arrow-rockets, 4 high explosive 17 pounds, and 4 antitank rockets. However the wingman equipped only antitank rockets. Reminding spared some ammunition for air cover to our choppers, escorted them to security area. The most in the west flank was the free-risk-area, NVA stationed on west shield-flank for avoiding U.S artillery pounding. All shells were only reached-impact on east flank. However cast your eyes on the parallel PT-76 armored tank red-earth tracks, a terrible mobile antiaircraft not to hard detecting them. When get them, the lead try surrounding used both-mini-guns for neutralized-strafing the gunner killers and the wingman used antitank rocket grilled them.
The weather is much better, now I take off first and Captain Tien’ formation for rejoining us at second ride and right on the operational-spot. The thin stratus was still clinging on the crest mountain. Every time rushing to operation zone in various trajectory flight-path but not different altitude just treetop usual flight, the NVA troop was never get a chance for shooting at us down when we were airborne but we get so much trouble when landing on the helipad and get hit by more than a thousand incoming rounds more than from such indirect fire weapons as mortars and artillery of different kind of artillery that NVA having so abundance right in their dump-cargo. So why every friend Fire Support Bases you could see VNAF’ helicopters subjected to ground-remained there – meanwhile US Army Aviation inflicted so much casualty, because they flied too many formations and the must need smoothly in control maneuvers and altitude [SOG’ information, American be killed 219 and MIA 38, respectively were aircrews] Scattering in front of me in this zone, I witnessed few helicopters were shooting down. Just last two week ago when I flown with Airborne division commander, General Dong onboard to Hill 31, the mountain scenery was quite natural, now this scenery causing my feeling of fear and eerie strange “the longest and bloodiest siege of the war will happened” that I was justified in my conviction that Vietnam-War was “an intelligence war” specialized by Bushes background heritage.
I didn’t believe that why I Corps staffs operation planner chosen the Hill-30 and 31 like in a wide bowl surrounded by jungle-high ground as same as a siege of Dien Bien Phu containing antiaircraft guns and bunkered NVA infantry. NVA knew the terrain intimately, not because General Giap was cooperated, informed by CIA’ counterespionage recently but because they had been living in this area secretly for quite a while during the last phase of bunker construction. All U.S artillery fire power was target on impact the most only East flank let them feel in security on other flanks like West side. Batteries of 175mm guns to install in the Khe Sanh, the “Long Tom” could throw a 147-pound shell 28 kilometers, covering beyond almost the operation area in Laos, but NVA hidden operational flank-west scurrying about. Those “strongpoint obstacle system,” which explained in my memoirs, were “designed to channel the enemy into well-defined corridors where we might bring air and artillery to bear and then hit them with mobile ground reserves.” The Marine Division was standby at Khe Sanh like a ‘rapid-deployment-force.’
When landed, I followed General Dong for inspection our fellows scurrying about digging the foxholes and carrying armfuls of sand-bags. I guessed that this strongpoint was not stronger than the PT-76s can overrun, because from the hollow with slop was not deep enough against the natural obstacle, the PT-76 could climbed up so easy. Over here sometimes I could hear their sound exploded shell Katyusha rockets 122mm orientation-adjustment, and readjustments.
Suddenly, my sergeant Duc shooting mini-gun tracing at a slop of a hill to NVA carrying the big pots and pans, every two NVA troops hanging the big pan in the middle on their shoulders by a bamboo stick, [these pans when I was in Communist jail, recognized that had a big pan with 4 feet diameter, used for cooking food, steaming rice, vegetable soup and good shelter too for any case bombardment prevent burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern]
Every helicopter crew must familiar with smelling the rotten remain, so now I have been the ability to sense things liked dogs have an excellent sense of smell it stinks. Over here from the started operation until now there was never got hit by B-52, I means in the northern flank of Route 9, but today I’m still smelling the taste of swollen, rotten of human remain too low altitude underneath of insulated in the womb-like cockpit, the corpses had deteriorated and bloated; which device killed them? Maybe from A.C-130B gunship [Pentagon plan EC-130B neutralized interdiction in northern flank as I experienced] that remind me the last week, here was the battle in the first serious counterattack came on the night of 18, 19, and 20 February, when one NVA regiment struck the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion northeast of Ranger LZ, Ban Dong. There was northern flank of the penetration, especially at Fire Support Base 30 toward west Fire Support Base 31; subsequently the major battles of the operation took place with six NVA regiments committed against Airborne and Ranger forces. TOC/ J-2 concluded that these could be reinforced immediately by three additional regiments from the south and within two days by three more regiments from the west and north. They used tactical separated regiment among division for predominantly fierce attacks on ARVN one by one and step by step, that tactical method sound like breaking every chop-stick instead of whole bundle for one time. Thereby Hill-31 the first tested target.
I concluded that no clue bomb hole of B-52 carpeted was took place over here for the commencement until now that testified the stinky smell from human remain being by strafing from EC-130B on the night of 18, 19 February.
Now two gun-ships were on the operational zone to air cover for 2nd battalion/3rd Airborne Brigade. Our friend forces so confident to dispatch so many targets in front of them; the attack approach was the spot yesterday we destroyed enemy’s POL depot, now the scenery looked very cool. NVA regiment scared engagement with only one airborne-battalion? I guess they gathered to retreat a concentration zone for fierce attack Hill 31?
Suddenly, I heard in my helmet in the faint voice “Magic-Club-1…this King-Star-3 …over?”
I answered “Go ahead”
I recognized the new pilot in 233rd Squadron. In fact I ordered their mission just merely in the southern flank, the LZ in that area little bit lower for specially air support to 1st Division but now northern flank was so much serious counterattacks they badly needed medical evacuation right beside my support operational zone, meanwhile U.S air-cavalier gave up due too many crashed, little bit to the north for 1st Battalion/2nd Airborne Brigade. Two battalions would like joint together for counterattack against so heavy enemy pressure but hard to reach meanwhile Ranger 39th Battalion needed reinforcement with 1stairborne battalion.
I read my heart reserve all priorities air-cover and fire power for this fresh new formed 233rd squadron.
Again I repeat where your location …King-Star-3 over?
Reacted quickly “Magic-Club-1, King-Star-3 now at the rendezvous point, over” [a rendezvous point stand for Lao Bao, right at border]
“Surrounding over there about four minutes I will reach you…King-Star-3 did you read me over” I will guided him to the spot for medical evacuation. I contact to friend force, left now and came back 20 minutes later. 2nd battalion radioed back to me and to stop proceeding for a while for relaxation.
Two gun-ships leaving the operational zone, heading to the southeast, still on the treetop, King-Star-3 flying higher than us so couldn’t see us.
“King-Star-3 turn right at 4 o’clock and descending… we will joint in about two minutes … how doing you read me over”
Now we are in combat formation, behind us about 300 yard was dust-off King-Star-3.
“Now we are on the target… King-Star-3 gains altitude to view-bird your LZ…at 12’ o’clock orange panel … We will prep in front underneath of your approach ….be patient”
Meanwhile at high altitude I heard the conversation between OV-10 and operation officer 2nd Airborne Brigade at Hill 30 by Vietnamese language on board of OV-10 Bronco, Vietnamese observer for FAC (forward Air Control) Two Phantom F.4 dropped napalm; they passed over of me so I could identified the kind of aircraft. Now from East, Seven Fleet, the Navy A-4 Sky-haws and F-8 Crusaders precision-dive-bombed, and A-6 Intruders bombers. But the NVA built “phony gun position” for the interpreters of the aerial photographs to find [at Washington surely Haig did care the phony gun position, know that by sophisticated sensors on satellite but he also did care about, his principal author, a prospect congruent with his later involvement in and reaction to the most ROE’ operation] NVA troop set off harmless explosion charges to simulate muzzle flashes for the air observer. They hid the real guns and mortars and rocket launchers in deep pits and in tunnels, fired if necessary. But how can they hide them without my own eyes witnessed. At last the fighter-bombers struck on enemy phony gun position. Haig didn’t care, just practiced exercise combat training
General Giap gave instructed orders regardless the harmful of US artillery at the border, because he was informed by the so called antiwar movement like John F Kerry instead of CIA counterespionage, Russell Flynn Miller. Putting them in vain as built stronghold at west flank; all U.S fire power at border was out of effect, included 16 “Long-Tom” 175mm, 18 Howitzer 155mm, and 8-inch Howitzer just solely reach at east flank.
I repeat “King-Star-3 make approach right ahead of you at 12 o’clock…very safe I will prep on the hill crest at your right side” I speak very slow for calming him, but I did feel there was a damn hot LZ, because our friend didn’t having time for clear the spot LZ . I was been meditate abruptly I waken smart-up due to my gunner played maximum round strafing on the hill crest seeing enemy scurrying down to slop.
Sergeant Duc yelled “Enemy crowded in the middle slop I shot 6,000 rounds per minutes to kill all of them.” I order the wingman shot anti-throng rockets [nail arrows] to the bald hill at right side. I make a hard tough turn to left for second pass, meanwhile Duc pressed the trigger, knowing those six-barrels were going to work just perfectly and spew thousands of rounds into the crowded enemy as the barrels on both flanks of the cockpit spat flame and buzzed like chain saws, their heavy bullets punching into the hot target. Now I could see my wingman a red-orange smoke behind him two by two rockets roaring in over the target, peppering it with his own mini-guns as I rolled in behind him for second run. But on this run I took my time, lining it up, making sure that we’d hammer that hostility enemy
I glanced down at the target “Everything is been cool now.”
King-Star-3 had seen the orange panel in the middle of LZ on the clipped-wood was a real hassle. The spot inclined little bite in left slop. I still ordered the gunners continued strafing less 2,000 round per minutes for neutralized interdiction back and forth evenly on the hill. We understood because the friendly force wouldn’t like created lousy noises when tree cutting for prevention enemy pounding artillery to it.
I contact “Quang Trung…Quang Trung are you in hurry the wounded and remain ready, we will land a couple minutes”
This is worst terrible LZ with the struggle facing a brand new rating pilot; I’m so worry for his landing. However he was trained with “Black Cat” Army Aviation Company at Marble Mountain, Danang. I am so nervous without patient glancing down the LZ the mountainous area was always having turbulence, the up and down drafts. How can he hold his helicopter in stable for hover; His hovering too long caused me increasing the heart beat but I must keep patiently, I dare not disturb him at all; Why he would able land …isn’t something wrong, but I still kept quiet let himself made decision, maybe the LZ couldn’t permit to touch down due to some trees still not cut yet. I flown over and check our troops trying to put in the wounded in cabin because the helicopter wouldn’t able touch on ground. I also saw two black poncho-bags scurrying by a flock of soldiers throw on the board of chopper.
Suddenly the enemy running down to slop standing bold strafing into the chopper, instantly my gunner react by 4,000 rounds into them killed all of them and my wingman continued strafing, in the haze of light fog I could see the tracers at the ratio of one tracer for every fourteen standard rounds scattered evenly on the hot spot, but at the rate those mini-guns fired, the spaced tracers would look like heavy raindrops.
I yelled “That’s enough…all bad guys were already died…stop it” I must spare the fire power for escort him back to Khe Sanh. King-Star-3 still hover in a strange and eerie silence, abruptly I see his main rotor blade trimmed few high-trees underneath; at this point, I knew I was no longer invincible. I could feel my heart thumping in my chest. In the space of few seconds, I had gone from feeling, but keeping so calm wait his reaction.
In my helmet I heard a voice utter faint word, and tried very hard not to groan or cry out with the incredible incident, “Magic-Club-1… my helo’ main rotor chopped the trees, now so hard tough shaken vibration… but I tried to take off…Magic followed escort to me…over”
I firmly respond in conforming voice “tried your best… we always behind you!”
His chopper flying like an untamed horse with so many vertical jerks in every turned cycle, I let him fly any altitude, heading, whatever reaching the home base as soon as he can.
“Easy your airspeed…never passed over 70 knots…O.K”
But fortunately he flies not too high for easy fired target to various kind of antiaircraft artillery; thank to my recent briefing he avoid the west flank of the highest ridge forming the crest and also the terrible AAA’ mobile of PT-76. That’s Okay now we are on low altitude flirting along east flank. I contact US fire power at border pounding cover in front of us. Now we flied over or in the smoke of “Long Tom” residue with confident none bastards underneath. Farther in front of us some vertical column smoke brought the patience of mind, we do feel the burned wood much favorable with somewhat security

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

At last, three helicopters landed at their home base safely. This afternoon had become hotter now toward the end of the rainy season, and the corpses in cabin had deteriorated and bloated enveloped the highland earth-dusted among the bursts of U.S artillery depart.
We must reload fire armament, and refuel right away to continue air cover support for the 2nd Airborne Battalion. I headed back for the largest site at full load fire power, running right along the treetop. We were going to provide fire support for the strayed ground airborne elements. Now two Airborne-compapanies/8th Battalion/3 Brigadier, were ambushed by one separated NVA regiment/320/Div. We’re scrambled over the battle. Two recon/companies just left from high elevated relief to down a stream to get water and be in a state of siege.
Now we advised the Airborne must defense themselves on the hiding spot. We start prep along the creek, on the declined stone slop where NVA standing bold shoot down the stream water. Our experience top-gun performed an accuracy air ground support moderated the rhythm 2,000 rounds per minute to smooth the gun-barrel in preventing jammed fired. First we destroyed in neutralization the hot area by 17pds rockets explosives fire power, in strafing, seeing the tracers at the ratio rounds scattered evenly on the bare rocks and bushes. The spaced tracers would like heavy raindrops. Suddenly, in my helmet I hear a Vietnamese voice on OV-10 Bronco: “Get out the operational area immediately …over here designed for three boxes B-52… but … in five minutes, 42 U.S artilleries from the border will strike cover to Airborne …don’t come back this area … this is a strict order”

The matter was that General Sutherland had apparently been slow to recognize and report those problems much less act aggressively to deal with them. Another senior officer present on the ground judged him to be “very passive,” really “a negative factor” in the operation. Until 23 February, a MACV staff officer told Abrams, “I think it’s fair to say we had no feel that his helicopter situation was quite as acute.” This news precipitated intense reaction at MACV. “The way this thing is supposed to work,” erupted General Abrams, “is that, once I said what the priorities were and what was going to be done around here, goddamn it, then these – USARV’ responsible to have maintenance people up there, keeping track of this, goddamn it! And they should know what’s happened! That’s what hasn’t been done.”
Abrams asked his assistance deputy, General Fred Weyand, how it looked to him. “Well,” he began, focusing on General Sutherland, “I guess I’m not too forgiving on Jock [Sutherland] I recognize the truth of what you’re saying, but goddamn it, you’ve got a corps commander up there who’s supposed to be keeping track of every fucking bird in the place every hour of the day. There’s something wrong there. You’ve got an organizational problem of some kind. He just doesn’t know what the hell’s going on.” Weyand recalled that there had been a battalion on Route 914 for two days before Sutherland was aware of it, even though they knew it…”That tells me that the coordination and tie-in…headquarters and General Lam’s is not fully effective.”
There followed a long pause, several heavy minutes in silence, then he said, “I guess I’d better go up and talk with General McCaffrey now. I just feel we’ve got to get some people up there today who can be feeding the facts back. Move the goddamn men and the tools and the stuff and get with it.” In contrast Abrams recalled enemy side “But goddamn it! –about the maintenance, either they’ve got enough that are well or something. But enemy seem to be to able to work on the roads, keep the trucks going, still fire the antiaircraft, still move the supplies, and unload and load it, backpack it, and all that. So I’d say they’re right on schedule table. I don’t think it means that somehow they’re going to screw it up.
Colonel Sam Cockerham was acting commander of the 1st Aviation Brigade when he got orders to fly north immediately in an aircraft provided by General Abrams. When Cockerham arrived, Abrams was already there, slumped down on the leather sofa in Sutherland’s office.
“Worst fucking OR [Operational Readiness] rate I’ve seen in U.S Army aviation history!”
He exploded by way of conversational openers.
“The entire concept, the entire national strategic concept, is at stake here!” he thundered at Sutherland. Abrams said he was going to give Col Cockerham all theater resources in Vietnam to get the operationally ready rate up to USARV standards. That was 80 percent, 5 percent higher than worldwide Army standards.
Abrams asked Cockerham how long that would take. It was then Monday at about 1:00 pm “By Wednesday night I’ll have it up to standard,” Cockerham replied, perhaps not realizing how bad things were. The UHI-C gunship OR rate, for example, then stood at 25 percent.
“I want a back channel from you to me every twenty-four hour,” Abrams told Cockerham as he left. The meeting made a deep impression on Cockerham, and not just because of the massive task that had been dumped in his lap. “General Sutherland was like a dog with his tail tucked under,” he recalled. “I thought the job was beyond him. He wasn’t prepared. Abrams worked around him.”
Shortly, Brigadier General Sid Berry, then assistant deputy division commander of the 101st Airborne, also played a pivotal role in restoring order to the realm of Army aviation in the operation he went in harm’s way over and over again to make things happen. Said an advisor who was there at the time, “General Sid Berry flew to the most critical areas and got things done that sync – When Lieutenant General Julian Well, unsavory figure pro-Permanent Government visiting Vietnam from this assignment with the U.S negotiation team in Paris, (maybe must be violated ROE for less harmful) went up to Khe Sanh to have a fresh-look around, he was impressed. “Their OR rate when I was up there Sunday was 79 percent,” he said “which I considered astronomical.” What the hell few NVA regiments were destroyed by B-52 carpets. Ironically, when fierce fighting erupted in the Lam Son 719 area of operations, virtually all B-52 took off from Utapao Thailand; those tactical sorties were diverted from interdiction to close air support for less aircrew casualty. “Speed of execution is essential to the success of this operation. An operation dependent solely on air mobility would be subjected to the vagaries of the weather and the considerable enemy antiaircraft artillery (all conventional AAAs) threat in the objective area.” It was also known that formidable air defenses were deployed along the Harriman Highway (Ho Chi Minh trail) and were particularly dense in the Tchepone area [eventually where will the “open-dumpster” of Soviet and U.S out of date weaponry and war materiel]

Pentagon’s traitorous behavior
Neutralization and Interdiction: Pentagon divided airpower to neutralize threat interdict by steady bombardments in three distinctive targets for getting both enemy [NVA] and friend [ARVN]: Northern Flank from Route-9 was responsibility by EC-130B Gun-ship; Southern Flank from Route-9 was Arc Light B-52; and on main-front Route-9 was Sky-spot (tactical fighter aircraft) for this war-game craps. As for my 42 days and night stayed at Airborne Forward Operation Base at Ham Nghi, Khe Sanh, I had been witnessed covered everywhere in the operational area by on treetop skimming maneuver. In the early operational days, General Haig played the battle-game inside the air-conditioner chamber in Pentagon, just followed up on the charts and road-maps. This play game created so much trouble to the 1st ARVN division. He used Arc light B-52 took off from Guam to preplanned strike on schedule that inflicted some casualty to friendly force in southern flank of 1st Infantry Division responsible. Every morning briefing, General Phu 1st division commander must cry-out in radio pushed their men hurry out the area for B-52 carpeted in the next couple hours. And 1st Armor Cavalier Task forces with 8th Airborne Battalion protected them, when they tried to spot on location on Route-9 for recuperated from their operation. Suddenly, the Pentagon staff under General Haig, due to ARVN’ main front force has moved so slowly, not right by the Pentagon road-map preplanned. As the result, an aircraft with a called-sign “Sky-Spot” was scrambled to this area and dropped a CBU-24 Bomb, which containing 600 small bombs like golf-grenade sized. Each golf results when explosion launched the 300 small pieces of steel in injuring vice commander of 8th Airborne Battalion and others numerous soldiers of both Armor 11th /Squadron and Airborne get wounded. As always our flights for air cover tactic low over our friend troop, also lucky day for our gun-ships, if Sky-spot drop bomb explosive “snack-eyes” our gun-ships should be absorbed all of their goddamn fragments. All long night of 5th March I heard intermitted throngs of B-52 ferocious onslaught around Tchepone and early 6th March MC-130 dropped bomb BLU-82AL [Aluminum is a silvery white and ductile member of the boron group of chemical elements, it has the symbol AL; it atomic number 13 … power and polystyrene (FAE) consist only of an agent and a dispersing mechanism and take their oxidizers from the oxygen in the air]
After 25th February, so many casualties of ARVN and U.S Air cavalier, General Haig assigned Colonel James Vaught to the so called ARVN Airborne Division Advisor, but in reality Vaught should be Haig’s eyes on the operational spot. He will wear monitoring error, and closed to General Phu 1st Division Commander. Particularly, where Landing Zone LoLo, the U.S helicopters was shot down to describe the falling leaves, Colonel James Vaught what to do to reduce, slow down the suffering? He began to manage B-52 campaign from “Rolling Thunder” to “Linebacker” means access to air ground closed support and protect friend troop from 300 meters, thereby no more NVA ambush near our troop. From now on, Vaught has to react and kill some thousands NVA troops thank to B-52 access support, artillery Long-tom 175 and 16 tactical aircrafts F-8 Crusader, A-6 Intruder from 7th Fleet. Typically, for short period to campaign medical evacuation, supply by renew tactical: Such as B-52 carpeted on front West, U.S artillery was strike on front East, and tactical aircraft pounded alternately to the North fence; Leave now South of the approach gate in and out for 20 helicopters Huey in exclusive, air assault two airborne companies move to LZ, whether to unload small ammunition and supplies, small quantity gasoline to full set cavalry. Three UH1-Hs got hit but still accomplished mission; continues to fly 3 consecutive lifts back and forth, we called Horse-shoes tactic.

[General Phu committed suicide for the betrayal a trusted friend, General Vaught: At the time damage, was change, in the time Saigon Fall, the new information brought to the week of General Phu for the betrayal of United States ally. Extract a paragraph in the document: Furthermore, General Phu Lam Son 719’s friend, General James Vaught, an American buddy asked him for advice, General had refused because he claimed that the Paris Accords prohibited lending him such help. Not even advice from an old and trusted friend. Who would have known? It was only the two of them, yet General Vaught, still, had said no!]

But right now, this moment, Colonel James Vaught was an Airborne advisor, his first command shows the prestige, guaranty, confidence of his interference with military operations to less casualty necessity; The lest retreat trajectory withdrawal in security. When the 1st Armor Brigade retreat to the branch of Xepon River together with two airborne battalions; How their crossing the river, Colonel Vaught gave some instructions to Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, 1st Brigade Commander and also for counter balance of dispensary destroyed-trucks: “Let all truck rolling by wheels, stayed remains for B-52 destroyed as similar to B-52 was destroyed all NVA trucks on the Parking No-2, in the early day SAC bombardment”

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

FIRE SUPPORT BASE, HILL-31 WAS IN DESPERATE: The NVA’ thrust was assisted by tanks. The fighting became fiercer and fiercer, and both side suffered heavy casualties. The 39th ranger battalion bravely battled on despite being low on ammunition. They resisted for one day and one night, before the position was lost. The battalion had to retreat toward the 21st ranger battalion’s position in the south. Having successfully occupied the hill, the NVA moved west and south west to threaten the 21st and the 3rd Airborne Brigade was well-supported by tactical air power. Despite heavy lost, the NVA continued to storm FSB 31 in the face of long and short range heavy Long Tom 175 artilleries. Although forewarned of enemy intentions, the 3rd Airborne Brigade failed to establish an effective defense, and shared the same fate of the 39th Ranger battalion. It had fought with courage and bravado, but succumbed to the massive suicidal onslaught of the NVA. The Brigade Staff, including Colonel Tho was captured. Some evaded and ran southwards toward FSB 30 which was occupied by the 2ndAirborne battalion. Even as they assaulted the 3rd Airborne Brigade Headquarter, the NVA pounded away at FSB 30 and A-loui FSB where the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 1st Armor Brigade were positioned. These two units were unable to give assistance to the 3rd Airborne Brigade at FSB 31, although help was sought of them.
As late as 27 February, three weeks into the operation, MACV J-2 was carrying only seven enemy regiments in the Lam Son area of operations, up from six with the arrival of the 324B Division’s, and separated 29th Regiment. Of the twenty-one enemy battalions then committed, five were assessed as having been rendered combat ineffective due to casualties. Nevertheless, fierce fighting was in progress all along Route 9 and at the positions ARVN had staked out north and south of it, especially at Fire Support Base 31 to the north. There an enemy attack that included tanks and armored PT-76 overran a brigade headquarters of the Airborne Division and captured the brigade commander, Colonel Tho and his staff-officers. As same as the 39th Ranger Battalion was also pressured into abandoning its position, joining the nearby 21st Ranger Battalion, after which both were evacuated from Laos.
At the Hill 31, thirteen days after General Dong and Colonel Tho commander 3rd Brigade, stationed on Fire Support Base 31 had have a short briefing for imminent “Hill-Fights”. A squad of 3th Battalion/3rd Airborne Brigade forward observer party from Hill-31 was ambushed in a grove of bamboo, often clever bunkers tunneled under thick bamboo clumps, providing NVA with a natural cover; on Hill 875 northwest of the Hill-31. There was clusters of intertwining ridges, the highest ridge forming the crest that gave the hill mass its designation by height in meters. Four airborne soldiers survived. This was the first and the cruelest struggle at Hill-31 vicinity, the “Hill Fights” began.
General Dong had been right that to hold this Hill-31 the airborne would have to garrison the hill-ranges that dominated the valley. The NVA understood this and seized the hills. A regiment from the NVA’ 320 Division marched in through the pea-soup fog and under the low clouds clinging over the crests of the monsoon and occupied Hill 875 and the two hills beyond it – 888 south and 888 North. A second regiment from this division hid itself in a reserve position behind the hills. It was subsequently discovered that NVA combat engineer troops had probably been at work on the three hills for long months without being detected by the ARVN Joint Staff Headquarters before the main body of general’s infantry arrived. Dong wanted to keep this Hill-31 less-vulnerable. The Airborne 3rd Brigade therefore had to drive the NVA from the heights. They did not know the strength of the enemy they faced, nor did they suspect the nature of the battleground the General Giap’ troops had prepared.
For four days two airborne battalions – initially the battalion stationed at Hill-31, quickly followed by the 6th Airborne Battalion under a Brigade/J-3 Command Group sent to take charge – attempted to clear Hill 875. The word “Hill” is field shorthand for what is properly called a “hill-mass” in military terminology. Hill 875 and Hill 888 South and 888 North were clusters of intertwining ridges, the highest ridge forming the crest that gave the hill mass its designation by height in meters. Hills 888 South and 888 North happened to be the same height and so were differentiated by the fact that one was north of the other.
The NVA troops on Hill 875 let the 6th Battalion Airborne climb the ridges to within fifteen to twenty meters, then raked the Airborne with fusillades from positions concealed in the undergrowth. Shells hurled by 82, and 120mm mortars which burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern, from unseen pits somewhere back in the ridgelines crashed into the Airborne, killing and wounding more of them. Counter-fired by the Airborne mortars, salvos of high explosive and white phosphorous from the howitzers 155 at the Fire Support Base 31, 30 strafing and rocket runs by our UHI-H gun-ships, and bombs and napalm from the tactical fighter jet from Thailand and Navy, Marine in of shore Pacific interrupted but did not silence the enemy mortars or discourage the Giap’ infantry. When the 6th Battalion Airborne tried to disengage, The NVA would not let go. They followed the Airborne, harrying them with automatic-weapons fire. The Airborne could not evacuate their wounded. Whenever they called in our helicopter for medical evacuation would plaster the landing zone with mortar 120mm shells. That missions must aborted due to so heavy enemy pressure in fire power.
The two Airborne-battalions were subjected to separate. Two Airborne/Rec/Companies of the 8th Airborne Battalion were on the northwest side of Hill 875, the battalion with the Brigade J-3 command and control told the 6th Airborne Battalion to link up with the 8th Airborne Battalion which he was attached. The Lieutenant Colonel J-3 leading the 6th Battalion replied that after four days of combat he did not have enough able-bodied men left to carry the dead and wounded that far. Airborne abhor abandoning their dead because of the mystical comradeship of the traditional Airborne Division. Leave the dead, the Brigade- Commander ordered. The Lt Col answered that he still would not have enough able-bodied Airborne to carry out the wounded, and wounded Airborne cannot be abandoned under any circumstances. He said he was pulling into a nearby bank of fog to hide from the mortars fragmentations and “fight until it was over” against the Giap’ infantry he was certain would follow.
The artillery officer back at the Hill-31 had his batteries walk shells to the battalion through the fog. He circled the beleaguered men with shrapnel, as Sergeant Hung had done to save Nguyen’s lost platoon. Litters for the wounded were improvised out of ponchos; the dead were slung in ponchos to be carried too; and the Airborne gathered up all of the riffles and equipment. When the column set out to march back through the darkness and rain and a pea-soup-fog that thickened with the lowering temperatures of the night, only the men at the point and the rear guard walked without burdens –the periodic downpours turned the dirt of the trails into slippery red-mud. The days had become hotter now toward the end of the rainy season, and the corpses had deteriorated and bloated. Many times during the night the Airborne carrying one of the dead stumbled and the body fell out of the poncho and rolled down the slope. The column halted. The body was retrieved and laid in the poncho again, and the march resumed. When the Airborne reached safety at dawn they had left none of their comrades behind.
The 8th Battalion also disengaged with the help of Armor unit 11th and 17th for the approach- reinforcements. The two depleted battalions (6th and 8th Airborne Battailions) were reorganized by one thrust attack-front still below the Hill-30, and the Airborne built up their forces at the highest ridge to two battalions under at 3rd Brigade command post at Hill-31 while the 105s of Airborne, the 155s of B/44th Artillery Battalion, U.S artillery at Khe Sanh’ 175 firing from one of the strongpoint back across the mountains, the fighter-bombers battered and burned Hill 888 for a full day and night. A combined airborne force then assaults the hill. But Giap’ troop was gone. They had apparently withdrawn to the next hill close nearby Hill-31 maybe they changed the tactical maneuvers? 888 South, possibly soon after the fight with the two Airborne 8th and 6th Battalions and before the worst of the bombardment had begun Giap’ troop left many of their dead behind; Otherwise, as the Airborne combined force after-action report noted, “the battle area was extremely well policed by the Giap’ troop; virtually no equipment or information of intelligence value remained.” The Airborne did count twenty-eight bunkers on Hill 888, and they found 300 foxholes on and around it and mortar pits on the back slopes. The overhead cover on a number of the bunkers was six feet high in layers of bamboo and packed earth and grass, [of course they had plenty time for these establishments] thick enough to protect the NVA troops inside from a direct hit by the artillery. The bunkers should have made the Airborne combined brigadier-force and battalion commanders suspicious.
The Airborne that launched another headlong assault against Hill 888 South after another day and night of battering and burning attacked right into a man trap. The NVA held fire once more until the lead squads were fifteen to twenty meters from the bunkers in the undergrowth and the opening volley would have maximum killing effect. Sniper hidden in trees not yet knocked down by bombs and shells picked out radio operators and machine gunners and killed them carefully with a single accuracy shot through the head or the chest. At the same moment, salvos of 120mm mortar shells again exploded among the Airborne. The NVA didn’t seem to mind calling mortar fire so close that they were, in effect, bringing it down on their own positions. In this moment, our gunship was contacted with airborne lead platoons putting on their heads and shoulders the ‘orange panel’ to easier identification friend and foe and also we can count on to air close-support in front of them 100 meters on spewing mini-guns 4,000 round per minutes that I was convinced in neutralization every snipers being killed, though the rockets detonated on the branches that help killing snipers too. Obviously we made flight circus so lower above friendly troops for security.
Airborne are unsurpassed as assault troops, and these Airborne pressed forward with the classic aggressiveness instilled by the Airborne tradition-motto. They discovered that the farther they fought their way into the NVA position, the more resistance they encountered and the worse their situation became. Soon those men still capable of fighting were unable to go forward or back. The fire from the bunkers, foxholes, and trenches in front was withering. Meanwhile, NVA in bunkers the Airborne had fought their way past were back in action behind them and had cut off their retreat.
I did know so well that the North Vietnam Communist anted “violent, close-quarters combat” because it “tends to diminish the effectiveness” of air and artillery was turning out to be something of an understatement; so our gunship with accuracy fire support encouraged the Airborne’ morale. The Airborne-men on 888 South were feeling the extent of the diminishment. While General Dong, Air Borne Division commander had been thinking about ports and warehouses for his attrition machine, the NVA had been learning better ways to fight the Airborne. There were not twice as many bunkers on 888-South as the Airborne troops had found on Hill 875, there were eight times as many, and the approximately 260 bunkers on this hill were astonishingly rugged. The smaller ones, apparently two or three-man affairs had been constructed with roof consisting of two layers of logs topped by five feet of dirt. Larger four-man bunkers had still better protection overhead and, before the battle, had served as fairly comfortable living quarters. They were fitted with storage shelves, bamboo-mat floors, and a drainage system to keep them dry. The largest bunkers, clearly the command posts, had roof with four to eight layers of logs and then four feet of packed earth above the logs. Field telephone wire had been strung throughout the bunker complex so that the NVA battalion, company, and platoon commanders could talk to each other during the battle and they and the forward observers could adjust the mortars by calling instructions to the crews in the pits on the rear slopes.
After long day-and-night bombardment of the hill that had seemed so awesomely destructive to the watching Airborne had been mainly celebrated holiday-fireworks. The rockets detonated on the branches or the overhead cover of the bunkers, and the machine-gun bullets and 20mm cannon shells didn’t penetrate anything either. Most of the napalm burned in the trees. The howitzer shells 105s, 155s, 175s and even 8-inch gun did give the Giap’ troops in the bunkers headaches. The bombs were more frightening, extremely difficult to bear. The concussion from them gave some of the NVA troops bleeding noses and ears, but the bombs usually did not kill or disable either.
Prior to the assault on the morning of February 21, the fighter-bombers had dropped no 750-pounders and only a small number of 1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs on Hill 888 South. Almost all of the bombs had been the 250- and 500-pound “Snake-eye” type preferred by the Marine pilots and their Navy and Air Force counterparts. Snake-eye bombs have large tail fins that unfold after released to retard descent so that the bomb can be launched from low altitude in a slow, parabolic trajectory that allows the aircraft time to fly clear of the blast and fragmentation. Jets can bomb accurately from a low, relatively flat approach and the weather over here also encouraged the use of Snake-eyes. The U.S pilots had to be prepared to fly anywhere. With one part of the Vietnam’s weather or the other always in a monsoon, they frequently encountered low cloud ceilings. At Khe Sanh in late February and early March 1971, the ceiling was often 1,000 feet or less-melee with fog. To drop the heavier 750-, 1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs accurately and escape the blast and fragments, a pilot had to take a high-angle approach akin to dive-bombing and pull away at a good height. An approach like this was dangerous when the clouds were down and the air space around a target was crowded. The NVA had also observed this practice of the U.S pilots. The bunkers were sturdy enough to withstand anything but a direct or close hit by a 250- or 500-pound Snake-eye bomb, infrequent in practice.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

Rain-forest bunker complexes served the NVA for both offensive and defensive purposes. During the early stages of a battle, as in the fighting for Hill 875, The NVA could sortie out and employ their flanking and envelopment tactics to advantage. They knew the terrain intimately, because they had been living in this area secretly for quite a very long years, where starting to build The Harriman Super-Highway since Neutral Laos Agreement 1962, plus POL pipe-lines parallel along it, while during the last phase of bunker construction. Later, when the battle was approaching a high-point, as in the assault on Hill-888 South, The NVA could wait out the bombardment in the shelter of the bunkers.
In the end, bombs and shells would exact their toll. Those NVA regiments who were ordered to hold their position or to expose themselves in counterattacks would die, as they were to die by the thousands during couple days of the “Hill-Fight”. Their crucial purpose were paralyzed the 105s of Airborne and 155s of B/44 Artillery Battalion at Hill-31 and used maximum indirect fire power for destroying helicopters when they attempted to land. By planning carefully, by fortifying in advance, and by designing a battlefield that enticed the Airborne into becoming victims of General’ Giap stylized methods of fighting at Dien Bien Phu battle in 1954; the separated NVA regiments could accomplish what was most important to them: they could prolong the combat and make any Airborne battalions sent against them suffer grievously. Merely to strip away the top layer of canopy trees, the second layer of pole trees, and finally the underbrush so that on could see the bunkers to attack them with precision consumed days of this standard bombardment with artillery from Khe Sanh 175s, 155s, and 8-inch-guns and 250- and 500-pound bombs. Despite all of the preparatory bombing and shelling of Hill 888 South, the Airborne could not see the bunkers until they were almost on top of them, and there were the bunkers until they were almost on top of them, and there were plenty of trees left standing to give the snipers leafy perches. So why as the guns lead, I recommended Lt Col Airborne X.O’ 3rd Brigade let the forward squads must wore the orange-panel for references I had sight accuracy for protected them in advance 60 to 100 meters ahead strafing and rocket runs, now I had ready 38 rockets in both side my bird.
Lt Col X.O Brigade care about the lives of his forces; He engaged to forward head-front of platoon right in the moment he received a report of the bloodletting on the hill, took a squad of riflemen, and crawled forward to find out for himself what was happening. He therefore understood the limits of conventional bombardment against bunkers like the ones he now saw on Hill 888 South and the rashness of sending his troop to seize them. He ordered all of two airborne joint battalions withdraw from the hills and recommended in suggestion the Air-Wing from Thailand and 7th Fleet to switch to 750-, 1,000-, and 2,000 pound bombs with delay fuses. The delay fusing meant that the bomb penetrated the earth before exploding. A miss was still effective, because the subterranean shock waves tended to collapse the bunkers from beneath.
The concussion from the big bombs was disabling in itself (lethal when the hit was close enough), and the delay also gave the pilots time to fly clear.
Lt Col X.O intervened too late. The death toll entirely of Lam Son after two weeks was thousands in these typical “Hill-Fights” of 875 and 888 were already hundred-eighty. Close to half of the men had just been killed in this impetuous attack on Hill-888 South, and this time the Airborne were forced to abandon their dead in order to extricate the living. When Airborne returned after fierce bombardments during 24 hours later to recover the bodies of their comrades and occupy the wasteland of cratered ridges littered with splintered trees, forty-five of bunkers were still intact and the NVA regiment-men were gone again. The survivors of the 320 NVA Regiment and 29th Regiment that had borne the battle until this point had retreated to Hill-888 North, where, unbeknownst to the 3rd Brigade commander, Colonel Tho, they had been relieved by fresh troops of the 29th Regiment, which the NVA division commander had been holding in reserve.
Subsequently, Airborne’ recommendation had also put in U.S Navy and Air-force squadrons to work on Hill 888 North with heavy bombs, but 2,000-pounders could not blow away the perverse weather of this mountainous area. As the lead 8th-Airborne Battalion neared the top of that hill late on the same afternoon that 888 South was occupied, the men encountered brisk sniper fire, meanwhile we had been covered strafing fire-support for 2nd battalion been leaving Hill-30. The Airborne thought they could handle the snipers. They could not handle the tropical storm that enveloped them with forty-five-mile-per-hour winds and blinding rain. The battalion commander had to order a retreat. It was too dangerous to allow his Airborne-men to plunge ahead into who knew what.
Now, five separated NVA regiments from 320 Division, 324B Division took advantage of the hiatus to launch a counterattack that night by two reinforced main forces. The NVA regiments troops broke through the perimeter of 3th Airborne-Battalion and seized some previously unoccupied bunkers in the tree lines. There, with automatic weapons and grenades, they traded their lives through most of the next day in a fight to the death bunker by bunker. More dying followed on subsequent hours. By the time the 52 hours of fighting for the Hill-875, 888 had end, the bodies of 80 airborne-men had been carried to the spot near a stony-creek for evacuated and 148 had been wounded but that never happened. The worst Airborne’ losses for any single battle of the start Lam Son 719 of the war thus far.
Actually, General Giap’ tactical strategy determined by every Fire Support Bases of ARVN must be paralyzed in isolation by the eight regiments of NVA artillery, and six AAAs anti-aircraft regiments. Specially 152s guns: the duds from these penetrated four feet into the earth, and 120mm mortars that burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern. Thereby every base our helicopter was crashed and grounded on those FSB. In this time so far: at Hill-31, two H34s crashed inside the FSB; at Hill-30, two UH1-H; at Hotel two UH1-Hs, and A-Loui, three UH1-H that I didn’t count so various kinds of choppers that U.S Aviation left there. General Giap’ tactical indicated instead broke every chop-stick one by one than couldn’t break a full chop-stick-bundle. He manipulated used main strong infantry forces with tanks attack from East at Dong Da of Rangers LZ North of 39th , LZ South 21st battalion, and West at Hill-31 Airborne than joint combined forces moved to attack South right after on Fire Support Hill-30 was seized; then Base A-Loui and Hotel [Hong Ha-2] later on. Certainly, 100 percent ended the Victory-War with perfect preparedness thank to CIA counterespionage help Giap with full detail information (Giap was engaged in OSS in 1943, now it seemed to me, General Giap at sit right on Pentagon side by side with General Haig)

As quickly as they let it ebb in the west, these three NVA regiments/70B, shifted the fighting to the eastern side of the Hill 31, striking the farther west Airborne Fire Support Base in three fronts, from west, north, and south. Brigade commander Colonel Tho ordered the joint forces come back from south-east to rescue 3rd Airborne Battalion and command post but fail because NVA 27th regiment was in the stronger-holding point on high relief. “The enemy is all over that goddamn area and seems to be getting stronger, if anything. And so there’s a real fight going up there. Particularly that indirect fire thing is worrying.” Just how worrying was demonstrated at Hill-31, where more than thousand and thousand incoming rounds every hour and more than from such indirect fire weapons as mortars 120mm and 122mm rockets and artillery – reportedly including 152mm howitzers – knocked out all the Fire Support Bases destroyed 105s and 155s friendly artillery and forced ARVN forces to withdraw for survive. Meanwhile the NVA 24B, and 66 regiments were paying a heavy price. The full 3rd Battalions, 300 soldiers were ordered died on the spot Hill-31 even though by raining 23, 14,5mm and grounding by PT-76 chains.
Now for counter-weight in the ROE’ compensation, the Strategic Air Command estimated that Arc Light B-52s alone were inflicting losses that were the equivalent of about one combat effective NVA regiment per week.” The Hill-31 area now, every direction shelling became the worst curse of this bloody fierce war, worse than the NVA regiments infantry assaults, worse than the ambushes of the supply convoys, worse than the raids by the sappers (a term American applied to NVA and Viet Cong commando-type troops) who stripped to their under-shorts and crawled through the barbed wire to toss satchel charges into bunkers and artillery revetments. The shelling was worse because it was equally lethal but harder on the nerves.
The worst on 25 February at 10:a.m it was still in heavy ‘pea-soup-fog’, the weather was marginal with clouds below the mountaintops and increasing ground fog. Still I thought low-flying helicopters, under clouded ceiling, could weave around the worst of it. Meanwhile five NVA’ regiments, setting from different direction, in column set out hurrying to march convergence to Hill-31 through the darkness fog that thickened with the lowering humid temperatures after long night. Suddenly, it too began to get serious when nearly just a short moment 5,000 rounds fell on the Fire Support Base Hill-31. The NVA regiments brought to bear all manner of artillery in the Soviet-designed arsenal by U.S dollars (financial-supported by creditor Skull and Bones, this remind you in the past history: in 1917 on his advise, [the founder Skull and Bone] the United States gave the Russian revolutionary government under Aleksandr Kerensky a $325 million credit to be spent on war but “materiel from the United States”) – 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, and 130mm guns; 120mm mortars that burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern; and 122mm Katyusha rockets nine feet long, and particularly 152mm guns, the duds from these penetrated four feet into the earth. From now they don’t hide the real guns and mortars and rockets launchers in deep pits and in tunnels, no more in camouflage they boldly keep firing not like in the early days built “phony gun” positions for the interpreters of the Bronco OV-10 observer to find as simulate muzzle flashes. I can cast my eyes on the NVA battery that was obliterated and several meters of brown-dirt blown off the tops of the ridges, exposing what had been underground warehouses.
From several miles of south-east of Hill-31, I led two gun-ships for closed air-support 8th Airborne Battalion to joint communicated with the remnant element from another 6th Battalion at north west. Something was strange NVA troops climbed on board PT-76 and shortly they hurried converging on Hill-31 in retreated from their high crests south Hill-31. Meanwhile two H-34 from Queen-Be Squadron were got hit by indirect artillery grounded on the spot Hill-31 after dropped supplies, the panic and the sick-sight of troop deserters mobbing helicopters and hanging from ski and now all over inside the helicopter cabin inflicting the crashes of two H-34. I meditate in thought, had bogged down and become a blood debacle, with our troops Laotian hill-top strongholds cut-off and annihilated piece-meal by the result of the ten NVA regiments rushing from five Divisions plus two separated regiment plus tank T-54, T-34 and armored truck PT-76 and artilleries regiments.
In the anticipated stratagem of Permanent Government about the outcome of this operation was “the biggest-fiasco that I saw in my whole time been here because it broke the back of the South Vietnamese finest army particularly irreplaceable were the dead elite-officers, I must said: since “that” the future leaders, they were all dead for turning in South Vietnam to Hanoi without bloodshed but blood-leaked or Saigon was not be a “pebble” Capital.
Now a deep gloomed over the hill scenery in front of mine, after numerous ferocious cruelty shelling pounded on Hill-31, “that by afternoon the setting sun would be shining through so much smoke and dust that you couldn’t see it.” First I could see the Hill-31 among the vertical smoked column but eventually it disappeared out of my sight by hours blurred in the haze of smoke and flashed. I couldn’t understand the plight of my H-34 crewmen there died or wounded. More friendly bombardment more enemy attacked approach-trajectory closer, the fighter-bombers couldn’t distinguish the friend troops will withdraw or dead on spot, which direction friend troops will forced retreat. The Air Force and Navy tried all manner of counter-battery measures to rescue or paralyze their opponents. The batteries from Khe Sanh’ Long Toms, and guns Eight-inch, 155mm Howitzer fired hundreds or thousands of shells around the Hill-31. The F.4 Phantom, F-105 from Thailand; the Seventh Fleet A-4 Sky-hawks, F.8 Crusaders precision dive-bombed, and A-6 Intruder bombers, which lofted a respectable seven tons each, laid carpets in the tens of thousands of tons. But nothing gave more than a respite from these Dien Bien Phu’ artillerymen who counted in their intellectual heritage the seventeenth-century French genius of artillery and siege-craft Sebastien de Vauban, and who had had so much practice at digging and disguising against his direct military heirs who had forgotten his teachings.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

At late evening of that day, the tide of battle now sweeping back the other way – the 3rd Airborne Battalion and Colonel Tho 3rd Brigade Commander, staying fire or died on the spot is his determined orders. The 3rd Airborne Battalion infantrymen in the first perimeter front in their foxholes could not afford to curse. They were battling now to avoid annihilation. Platoon leader stopped the armored PT-76s – he leaped from his foxhole and stood up right in front of the metal beasts. Their ugliness was part of the terrifying effect these evil contrivances had always had on him and his men. The fore ends angled down into broad snouts with pop-eyes on top where the two headlights for night driving protruded. Yanking a grenade from his belt, he pulled the pin, cooked his arm, and hurled it at one of the monsters. The grenade landed on top of the PT-76 and erupted with a great bang and flash. Carried beyond their fear by his courage, the men of his platoon abandoned the protection of their foxholes to join him, throwing their grenades at the metal beasts too. But all of 3rd Airborne Battalion men were died or wounded by rainy bullets from the armored tracks or by shrapnel from their own grenades. Oh God, my unknown soldiers!
The enemy mobilized a large number of waves of assaults against Hill-31 to viciously attack from every direction convergence to Hill-31 – “the longest moment and bloodiest siege of the war” And in the meantime General Vo Nguyen Giap found himself as excellent commander of the war, but to me, a fate undeserved for a excellent and brave commander because CIA counterespionage gave him beforehand the plan of that Operation Lam Son 719. Subsequently,
in the moment, now I couldn’t see the Hill-31 clearly in the twilight but above was huge smoked mushroom shaped cover entirely the hill and below it was a huge flame blasted, still shelling red trajectory curb into hill, in my mind I thought even the insects couldn’t alive. “The Hill-31 was overrun by numerous NVA 24B regiments” The Airborne Division’s 3rd Brigade headquarters was captured and its 3rd Battalion essential annihilated to the last man. These were the brave unknown heroes. Colonel Thọ was captured
But after nine year (1980) I had see Colonel Tho in the same Camp with me, the so called “Reeducation Camp” at Yen-Bai, Hoang Lien Son province, North Vietnam.

I must go back to Khe Sanh for refueling and rearmament by requesting 2nd Airborne Battalion commander for leaving fact-order. The gloaming swept in quickly in the mountain area, draining the sunlight from west skyline and replacing it with darker, gloomy shadows. Understood the Skull and Bones’ scam, “conscientious objector” which required one to argue that one’s religious beliefs did not allow involvement this operation, for I did not believe that war was at a mortal levels sufficiently low to require my own resistance. The war, as I understood it then, was not in itself an evil; if there was evil, I thought it was in how ineptly it was being conducted and in the consequences of this ineptitude. This was bloodiest war in just few weeks, the really “dirty war” like U-Thanh, United Nation’ Secretary had said. Even good leadership and motivation were definitely not developed to an adequate extent and…this failure had a disastrous effect on the eventual outcome of the war.

At 10: am on 27 February, it’s still light fog, right the weather was blurred enough, and the sun was shining and most of the fog had burned off gradually. I took a lead of formation gunship hurrying back for the target site at full power, running right along the treetops, to 2nd Airborne Battalion and depleted Ranger 39th Battaillion. The 8th Battalion of 3rd Brigade also disengaged without the help of the reinforcement. Now I had to manipulated brought them joint together and moved them to southeast back to Route 9. I was going to provide fire support for the ground strayed elements. The most important was two battalions of 3rd Brigade consolidated for greater efficiency. I realized that everyone had been told now to consolidate at the high relief crest. Companies, platoons, squads, and mobile command post would be racing toward that new position. The NVA infantrymen knew the terrain intimately, because they had been living in this area secretly for quite a while during the last phase of bunker construction. So, it would be very hard to distinguish friends from foe in such a melee. I couldn’t just cowboy in there, spewing four thousand rounds a minute. Two gunners behind backseats electrically controlled mini-guns could be armed only by me throwing a switch in the cockpit. I spoke to them very carefully.
“Okay, guys” I said. “I’m arming your guns, but we’re not doing any shooting until we figure out where everybody is. Roger that?”
They grunted a “Rahj.” But I flown low enough they could distinguish between the camouflage airborne and Nam-Dinh NVA’ fatigues. If you were going to fly a gun platform there was absolutely no room for error. When you shoot very close to your own personnel on the ground, you’ve got to be extremely disciplined and precise, because if you make a mistake, people are going to die. I was determined that we would be on standby in alert: shoot as well as we did, execute the mission as precisely, and be just as brutal in the tent debriefs. I was going to note every mistake that any of gunship commanders made and take appropriate action. In short, I became a “real pain in the ass, but for good reason.”
Typically the Airborne forward squad bore on their back-shoulders with orange panel hint sight our friendly troops. I was so confident of my two gunners. Shaking my head as six anti-aircraft regiments composed as thousand of AAA-batteries in this operation area; for a special operations pilot who should have been at the point of the spear, I felt like I’d just had my wings clipped. At this very moment I was supposed to be flying an UHI-H Gunship on a lightning raid into the heart of Hanoi in the very tough moment.
Within minutes I was back over the mobile-command-post element, flying a wide but low altitude circular pattern, trying to locate the targets and clearly spot the enemy before we opened up; if we climbed high enough to oversee the vast area, we’d be vulnerable to the NVA troop in mid-and high-altitude air defense systems. At first, I was peering past down into total confusion. It was just smoke, haze, and dust and indistinguishable, sprinting forms. We jinks up and down, getting high, getting low, but always low above the friend troop, trying to make us hard to hit, all too aware the NVA troops were now shooting at us from every treetops and high relief. I looked quickly around the cockpit, while gunners did the same, four of us testing the controls and checking the gauges. Everything was “in the green”: no flight control problems, engine malfunctions, or weird noises. No one in my bird said a word, and then … what will happen?
The Airborne mobile command post gave me the order – “any price the must communicated a strayed deplete Company and guiding them back in joining actual consolidated-forces”. A day earlier, this Company tried to go back Hill-31 for rescue-enforced fighting for the home base by the order of Colonel Tho 3rd Brigade commander. After a long night busted-flashed and smoked over Hill-31 now everything was calm, causing a feeling of mystery-fear, a strange and eerie silence- The company commander know how to reacted; now he tried to joint with his own-battalion but couldn’t crossed the dry-spring hollowed in the small valley that dominated by two NVA regiments on the flank crests. Although that damn good fighting company but they couldn’t cross the spring because the only very-one 85mm Mountain gun which shot directly down to spring when Airborne trying to cross, where they had some men wounded and died there.
I was contacted by the Colonel Commander on the mobile-command post:
“Magic Club One …this is Quang Trung…Quang Trung …” Crackle-crackle-crackle.
His transmission had broken up on the last word.
“I have an urgent mission change for you, this is Quang Trung” Lieutenant Colonel’s voice was usually cold as ice water, but on today he actually sounded a little keyed up. “Copy these coordinates.”
“Roger that,” I said, and as my copilot continued the lazy orbit over the airborne activities below. I repeated the coordinates back to him.
“You are cleared direct to the target, Magic Club One – the Colonel ordered “Target is a possible…” Crackle-crackle-crackle
“I need the targets for salvo rockets and ammunition and we must rearm the next special weapon for firing support to destroy a worst enemy 85mm Mount-gun”.
Obviously they had so many targets, the crest in front of the forward squad at the high tree slope. We commenced strafing from 100 to 200 meters for Airborne-Platoon can assault-reached the high point of crest ahead. I rolled out on a course direct to the objective. I was Tactical Lead now, and took the aircraft controls back from my copilot and called on my wingman – once again, I radioed the details to wingman to switch on VHF…frequency.
“Magic Club 2 how do you read me… over”
“One…Two five/five clear …over” he answered. “Go ahead.”
“For killing 85mm gun at higher on crest, position at above your main rotor, at left side at 10:30 o’clock of us; “Two” must load 19 at each side-mounted 2.75-inch rocket pods of 17 pounds high-explosive and 6,000 rounds 7.62mm mini-gun-ammo… and “One” equipped 14 “nail-arrows” rockets and 12,000 rounds of ammo… the react-aiming devices for the six-barreled mini-guns were our own gunners eyes…O.K! Their tracers for experience missions like these were also infrared at a ratio of one tracer for every fourteen standard rounds and we must thrust them.
Suddenly, I heard the loudly sound hissed in my earphones:
“Magic-Club-One…Magic Eight calling… how you read me over… how you read me over”
I said “Go ahead”
“Magic Eight and Nine were over the rendezvous point needed your air cover over to Hill-30 for supplies and medical evacuation over”
“Standby one orbit there, I’ll be there about six minutes…over …now we had to salvo all some ordinance and re-arm … then …for your air cover…over”.
I said, “Magic Two hold the fire-power for new escorted mission.”
After 20 minutes, two UHI-H slicks were escorted to Hill-30, reached their familiar with designated landing-pad. The NVA regiments when they heard the sound of helicopter, from to various indirect heavy guns pounded away with numerous concentrated shelling to the Fire Support Base, Hill-30. I flew into a hornets nest at FSB-30, when we arrived, we saw two PT-76 within the perimeter wire, and NVA troops everywhere; The Airborne 2nd Battalion troops survivors had consolidated in the command bunkers at the center of the camp and were fighting hard to keep the NVA at bay. Our two gun-ships fired some ordinance and then supported two Magic 8 and 9 with new type of tank killing missile. When we’d expended all our fired power, we returned again to Khe Sanh to once again re-arm and re-fuel. We then launched back out on our four combat mission of the day, returning Khe Sanh.
After took off from Khe Sanh, we were asked to escort a re-supply Magic 8, 9 Huey helicopters into Hill-30 [FSB-30] low level on the tree-tops. We approached the Hill-30 with guns blazing, ours and theirs. In my pilot seat, my copilot adjusted his chicken plate again. I was firing pairs of rockets. At the same time, we were engaged by numerous enemy small arms and anti-aircraft weapons as we continued inbound. Two helicopters, Magic 8 and 9 successfully completed its critical mission among the columns of smoke. These helicopters came to a very brief hover, kicked off the ammo boxes and lifted out. We turned to cover their departure in strafing in-front of them with spew 4,000 rounds per minutes. Now we could see so many vertical column smokes around the base. One U.S helicopter grounded on the helipad due to get hit from the fragmentations just yesterday. So now VNAF must take on charge in limited missions affordable meanwhile U.S air cavalry gave up. I don’t blame our fellow U.S aviators because there wasn’t their country but ours.
Right after the Hill-31 was overran by five enemy regiments. Colonel Battreall recalled, he saw a badly shaken U.S air cavalry squadron commander describe the horrendous antiaircraft defenses surrounding Tchepone and recommended against the planned airmobile assault there.
Colonel Ray Battreall was being throughout the operation deficiencies at high command levels continued to undermine the abilities and performance of ARVN’ troops. Battreall, a very experienced officer who watched most of this firsthand from I Corps Forward at Khe Sanh, later provided some useful insight into the challenges confronting General Lam, I Corp and Lam Son 719 commander. For responding the challenge General Lam pondered for a moment and then replied, “No, we have B-52s. We will use them, and then we will go. And so it happened,” said Battreall. “The antiaircraft was obliterated and several meters of dirt blown off the tops of the ridges, exposing what had been underground warehouses. The 1st Infantry Division assaulted almost unopposed and methodically destroyed everything of military value before commencing what turned out to be a bloody and hard-fought withdrawal. It took real guts for Lam to make that decision, and he made it quite alone with no U.S advisor twisting his arm. Whatever he did before or after cannot detract from that moment”.
General Lam counted on B-52 and President Thieu would like one U.S Division joining with South Vietnamese troops; these two expectations were adversely affected by Permanent Government due to violate the Rules Of Engagement and screwed-up the progressive U.S force go home plan. But now it seemed to me that such very worst situation, the Permanent Government must violate the ROE for dreaming up a grand scheme to save the honor country? I call it C-Y-A. (Cover Your Ass). From now on, so far there was appeared a secret “Linebacker” and no more “Rolling Thunder” emerged again. Linebacker was real war. You will read the next on 5 March in the dawn something so strangely happened.
If it was violated the ROE, though Seventh Air Force’s pilots dropped bomb by the CIA gave ordered to the targets but bitterly the SAC commander was made a scapegoat for C-Y-A conspiracy strategy. The pretentiousness was the so called Allies forces took one significant casualty even before the main battle began. General John D. Lavelle, commanding Seventh Air Force, was found to have ordered the ‘so-called’ a number of pre-planned “protective reaction” strikes against in North Vietnam, thereby violating the ROE then in effect. The offensive was compounded by the fact that false reports, representing these as genuine protective reactions, were subsequently filed. Summoned home by the Air Force Chief of Staff, Lavelle was relieved of his command and retired in two-star rank. Said few critic venal-journalists, fabricating that Lavelle had “acted improperly,” rules were a way of life in Vietnam. In a purely military sense, they acknowledged, some of those rules looked silly, but “if you are going to hold it together, they must be followed.”
Subsequently Lavelle’ successor, General John Vogt, arrived just in time for real “Linebacker” campaign, in hindsight it seemed to me – Lavelle was just played on agenda table the “Rolling Thunder” only? Likely Westmorland moving U.S troop in for “search and destroy” and Abrams moved U.S troop out.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

Now, there was incredible the Hill-30 below enveloped in huge hazed smoked. I set up an overhead cap, keeping an eye out for potential threats to the vulnerable two supplied Huey-slicks as they landed and discharged their special ops cargo. I looked down at the enormous fresh earth-dust clouds kicked up by the massive heavy weight birds as they touched down on the helipad floor in the melee of dark-white shelled smoked. And I was thinking how glad I was to be up here in the clear blue sky instead of down there wrestling with that nowhere shell monster coming. I rolled out on a course direct to over above the second slick, that maybe “Magic Nine” get hit by enemy shell- fragmentations. They shut down the engine in the shape the main rotor decrease rotated and stops. All crewmen are running to “Magic Eight.” No one said a word, the “Magic Eight” taking off – I automatically joined him. I checked again on the Hill-30; three choppers were already grounded there.
Suddenly Magic Two, my gun-wingman got hit, Captain Chau’ neck and face all bloody by ricochet bullets when impact on the hard “chicken-plate” surface, the fragments fly back to his upper part neck and face. Don’t say a word I lead him back to Khe Sanh and hurrying to airfield for Chau medical evacuation, rearmament and flight-crewmembers replacement. Now, visibility too poor, I ordered three our choppers must pulled our choppers in to about one-half rotor disk separation, maybe fifty feet, closing formation so we wouldn’t lose sight of each other in the hazy light fog. I made the decision to go for some altitude on the east flank and avoid any anticipated obstacles on the forest terrain, but that just made the mountainous area harder to see in the low visibility. Yet we really had no choice but to press on. Although a little safer on the eastern flank, meanwhile the U.S artillery at Khe Sanh shelling impact only east flank on high mountains but if we climbed high enough, we’d be vulnerable to the NVA antiaircraft batteries that they were located on the high crests – their ferocious high-altitude air defense systems. The temperature rose as we flew east to Khe Sanh and luckily the mist-fog quickly dissipated. I spotted the airstrip, its black strip barely discernible beneath a blanket of shifting steam, and as we settled onto the tarmac a dense cloud of fog enveloped the choppers like the hand of a giant ghost.
“I believe the Hill-30 is on the brink of overran by numerous NVA infantry-regiments again”
After rearmament, the sun on the vertical highest position was shining and most of the fog had burned off and I grunted in the air “good afternoon” to our fellow aviators? Two heavy fired power gun-ships hurrying back to a crucial target – kill the 85mm mountain-gun. Racing along but different trajectory of course, on treetop to the target at level 2,400 feet high enveloped with virgin forest dark green and high trees but the only trail to come-up were clear easier detected. This artillery instead pounding indirect but now in direct killing the airborne passing the spring below them,
The earphones in my helmet hissed, “Magic Club One… Two in need your instruction for prep …over” Magic Two radioed to me.
I responded quickly, “turn back to VHF frequency…”
“Roger, Magic One on VHF…going ahead for possible mission”
“When we’re over the Mobile Command-Post, Magic Two flying over friendly force, meanwhile I manipulate gain altitude by easy get altitude on the clusters of intertwining ridges on ranch-mountain to farther north of the crest peak. Remembering when I reached at 4,000 feet and behind the 85mm gun, then I contact with you and this critical time you prepare to strike, but you would never gain altitude at above 2,700 feet. This space for safety when I dive the bird in 60 degrees diving like fighter-bomber for the effectively of special rockets nail-arrows; and this time you keep little up or parallel altitude 2,400 feet and shot four by four 17 pounds rockets direct to tunnel. This time all the bastards were paralyzed or became disable to shot into your chopper. However I still orbit on the spot and spew two mini-guns with 4,000 round 7mm 62 to cover you at 3,100 feet higher. Everything O.K… you got this?”
This tactical mission was strange to NVA troops, because that the first time what I have said applies only to this particularly circumstances. I rolled out my gunship started climbed up slowly on the left clusters of intertwining ridges to the higher ridge forming the crest-peak that gave the hill target spot its designation by height in meters 750 meters (2,400 feet) I use this tactical flight for screening their eyes to farther behind them. I suddenly ‘cow-boy’ racing high airspeed up, raised helo nose to decrease airspeed over the target spot, abruptly used right rudder-pedal to lower the helo-nose, take a high angle diving approach so deep akin to plunge strafing, simultaneously two mini-guns spewing at 4,000 rounds per minute and two by tow rockets busted down into the target. Friend and foe could see the orange-red smoked behind my gunship after strafing, I pressed the trigger, knowing my gunners as the barrels on both flanks of the cockpit spat flame and buzzed like chain saws, their heavy bullets punching down to the 85mm gun-target. I don’t think kill them but at least neutralization in disable for my wingman destroyed him later – orbit over target still spewing at 2,000 rounds per minute.
Quickly I Said “Magic Two…now been on your prep turn… over” I have been orbit over the target for two mini-guns firing smoothly like they were brand new out of the box over the target appeared like ‘red-frog-mouth’ battery stronghold.
Quickly I said, “Magic-Two everything quite… no enemy respond…your turn – over”
Now I flied back above Magic Two – our ground-airborne troops absolutely confident. I so pleased my wingman strafing 80 percent right on the target. And I led copilot took control. I took the last cigarette in my zipper pocket and enjoyed the last happier cigarette. I saw Magic Two four rocket a time and continued progressively strafing into the tunnel, no second explosion but surely all were destroyed.
The Company Airborne Commander thanked so much for our outstanding strike, that Company very soon joining with their own 8th Battalion. I don’t know all the bastards were killed or not. But no one could continue shot down into our troops crossing the spring now.

All of a sudden, a loud hissing noise in my earphones on “guard frequency”
“I get hit…autorotation forced landing uh..uh King-Star Four…Crackle-crackle-crackle.”
My reaction reflected I knew that King-Star 4 and 5 mission supplies and evacuation at LZ Hotel (Hong-Ha) because U.S Army Aviation turned down to fly on vulnerable zone such as Fire Support Bases because two accuracy indirect guns 152mm and 120mm mortars were already preset right on their coordinated targets. Two U.S helicopter, one CH-53 Stallion, and one OH-6 were just shot down there. When enemy hear the noise of helicopter coming they pounding shells right away. NVA batteries over there waiting for Tank T.54 and armored carrier PT.76 for bloody attacked assaults; However the copilot of King-Star 4 always contacted with me for monitoring. I’m impatient for two HUI-G Cobras gunship for their air cover. Cobra lead them at high altitude 5,000 feet, reminded me to reconsider my concerning for shot down by ground fire. When King Star start go down. I’m wonder so worrying. That’s right shortly in my earphones I hear
“Ground fire…ground fire in the ‘Guard frequency’
King-Star copilot radioed to me that the two Cobras rolled out leaving us to prep on the antiaircraft position; they shot the rockets with red-orange smoked behind them. I saw left too many pieces of clouds AAAs in the middle sky and two Cobras just flied away now these piece-buns of cloud all over around us.
I reacts what yours guy reactions? I couldn’t hear the muffled voice of his copilot, but mostly I just heard the constant whir of my own blades above and the altering tone of the turbo jet engine as I worked the controls.
The earphones in my helmet hissed, “Magic One … we are in besiege with hundred indirect shells of the enemy pounding on LZ, we tried touch down as quick as we can for unloading the supplies. .. Oh my crew-chief get wounded hit… ” Crackle-crackle-crackle
At this point, all Fire Support Bases were isolated by paralyzed pounding from NVA artillery. I knew I was no longer invincible. I could feel my heart thumping in my chest. In the space of few moments, so I couldn’t even imagine what they might do to my crewmembers. The images of mutilation that flashed into my mind terrified me. I don’t know what the hell happened out there. There were not utter a word. Many people may not understand my feelings and indeed it is difficult to express them accurately. Earlier yesterday the Hill-31 was overran, I didn’t know the plight of our H-34 crewmembers died or wounded. In the course of this Vietnam War’s history, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of my fellow American aviators and flight-crews had been shot down and captured by Communist Hanoi. The most was of this Lam Son operation, according from SOG reports: 219 killed and 38 MIA, respectively were aircrews. Up North, they had parachuted into the waiting arms of the people of North Vietnam, been hunted down by the minority tribe-men, been used as pawns by the KGB endured years of torment in Hanoi-Hilton. Few of them had escaped, few had lost their youth through years of captivity, and few had never come home. And from the moment of each one’s capture, each had surrendered his future to the unknown. None had known when or if they would see freedom again.
Now I let my copilot took control for leading formation and impatiently I tried monitoring at LZ Hotel activity.
“Yelling in my helmet, Lieutenant Phuc got hit at his left leg and shut down the engine because his chopper was been serious damage by fly-shelling, the red warning lights appearing most in the instrument panel. We will run to the bunker closer…” Crackle crackle-crackle.
I couldn’t hear anything else except the noise of M-60 machine gun roaring sound in my helmet.
“Magic One, this is King-Star 5… I must escaped run away as far as possible because enemy pounded shells everywhere on the LZ. I hover for rescue King-Star 4’s crews but couldn’t see in the blindness except earth dust and shell carbon-smoked and some huge U.S Army helicopters grounded there too, suddenly the crew chief yelling he is wounded, and the crewmen of King-Star 4 could came out because heavy incoming shell-impact of enemy artillery nowhere… Now we continued climbing...”
I am worrying so much because they are young rating pilots and did know the antiaircraft situation over there. “Climbing higher is the way of suicidal tendencies”. If they flied “cow-boy” like mine maybe escaped. But too late now I kept quite, don’t let them over excited – I am just impatient waiting the worst will happened, I’m praying for them. I’m right with my experience, the antiaircraft everywhere on the relief convergence strafing to alone bird continued climbing. There one can see the earth dust blown meant AAAs have been shooting up to only target aircraft slowly climb. You could see the network of red tracers every direction from mountain flank rocketed up to the lonely bird.
Unfortunately, one red tracer hit right in the transmission and flash-exploded, (maybe 37mm) flame and smoke enveloped the cabin and cockpit, Lieutenant Dat tried spontaneously down to collective control pitch and cyclic for properly air speed for making autorotation in the hollow of a small valley to manipulate as closer the Hotel Base as good.
On Guard frequency, “May day…may day…King-Star 5 forced landing at northeast LZ Hotel (Fire Support Base Hong Ha-2, this stronghold was dominated by 3rd Regiment/1st Division, the crest of the Hill was about 600 meters above sea level, inside Laos about 20 kilometers, but there was the deep throat of Ho Chi Minh Trail; naturally sooner NVA troops had would destroyed. This Base had two helicopter-pads; the closer near bunkers was LZ for hook-up artillery and water truck container, and nets hook-up. U.S Aviation refused to fly because they got heavy casualties. At the LZ for 155mm howitzer one CH-53 Stallion the color dark-green-USMC grounded there and beside him was one more helicopter OH-6)
In the enveloped of smoke and flame Lieutenant Dat tried as soon as touch the ground before the bird exploded. He opened his eyes broader…broader making for the safe touch down to the nearest LZ Hotel if possible lower in the deep small valley; abruptly the forest emerged and tall trees bigger…bigger, at last he flared up and felt on the bushes of little inclined slope. The sound hit the ground was absorbed by small threes and two skid spring up to the floor. So the crewmen could easy out by step on the humidity dew-grass and scurrying the wounded peoples out of the bird. The gunner screamed silence in his heart, he did not utter a word, and he tried very hard not to groan or cry out with the incredible pain; he should know a long struggle glooming ahead. He did not want to remind these fellow comrades that he was still their living, breathing his nemesis, a creature of loathing whose could be made to suffer further for their losses.
When everyone reaching an easier way safety space, the J.P-4 from the fuel tank leaking flow joint the flame and instantly the helicopter exploded spread-smoked and flame come up to the sky in huge vertical column about 100 feet high.
“Thank God everyone survived. Now what happened for next?”

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

Lieutenant Dat was recently a platoon commander in the infantry, now he led the team with pistol P.38s for self-defense. Seeking way back to the Hotel Fire Support Base that everyone could easier identified on the hill referenced higher, where the smoke still in burning was permanently at present there. Truly, they’re aviators never familiar with this scenery mountainous jungle. When you’re out there in the jungle, you’re in a strange, new world – a world that feels untouched by aviator flight crewmembers… totally alien. Nothing seems familiar. You have a real sense of uncertainly about what might confront you. There were constant surprises. And even though they went in with savvy, experienced companions, they always felt as though they were on their own. The jungle does that to you… it makes you feel solitary.
Their run-away in the jungle was known as escaped from the prison by their bold determination. The jungle was too dense for suitable camouflage. They had to literally hack their way through vines and thick foliage, couldn’t moving fast just very slowly with the wounded gunner, mostly few peoples-sized. Now they started to learn a great deal about jungle craft, intruding, tactics, and the most survival from the skilled how to run away quietly through rugged terrain of the jungle surrounded by enemy. They wouldn’t actually hope to encounter with large numbers of the NVA troops, but surely they knew they were about there. Here NVA infiltration routes, or base camps or other places they might be using as sanctuaries; and the run-away team was frequently found unoccupied NVA position – often clever bunkers tunneled under thick bamboo clumps, providing them with a natural cover. There they found the camouflage entrance to a large underground complex. NVA were masters at constructing well-hidden underground tunnel systems.
Even proceeding too slow, but suddenly Lieutenant Dat makes sight to stop: crossing danger areas such as stream and clearing, setting up ambushes; in the jungle, it wasn’t only the enemy you had to worry about; other dangers could easily strike, on a tree foliage revealed a gigantic snake curled on around the branch a few feet above them – a twelve-foot python with a big bulge in his middle. She was full, no harm. They always crossed clearings carefully, as danger area. But fortunately, the heavy canopy and ground cover kept them from suffering casualties, but they knew it was only a matter of time before their luck ran out. When they started moving, they got there, where a wide red dirt muddy patch of ground covered with fresh boot prints – lots of sneaker-tread NVA boots. A big NVA unit maybe regiment sized had recently moved through.
They were hurrying up to climb over the inclination slope vines and bushes, passing a clump of dense shrubbery. The sharp pointed on the stem of certain bushes with thorns hedge or scrub causing difficulty in moving, but thorny problem was never stopping them in proceeding. Physical courage is often more difficult than moral courage, having lost all physical feeling or the power to feel because they went numb with terror.
They stopped under thick foliage for break and thought a long way was passing but the truth just a half mile really. Now they took turn help the wounded moved little bite faster, they thought very close to the Hotel Base but still far away from them in the dip hollow valley. When they reached at the high clear point they discovered the Hotel Base above them about half mile and still smoke haunted above. They turned back and saw the column smoke of their bird still evolutionary upward processes. The temperature rose created terrible water thirsty, exhausted, no choice they must continued climb cross the rock and vine-bushes, running more thorns, prickles into their faces, necks and ears, kept moving.
Suddenly, on the crest mountain some sounds of AK.47 firing down to them, the North Vietnamese voice shouted, “Surrender be alive or run away be killed” They repeated many times,
“Captured them …the dead helicopter pilots” NVA troops shouted again and again.
Once again they were hurrying up climb up much faster – three men carrying the wounded. They climbed a middle of the hill. They can smell the rotten remains of NVA troops. A numerous body remains scattered everywhere with B.41 and AK 47, by group of four or six peoples. They were subjected shattered by Bombs and friendly 155s fragmentations. The NVA motto-oath was “born at North died at South”. That outcome due to many throngs of attack to Hotel Base – For
Pity’s sake, please stop the war! They knew they had no choice, no hope and they went ahead and just died. In the way my thought was very emotional – “that what is going on now is just a lot of unnecessary killing”.
Reaching at 200 meters from Hotel Base perimeter, Lt Dat hold the team on the spot there, slumped down on the floor soil for relax with plenty happiness. Crashing the airplane burned and exploded but then O.K and survived arriving to friendly spot; that was hard and unthinkable, thank God! Should they deserve for rescue, who tell it… Dat, he well knew the claymore mines and grenades sowed somewhere who knew, little bite far up they saw different kind of helicopters shot-downed there likely helicopter-cemetery.
A soldier of 3rd Regiment/1st Division yelled with lousy but nice voice flowing in the wind “Hold and free your position!” Because 3rd Regiment men could saw them under the lower of valley recently, “we sent people down to guide your peoples into bunkers right away”
One soldier slowly come down avoiding the mine-field and guided the team to the nearest bunker with the sound of clapped hands. This 3 pm o’clock afternoon, two flight crewmembers embraced with overjoyed whishes. The most important messenger was confirmed one helicopter from 213th Squadron will coming pick up two crewmen. All they were prayed for waiting a saver from northeast.
I couldn’t leave air support to Airborne for rescue them because the situation down there so much worst and complicated, two NVA regiments attacked one strayed airborne element and overran on the spot. Now I must find them out and guiding them joint with his related battalion. They were never released us till salvo all armament and go back Khe Sanh for rearmament. In my mind I should spare time to escort a slick to Hotel Base for rescued them immediately. This morning count on the heavy pea soup fog, I intended to see General Dong, Airborne Division commander and complain about the sick-sight of airborne-men deserters mobbing our helicopters and hanging from skid and filled over on board as result of two H-34 were over weight and then been shooting down by indirect artillery fragmentations. “Airborne hold us like the hostages.”
General Dong responded by closed his mouth in the pale face with madness. He knew why and he told me before this operation commenced. He knew this is the Big-Trap for us. I understood his position so I get out of his sight immediately.

Today was on 27 February 1971, all Fire Support Bases were isolated by enemy artillery that left the bases suffer from paralysis of the aerial supplies. The U.S Aviation was no more fly-supply except VNAF must be on charge. So I ordered our choppers don’t touch the ground, just hovering lower enough they can put in the wounded and throw down the ammunitions supplies.
Subsequently, all the Fire Base must withdraw due to 152mm enemy-guns destroyed all 105s and 155s of ARVN. All the Bases were just only the target for preset coordinated by 152mm guns, these gun pounding so much accuracy so why none of ARVN guns could in commission or be destroyed.
One week passed, all fired bases support were under-pressure of various artilleries such as: rockets 122mm, 107mm Katyusha, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, and 130mm guns, that special 120mm mortars which were the helicopters big-killers, and 152mm guns were big-killers to ARVN artilleries. The Bases didn’t have water, none food, no ammunitions. The Regiment Commander makes decision withdraw to night prior to NVA tanks coming. Though very close to the Base, some F-4 Phantoms and F-105 Thunder-chiefs were forward air control to strike around the suspect artilleries by FAC of OV-10 Bronco. And now they have strike on the bird King-Star 5 for destroyed. Two crewmembers peered from the bunkers at their bird was flashed in flame impatiently. Suddenly, one F-4 got shot burned with smoked below the wing. They abandoned the aborted mission and heading to Udorn AFB, Thailand.
My field-X.O (Operation Officer) at Khe Sanh was Major Ky who was the braved officer that I’d never see before; he was not only a fanatic about mission preparation, but a damn good stick as well. We can live with the fact of knowing he should died to save another men rather than had he died from a random bullets shot from a hidden source. If you knew Major Ky you would know that he was a very quiet and unselfish man. He always put others first and therefore Ky truly loved what he did and had God given him the choice of how to die I know deeply in my heart he would have chosen to go down if just as he did. So why I always closer with him trying get a chance for him promotion; He knew so well in the past for saving the lives of SOG recon-team that I flown so many rescue missions alone without copilot and crewmen. Yet in spite of my sometimes obsessive personality, this situation is never resolved quickly, I thought. You can create a psychological roller coaster in your mind that’ll devastate you. I could guess Ky’s struggling for save two flight crewmembers to take that risk?
Recently, at 2: 00 PM today, General Lam issued the orders no helicopters landing at LZ Hotel, Hill-30 due to enemy already had coordination fired preset, we don’t want the risk in vain, that’s enough for various kind of helicopters been crashed over there. So why I couldn’t utter a word-ordered to Ky – But Ky felt a slight pricking sensation in his thought, the crewmen tried their best survive to reach at Hotel Base, they should be deserved for rescue by Lord of God will help. Following these enemy situations in most everyday, I deadly certain the NVA will wait till the Tanks coming from Northwest to reinforce and cover infantry assaults. Now they were just tried isolated the Hotel Base and cut the supplies by air…and waiting – sometimes they took turn for pounding different kind of shells in neutralized intimidation ARVN troop. They’re planning attack Hill-30 maybe tonight just I guess. I had had see many column of PT.76s hurry convergent to this Fire Support Base. They have three Tank-Regiments involved this operations but in the last few days, they were destroyed by E.C-130B killed-hunting one regiment. And the enemy was paying a heavy price, MACV estimated that “B-52 alone [for the war-game counterweight compensation] were inflicting losses that were the equivalent of about one combat effective NVA regiment per week.” The NVA infantry any price must wait for PT-76, they tried in temptation attack many times but fail. Although as much my knowledge but I could not pushed Ky. However Ky had knew my background Recon-team rescued in Project Delta Force in the most very hot LZ, likely the 559th Group Forward Base headquarters not to far from here, the SOG called ‘Oscar-Eight’; northern Ashau’ Tam-Boi mountain contained immense chambers hewn from solid rock, so well constructed that they withstood B-52 strikes. Where General Vo-Bam, commander 559th Transportation Group’s forward – the Ho Chi Minh trail’s Control Center.
As a commanding officer I prophesied that Major Ky would be the only rescued saver. We tried accomplished this air close support and requested go back to Khe Sanh for rearmament. On the way back home base, I peered up at the sky, looking for any sign of the mysterious A.C-130 Spectra gunship was supposed to be orbiting overhead for cover Hill-30, but there was no sign of that either. I looked down at the calm and eerily silent forest of Laotian. It seemed as though nothing was happening. There was no visible activity on the ground. Then the huge flight of AC-130 appeared above me on the blue sky. It was an absolutely awesome sight as that train of massive cargo craft passed so close above us. Suddenly too many antiaircraft artilleries opened up with everything they had, included A.K-47 too. Thousand of red-tracers from batteries started raking across the sky. My sergeant Duc has an abrupt reacted manner, he opened his 4,000 rounds strafing direct into a ZSU-2 double-barreled antiaircraft gun been firing up at the A.C-130s, its heavy 23mm shells lancing past the wings of the lumbering birds. But I knew she had to be taking hits from that gun. Thank to my gunner Duc who spat blowing rainy 7mm 62 bullets pounded the position and the antiaircraft gun stopped firing immediately.
This eerily zone reminded me in the beginning of this operation, a Magic Club 14 was shot down right here. I shot rocket burned POL pipe lines down there and I was downed by enemy PT-76 with 14,5mm cartridges due to a low pass stupid confused M-113 but P.T-76. Big mistake I must pay because not distinguish foe and friend. I recalled that afternoon, after got a lot of hits, the nose of my helicopter immediately started to spin to the right. The tail rotor on a UHI-H counters the torque created by the main rotor system, and the pedal control the pitch of the tail rotor maybe fail hydraulic pressure or the tail rotor blades tear up. As I passed through the first ninety degrees of rotation, I instinctively countered with left pedal, and I knew we’d lost it. I’ll never forget looking down the floor to make sure I was pushing the pedal, and seeing my boot jammed all the way to the floor. My body was reacting properly, but my bird was not. I keyed the mike.
“Magic…Two… we has lost the tail rotor…we’re going in hard…forced landing”
Too close with the ground, I was referring to the engine, because the only way to counter that spin was to shut it down and eliminate the torque. But just as the manual book describes such an emergency, if you don’t kill the engine right away the centrifugal force will make it physically impossible to reach up for the power control levers. I’d always thought that sounded a little extreme. It wasn’t. I make a forced landing at once. The chopper’s windshield was almost completely gone, no skids in both sides; miraculously, I was just getting out straight-ahead from my chopper’s nose. All crewmen scurrying out, and instantly Magic Two landed and pick up everyone to Khe Sanh. Miraculously, we’re all be saved by God!

At the Khe Sanh airstrip, the refuel and rearm point, I said over internal channel
“Crew chiefs, One and Two loaded all nail-arrows rockets and 12,000 rounds ammo”
I hissed into my mike “Magic Two…we will escorted and air cover Major Ky first…you got it?”
“Magic-Two roger, Sir,”
Now 4: 00 pm at Hotel Fire Support Base, the temperature rose up, two crewmembers were exhausted, thirsty, nobody give them a drop of water. The TOC at Khe Sanh let us know Ky on the way to LZ Hotel for mission rescue. Down the command-post of 3rd Regiment at Hotel Base, having ordered from General Lam, “praised help two crewmembers come back to Khe Sanh in safety without chaotic”
Two crewmen were excited forget hungry, thirsty, thorn and prickle sore or itch. At the northern sky, the sound of helicopter exerting the rescue hope, these aviators peered up from one bunker at the northern sky, looking for a lonely mysterious UHI-H from Magic Club 213th Squadron. I seemed to have the gift of prophecy that Ky would fly this mission impossible for rescued our fellows, now it’s true history of knowing he would died to save another eight men rather than had he died from a random bullet shot from a hidden source.
His chopper seemed a hen tried broader her wings to protect her chic from predator eagles.
The lonely aircraft plunged into the network antiaircraft artillery drawing the hero scenery of VNAF’ history forever no one forgettable, he knew how to step over by his flying experience. He flied over the treetop to LZ Hotel but not direct from Khe Sanh to there. His simple flight maneuver is deceptive. He came to LZ Hotel not like from Khe Sanh but in opposite direction meant at south of LZ Hotel. The wind was strong blowing from the sea letting his chopper sound almost quietly. However when he was on the LZ, NVA could detected by high relief surrounding.
Secretly he was flown crisscrossing over the high virgin-trees, no human activities. But unfortunately when he hover right LZ Hotel, a thousand preset-coordinated shelling pounding on him – a instant before that Ky observed like a ghost camp base, eerily calm, but now so terrible everywhere were smoked, earth dust, smell all CO2 gas. Too many high columns smoke as huge Cumulonimbus cloud enveloped the LZ. He couldn’t see many different kinds of choppers grounded there. His chopper shaking after each flashed explosive. He must left now to a safe area mean high trees at western, think it over…over. He contacted with 3rd Regiment control post to see Lieutenant Dat.
After a good reference, clear detail information, identification the bunker for pick-up, Ky said exactly TOT four minutes all crewmen must ready in that bunker. Now Ky started fly back on treetop crisscrossing, abruptly hovered put right skid on sand bags revetment. About 10 seconds everyone climbed on the cabin, three wounded first and the rest after. With no choice Ky took off down-wind with heavy load, diving down to valley he lower the nose of helo for gaining airspeed. When the chopper was airborne, they detected five deserted soldiers already on board. Now the LZ Hotel Base submerged with flashed and smoked peering by behind their eyes. Many individual rifles fired on the air like fire cracker meanwhile Ky burst out laughing. In the air now like haven from the hell on ground; Chopper flied faster over the treetop, disappeared and appeared in the evening haze. “That by afternoon the setting sun would be sinning through so much smoke and dust that you couldn’t see it.”
At Khe Sanh airstrip we took off for Ky escorted by air cover. The formation rose up through its own enormous cloud of rotor-wash dust. As I made my way back to operational area, when TOC informed that we heard Ky accomplished his rescue mission. We are so proud of our Squadron motto “never left our crews in the enemy hand though died or alive.” Whereas the Army says it never leaves behind its wounded; the Marines say they never leave behind their dead.
Two gun-ships with heavy armament hurrying back to airborne operational zone. The evening swept in quickly, draining the sunlight from my cockpit and replacing it with dark, gloomy shadows. On the blue sky, above us at 11 o’clock was the Ky chopper from LZ Hotel heading back to Khe Sanh with both crewmembers on board. We were almost overjoyed to see him passing above us. I like to meditate before an important example as my meditations on the besieged causing of the axe of evil craps.
Every going back to the operational area, each time, I must challenged different direction like to sew threads of a bamboo-basket or fishing net covering the area about 60 squared kilometers. Crucially I should intimated familiar with foe and friend situation. Eight NVA artillery regiments and six antiaircraft regiments situated where and nowhere in their tunnels that I could located. Along the bottom of valley closer the spring, stony-creek, or stream where the forty-round salvos of 122-mm Katyusha rockets pounded to Fire Support Bases, not accuracy but real intimidation. The mobile antiaircraft device as PT-76 were well camouflage in the middle of crest brought a lot of risk to our choppers by equipped ZSU-2 double-barreled antiaircraft gun with its heavy 23mmm shells lancing past our chopper transmission. Along the west flanks of mountain range where some cleared enough-area to positioned 152 guns, that big killer to our artillery 105s, 155s; the duds from these penetrated five feet into earth. Disguising in the tunnel, I can detected only while they were firing by huge of blowing earth dust over them. The NVA regiment equipped with 120mm mortar so precisely and numerous burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern so why our choppers must crashed right on the LZ by their fragments.
Suddenly I detected underneath of dark foliage, a gloomy-convoy looked like elephants with their tugs swinging left to right, up and down: a dark column Tank T.54 and PT-76 make queue line up hurrying to Hill-30. We missed a change to destroy them because we were armed with nail-arrow-rockets to very mission rescue. However I decide to strafing into them, at least we killed the gunners.
“Magic-Two… your ready for prep … over”
“Okayto…Roger that”
We make wide pattern prep-attack, distance 10 seconds. There were so strange no tanks responded or played back some fire powers. They rushed forward in contempt of our stupid strafing? Of course they did welcome our orange-smoked color though tease-looking pleasing their eyes. I felt damn shame in vain and ordered “O.K we relieved them… racing to Airborne for fired cover. They will have to reach as soon as they can for the next assault attack on the Hill-30.

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

How managing to reinforce by tanks covered! The terrain also made it extremely difficult for track vehicles to be sent to help. Whilst the NVA utilized heavy T-54 tanks, the 1st Armor Brigade [ARVN always outgunned] only had a squadron of M-41 tanks, the other vehicles being M-113, armored personnel carriers. Compounding the problem was the fact that the ARVN did not know the terrain well, and had misjudged the tactical of the enemy tanks. After this fiasco, Corps hurriedly sent another tank squadron to reinforce the area around Route 9. Whereas the enemy anti-aircraft activities were very intense, making life very difficult to provide air supplies, air support and medevac. Wounded soldier were stranded at the base for days. Helicopters could not land, so ammunitions had to be dropped by parachutes. As a result the morale of the soldiers plummeted. While supporting ground troops, an American aircraft was gunned down. All air support immediately ceased in order to rescue the landed aircraft. The NVA benefited from this, and their attacks met with more success.
After FSB 31 fell to the enemy, they drove on toward FSB 30. This position was quit high and the terrain was very different to that at FSB 31. Only the northeast side was suitable for an assault. The other three sides had near vertical drops. Thank to the suitable topography, and to good defenses the 2nd Airborne Battalion was able to repulse the NVA. Faced with such resistance and high morale; The NVA abandoned the suicidal tactics, and chose instead to pound the position with 120mm mortar rounds, whilst they waited for an opportunity. Toward the end of the week, supplies were running low, bunkers were nearly all flatted and practically all artillery guns 105s, and 155s were destroyed. The 2nd Airborne Battalion had to abandon the base in the dead of night to retreat to the 1st Airborne Brigade’s area of responsibility at FSB A-Loui. Why wait to fall likely Hill-31?
Significantly putting eye on it, the main arterial route from A-Loui to the Laotian Border, once so busy, was approached by the enemy, who erected posts to block supplies and evacuation of the wounded. No problem, Colonel James Vaught [the so called his advisory the Airborne Division] should take care about that. “The ARVN’ heavy casualties …that enough… always outgunned Garant M1 against AK47, T-41 against T-54, none anti tank weapon like B-40, 41 against T-54…” From now on, on behalf of “Permanent Government” meant General Haig representative, Colonel Vaught managed switched the air campaign from Rolling Thunder became Linebacker meant “air ground closed support” from friend 400 meters by Arc light tactical B-52. Consequently, with his cover guaranty our friend troop forces retreat in safety condition to Khe Sanh.
In last week, at Hill-30, the C-Battery/44th Artillery Battalion of 155s fired support covered all mutual friend troop stronghold; the most power-fired support to Hill-31 on 23/February where was B-Battery/44 detachment to 3rd Airborne Brigade. When NVA regiments attacked Hill-31 they pounded shells to Hill-30 and Captain B-battery commander advised fired over the top of the Hill-31 due to a large enemy forces support by Tanks and armored carriers. After Hill-31 was overran by enemy. The Hill-30 would be the next target I guessed. Now A-loui, Lao Bao, and Khe Sanh Fire Support Bases fired cover to Hill-30 from East and Southeast, batteries /44/ /Battalion included 42 pieces artillery from the border of U.S fire-power some time intercepted.

Tonight, 24 February that column Tanks continued flared high beam up and down by terrain-shapes. The Hill-30 became isolated – no friendly force at northwest and northeast, enemy occupied a large terrains after there were destroyed all their cargo by two 39 and 21 Ranger Battalions. At 23 till 24:00 the eerily silence cover the earth, no strange sound around Hill-30 where one full of braved 2nd Airborne Battalion prevailed in the foxholes.
At 0: 30, 27/February the East side of Camp perimeter was under pressure with large crawled enemy to the fence of barbed wire and another throng rushing behind PT-76s flared-up high-beam going up and down. Unfortunately, the ARVN were not equipped the weapon antitank.
Airborne, Colonel Thach ordered: “Be vigilant against enemy attack…to fighter harder and never surrender…either winning all or losing all.”
Along with Vietnamese Marine, the Airborne comprised the National Strike Force – “fire brigades” that were only committed to action where was a critical threat or military emergency. The airborne brigade consequently saw action in all the corps-tactical-zones in South Vietnam during the war as well as in Cambodia and Laos, building a reputation as tough, courageous fighters and superb light infantry. They also had a reputation as a powerful political force whose support was necessary for any Vietnamese leader who aspired to seize or hold power. Obviously, they were much respected and admired by the Vietnamese people (anyone wearing their camouflage uniform – including my fellow Americans – was customarily honored in cities, towns, and villages throughout the South Vietnam). And they traditionally marched at the head of the military formation in Vietnam’s annual National Day Parade, a place of honor that had to be earned each year from combat performance. A very different reaction came from areas controlled by the Vietcong – further confirmation of the respect they command.
-Many enlisted men had been wounded, and most suffered from bouts of malaria. All had seen friends and comrades die in battle. Yet they were by no means grim; they looked for every opportunity to let loose their lively spirits and sense of humor. They were irrepressible practical jokers, never losing a chance to pull somebody else’s chain – yet never cruelly or meanly. It was always to share a laugh and not to cause pain.
-The Officers were no less tough, and no less lively. But they had also received serious professional training at the Vietnamese equivalents of U.S military academies, all graduating near the top of their class. Like their enlisted men, they spent more time in action in the field than at home bases. This experience had honed most of them into tactically competent leaders whose small unit kills and technical proficiency were exceptional; they all tended to lead from the front. Many older officers were highly decorated with both Vietnamese and American awards for heroism.

Captain battery commander at Hill-30 manipulated four 155s fixed target on the entry path from the helipad down to the first perimeter of the camp, because there was the only way they could come. Number 2 and 3 tried the best at direction 5,800 of 6,000 mm, standby in readiness fired direct at the foot of hill. Number 1 ready for illuminated in case flare-ships AC-130 leaving or in case needed. Number 6 axed at southeast, down to the valley in direct shooting. The Captain 155s battery commander also ordered everyone preparedness for retreat out of here with his situation-experiences, burned all classified document, ready the special grenades for destroy our guns, becoming the reliable infantrymen..
Colonel Thach Airborne Brigade Executive Officer, J-2 contacted with liaison officer 320 and requested artillery fired cover from B/44 battery at A-loui to west to south from close to the Hill-30; B/44 at Lao Bao, A/44 at Phu Loc will cover at North and Northeast of the camp. Liaison officer 320 maybe on board of AC-130 flare-ship requested U.S 175 Long-tom artilleries at Khe Sanh for cover.
At Khe Sanh, coming from chow-room as late had been ate a full moon left an eerie glow across the mountainous area. In time, I would develop into an experienced veteran who could remain focused in the madness of a firefight. The sounds and flashed from the weapons would tell me what types were firing, at what distances, and how many there were (8-inch howitzers, 175mm, and 155s guns) Sure enough, around that midnight, the whole area erupted with fire. But about internal at this point, all I heard was a cacophony of noises, flashes, and blasts. I dove back into the tent and slipped under my poncho liner inside military cote. Of course I could able to sleep that got my personnel aviator attention. Excited to be getting into a close-quarters firefight for the first time, I carefully laid out my M-16 and harness, even I was a flight personal, figuring out how I would roll out of my poncho liner, grab my riffle and gear, and come up ready to shoot. “May God protect the innocent and the ignorant airman?”
Suddenly, having the report from the stronghold at eastside “enemy was closed at 500 meters Colonel Thach ordered: “Patiently waiting till close, aimed at right middle of two headlights.”
100 per cent must be P.T-76 could climbing up the hill, now was just 1000 meters from the 155s guns aim-axed. These only weapons can knock them down.
Shortly, the Vietnamese language sounded from AC-130 Spectra repeated many times at PRC-25 channel to the commander of Hill-30 (headquarters of 2nd Airborne Battalion)
“At North, North-East appeared two P.T-76 and many throng infantrymen behind them.
“The fates of Hill-30 will be the same with Hill-31?” I thought
Two P.T-76 appeared at direction 200 were targeting at between two headlights. Unfortunately the battery at Hill-30 didn’t have the warhead “Heat”, so they used the warhead delay for direct shooting (each warhead having two setting positions, ‘delay’ or SQ (impact fast-exploded)
Over Hill-30 an AC-130 flare-ship ordered the battery commander C/44:
“93…93 you don’t have ‘Heat’ warhead tried to switch to SQ… this is my order…over!”
The battery commander responded “This 93 whose authorizations are just stated”
“93….93 this is 11 … 11; I ordered you to apply order at once over... 93 keeping 7 patches, used delay will ricochets when impact the steel surface. Making sure lining it up at least the shells of high-explosive charges should exploded like a mini-bomb and their pressure will kill all creatures around them. The battery commander showed up the foxhole and ordered the number 4 direct shot, SQ position, lining up right the middle of headlights.
Caporal Duong Cu repeated “Number 4… direct impact… SQ…fire”
In simultaneously, number 2, 3, 6 fired directly down to barb-wired from north to west and to south. The communication became so important for them. The battery commander ordered Sergeant Bach to mount the 292 antenna to reach the 44/Artillery Battalion command post was destroyed by enemy artilleries (the cargo truck 2, 5 tons generator and antenna 292) Thank to the darkness of the night, the NVA couldn’t see and they build consolidated the high 292 antenna, now the Captain battery commander could contacted with his Battalion 44 command post for new information. The order from artillery high command said ‘must staying and fighting’; although anyone could easier understand this situation all 155s and 105s of the Hill-30 would be destroyed by enemy 152 mm Soviet sophisticated gun soon or later; and the Hill-30 will be completely paralyzed isolation state. Everyone soldiers over here are waiting for the order to withdrawal that was absolutely correct in logical thinking. Everyone in the Hill-30 were carefully laid out their individual M-16 and harness, figuring out how they would roll out of their foxholes, bunkers, grab their riffles and gear, and come up ready to close shoot.
The 44 Artillery Commander tell lies to their subordinates (because he wasn’t the supreme commander) “Be patient, the high command plan to dispatched the Marine to assault landing to morrow morning for reinforcement at the east side from you… so be patient”
Meanwhile the Hill-30 don’t have antitank guns, all mines were already exploded, shelling different from various kind of indirect came onto so accuracy by NVA adjustor their fire, bringing it down almost 80 to 90 precision on targets. The rounds were starting to hit all around the camp, focused as they were on the guns. A few minutes later, all guns on Hill-30 were smacked by artillery rounds, while earth-dust bust all around from flying shrapnel. This is the longest and bloodiest siege of the war. Meanwhile a numerous Tank 54 and PT-76 continued high beam up and down convergence to the Hill-30 to consolidate their forces.
Suddenly, at the west side of the camp, only one 105s gun of airborne was still in action it direct shot onto barb-wired many NVA soldiers were killed there; it was still fired spread along the perimeter. Now shelling came from everywhere couldn’t distinguished foe or friends from flying shrapnel. But at South side. A company 1/21 Ranger Battalion depleted and staying with Airborne to protect outside of 2nd Airborne Battalion command post. The NVA regiment was almost half overrun the perimeter of the camp.
The sound had been determined that Colonel Thach yelled:
“Patiently prepare to mobilize and strike the enemy hard. Be vigilant.”
One PT-76 was knocked down right the entry path near to the 2nd Airborne Brigade command post.
The AC-130 radioed back to the camp “we killed one tank… now another tank being rushed to command post. A while later AC-130 flare-ship report one more tank was destroyed in front of command post. They hold the attack for waiting reinforcement.
Now at 01:00 on date February/27/1971; The Hill-30’s command post requested to hold all artilleries from A-Loui, Phu Loc, and Lao Bao, plus U.S artilleries letting for air to ground support. After about twenty minutes with a close exchange of fire, the firing trailed off and eventually ceased. The Spectra had come in high altitude, bracing one flank of the high mountain as she can fired many kind of weapons including 105mm howitzer at enemy tanks and AAAs, her heavy shells pounded the enemy fired position stopped firing. When EC-130B intercepted for 2nd Airborne Battalion retreat, repeated just likely last week air closed support to 39th Ranger Battalion retreated to 21st Ranger Battalion position.
“Spectra…Spectra … Check fire! Check fire how do you read me…over”

(Continued)

[vinhtruong]

The operation Lam Son 719’s commanders were never letting the Hill-30 became the same fate of Hill-31 such as from 34 hours ago. Subsequently, why the fighter-men of Hill-30 were confident to fight at this stage, it was the effectiveness of commanders and enlisted men that would determine the outcome – either winning all or losing all… fighting hard and died on spot.
Because the slope little high causing so difficult for PT-76 climbing, the NVA commander changed the tactic assault by overwhelming by infantrymen of five regiments because the terrain was hard-tough not suitable for armor truck PT-76 to attack like FBS Hill-31.
Now Captain Hanh Executive Officer of 2nd Airborne Command post adjusted the spot-targets for Jet fighter-bombers and Cobra gun-ships. One could see the flame flashing around the camp of high explosive and white phosphorus from aircrafts, strafing and rocket runs by Cobra but not silence the NVA mortars 120mm or discourage the NVA infantry. The almost high angles of approach of fixed wing and very low strafing from Cobra and lowest UH1-H gunship of 213th Squadron were heroism maneuvers ever have in war liked Lam Son 719 in the melee of red tracers AAA. The ground camp soldiers were raised their morale
Now five NVA regiments tried to overrun but a Ranger Company/21st with a full brave 2nd Airborne Battalion could stopped them under the slope of the helicopter-pad; The NVA plunged to the concertina wired reached at helicopter-LZ. They did very best by their mortars 120mm to shut down the guns 105mm of airborne. Captain Hanh a very good forward air ground controller did the job outstanding features. The perimeter become free of claymore mines exploded and Captain Hanh should direct to adjust the air support too closer at 200 meter from the command post. The NVA troops rather tried get closer than for less suffer casualties, but gunship/213th strafing them from prep-below the valley up the wire bared fence, trying kill all of them. This prep maneuver didn’t teach in school but that the first time we did. The perfect sufficiency air-strikes were out of camp perimeter from west to east. The eyes witnessed from airborne-soldiers saw a lot NVA bodies blow up the air like the leaves on the twist-wind storm. All the rockets from Cobra help to stop the enemy throng attacks. Captain Hanh was only the hero know how to keep the maintenance stand for of Hill-30 out of the NVA hand.

The darkness was slowly cover base scene, peering at down onto helipad, under the illuminated flares our friendly troops could detect the large number of NVA infantry hidden behind the bulldozer D-4s, the heavy shell-nets and water container; That meant the enemy seized the first perimeter strong hold. In the sky the air close support were done run-out armament and they flied back to home base. Now at the second front defense, the airborne soldiers must use the claymore mine by manual and grenades and launcher grenade M-79. Only AC-130 flare-ship for air cover; sometimes the flare-ship strafing by mini-guns or 20mm canon or 40mm at 200 meters outside of the camp formed red tracers down to the slope of the hill.
Shortly, from AC-130 detected some spot of mortars 120mm at 400 meters at full north. Try used 155s to directly shot at them as soon as friendly force can. AC-130 saw the blasted spots; she will help to shut-up these mortars. One big round orbit in the air, now one can see the red-tracers from AC-130 to the ground and completely destroyed them. In reality, no one can hear the depart-sound of mortar-shells hurled by 120mm mortars. AC-130 dropped flare illuminated over the Hill-30 help our soldiers to figure out the enemy positions. From the top of the hill the airborne soldiers could see the helipad of outside the second front, a bulldozer D-4 with huge earth-blower-blade was a very good shield protection for NVA infantry men; beside was a U.S helicopter crashed there in serious damage.
Now an enemy throng advanced to the helicopter, they passed the first-front overran the helipad, used grenade burned the helicopter. One blasted noise flame and smoke exploded like daytime where about lasting in couple minutes. The huge flame-thrower the hot and humidity spreading to command post, instantly NVA troops running onto the helipad behind the D-4 shield blower. However the airborne brave soldiers came out the bunker and strafing launcher grenades M-79 killed some of enemy. Now they were too closer from 80 meters from command post, they scurrying dig the foxholes on the spots. They exchanged fire from AK-47 and M-79 of our troops forming all red tracers back and forth. Fortunately the bulldozer was their perfect protection, what if the airborne soldiers used and run out the M-79s and grenades?
Now Colonel Thach ordered used 155 shell to shot direct into the D-4 bulldozer. The battery commander ordered number 4 shoot direct into bulldozer. At number 4, artillerymen tried to maximum lower the canon in prying it off to lower level.
“Ordered number 4 four-set warhead SQ… direct shot… fire” Àmzio… Àmzio… The bulldozer blown up to the air and fall back in the flame, no one brother-enemy troops alive there. The sound praising come up everywhere in the command post, praising our artillery… praising our battery, go ahead and shooting; their morale were being raising in encourage
After that Colonel Thach ordered guns 155s make clearance all obstacles around the camp meant to continue to shot in devastation such as shell-nets, two water container trailers, D-4, remain helicopter. There were unbelievable the M-79 of airborne soldiers and direct shot from 155 just about 75 meters (the effect of high explosive at maximum adjustment 1, 8 second time and set 3 with 5 white bags, that was the first time they tried get a chance) meant something different to NVA troops. Now they were discouraged to advance due to suffering high casualty. Were they defeated?

Now at 04:30 morning on February/27/1971
General Giap’ troops stopped to attack maybe temporary for a while? The darkness lasting left an eerie air flowing across the mountainous area. At this point, they knew they were no longer invincible. They could feel their hearts thumping in their chests. During the longest night, they were the men in a land of no futures, without a hint of what might happen next, and they could not prepare themselves for any coming event. The firing trailed off and eventually ceased. The fighter-men crawled back under their poncho liners, some get something to eat and drink due to sore bitter throat.
The morning come in the blue sky, now at 8:00 AM but none shelling pounded on Hill-30 made them so surprisingly? Should be new tactical plan? They were defeated completely? At 8:30, Colonel Thach ordered the Ranger and Airborne tried to seize back the helipad and restored order to the camp. At 9:00 AM, a half squad airborne reached the helipad, suddenly the NVA troops shot up into the helipad, the airborne retreated into the bunker; that wasn’t right place for fighting. Now the battery-men could see the NVA troops behind the VNAF grounded-helicopter in the second down helipad. This UH1-H of 213th ‘Magic Club’ Squadron was hit by indirect shell, grounded there in couple days ago.
Now once again the same number 4 gun direct shot into that HU-1, the flame burst in flashing killed all NVA troops in the spot. The JP-4 flowing out burned so high like a vertical column of smoke. For saving their lives and with any price they assault to our bunker or shelters to hide. “Everyone must grab your M-16 and rushed to the foxholes right away in closed fighting…come up ready to shoot.” Colonel Thach ordered, the main target was the helipad one.
All riffles aimed at the helipad where the NVA troops tried assault, they started cover by AK, B40, B41, 57mm recoil determined overrun the command post. At last the unfortunate effective gun number 4 was in out commission. The B.40, 41 raining into our guns forced them rushed back to bunker shelters. The battery men jointed with Airborne and Ranger forming a strong-front holding point covered the Command-post of 2nd Airborne Brigade. Now everywhere was the sound of grenades, the burst of explosions rockets, claymore mines and every kind of weapons were certainly never quit.
The sky was bright blue, haze with high humidity, none of wind and cloud, appearing the relief of mountain crests. Now on the Hill-30 at 727 meters high level above the sea was overwhelmed by the NVA infantrymen forces. But with determination, the friendly troops tried to seize back the helipad like they felt buoyed up by the good-news; Foe and friend tried to conquer that spot like the saver on spring-bridge; thank to inside the bunker the friendly troops were step by step killed NVA troops in the open spots without protection. Suddenly only a very shell 120mm mortar pounded into the bunker inflicted some people serious wounded. The flak jacket had been useless in stopping the rounds and fragmentations, even they hated these heavy things; but it was the policy to wear them. As they peeled off the flak jacket, a bloody piece of flesh fell out. Not encouraging. Alas! How can they catch for medical evacuation in this situation? How can they have the helicopter!

After capturing and destroying FSB of Hill- 31, NVA troops continued performing with great élan to encircle and harass ARVN fire bases. North of Route-9, FSB of Hill-30 continued to bear the pressure of heavy artillery attacks each day and was cut off from the rear by an almost impenetrable air defense net. The ARVN armored task force which tried to pick up the survivors of the 3rd Airborne Battalion from FSB of Hill-31 was repeatedly engaged by NVA armor-supported infantry. South of the road, the targets of enemy encirclement were FSB Hotel 2, seven kilometers southwest of LZ, and the 2/3 and 3/3 Battalions of the 1st Infantry Division on mobile operations along Route-92 nearby. On 27 February, despite heavy air strikes which attempted to silence enemy air defense guns, a big CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter was hit and exploded in the air while trying to sling-carry a 105-mm howitzer. It was then decided to close FSB of Hotel-2 and send the 3rd Regiment northwestward on a mission to interdict and disrupt Route-914. This plan could not be carried out immediately because there still remained a battery of 105-mm howitzers. On 3 March, in execution of the plan to enter Tchepone, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment was inserted at LZ of LoLo, 13 kilometers southeast of Tchepone. The landing had met with strong enemy opposition and had been postponed twice because of additional preparations required for the landing zone, the 1/1 Battalion finally touched ground at the price of 11 helicopters shot down, 44 others hit by gunfire and two D4 bulldozers destroyed after being dropped from the air. The following day, the 1st Regiment Headquarters, the 2/1 Battalion and a battery of 105-mm howitzers were brought into LZ of LoLo FSB. Base LoLo was thus established. The 4/1 Battalion meanwhile landed at LZ of Liz, six kilometers west-northwest of LoLo. The various units then moved out to search the area but only a few light contacts were made with minor results. In the morning of 5 March, in order to continue its westward push, the 2d Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division was scheduled to occupy LZ of Sophia, four-and-a-half kilometers southwest of Tchepone at 11:00 hours but unexpected bad weather delayed the operation.
After preemptive air-strikes, at exactly 13:20 hours five UH1-Hs landed safely sporadic gunfire was received but posed no major threat. By nightfall, LZ of Sophia had eight 105-mm howitzers in position with adequate ammunition. Searching further out the 4th and 5th Battalions found the bodies of 124 enemy troops and seized 43 AK-47s, nine 12.7-mm machineguns, four RPD automatic rifles, nine B-40 rocket launchers, three radios, military clothing, equipment and food supplies. After securing FSB of Sophia, the 2nd Regiment was now in a position to control Tchepone from its mountain base and keep the areas surrounding the town within range of its artillery. For the next two days, throughout the areas of operation of the 1st Infantry and the Marine Divisions, friendly units caught the spirit of the new offensive. They fought aggressively, repeatedly engaged the enemy, and defeated him everywhere. In the morning of 5 March, in the area of Objective Alpha, the 4th Marine Battalion killed 130 enemy troops and seized 25 assorted weapons including two 82-mm mortars. Friendly forces sustained six killed and 42 wounded. The 4/1 Battalion made contact near LZ of Liz, killing 41 Communist troops and seizing 15 weapons along with two mortars. By 6 March, engagements were increasing and occurring everywhere, but friendly forces suffered only light casualties while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. More importantly, they were now within easy reach of Tchepone, the final objective that President Thieu had ordered them to take just three days earlier.
The day selected to enter the ultimate objective, Tchepone, was 6 March. A total of 276 U.S. helicopters were assembled to carry out the assault. In addition to B-52, U.S. tactical air strikes or air cover sorties were scheduled every 10 minutes. Elements of the 2/17 U.S. Air Cavalry reconnoitered targets, prepared landing zones and covered the assault. An enemy attack by fire on Khe Sanh Base forced the huge assemblage of U.S. helicopters to depart 90 minutes earlier than planned, but preparations for this operation had been so carefully executed that when the first helicopters carrying the 2/2 Battalion landed at Landing Zone Hope four kilometers northeast of Tchepone, only sporadic gunfire was received. By 13:43 hours both the 2d and 3d Battalions along with an element of the 2d Reconnaissance Company and the tactical command post of the 2d Infantry Regiment had landed safely at Hope. Searching the adjoining areas and occupying key positions, the 2d Regiment only made light contacts but found the bodies of 102 enemy troops killed by B-52s and seized five 12.7-mm machineguns and one anti-aircraft artillery gun. Extending its search further south toward Tchepone, the 3/2 Battalion found a cache of an estimated 1,000 tons of rice and 2,000 gas masks along with 31 enemy bodies and numerous weapons destroyed by B-52s nearby. The 2/2 Battalion found an area devastated by B-52s with nearly 100 enemy bodies and assorted weapons shattered to pieces. After the two reinforced ARVN battalions had made assault landing near the objective and rapidly exploited their success, the district town of Tchepone was practically under ARVN control, dominated as it was by the array of artillery pieces to the south. The most remote terrain objective of LAM SON 719 was attained.

Continued

[vinhtruong]

Now the must used “Linebacker” instead of “Rolling Thunder
It was real war! After having invaded two important northern bases on Route 559 [Ho Chi Minh Trail] The NVA troop temporarily stooped to regroup. Though they had the upper hand, they had also suffered a huge number of casualties. They only delivered shelling and sent forth small units to limit the ARVN from expanding into the surroundings. They also concentrated on the shelling in the attempt to destroy the ARVN’ Armor unit before resuming their assault. Meanwhile, pressured by the Ranger and Airborne units in the north, the NVA decided to harass the 3rd Infantry Regiment at FSB Hong-Ha-2, in the southeast. Although assisted by U.S Air support and friendly artillery. The 3rd Infantry Regiment struggled, and was forced to retreat to a safer area, from which they were eventually airlifted back to Khe Sanh. Casualties and loss of weapons were as heavy as the numbers suffered by units in the northern front. Naturally with their tactics of using human waves, regardless of the toll on their numbers, the enemy also suffered terribly. Many were lost during the assault and many more were killed by ARVN guns, and air support.

Hanoi take retaliatory measures due to Pentagon violated ROE?
Strangely, an abrupt afternoon of 6 March – After my 28 days stayed at Airborne FOB at Khe Sanh, but suddenly, in early certain morning, right after the SAC/MC-130s dropped bombs BLU-82AL, and BLU-82B at Tchepone vicinity, KGB urged General Giap to retaliate by launching rockets strafing into Khe Sanh in which received an attack by fired of an estimated 22 rounds of 122-mm Katyusha rockets inflicted two U.S. troops were killed and 10 wounded. The nature of battle might change somewhat, elsewhere, the enemy appeared to take no significant initiative but he was increasing his use of surface-to-air missiles in lower Laos. Earlier, on 2 February, a Mohawk Army-aircraft flying west of the demilitarized zone reported an unidentified missile fired from the ground which exploded approximately 100 meters away, causing no damage to the aircraft. Subsequently, 14 instances of surface-to-air missile firing were photographed or reported by forward air controllers, U.S Army pilots, tactical air and reconnaissance aircraft. Missile transportation equipment and antenna vans along with other equipment related to surface-to-air missile systems were also sighted in the tri-border area.
Under the fierce fighting conditions, our embattled units were unable to provide assistance to each other though the Airborne Division sent 6th Airborne Battalion to reinforce FSB 31. The helicopters carrying paratroopers met with intensive antiaircraft fires and could not land. Several were shot down, causing the toll of rise even higher. Operation Headquarters reaction was limited to increasing tactical air sorties. A few U.S aircrafts were hit during their round-the-clock bombarding mission.
Ironically, Lam Son 719 – which sought to interdict enemy lines of communications through ground action – was going to ease the air attack on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Now fierce fighting erupted in the Lam Son area of operations, virtually all B-52s sorties were diverted from interdiction to close air ground support of the troops in contact. Also thank to the transport fixed-wing EC-130B gunship, though, that same week earlier a new record high in truck kills was achieved by transport gunship airplanes which performed significant jobs. ROE’ Violator: To night 5 March, at FOB Ham Nghi, Khe Sanh, under four corners of mosquito-net, I lay in the military cot-stretch hearing every throng-wave of raid began with midnight until dawn of Arc-Light B-52, almost every 15 minutes spell-interval, B-52 coming from Guam busted shorter than B-52 coming from Utapao AFB, Thailand? (B.52 armaments at Utapao was almost double weight than Guam AFB so the spell lasting longer than 30 seconds) My prophetic warning “a crime against humanity” emotionally – “that what is going on now is just a lot of unnecessary killing…the longest and bloodiest siege of the war was haunted in my mind” Tonight was the night on 5 March and the early morning of 6 March/ 1971. In my thought “It’s this brother enemy’s bloodiest-war looked like WWII Dropping the Atomic-Bombs brought the war to a swift conclusion, saving many lives in the last-long process?” Finally, at early morning 6 March 1971, before happened the helicopter air assault never have in the world so big, so numerous choppers landing at remote mountainous area like Tchepone. Unfortunately one impact event that the huge 15,000pds, BLU-82AL bomb dropped, this 1,000pds square inch pressure bomb Aluminum is a silvery white and ductile member of the boron group of chemical elements, it has the symbol AL; its atomic number 13 … power and polystyrene (FAE) consist only of an agent and a dispersing mechanism and take their oxidizers from the oxygen in the air. Because according to axiom-1, US Permanent Government wouldn’t like to turn-in Saigon to Hanoi authority not like a ‘Pebbly Capital’, not bloodbath but blood-leak! Consequently, is this operation purpose meant save people live?
The day selected to enter the ultimate objective, Tchepone, was in phase-3, start 6 March – In starting the phase-3 of this operation (6th March to 15th March) the Pentagon names were chosen for objectives, fire-bases and the like primarily to facilitate communications with U.S. support units. During this operation, General Al. Haig had followed a parallel practice (at Dien Bien Phu, for example) Perhaps feminine names were in southern of Xepon River, in the thought of Pentagon plan, selected to bring some softness into the virile world of combatants at war. "Lolo", "Liz", and "Sophia" were chosen by WSAG’ chief of staff, Donald Rumfeld, the ugly guy but very effective masterminded. Pentagon Command and control which assisted in maneuvering the operation during this period under siege 604 Cargo Base that Richard Helm had served for several years in the position Linebacker, in coordination with ARVN and U.S. combat units, and he naturally followed their practice in naming fire-bases. Though the NVA Steel Division-2 was ready assigned to ambush underground in the strongholds, and small return that General Giap might have enjoyed by exploiting these names for propaganda value - as proof that the Americans were still in charge despite Vietnamization - was certainly overridden by the practicality of having words the Americans could understand and pronounce. Consequently at 10:00 am, on 6 March two battalions of the 1st Infantry Division were safety airlifted to the vicinity of Tchepone, in the northern-heart of the NVA Base-Area 604. This is the crucial objective of this operation. A daisy chain of 276 UH-I helicopters picked up ARVN troops at Khe Sanh and deposited them at LZ Hope near Tchepone; most ships made three round trips. “No aircraft were lost to ground fire during this airlift operation,” That’s surprisingly, recalled Colonel Cockerham. “We were using armor tactics as the basis for our operations, designating an objective, intermediate objectives, and so on. We would secure them, then that build an air tunnel so as to deny the enemy direct fire and indirect fire observation. We had one aircraft disabled in the final LZ due to engine failure.” How many percent you guess this mystery, truth if you guessed? Why even though an AK.47 could fire up to the huge helicopter formations was unable? Clearly I’m justified in my conviction that Vietnam was “an intelligence war” by George H W Bush masterminded. Giap’ retaliation due to U.S a ROE-violator, as a result at 15:00hours, 6th March, 2 G.I were killed and 10 wounded by 22 rockets 122mm launched into Khe Sanh Base.
Phase-3 (6 March to 15 March) had to be carried out taking into account the change in circumstances: The situation by this time was becoming increasingly tense throughout the area of operations. ARVN Truck convoys were frequently attacked on Route-9 in Laos and on the ARVN territory, the enemy increased efforts to ambush convoys and attack rear bases. The ARVN westward drive was stalled. In the midst of this situation, I Corps Headquarters received a directive from President Nguyen Van Thieu to have the Marine Division relieve the Airborne Division. He must have realized that such a relief under the combat conditions on that battlefield would be very hazardous. Besides, the Airborne Division was still a strong unit; it had suffered some losses but these losses were not yet too serious. What then caused him to order its replacement? The most probable answer could be that he was really worried over the additional losses that the Airborne Division would sustain in protracted combat. He certainly would like to keep this elite unit intact at all costs. In any event, the Marine Division was a poor choice for the relief. Despite the combat worthiness of its individual brigades, it had never fought as a division. Meanwhile the 2nd Infantry Regiment, the unit assigned to invade Tchepone was preparing to be airlifted. At the stage, the invasion of Tchepone was no longer an option for the ARVN. After the world media had prematurely broadcasted the news that I Corps had invaded Tchepone, it became a matter of honor to achieve just that. By orders from President Thieu, General Lam secretly let 2nd Regiment to send the most able of its battalions by helicopter to Tchepone. The idea was to carry out activities in Tchepone for a short while, enough to prove that the ARVN had indeed invaded the city as reported pictures and then retreat immediately by airlifts, as the enemy presence was too strong. Thank to Colonel James Vaught for his involvement special bombardment, the enemy did not react. Their silence was predictable …scared BLU-82AL Bomb? They were not stupid as to place their unit right at the site of the target. They had instead stationed well outside the target to avoid the bombings prior to the ARVN’ landing, and only after the ARVN arrived did they move in for attack.

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The intelligent airlift-war had finished at daytime, now nothing happened until late in the evening when the enemy artillery started concentrating their artillery on the positions of the 2nd Regiment. But the unit had withdrawn to a pick-up zone to be airlifted back to their bases in the morning. When the NVA knew of this, they rushed their troops to the pick-up zone, causing a lot of difficulty to the infantry men at the rear of the retreat. A number had to flee in the direction of the Airborne-units that Colonel Vaught was a new U.S Advisor. While the NVA was continuing to pressure the Infantry, their other units applied the infantry and the artillery to attack the 1st Infantry Regiment, the Airborne and the Armor units south of Route 9.
Prior of that their efforts to push through to Tchepone with airlifted infantry, rather than continuing efforts to advance along the inadequate road, began on 3 March when a battalion of the 1st Division was inserted to establish a landing zone called LoLo, the first in a planned chain of positions extending west toward Tchepone. Unsurprisingly, the assault was met with intense enemy fire – seven helicopters were destroyed and many others damaged – but the troops got into position. The next day two more battalions were brought in, along with artillery and supplies, building up strength on LoLo. Also on 4 March a battalion was airlifted to establish LZ Liz, farther west and closer to Tchepone; again it attacked into the teeth of intense enemy fire. On 5 March two fresh battalions were inserted west of Liz to set up LZ Sophia. Next was LZ Hope.
(General Haig’ Staffs was played the war-game with these movie-start names putting on the LZs stand for the concept of Permanent Government, likewise at most schools and universities, Hollywood, and Media broadcaster as the basis for explaining the outcome of Vietnam-War by Academic-Freedom-Act)
That same day on 6 March, General Abrams met with General Vien to review the enemy situation. “I said the operation has shaped up must be stopped, including Route 914, and a major battle, which might even be the decisive battle of the war, must be won. I urged the employment of the 2nd ARVN Division from Chu-Lai to engage Lam Son 719 now. Politically, psychologically and militarily, President Thieu can accept nothing less. We have the resources to do it. It means another month of hard fighting. General Vien agrees with all this; I truthfully think it is the way he feels anyway. He said he would take it to the President.”
By this time, XXIV Corps reported to Abrams, General Lam, having gotten some elements to Tchepone, “apparently feels that he has accomplished the mandate given him by President Thieu and is now turning to a more cautions approach as he awaits further instructions from Thieu”. In addition among ARVN commanders “the general feeling is that their mission has been accomplished and it is now time to withdraw. They do not concede that there is still much to be done in inflicting maximum damage or that there is now the opportunity to exploit initial success with even more telling results.”
On March, General Vien and Lam recommended to President Thieu that the overall operation be terminated, far ahead of schedule. I thought that “a careful military estimate was based upon the U.S helicopter supports capable: it was time to get out.” Obviously, “it was apparent the President Thieu had decided, at the outset, that once Tchepone had been entered by a small unit of 1st Infantry Division the withdrawal should begin without delay.” This is his official statement. But in the reality Thieu ordered to General Lam: “touch there pissed at a mess and go home”. On this occasion, the venal critic journalists (Skull and Bones’ revengefulness and pretentiousness) have speculated that comparisons with American leadership of the time might have yielded interesting results. President Thieu, for example, was arguably a more honest and decent man than Lyndon Johnson, and – given the differences in their respective circumstances – quite likely a more effective president of his country. At the time someone pointed out the President Thieu also probably had more freedom to move about in his own country than LBJ did in his (In testimony evidence by the conversation verbatim between Michael Forrestal NSC cautioned George Bundy’s president advisor that “to send the telegram without Averell’s approval is just asking for trouble.” Even the telegram had already received presidential approval, but that was not enough. It still required an endorsement from Harriman. It is almost unthinkable and damn shame, surely unforgivable that a great nation should leave the president a deprived authority)
General Abrams wanted to push the thing, recommending to Thieu that instead of withdrawing he reinforce with the 2nd ARVN Division. Thieu flatly declined, reportedly saying he would do so only if an US division was also committed. Of course both Abrams and Thieu knew that was prohibited; meanwhile the drawdown of US forces continued unabated, 60,000 more departing during Lam Son 719 operation (January – April 1971) “All Americans have got to be pulling in the same direction, and all together, and that’s always ‘a neat-trick’ to do under the most ideal circumstances. Americans are all different. They’re individualists and enthusiasts, optimists and pessimists, then a slight sprinkling of just screw-ups. So the response effectively ended discussion of reinforcing the operation. Thieu’s unwillingness to commit more forces, politically said General Vien, “reflected his concern that ARVN divisions were unprepared for a strategic task.”
The ‘Early-Out’ by President Thieu ordered to General Lam “Touch there pissed a mess and go home” In the early morning of 7 March, the first enemy reactions to the 1st Division's presence at Tchepone occurred in the form of artillery and mortar fire against FSB LoLo. The first attack, which was brief and light, caused only five casualties, but the second attack was heavier as indirect fire poured in from all calibers of guns from 82-and 120mm mortars to 152-mm artillery. More than 20 soldiers were hit - three were killed - and all of the bulldozers used in the construction of fortifications were damaged. While the troops on LoLo were digging in under this heavy bombardment, FSB A-Luoi was also subjected to a heavy attack by fired NVA artillery fell on the positions intermittently throughout the day, disrupting the scheduled airlifted supply and evacuation runs. On the same day, the elite Black Panther (Reconnaissance) Company of the 1st Infantry Division, which had been attached to the US 101st Airborne Division from the beginning of the campaign, landed troops about five kilometers west-southwest of Ban Dong to rescue the crew of an U.S. aircraft which had gone down two days before The Black Panthers Company scored a major combat exploit by rescuing all the Americans and subsequently made contact with the enemy, sustaining light casualties but killing more than 60 NVA troops. During this violent action, they also seized 30 NVA automatic rifles, destroyed an anti-aircraft gun position, and found another 40 NVA soldiers killed by air-strikes. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, on a mission to assess B-52 bomb damage in an area east of Tchepone, found a smashed weapons supply point that contained 150 rocket launchers (122-mm) 43 grenade launchers, 17 heavy machineguns, eight 82-mm mortars and 57 AK-47 rifles, all damaged beyond U.S air-strikes. Nearby, the battalion found two Communist tanks destroyed by tactical air-strikes and an ammunition storage area which it marked for future disposal (B-52 strikes conducted later on this target resulted in approximately 2,000 secondary explosions for long day) While the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry reconnoitered east of Tchepone, the 4th Battalion, 1st Infantry conducted a similar mission in the heights southeast of Tchepone and found the bodies of 112 enemy troops and seized 32 medium mortars, five 12.7- mm machine guns, six grenade launchers and 18 AK-47 rifles. Meanwhile the 2nd Regiment launched the first foray into Tchepone, to find only a shambles of the former district seat, and no human beings in sight. On their way out, the reconnaissance troops killed a squad of NVA soldiers and found a cache containing eight 82-mm mortars, two tons of rice and other military equipment.
Thereby the Disengagement on 7 March, 1971 In the early morning of 7 March, the first enemy reactions to the 1st Division's presence at Tchepone occurred in the form of artillery and mortar fire against Fire Support Base LoLo. The first attack, which was brief and light, caused only five casualties, but the second attack was heavier as indirect fire poured in from all calibers of guns from the best of-date as 120-mm mortars to 152-mm artillery. More than 20 soldiers were hit - three were killed - and all of the bulldozers used in the construction of fortifications were damaged. While the troops on LoLo were digging in under this heavy bombardment, FSB A-Luoi was also subjected to a heavy attack by fired NVA’ artillery fell on the positions intermittently throughout the day, disrupting the scheduled airlifted supply and evacuation runs. On the same day, the Black Panther “Hắc-Báo” (Reconnaissance) Company of the 1st Infantry Division, which had been attached to the US 101st Airborne Division from the beginning of the campaign, landed troops about 5 kilometers west-southwest of Ban Dong to rescue the crew of an U.S. aircraft which had gone down two days before. The Black Panther-Company scored a major combat exploit by rescuing all the Americans and subsequently made contact with the enemy, sustaining light casualties but killing more than 60 NVA troops. During this violent action, they also seized 30 NVA automatic rifles, destroyed an anti-aircraft gun position, and found another 40 NVA soldiers killed by air-strikes. Almost everywhere about this area were the NVA remains killed by air strikes.
The 2nd Infantry Battalion, 2nd Regiment, on a mission to assess B-52 bomb damage in an area east of Tchepone, found a smashed weapons supply point that contained 150 rocket launchers (122-mm), 43 grenade launchers, 17 heavy machineguns, eight 82-mm mortars and 57 AK-47 rifles, all damaged beyond used. Nearby, the battalion found two T-54 and PT-76 tanks destroyed by air-strikes and an ammunition storage area which it marked for future disposal (B-52 strikes conducted later on this target resulted in approximately thousand secondary explosions) While the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment reconnoitered east of Tchepone, the 4th Battalion, 1st Regiment conducted a similar mission in the heights southeast of Tchepone and found the bodies of 112 enemy troops and seized 32 mortars, five 12.7- mm machine guns, six grenade launchers and 18 AK-47 rifles. Meanwhile the 2nd Regiment launched the first foray into Tchepone, to find only a shambles of the former district seat, and no human beings in sight. On their way out, the reconnaissance troops killed a squad of NVA soldiers and found a cache containing eight 82-mm mortars, two tons of rice and other military equipment.
During the morning of 8 March, while Marine and Airborne units made sporadic contacts with the enemy in all other areas with varying degrees of success, FSB LoLo continued to receive attacks by fired which caused all planned re-supply and evacuation flights into the base to be cancelled. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment continued to search the areas around Tchepone and found 52 dead enemy soldiers along with three heavy machine-guns, 44 rifles and about 50 heavy artillery rounds destroyed by air-strikes. Late afternoon found the units of the 2nd Regiment assembled near the banks of the Tchepone River. That night, two battalions of the 2nd Regiment moved past Tchepone on the east and crossed the river to the southern side. On 9 March at 09:00 hours, the regiment began to climb the ridge to FSB Sophia. The invasion of Tchepone had been completed.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Lam, Commander of I Corps, arrived at the Presidential Palace in Saigon to report to President Thieu on the situation. General Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, was present at that meeting and heard General Lam present the rationale for the withdrawal and the outline of how it would be executed. Why did General Lam and General Vien recommend to President Thieu that the apparently successful operation into Laos be terminated so far ahead of schedule? The 2nd Infantry Regiment had not nearly completed its mission in the hills east of Tchepone where great quantities of NVA military supplies were stored, and only a brief reconnaissance had been conducted into the town itself. No ARVN’ reconnaissance in force had reached the Xe Bang Hiang River, the principal waterway that flows from north to south west of the town, although the ARVN Commander in this zone had requested that CBU-42 (timed-delay-bomb) be sewn on the west bank to make it difficult for the NVA to concentrate there. Coincidentally, of course, this barrier also inhibited any ARVN crossing of the river in this area, although it was the western side of the Tchepone complex that was suspected of containing numerous supply depots and huge quantities of war materiel. The river would have to be crossed to complete the task.
Why was the river not crossed? The answer is that a careful military estimate was made, based upon all the pertinent information available at the time, and the conclusion was inescapable: it was time to get out. First was the problem of terrain. In a tactical sense, ARVN forces were facing an uphill task, progressing as they did from the lowlands, with which they were familiar, to the highlands where the well entrenched enemy enjoyed the advantage. The only road available for troop and supply movements ran through steep mountains and dense forests. The enemy had operated in this region for many years, was familiar with it and knew all the trails. He could cut the road or lay ambushes almost anywhere. To the west past Ban Dong, this road ran through a range of high mountains. All along the slopes the NVA had positioned a dense array of antiaircraft guns, big and small. These guns not only fired at aircraft but also at ARVN troop columns and truck convoys moving to and from Tchepone.

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The forests of the Truong Son Range are especially formidable obstacles to cross country movement. The bases of the tall trees are girded by bamboo thickets, dense and thorny. These forests do not permit armored operations and thorny bamboo greatly hampers movements of infantry soldiers. But NVA troops were familiar with the terrain, had pre-dug fortifications and knew all the paths and trails. The NVA soldiers enjoyed this important advantage. The weather was a factor which also worked for the enemy and seldom favored to our ARVN side with its numerous helicopters and strong air force, as lower Laos is usually obscured in fog from dawn until mid morning, sometimes until noon. Our choppers could usually operate after the fog lifted until late afternoon, but only if there was no rain and even if it didn't rain low clouds sometimes prevented the full use of ARVN' air support. On the other hand, the endless mountains and forests provided good concealment for enemy deployments within the area of operations as well as for the movement of reinforcements from far away, our failure to detect all of these movements presented ARVN commanders with many unwelcome surprises. Even those enemy units which had not previously operated in the Laos panhandle had the support of veteran units to provide guides, assistance and advice.
In short, the NVA was thoroughly familiar with the terrain in lower Laos and ARVN troops were not. The terrain and weather favored the defenders and handicapped the attackers. The area was especially disadvantageous for our mechanized and armored forces which were restricted to narrow jungle roads on which two vehicles could not pass and on which entire columns could often be jammed or stalled by one disabled vehicle. Moreover, the NVA strength and reinforcement capability was the second factor that influenced the decision to initiate the withdrawal. Estimated enemy forces in the immediate area of operation consisted of three infantry regiments, rear service elements capable of local defense, and artillery elements especially notable for their air defense capability. It was estimated that the NVA could reinforce, within two weeks, with up to eight infantry regiments and the equivalent of an artillery regiment. Heavy artillery and armor also strengthened the enemy's capabilities. First among these was the enemy's dispersed and well concealed 130-mm and 152-mm heavy artillery. ARVN' stationary FSB on hilltops, therefore, were easy targets for enemy artillery fire. The second factor in the enemy's capability of deep concern to the leadership in Saigon was the enemy armor strength that had become apparent. The intent Pentagon planners of LAM SON 719 had failed to give [with purpose] sufficient consideration to the threat of NVA’ Armor superiority, and now this threat had become in reality. Even though NVA’ Armor was under daily attack from the air, FSB/Hill- 31 had been lost because of the enemy's effective coordination of armor and infantry forces. In other places the NVA used his tanks as highly mobile field guns moving them individually over trails to ambush ARVN armored vehicles M-113 on the roads. The maneuvering of tanks on such a large scale over forest trails known only to the NVA posed a great threat to ARVN armored vehicles which were confined to congested one way roads strewn with disabled vehicles. Moreover, NVA tanks had thicker armor and mounted guns of a larger caliber than the ARVN tanks, 100-mm versus 76-mm and had a significantly greater armor defeating capability.
Even after a month of intensive attack the enemy's air defense capabilities showed no signs of being subdued and he had positioned surface-to-air missiles west of the border or at the Ban Raving Pass but not in operational area. These missiles had Route-9 from Khe Sanh to Ban Dong within effective range, a challenge that the U.S. Air Force had to face, around the ARVN' besieged bases, even after waves of air-strikes, enemy anti-aircraft guns would reappear close to their original positions. Also, antiaircraft batteries were deployed along helicopter avenues of approach; those positioned on the mountain slopes between Ban Dong and Tchepone seemed impossible to uproot. This enemy capability practically neutralized the ARVN advantage of helicopter mobility and logistic support. In contrast to the NVA who had large uncommitted reserves in North Vietnam, our reserves were limited indeed. The Airborne and Marine Divisions constituted the entire general reserves of the GVN and they were already committed. Committing the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Ranger Group required an extreme effort made possible only with the help of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division which replaced these two units in the lowlands of Thua Thien Province. And now, in the light of the enemy's reinforcement and strength on the battlefield, it was becoming apparent that the ARVN force committed to Lam Son 719 was too small for the task. General Abrams recommended that the ARVN, 2nd Infantry Division be sent in to reinforce, and the division was preparing plans to turn over its area of responsibility in MR 1 to the U.S. 23rd Infantry Division. Still, in the view of the GVN leadership, one additional division would be insufficient to ensure total victory and would result in a higher casualty figure for our forces in Laos. Also, removing the 2nd Division from MR 1 would leave more of the vital lowland areas of MR 1 undefended. The only reasonable course of action was an orderly withdrawal to conserve as much of the committed force as possible. Further reinforcing this conclusion was the fact that the political and psychological objective of the campaign had been achieved; the South Vietnamese Forces had entered Tchepone. It was apparent that President Thieu had decided, at the outset, that once Tchepone had been entered by RVNAF, the withdrawal should begin without delay.
The main features of the withdrawal plan were outlined to President Thieu at the 9 March meeting. The 2nd Infantry Regiment would close FSB Sophia and establish a new fire base (called Brick) near Route-92 about 8 kilometers south of Ban Dong. The units of the 2nd Regiment would be picked up at various landing zones in the Sophia-Liz area and inserted into landing zones south and west of FSB Brick. Thereafter, the 2nd Regiment would move southwest, searching for and destroying installations of NVA’ Binh Tram No 33 and interdicting Route 914. The 1st and 2nd Regiments would conduct operations in the area of Route-914 for 7 to 10 days. The withdrawal would then proceed in the following order: first, the 1st Division, then the Airborne Division. FSB LoLo would close thereafter to be followed by FSB Brick; the 3rd Infantry Regiment in the area of Brown and FSB Delta-1 would pull out after closing FSB A-Luoi. After the withdrawal of the Airborne Division, the 147th and 258th Marine Brigades would move out from the areas of FSB Delta and Hotel. The entire withdrawal, according to Lieutenant General Lam's estimate, was scheduled for completion by 31 March. After resting and reorganizing for about two weeks, the 1st Infantry Division, two Marine brigades and one Airborne brigade would conduct operations into the eastern sector of enemy Base Area 611, the A Shau Valley and the Laotian salient. The Khe Sanh Base would probably close on 15 April.
While the withdrawal plan was being explained to the President, the 1st Infantry Regiment began to move toward objective area Ta Luong. Advance elements reported sighting NVA tanks near the area. Further north, near Route-9, at 9 kilometers southeast of Tchepone, observation teams of the 1st Regiment also reported sighting some NVA/ PT-76s Armored 202 Group. ARVN artillery opened fire and disabled five NVA tanks. Meanwhile, the Marine sector was very active, the battalions received heavy attacks by fire, and, searching out 9 km south-southeast from their bases, found a NVA Binh tram camp that had been bombed by B-52s with huge 6,000 heavy artillery shells, rockets along with numerous other weapons and substantial volumes of ammunition all destroyed. In the morning of 10 March, the 1st Marine Battalion engaged the NVA troops twice, the first time in a light encounter and the second time fighting a battalion size unit with the following results: 72 enemy killed and 20 small arms, one recoilless rifle, and four grenade launchers seized. The Marine losses were only six killed and 19 wounded. The 1st Infantry Regiment continued to search the areas of Ta Luong and Route-914 and was able to assess the substantial damages inflicted by B-52 bombing runs. In two areas approximately 9 kilometers south and southeast of FSB Sophia, the 4th Battalion found the bodies of 72 NVA troops, 12 Soviet and China-trucks, eight tracked vehicles, three 122-mm towed cannons two 37-mm anti-aircraft artillery guns, four 12.7-mm machineguns, two 122-mm rocket launchers, 400 AK-47 rifles, thirty two 82-mm, 120mm mortars, 18 B-40s, 60 Chicom-Radios and huge quantities of food of all types. Most of these supplies were blown to bits by B-52 bombs. The battalion also captured five prisoners of war.
During the morning of 10 March, the 2nd Regiment on FSB Sophia received a heavy attack by fire. The attack wounded 13 soldiers and damaged six of the eight 105-mm howitzers at the base. On 11 March, 2nd Infantry Regiment elements operating around the fire support base had increasing contacts with the NVA. At 11:00 hours, a reconnaissance element operating approximately one kilometer southeast of the base engaged a NVA patrol killing eight and seizing their weapons. According to plans, the 2nd Infantry Regiment was to move this day, on foot to Landing Zone Liz from where it would be airlifted eastward. Between 14:00 hours and nightfall, the 2nd Battalion was removed from Landing Zone Liz and deposited on Landing Zone Brown. The 5th Battalion landed approximately one kilometer north of Landing Zone Sophia East where the headquarters of the 2nd Regiment had already relocated while the 4th Battalion continued to secure FSB Sophia. Late that afternoon an element of the battalion engaged the enemy approximately 900 meters south of the base but casualties were light on both sides. During the day, 1st Infantry Regiment forces continued to search the Ta Luong area and found more substantial damage caused by B-52 attacks. On 12 March, the evacuation of the 2nd Regiment was completed. The 3rd Battalion from Liz landed approximately 900 meters south of Sophia East and the 4th Battalion was the last unit to leave Sophia. In order to facilitate the movement of troops, U.S. tactical air bombed and destroyed the eight 105-mm howitzers left on the base and another 105-mm battery was brought to Sophia East from Khe Sanh. The units of the 1st Infantry Regiment, whose headquarters was at FSB LoLo, were the forces located deepest to the west. On the fronts manned by the Marine and Airborne Divisions, engagements and attacks by fire followed an increasing trend. Meanwhile, two M-41 tank troops reassigned by JGS from MR-2 were moving into lower Laos to reinforce the 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron. U.S. air support was becoming more effective since Vietnamese interpreters flying with forward air controllers [FAC on OV-10 Bronco] had become more familiar with the situation. Re-supply operations were conducted throughout the battle area thanks to the daring and the noble spirit of sacrifice of U.S. Army helicopter crews.
Upon the 2nd Infantry Regiment's withdrawal from the area west of FSB/LoLo, NVA forces, probably elements of the 1st and 31st Regiments of the NT-2 Division began to encircle units of the 3rd Infantry Regiment. Beginning on 13 March, the battalions operating in the Ta Luong area were gradually forced to withdraw north and FSB/LoLo began to receive uninterrupted attacks by fire. On 14 March, the intensity of these attacks increased. During the day, the base received an estimated more than two hundred 122-mm rockets and one hundred 152-mm artillery rounds. Thanks to their solid shelters and trenches, the regiment had only three killed and two wounded but one D-4 Bulldozer and two 105-mm howitzers were seriously damaged by delayed-shells of 152mm. In the meantime, the NVA had moved up to the base and small arms fire was being directed at supply aircraft, causing medical evacuation and re-supply attempts to be called off. On 15 March, the base couldn’t be re-supplied (nor could Delta or A Luoi, both of which were under attacks by fire) The various units on and around the base were running out of ammunition and the number of wounded in need of evacuation was increasing. A withdrawal plan was hastily prepared. The headquarters of the 1st Regiment and the battalions outside the base would move east. The 4th Battalion would serve as the rear guard protecting the regiment in its effort to break through enemy encirclement. The plan was carried out satisfactorily but the enemy tightened its hold on the 4th Battalion. Finally, this unit fought its way out with the enemy in pursuit, all the while rejecting the NVA demands for it to surrender.
On 17 March, close to the banks of the Tchepone River, the battalion was intercepted and the fighting lasted all day, with tactical air and gun-ships providing dedicated support. The battalion commander and his deputy were both killed. Most of the company commanders and officers of the battalion were also killed and the few survivors managed to escape to an area near Route-9. There, in the late afternoon of 18 March, U.S. helicopters with tactical air support conducted a daring rescue. Three helicopters were hit and one fighter-bomber exploded in the air but the thirty two survivors of the 4th Battalion were rescued and flown to the rear. The battalion had accomplished well its rear guard mission and in the process, had sacrificed nearly every man. The fight put up by FSB LoLo and the units of the 1st Infantry Regiment had resulted in 1,100 enemy killed, causing severe losses to two main force regiments of the “Steel/NT-2/Division.

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At northern Lam Son-719 Operation, there were three passes: Mu-Gia, Ban Karai, and Ban Ravan. These three huge NVA, Cargo depots must be untouchable by US air power in sparing to support axiom-1 (There was never a legitimate non-communist government in Saigon) Many aircraft over these passes where every kind of tactical fighters had gone down by air missiles .., more identified in the master pieces “THE NEW LEGION” Vinh Truong, 2010, author discusses the three Axioms in the dominant interpretation of the U.S.-Vietnam War that were established by “the invisible permanent government” right after the National Security Council meeting on September 21, 1960. They are: - There was never a legitimate non-communist government in Saigon (dissolution GVN) - The U.S. had no legitimate reason to be involved in Vietnamese affairsTonkin- (Gulf-Incident) - The U.S. could not have won the war under any circumstances (U.S. troop honorable withdrawal)
There are many reasons why the author decided to write this book, The New Legion. He felt compelled to write it for the longest time; after spending thirteen years in the Communists' so-called "reeducation camp." He escaped from a canal in the Mekong Delta and drifted in a rickety old boat similar to a child's toy from South Vietnam for fourteen days until he reached the nearest Pacific island, Palawan Islands, Philippines. He knew the pain that all the people who were involved suffered yet he thought that perhaps it might be best to let it become a not-so-distant memory. Now, he has finally decided to write the truth at last. It is the story of loyalty, duty, honor, and love.
"Fierce-battle in lock its head, grip its tail" (Phase-4: 16thMarch-7th April) While the 1s Regiment was subjected to heavy attacks which eventually caused it to pull out of the FSB/LoLo area, the battalions of the 2nd Regiment continued to conduct reconnaissance in force and search the Cua Tung and Cua Viet objective areas along Route-914 to joint with 922. In three areas, approximately one and a half, six and seven kilometers southeast of FSB/Sophia East, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions found many logistical installations and camps destroyed along with decomposed bodies of enemy troops. Supported by helicopter gun-ships, they destroyed five enemy trucks. In the southeast, activity in the Marine sector began to pick up. The 147th Marine Brigade Headquarters at FSB/Delta received 400 incoming rounds which killed eight marines. The 7th Battalion, operating outside the base, received a corresponding number of artillery rounds and had five wounded. Other units of the brigade, the 2nd and 4th Battalions, continued to search objective area Alpha, approximately 4 kilometers south of FSB/Delta. During the afternoon of 16 March the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Regiment/1st Division and its 4th Battalion were picked up in the Delta-1 area and taken to Ham Nghi Base along with a number of supporting units. The 3rd Battalion had been taken out for rest and reorganization two days before, the 1st Battalion remained to secure the base Delta-1. Meanwhile, the enemy was beginning to harass Khe Sanh. For the second day running, this fire support base was hit by mortar fire which wounded four Americans and damaged two helicopters and a number of vehicles. It seemed to me: The U.S violated the ROE (Rules Of Engagement) abruptly used B-52 at Utapao, Thailand in air carpets by Linebacker campaign and bomb BLU-82AL [Aluminium is a silvery white and ductile member of the boron group of chemical elements; it has the symbol AL; its atomic number is 13 …power and polystyrene (FAE) consist only of an agent and a dispersing mechanism and take their oxidizers from the oxygene in the air] on 6 March inflicting NVA heavy casualties. A resumption to retaliate, on 17 March, NVA gunners stepped up their shelling of other targets. In ARVN territory, at the border, FSB Phu Loc and Lao Bao were attacked by 130-mm artillery but the losses were small. FSB A-Luoi received attacks by fire practically every day and FSB Delta and the 7th Marine Battalion were pinned down. In a small engagement, the 7th Battalion killed 16 enemy troops while suffering only five casualties. A NVA recruit just assigned to the 812th Regiment, 524B Division rallied to the Marines and disclosed that the entire 324B Division was in the Route 9 campaign with its 29th, 803rd and 812th regiments. The 29th Regiment had recently suffered heavy losses and the 812th Regiment was engaging the 147th Marine Brigade. In the meantime, in the area of the 2nd Regiment, the 5th Battalion received an intense early morning attack of an estimated 300 rounds of mortar 120mm and artillery fire. The battalion continued its search operations and, thanks to intensive air support, scored a major victory in the area near Landing Zone Brown, killing nearly 100 NVA and capturing a large number of weapons and many tons of ammunition. In accordance with the withdrawal plan, the headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Regiment was evacuated to Delta-1 while its battalion proceeded east on foot.
From 18 March on it seemed that the enemy was well aware of the ARVN withdrawal and there were signs of the enemy concentrating a regimental size unit northwest of FSB A-Luoi while pressure increased around FSB Delta of the 147th Brigade. The base began to receive fire from 152, and l30-mm field guns and NVA infantry had infiltrated close enough to fire at choppers landed. There were about 10 anti-aircraft guns positioned on the mountain slopes around the base that could not be silenced. The 2nd and 4th Battalions operating to the south were recalled to sweep the area around Delta and to prepare for the withdrawal. By mid-day of 18 March the 1st Infantry Regiment, with its 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions, after falling back from the LoLo area, arrived in an area approximately 2,000 meters southwest of FSB A-Luoi. There they were picked up by helicopters and flown to Khe Sanh. The survivors of the 4th Battalion were also flown back in the late afternoon. Next came the turn of the 5th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, which boarded helicopters from an area adjacent to Landing Zone Brown. Immediately thereafter, from about 16:00 hours and continuing through the night of 18 March, the remaining three battalions of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th, received heavy attacks west of the Brown area. The NVA followed up its artillery with ground assaults. The next morning the 4th Battalion made a preliminary report that it had 33 wounded and five missing. The 2nd Battalion had similar casualty figures while enemy losses were unknown.
For four days now, reports flowed into I Corps headquarters of strong attacks that included very heavy bombardments by heavy artillery and tank attacks. Reports of ARVN losses, including the decimation of the 4th Battalion, 1st Infantry, were very disturbing to General Lam, as were the many indications that the enemy was reinforcing and maneuvering to prevent the orderly ARVN withdrawal from Laos. So, on the night of 18 March, General Lam called Brigadier General Phu his division commanders to a conference at Ham Nghi Base, Khe Sanh to hear their assessments and recommendations. They each recommended that disengagement proceed as quickly as possible; General Phu, commanding the 1st Division, displayed anxiety for the first time in the campaign. When the conference was over, General Lam ordered that the withdrawal proceed at a quicker pace and that preparations begin immediately for the extraction of the 2nd Regiment from the Brown area and FSB Delta-1 where all its battalions were wider heavy attack and in danger of being cut off and destroyed.
On the morning of 19 March, abandoning FSB A-Luoi [Ban Dong] ARVN’ 1st Armored elements and attached Airborne units moved overland to take positions along a line near FSB Alpha. The 2nd Airborne Battalion operating to the north and having made a contact with the enemy during the day would be airlifted from a landing zone north of Base Alpha. After the elements from Ban Dong had arrived at Alpha, the remaining forces of the 1st Infantry Division were also picked up, including the battalions of the 2nd Regiment from the Brown area and the 2nd Regiment Headquarters along with the 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment from Base Delta-1. Information received during the night added some clarity to the situation. Almost all the airborne battalions were in contact with the enemy. The 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Airborne Battalions had relatively light engagements with minimal losses on both sides thank to Colonel James Vaught, a representative of General Haig at Pentagon interfered in B-52s and EC-130B engagement air ground close supports. The 1st Airborne Battalion, however, had 18 casualties and reported killing 80 enemy troops, capturing five prisoners and seizing five AK-47 rifles. The 2nd Airborne Battalion also suffered relatively high losses, with 18 killed and 57 wounded. Enemy losses were unknown. On the Marine side, Base Delta was still experiencing heavy enemy pressure. The 7th Marine Battalion constantly received attacks by fire and ground attacks. The enemy even used a noxious gas but suffered heavy casualties with 42 killed. Marine losses were light.
The 19th of March likely 19th February of Rangers was a same day of intense activities. All ARVN units in Laos reported enemy contacts. A synthesis of information received from prisoners, railing and the combat units gave a rather clear picture of enemy dispositions on the battlefield. The 308th NVA Division with its 36th, 102nd and 88th Regiments were attacking from the north. The 64th and 24th Regiments (respectively from the 320th and 304th NVA Division) continued to encircle the Ban Dong area east of Route-9. The 2nd Division was trying to annihilate the remaining forces of the ARVN, 1st Infantry Division. The 324th NVA Division deployed its 29th and 803rd Regiments to attack the 147th Marine Brigade while its 812th Regiment pinned the 258th Marine Brigade down around Base Hotel and at Co Roc highlander. The NVA apparently wanted to catch the entire ARVN force in his trap by strategic tactical “Lock its head, grip it tail.” In the manner of a hunter, he set about to kill his prey by "locking its head and gripping its tail." This was his strategy of annihilation for which he had coined this metaphorical phrase. In the ARVN territory, all Communist main and local force units stepped up their operations. Mine attacks and ambushes occurred daily on the LOC, Route-9. Enemy sappers continually probed logistical installations and the enemy launched a psychological warfare campaign aimed at publicizing the NVA victories along Route-9.
Beginning in early morning, north of Ban Dong, the 8th and 9th Airborne Battalions were under attack. The 8th Battalion had 32 casualties while the 9th Battalion immediately to the east inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Only light engagements were reported along Route-9 while Ban Dong Base began to be evacuated after most of the artillery pieces had been lifted out by helicopters. The armored logistic convoy set out, towing damaged vehicles and guns under the protection of airborne units and other armored elements while the enemy continued to exert pressure on the rear of the column. At 07:30 hours, approximately two kilometers north of Ban Dong, forward air controller aircraft reported sighting four enemy tanks moving down. Approximately four kilometers east of Ban Dong Base, the logistic convoy was ambushed and all 18 vehicles were immobilized. Some of the lead vehicles were hit by direct fire and destroyed. The road had only one lane; the vehicles behind were stalled in the ambush zone. While the battle was in progress no reports were received from the convoy commander; his superiors were therefore unaware of what was happening to the convoy. Losses incurred during the ambush were neither reported nor even analyzed afterwards. According to reports from an observation plane OV-10, four M-41 tanks and three M-113 APC, each towing a 105-mm howitzer, were apparently damaged among the 18 stranded vehicles. Road security for the movement of this convoy was the responsibility of armor and airborne units but during the attack, the convoy never initiated any request for air support or gun-ships. Apparently the ambush caught the convoy by surprise and it ended as quickly as it began. Later Colonel Luat, Commander of the 1st Armored Brigade requested tactical air to destroy the ambushed vehicles and his request was immediately granted in order to prevent the enemy from capturing usable equipment.
On the front manned by the Marine Division, the situation was even more serious. The units of the 258th Brigade were increasingly engaged by the enemy and the encirclement of FSB Delta didn’t relax in anyway. Supplies could not be delivered and the 2nd and 4th Battalions were intercepted on their way to the relief of the base. Inside the base, five of the ten 105-mm howitzers were out of action due to enemy fire and the number of marines killed and wounded kept increasing. In the area of the 1st Division, FSB Delta-1 was hit by numerous 122-mm rockets and 75-mm recoilless rifle rounds which put four 105-mm howitzers out of action and caused 1,400 rounds of 105-mm ammunition to explode. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 2nd Infantry Regiment west of Sophia East were involved in skirmishes throughout the day. Late afternoon saw the enemy attack more fiercely and the tactical air as well as EC-130B gun-ship was called in to provide support. By midnight all three battalions reported having consolidated their positions. The 3rd Battalion had 47 casualties after killing 87 Communist troops and seizing 49 AK-47s and 17 grenade launchers. Among the enemy bodies were those of two company commanders of the NVA 2nd Division. The 2nd Battalion had light casualties but reported killing 85 NVA troops, seizing 47 AK-47s and several other crew-served weapons. The 4th Battalion reported killing 195 enemy-troops and seizing 59 AK-47s and numerous other weapons.
During the day, U.S. air support substantially increased, with 686 sorties of helicopter gun-ships, 246 tactical air sorties and 14 B-52 missions which dropped 1,158 tons of bombs. Late in the afternoon of 19 March, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams were received by President Thieu. President Thieu disclosed he had directed a cautious withdrawal which would be completed from 5-8 April. When the withdrawal was complete, he planned to have about three battalions launch a raid against Muong Nong, the center of Communist Base Area 611, and wanted strong U.S. air support for this raid. On 20 March, the U.S. Air Force and Army helicopters exerted their maximum effort, with thousand gun-ships sorties, 27 tactical air strikes and 11 B-52 missions dropping 909 tons of bombs. Around 13:00 hours, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Regiment was extracted from the area west of Sophia East by U.S. Army helicopters which flew through heavy antiaircraft fire to evacuate it to Ham Nghi Base. In the process, 28 of the 40 helicopters involved were hit. Plans for the extraction of the 4th Battalion of 2nd Regiment were subsequently aborted because the first helicopter attempting to land was hit by fire and exploded in the air. Before nightfall, the artillery pieces at FSB Alpha along with the 2nd and 7th Airborne Battalions were transported back to Vietnam mainland. Plans provided for the 2nd and 4th Battalions, 2nd Regiment, to be picked up the next day, followed by the regimental headquarters, its artillery, and the 1st Battalion, 3rd Infantry from FSB Delta-1. The two 2nd Regiment battalions were ordered to find a more secure pick up zone. In the meantime, the 1st Armored Brigade, reinforced by the 7th and 8th Airborne Battalions, had arrived at Phase Line Alpha the preceding evening. The armored and airborne elements deployed to provide security for Route-9 from Alpha to Base Bravo. At 21:00 hours the NVA attacked the 8th Airborne Battalion and 11th Armored Cavalry Squadron south of Alpha but were repulsed with heavy losses. Around FSB Delta of the 147th Marine Brigade, on this same day, General Giap’ troop suicide troops reached the defense perimeter and dug in. Small arms fire from these pockets made helicopter landings and takeoffs even more difficult. Supply deliveries could not be made but the 7th Marine Battalion and the troops of the 147th Brigade held on because they had previously received a ten day reserve of supplies which would permit them to continue fighting.
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On 21 March, at 03:00 hours Giap’ troop action became intense in the area to the west, where the 2nd and 4th Battalions of the 2nd Regiment were stranded 2 kilometers east of Sophia East. The Regiments of the NVA 2nd Division, which in position ambush at 604, now fly back to cut friendly retreat to Khe Sanh, were determined to attack and annihilate these two battalions but they were not successful. In the process, the enemy lost 245 killed, 52 B-40s and B-41s, seven machineguns, seven 60-mm mortars, five 82-mm mortars, eight flame throwers, nine 12.7-mm machine-guns and 65 AK-47s. Friendly losses were 37 killed, 58 wounded and 15 missing. This ARVN victory caused enemy pressure to relax and the remaining forces of the 1st Infantry Division were transported by U.S. helicopters to Ham Nghi Base before nightfall. Meanwhile, Colonel Luong at headquarters of the 1st Airborne Brigade, the 5th Airborne Battalion and the troops of the artillery unit left at FSB Alpha were also safely evacuated south. Fire support bases Alpha and Delta-1 were thus closed on that day and ARVN forces pulled back near FSB Bravo, 5 kilometers west of the GVN border. The situation in the areas manned by the 1st Infantry and the Airborne Division had been resolved but, over in the Marines' area, there was an eruption of fire. The 29th and 803rd Regiments of the 324B NVA/Division were determined to destroy FSB Delta. These two enemy units began attacking fiercely at dawn of 21 March. Mortar and direct artillery fire – the latter believed to come from tank guns, was very accurate. All U.S Long-Tom 175-mm guns from the Vietnam side of the border were mobilized to provide close fire support to the Marines. In the morning, 13 tactical air sorties provided additional support. A B-52 mission was diverted to the area and crushed an enemy battalion [a POW later reported this battalion had lost 400 men from this B-52 action] the attack was checked and the base held firm. A casualty count showed that the Marines had 85 killed, 238 wounded and 100 weapons damaged while enemy forces suffered 600 killed, five detained and an estimated 200 individual and 60 crew-served weapons seized. After the battle, the 147th Brigade and the 7th Marine Battalion ran short of supplies. Thanks to air support, 7 U.S/UH1-H helicopters were able to land, bringing ammunition and evacuating wounded. These helicopters were able to return to their base but all bore battle scars. An eighth helicopter was shot down. During this period the enemy greatly increased his interference and jamming of our radio communications. Several frequencies were so badly jammed that communications became impossible. In many instances, enemy radio operators argued and exchanged insults with ours. These heated verbal exchanges occurred most frequently when the enemy intensified his attacks against the marines. To return the courtesy, our operators also intercepted and jammed enemy radio frequencies. During one of these interceptions, marine operators overheard a female voice giving combat orders. In general, South Vietnamese units did not make enough effort to safeguard radio communications security, often using the most rudimentary of self- devised code systems. This episode of reciprocal interference and jamming was perhaps more damaging to our side than to the enemy who was usually more disciplined. The extent of this damage, if any, could never be ascertained because of the intense fighting.
In the morning of 21 March in resumed retaliation because Arc Light/B-52 instead the ‘Rolling thunder’ changed to ‘Linebacker’ Air campaign. – Vandegrift logistical base was penetrated by Communist sappers and 10,000 gallons of aviation fuel exploded into flames. Along Route-9, near FSB-Bravo, the 11th Armored Cavalry Squadron and 8th Airborne Battalion were heavily engaged. There were nearly 100 casualties while 4 M-41 tanks and 13 armored personnel carriers were damaged. This battleground looked forlorn after the attack, with damaged vehicles abandoned and scattered across the road, making passage extremely difficult. During the day, U.S. air support remained at a high level to help relieve the enemy pressure and facilitate the withdrawal of ARVN forces. Once again, thousand gun-ship-sorties included VNAF gun-ships of my 213th Squadron, eleven B-52 missions Linebacker dropping 921 tons of bombs and 157 tactical air sorties which destroyed 37 enemy vehicles and one field gun and damaged 18 other vehicles. During the night of 21 March, the 1st Armored Brigade and the 1st and 8th Airborne Battalions left their positions along Route-9 and moved east through the jungle in search of a point to cross the Xepon River. Successful in avoiding enemy contact, the convoy of nearly 100 vehicles meandered through the dense jungle until about noon the next day when it came out near the banks of the river, about one kilometer south of Route-9. Now Colonel James Vaught Airborne Advisor, he brought with him the French map of operational area for searching the dry- drought stream on Xepon River, contact 101st US Airborne to facilitate any means helping the ARVN to retreat and the brigade was provided with a Huey to help it find a crossing point and the commander of the Airborne Division had helicopters CH-54 Sky-crane, CH-53 Sea Stallion and Chinooks CH-47 prepared to airlift light D-4 bulldozers as well as tree cutting equipment to help set up a crossing point for the armored vehicles. During the dry season, the Xepon River is usually shallow but the current is swift and the banks are steep, in many places ten meters straight down. A crossing point for vehicles was therefore not easy to find. Meanwhile, the 9th Airborne Battalion had crossed the river and secured the eastern bank. In late afternoon, two D-4 bulldozers and other pieces of equipment were lifted in by U.S. Army CH-54 helicopter and the river crossing site was prepared.
Meanwhile, forward air controller aircraft sighted an estimated 20 enemy armored vehicles closing in pursuit nine kilometers to the west by way of Route-9 and called in tactical air. The lead tank was hit and went up in flames. Enemy antiaircraft gunners returned the fire and one F-l00 aircraft was shot down. The pilot was not seen ejecting. Two more flights of aircraft were called in and two more enemy vehicles were destroyed. Artillery support following the air strikes finally caused the enemy armored formation to break up and the vehicles to seek concealment. Why did the armored convoy leave Route-9 and make a cut through the jungle to find a way to cross the river when there was only a final stretch of five kilometers left to cover until the Lao- Viet border? The reason was never officially explained but Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, Commander of the 1st Armor Brigade, later told to me that had his unit not taken to the jungle to seek a way out. He did not believe a single vehicle could have made it back to Vietnam. Route-9 was a one way road, not only littered with abandoned vehicles and rigged with mines all along, but every section of it could conceal a Communist ambush site. It was so treacherous that no one dared venture on it. The withdrawal along Route-9 surely did not proceed as planned in an orderly and controlled manner.
Early the next morning, 23 March, while Khe Sanh Base was still finishing off Communist sappers who had infiltrated earlier, the ARVN armored column crossed the Xepon River and the lines of the U.S. 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 5th Division. The convoy returned with 98 vehicles left behind, among them 22 M-41 tanks and 54 armored personnel carriers. Aerial and photo reconnaissance showed that the ARVN units had left 21 tanks, 26 armored personnel carriers, 13 bulldozers, two graders and 51 vehicles at a night bivouac area on Route-9. U.S. air force EC-130B gun-ships and artillery were used to destroy these vehicles to keep the enemy from using them. Khe Sanh Base, in the meantime had received four attacks by fire during the night, all by 122-mm artillery, but damage was insignificant. In lower Laos, meanwhile, fighting was still fierce around FSB Delta. The airdropping of supplies on the base was not successful and ammunition stocks had dropped to an alarming level. Enemy troops had penetrated and established a firm foothold inside the Marines' perimeter. Late in the afternoon, the enemy launched a new attack, this time supported by ten flame throwing tanks. The Marines blew up the first two tanks with light antitank weapons. The third tank detonated mines and the fourth was hit by tactical air. But the remaining tanks continued to advance. The headquarters of the 147th Brigade had to move out of its position. The 2nd and 4th Battalions supported the 7th Battalion to break the enemy's encirclement and withdraw toward the 258th Brigade at FSB/Hotel. The enemy seemed to have anticipated this move and he intercepted the troops of the 147th Brigade in an ambush. A pitched battle ensued with enemy tanks and infantry. The following morning, 23 March, all battalion commanders of the 147th Brigade, though wounded, managed to maneuver their battalions to link up with the 258th Brigade. Eventually, isolated teams of marines who had been cut off from their units also followed suit. Almost immediately thereafter, 230 wounded were evacuated and, before nightfall, the entire 147th Marine Brigade with its 2nd, 4th and 7th Battalions were transported by U.S. Army helicopters to an area near Ham Nghi Base. There were initially 134 missing reported but they gradually came back, leaving the entire brigade with only 37 missing; The battle at FSB Delta had cost the enemy an estimated 2,000 Giap’ troops, seriously hurting his 29th and 803rd Regiments. Around noon of 23 March the last vehicles of the armored convoy crossed the border and the remaining airborne elements successively reached the forward positions of the U.S. 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division [mechanized] Because of enemy armored presence reported near the border, the U.S. Brigade had recently been reinforced with a tank battalion. During the day, 23 March, U.S. air support continued at a high level: 756 helicopter gun-ship sorties, 11 B-52 missions dropping 941 tons of bombs which caused 77 secondary explosions, and 283 tactical air sorties.
In the morning of 24 March, as if propelled by the momentum of the pursuit, many NVA’ armored of 202 Regiment vehicles appeared on the Laotian side of the border. Near Route-9 and south of the road, between 10:00 hours and noon, U.S. air cavalry reported up to five different locations of enemy armored vehicles near the border. The U.S. air cavalry and tactical air attacked and destroyed 5 NVA’ tanks, not counting those suspected of being damaged. In the area of FSB Hotel, the remaining elements of the 258th Marine Brigade began to feel enemy probes. Not wishing to fight another Delta battle, the Marine Division commander ordered its evacuation. In the late afternoon, U.S. helicopters lifted out all six 105-mm and four 155-mm howitzers, and all of the Marines. Immediately upon reaching Khe Sanh, the 258th Brigade was sent to Lang Vei to set up a fire support base and take over an area of operations. On this same day, the 2nd Regiment, 1st Infantry Division also deployed its units to provide security for Ham Nghi Base. The 54th Infantry Regiment from Hue received orders to move to Khe Sanh and relieve the 2nd Regiment which needed some rest. ARVN units including the 5th Regiment, 2nd Division were also deployed to gradually replace U.S. units west of Quang Tri. On 25 March, upon special orders from I Corps, the Marine Division dispatched two reconnaissance teams to the Mt Co Roc area to control a vantage point essential for the security of Khe Sanh Base.

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On this day, 25 March, there were only two small ARVN reconnaissance teams left on Laotian territory. – During the morning of 8 March, while Marine and Airborne units made sporadic contacts with the enemy in all other areas with varying degrees of success, FSB of LoLo continued to receive attacks by bombardment fire which caused all planned re-supply and evacuation flights into the base to be cancelled. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment continued to search the areas around Tchepone and found 52 dead enemy soldiers along with three heavy machine-guns, 44 rifles and about 50 heavy artillery rounds destroyed by air-strikes. Late afternoon found the units of the 2nd Regiment assembled near the banks of the Tchepone River. That night, two battalions of the 2nd Regiment moved past Tchepone on the east and crossed the river to the southern side. On 9 March at 09:00 hours, the regiment began to climb the ridge to FSB Sophia the invasion of Tchepone had been completed. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Lam, Commander of I Corps, arrived at the Presidential Palace in Saigon to report to President Thieu on the situation. General Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, was present at that meeting and heard General Lam present the rationale for the withdrawal and the outline of how it would be executed. Why did General Lam and General Vien recommend to President Thieu that the apparently successful operation into Laos be terminated so far ahead of schedule? The 2nd Infantry had not nearly completed its mission in the hills east of Tchepone where great quantities of NVA military supplies were stored, and only a brief reconnaissance had been conducted into the town itself. No ARVN reconnaissance in force had reached the Xe Bang Hiang River, the principal waterway that flows from north to south west of the town, although the ARVN commander in this zone had requested that CBU-42 (timed-delay bomb-lets) be sewn on the west bank to make it difficult for the NVA to concentrate there. Coincidentally, of course, this barrier also inhibited any ARVN crossing of the river in this area, although it was the western side of the Tchepone complex that was suspected of containing numerous supply depots and huge quantities of war materiel. The river would have to be crossed to complete the task, but President Thieu decided early-out there.
Why was the river not crossed? Because President Thieu ordered “pissed there a mess and go home”, that was a rough simple order from military supreme high-level? You should guess! Thieu suggested if U.S sent one division engaged the war game, and we’ll approve and go ahead for battle deployment for anywhere, anytime she wanted. Unfortunately U.S turned down flatly, and progressively withdrawn, then Thieu reiterated “we’re carrying out tactical job, but strategic plan, we’re not ready. However, literally we’d guessed: The answer is that a careful military estimate was made, based upon all the pertinent information available at the time, and the conclusion was inescapable: it was time to get out. First was the problem of terrain. In a tactical sense, ARVN forces were facing an uphill task, progressing as they did from the lowlands, with which they were familiar, to the highlands where the well entrenched enemy predominantly enjoyed the advantage. The only road available for troop and supply movements ran through steep mountains and dense forests. The enemy had operated in this region for many years, was familiar with it and knew all the trails. He could cut the road or lay ambushes almost anywhere. To the west past Ban Dong, this road ran through a range of high mountains. All along the slopes the NVA had positioned a dense array of antiaircraft artilleries, big and small. These guns not only fired at aircraft but also at ARVN troop columns and truck convoys moving to and from Tchepone. The forests of the Truong Son Range are especially formidable obstacles to cross country movement. The bases of the tall trees are girded by bamboo thickets, dense and thorny. These forests do not permit armored operations and thorny bamboo greatly hampers movements of infantry soldiers. But NVA troops were familiar with the terrain, had pre-digging fortifications and knew all the path and trail orientations. The NVA soldiers affected this important advantage.
The weather was a factor which also worked for the enemy and seldom favored the ARVN side with its numerous helicopters and strong air-mobility-force. As presented in the terrain description of lower Laos is usually obscured in fog from dawn until mid morning, sometimes until noon. Aircraft could usually operate after the fog lifted until late afternoon, but only if there was no rain and even if it didn't rain low clouds sometimes prevented the full use of ARVN' air supports. On the other hand, the endless mountains and forests provided good concealment for enemy deployments within the area of operations as well as for the movement of reinforcements from far away. Our failure to detect all of these movements presented ARVN commanders with many unwelcome surprises. Even those enemy units which had not previously operated in the Laos panhandle had the support of veteran units to provide guides, assistance and advice. In short, the enemy was thoroughly familiar with the terrain in lower Laos and ARVN troops were not. The terrain and weather favored the defenders and handicapped the attackers. The area was especially disadvantageous for our mechanized and armored forces which were restricted to narrow jungle roads on which two vehicles could not pass and on which entire columns could often be jammed or stalled by one disabled vehicle. The NVA strength and reinforcement capability was the second factor that influenced the decision to initiate the withdrawal. Estimated enemy forces in the immediate area of operation consisted of three infantry regiments, rear service elements capable of local defense, and artillery elements especially notable for their air defense capability. It was estimated that the NVA could reinforce, within two weeks, with up to eight infantry regiments and the equivalent of an artillery regiment. Heavy artillery and armor also strengthened the enemy's capabilities. First among these was the enemy's dispersed and well concealed 130-mm and 152-mm heavy useful-artillery. ARVN’ stationary fire support bases on hilltops, therefore, were easy targets for enemy artillery fired. The second factor in the enemy's capability of deep concern to the leadership in Saigon was the enemy armor strength that had become apparent. The planners of Lam-Son 719 had failed to give sufficient consideration to the threat of NVA Armor 202 Regiment, and now this threat had become a reality. Even though enemy armor was under daily attack from the air, FSB of Hill-31 had been lost because of the enemy's effective coordination of Armor and Infantry forces. In other places the enemy used his tanks as highly mobile field guns moving them individually over trails to ambush ARVN armored vehicles on the roads. The maneuvering of tanks on such a large scale over forest trails known only to the enemy posed a great threat to ARVN armored vehicles which were confined to congested one way roads strewn with disabled vehicles. Moreover, NVA tanks had thicker armor and mounted guns of a larger caliber than the ARVN tanks, 100-mm versus 76-mm and had a significantly greater armor defeating capability. After all, we’re outgunned which was the Axis of Evil’ scam, they really want it for their selfish-interests.
Even after a month of intensive attack the enemy's air defense capabilities showed no signs of being subdued and he had positioned surface-to-air missiles west of the border or at the Ban Raving Pass. These missiles had Route-9 from Khe Sanh to Ban Dong within effective range, a challenge that the U.S. Air Force had to face. Around the ARVN’ besieged bases, even after waves of air-strikes, enemy anti-aircraft artilleries would reappear close to their original positions. Also, antiaircraft batteries were deployed along helicopter avenues of approach; those positioned on the mountain slopes between Ban Dong and Tchepone seemed impossible to uproot, because they’re hidden in the tunnels and plenty ammunitions scattered along mountainous ranch northern Route-9, so they get a chance of shoot down my Gunship on last week. That enemy capability practically neutralized the ARVN advantage of helicopter mobility and logistic support. In contrast to the enemy who had large uncommitted reserves in North Vietnam, our reserves were limited indeed. The Airborne and Marine Divisions constituted the entire general reserves of the RVN and they were already committed. Committing the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Ranger Group required [if so much dependable on air-supports, then sometime we get trouble because WIB Bones plot with Russia against us] an extreme effort made possible only with the help of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division which replaced these two units in the lowlands of Thua Thien Province. And now, in the light of the enemy's reinforcement and strength on the battlefield, it was becoming apparent that the ARVN force committed to Lam Son 719 was too small for the task. General Abrams recommended that the ARVN 2nd Infantry Division at Chu-Lai be sent in to reinforce, and the division was preparing plans to turn over its area of responsibility in MR 1 to the U.S. 23rd Infantry Division. Still, in the view of the RVN leadership, one additional division would be insufficient to ensure total victory and would result in a higher casualty figure for our forces in Laos. Also, removing the 2nd Division from MR 1 would leave more of the vital lowland areas of MR 1 undefended. The only reasonable course of action was an orderly withdrawal to conserve as much of the committed force as possible. Further reinforcing this conclusion was the fact that the political and psychological objective of the campaign had been achieved; the RVNAF had entered Tchepone. It was apparent that President Thieu had decided, at the outset, that once Tchepone had been entered by RVNAF, the withdrawal should begin without delay
The main features of the withdrawal plan were outlined by President Thieu at the 9 March meeting. The 2nd Infantry Regiment would close FSB of Sophia and establish a new support fire base (called Brick) near Route-92 about 9 kilometers south of Ban Dong. The units of the 2nd Regiment would be picked up at various landing zones in the Sophia-Liz area and inserted into landing zones south and west of FSB of Brick. Thereafter, the 2nd Regiment would move southwest, searching for and destroying installations of NVA sanctuary [Binh Tram 33] and interdicting Route-914. The 1st and 2nd Regiments would conduct operations in the area of Route- 914 for seven to ten days. The withdrawal would then proceed in the following order: first, the 1st Division, then the Airborne Division; FSB of LoLo would close thereafter to be followed by FSB of Brick; the 3rd Infantry Regiment in the area of Brown and FSB of Delta-1 would pull out after closing FSB A-Luoi¸ After the withdrawal of the Airborne Division, the 147th and 258th Marine Brigades would move out from the areas of FSB of Delta and Hotel. The entire withdrawal, according to Lieutenant General Lam' estimated, was scheduled for completion by 31 March. After resting and reorganizing for about two weeks, the 1st Infantry Division, two Marine brigades and one Airborne Brigade would conduct operations into the eastern sector of enemy Base Area 611, the A Shau Valley and the Laotian salient. The Khe Sanh Base would probably close on 15 April.
The 1st Infantry Regiment continued to search the areas of Ta Luong and Route-914 and was able to assess the substantial damages inflicted by B-52 bombing runs. In two areas approximately 10 kilometers south and southeast of FSB of Sophia, the 4th Battalion found the bodies of 72 Communist troops, 12 Soviet and Chinese Trucks, eight tracked vehicles, three 122-mm towed cannons two 37-mm anti-aircraft artillery guns, four 12.7-mm machineguns, two 122-mm rocket launchers, 400 AK-47 rifles, thirty two 82-mm mortars, 18 B- 40s, 60 Chi-com radios and huge quantities of food of all types. Most of these supplies were blown to bits by B-52 bombs. The battalion also captured five prisoners of war. During the morning of 10 March, the 2nd Regiment on FSB of Sophia received a heavy attack by NVA fired strafing. The attack wounded 13 soldiers and damaged six of the eight 105-mm howitzers at the base. On 11 March, 2nd Infantry Regiment elements operating around the FSB had increasing contacts with the enemy. At 11:00 hours, a reconnaissance element operating approximately one kilometer southeast of the base engaged a NVA patrol killing eight and seizing their weapons. According to plans, the 2nd Infantry Regiment was to move this day, on foot to LZ of Liz from where it would be airlifted eastward. Between 14:00 hours and nightfall, the 2nd Battalion was removed from LZ Liz and deposited on LZ of Brown. The 5th Battalion landed approximately one kilometer north of LZ Sophia East where the headquarters of the 2nd Regiment had already relocated while the 4th Battalion continued to secure FSB of Sophia. Late that afternoon an element of the battalion engaged the NVA troops approximately 1,000 meters south of the base but casualties were light on both sides.
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During the day, 1st Infantry Regiment forces continued to search the Ta Luong area and found more substantial damage caused by B-52 attacks. On 12 March, the evacuation of the 2nd Regiment was completed. The 3rd Battalion from FSB Liz landed approximately 1,000 meters south of FSB Sophia East and the 4th Battalion was the last unit to leave FSB Sophia. In order to facilitate the movement of troops, U.S. tactical air bombed and destroyed the eight 105-mm howitzers left on the base and another 105-mm battery was brought to FSB Sophia East from Khe Sanh. The units of the 1st Infantry Regiment, whose headquarters was at FSB of LoLo, were the forces located deepest to the west. On the fronts manned by the Airborne and Marine Division, engagements and attacks by fire followed an increasing trend. Meanwhile, two M-41 tank troops reassigned by JGS from MR-2 were moving into lower Laos to reinforce the 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron. U.S. air support was becoming more effective since Vietnamese interpreters flying with FAC [forward air controllers] had become more familiar with the situation. Re-supply operations were conducted throughout the battle area thanks to the daring and the noble spirit of sacrifice of U.S. Army helicopter crews.
Upon the 2nd Infantry Regiment's withdrawal from the area west of FBS LoLo; NVA forces, probably elements of the 1st and 31st Regiments of the NT-2 Division began to encircle units of the 3rd Infantry Regiment. Beginning on 13 March, the battalions operating in the Ta Luong area were gradually forced to withdraw north and FSB of LoLo began to receive uninterrupted attacks by NVA fired bombardment. On 14 March, the intensity of these attacks increased. During the day, the base received an estimated two hundred 122-mm rockets and one hundred 152-mm artillery rounds. Thanks to their solid shelters and trenches, the Regiment had only three killed and two wounded but one D-4 bulldozer and two 105-mm howitzers were seriously damaged. In the meantime, the enemy had moved up to the base and small arms fire was being directed at supply aircraft, causing medical evacuation and re-supply attempts to be called off. On 15- March, the base could not be re-supplied (nor could Delta or A-Luoi, both of which were under attacks by terrible bombardment fired) The various units on and around the base were running out of ammunition and the number of wounded in need of evacuation was increasing. A withdrawal plan was hastily prepared. The headquarters of the 1st Regiment and the battalions outside the base would move east. The 4th Battalion would serve as the rear guard protecting the regiment in its effort to break through enemy encirclement. The plan was carried out satisfactorily but the enemy tightened its hold on the 4th Battalion. Finally, this unit fought its way out with the enemy in pursuit. All the while rejecting the NVA demands for it to surrender due to their overwhelming on 17 March, close to the banks of the Xepon-River, the battalion was intercepted and the fighting lasted all day, with tactical air and VNAF 213th Magic-Club Squadron, Gun-ships Cobra Air Cavalry providing dedicated support. The battalion commander and his deputy were both killed. Most of the company commanders and officers of the battalion were also killed and the few survivors managed to escape to an area near Route-9. There, in the late afternoon of 18- March, U.S. helicopters with tactical air support conducted a daring rescued. Three helicopters were hit and one fighter-bomber exploded in the air but the thirty two survivors of the 4th Battalion were rescued and flown to the safety rear. The battalion had accomplished well its rear guard mission and in the process, had sacrificed nearly every man. The fight put up by FSB of LoLo and the units of the 1st Infantry Regiment had resulted in 1,100 enemies killed, causing severe losses to two main force regiments of the Communist NT-2 Division (Steel-Star)
Hero worship by Vietnamese to Lancaster and Jim Manthel Early morning 20th March, the TASK force 1st Armor Brigade retreated back to Khe Sanh on Route-9, reaching four kilometers east of FSB/A-Luoi. When the convoy been crossing a small stoned creek, the NVA on the high crest shot down every kind of individual weapons the most B-41, 40 and launched grenades, the tank/M-41 leader was destroyed, damaged four chain tanks and 18 GMC Trucks. Now the Airborne men were just jump out the armor-M-113 to counterattack. Colonel Luat decided must leaving behind the damaged vehicles: 4 M-41, 3 M-113, and 18 GMC Trucks for easier go ahead to proceed. Our two gun-ships had to engage of interdict to neutralization about 3 hours covered strafing. The convoy continued en route while we strafing for empty all last firepower. The convoy resumed to move very slowly in hesitation. A reconnaissance FAC plane OV-10 Bronco let the Colonel Luat a hot-information coordinated with NVA/POW investigations that the enemy used our damaged tanks and its guns to fire back strafing our convoy while in contact. So Airborne, Lieutenant Colonel XO Ngoc, from Airborne’ convoy-lead commander gave order to our 213th gun-ships belong to Airborne had to neutralize all suspect spots in front of them. Now our gun-ships were run out of rockets so we used mini-guns to kill the new occupied-gunners in our damaged-tanks M-41s and armored carriers M-113s. Then we flown razed on the ground, not diving approach like Cobra; suddenly many throng showered bullets that enemy don’t know nowhere and everywhere, this magnificent tactic neutralization let enemy must hidden underground, and now four of our gunners make circle pattern 75meters over them, in spewing at 4,000 rounds until we empty our ammunitions and diving low level in razing to go home for rearmed, miracle no birds get hit. Heavy sound in my helmet, Lt Colonel Ngoc reminded us rush back at once after reloaded armament, refuel with the both flank-side equipped two a 19-shot 2.75-inch antitank rocket pods [as my order and reduce in am-container at 6,000 rounds, we will reinforced one more gunship in formation of three gun-ships.
One of the first major problems that our forces had to face, in addition to the enemy's blocking positions, was his elusive but devastating anti-aircraft system. The most common weapon he used against our chopper was the 12.7-mm heavy machinegun which constantly switched firing positions. In addition, throughout the area, there were about 200 AAA pieces from 23-mm up to 100-mm, some of them radar controlled. Even these heavy weapons frequently changed their firing positions which were usually well concealed. In general, the enemy's anti-aircraft system seemed to be well coordinated and its fire controlled with skill and discipline. His heavy machineguns such as 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm or even 23-mm, were arranged in an equilateral triangle or circle pattern, affording mutual protection and providing a well coordinated fire trap. For example, one weapon could open fire to draw our aircraft to it and when our aircraft made the attack, it would enter another weapon's field of fire. Enemy AAA positions not only changed frequently, they also moved in uncomfortably close to our units in coordination with an envelopment and attack by infantry troops. The most effected by AAA mounted on PT-76s. As a result, they were extremely difficult to destroy and the price our choppers had to pay when lifting troops, delivering supplies or evacuating the wounded was high.
The sharp conflict between Airborne and Armor unit that was created so much trouble in the retreat operation, because as far as I knew: The Airborne men had to proceeding in front and broader security for both side of the Route-9 in SOP [Standard Operation Procedure] principle of convoy protection, might be Airborne men were too exhausted due to long combat activities under horrible indirect bombardment. Then they were waiting while be ambushed so they reacted …Oh God! That too late! This conflict lasted two days, between Colonel Luat Armor and Colonel Luong Airborne. Then two 7th and 8th Airborne Battalions designed a spearhead for the convoy. Today, 20th March the U.S forces having abrupt order from high command retreated to Dongha leaving Lao Bao, afterward Khe Sanh should be on time table. From now on, our gun-ships carried out the rest. Likely last three weeks, while the Air Cavalry had 25% aircraft in commission, the VNAF had to replace a few, due to a handful choppers we have then we’re just ran priority for medivacs and supply few amount of small arms cartridges ammunition and water. Long considered as the elite unit of the ARVN, the Airborne Division did not perform as brilliantly as its reputation would indicate during Lam Son 719. Despite the enemy's superiority in maneuvering forces and his employment of new weapons, the fact that the division was unable to hold FSB 31 [because only 300 fighter soldier defenders] seemed to be indicative of its lack of contingency planning for such a situation. But our airborne units fought extremely well as individual elements. One of the division's brigade commanders, Colonel Nguyen Van Tho was missing in action - probably captured by the enemy; and five out of nine of its battalion commanders were either killed or wounded. This testified to the intense fighting that the division had to face but by and large, the division accomplished nothing spectacular in its assigned mission. During the final stage, the division also failed to provide effective flank protection for the major effort and secure Route-9 even with the reinforcement of four armor squadrons. This failure greatly complicated the ARVN withdrawal from Laos.
The 1st Armor Brigade was at a great disadvantage when faced with enemy tanks deep in the jungle. In those circumstances, ARVN armor officers were naturally unable to make effective use of combat tactics they had learned in Saint Cyr, Saumur-French and Fort Knox-U.S schools. The brigade commander was also not resourceful enough to meet this unusual combat challenge. The outcome was evident: only one third of the total number of armored vehicles committed managed to return home after accomplishing nothing substantial. If someone was to be held responsible for this failure, the question would arise as to whether it should be the commander of the brigade or his superior, who committed this unit to such an undesirable and impossible situation. A withdrawing under siege of enemy pressure was always a difficult operation which should be carefully planned by Pentagon [General Haig’ staff-officers] and executed on his map plan decisive on January, 18, 1971. Thereby, the time allowed for its execution was too short. The extrication of troops by helicopters naturally increased their vulnerability when compared to a withdrawal on foot. However, some movements to the rear on foot were not executed in a satisfactory manner. Our forces suffered serious losses on routes selected for withdrawal because of combined armor-airborne ambushes laid by the NVA separate regiments. During the retreat, the Airborne Battalions 7 and 8th and the entire Armor force were unable to ensure protection for their own movements our gun-ships unable help. The 1st Armored Brigade, reinforced by the 7th and 8th Airborne Battalions, had arrived at Phase Line Alpha the preceding evening. The armored and airborne elements deployed to provide security for Route-9 from Alpha to Base Bravo. At 2100 hours the NVA attacked the 8th Airborne Battalion and 11th Armored Cavalry Squadron south of Alpha but were repulsed with heavy losses.
During the night of 21 March, the 1st Armored Brigade and the 1st and 8th Airborne Battalions left their positions along Route-9 and moved east through the jungle in search of a point to cross the Xepon River. Successful in avoiding enemy contact, the convoy of nearly 100 vehicles meandered through the dense jungle until about noon the next day when it came out near the banks of the river, about one kilometer south of Route-9. The brigade was provided with a helicopter to help it find a crossing point and the commander of the Airborne Division had helicopters prepared to airlift light bulldozers as well as tree cutting equipment to help set up a crossing point for the armored vehicles [thank to successful assistance of Colonel James Vaught, a new Airborne Advisor, he carried with him the French operation map with some references] During the dry season, the Xepon River is usually shallow but the current is swift and the banks are steep, in many places ten meters straight down. A crossing point for vehicles was therefore not easy to find. Meanwhile, the 9th Airborne Battalion had crossed the river and secured the eastern bank. In late afternoon, two D-2 bulldozers and other pieces of equipment were lifted in by U.S. Army Sky-crane, CH-54 helicopters and the river crossing site was prepared. Why did the armored convoy leave Route-9 and make a cut through the jungle to find a way to cross the river when there was only a final stretch of five kilometers left to cover until the Lao-Viet border! The reason was never officially explained but Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, Commander of the 1st Armor Brigade, later told this writer that had his unit not taken to the jungle to seek a way out. He did not believe a single vehicle could have made it back to Vietnam. But this is WIB Bones objectives. Route-9 was a one way road, not only littered with abandoned vehicles and rigged with mines all along, but every section of it could conceal a Communist ambush site. There was so treacherous that no one dared venture on it. The withdrawal along Route-9 surely did not proceed as planned in an orderly and controlled manner. Meanwhile, forward air controller aircraft sighted an estimated 20 enemy armored vehicles closing in pursuit nine kilometers to the west by way of Route-9 and called in tactical air. The lead tank was hit and went up in flames. Enemy antiaircraft gunners returned the fire and one F-l00 aircraft was shot down. The pilot was not seen ejecting. Two more flights of aircraft were called in and two more enemy vehicles were destroyed. Artillery support following the air strikes finally caused the enemy armored formation to break up and the vehicles to seek concealment.

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The NVA heavy artillery supported also strengthened the enemy's capabilities. First among these was the enemy's dispersed and well concealed 130-mm and 152-mm heavy artillery. ARVN' stationary fire support bases on hilltops, therefore, were easy targets for enemy artillery fire [due to Pentagon prepare under siege for our ARVN on the traps for blow-out all out of date war materiel] the other factor in the enemy's capability of deep concern to the leadership in Saigon was the enemy armor strength that had become apparent. The Pentagon-planners of Lam Son 719 had failed to give sufficient consideration to the threat of NVA Armor, and now this threat had become a reality. Even though enemy armor was under daily attack from the air, Fire Support Base 31 had been lost because of the enemy's effective coordination of armor and infantry forces. In other places the enemy used his tanks as highly mobile field guns moving them individually over trails to ambush ARVN armored vehicles on the roads. The maneuvering of tanks on such a large scale over forest trails known only to the enemy posed a great threat to ARVN armored vehicles which were confined to congested one way roads strewn with disabled vehicles. Moreover, NVA tanks had thicker armor and mounted guns of a larger caliber than the ARVN tanks, 100-mm versus 76-mm and had a significantly greater armor defeating capability. This situation was a repeated scene between Garant, Carbine M-1 against AK automatic weapon at 1968 Tet-Offensive.
Having an adverse effect on our area of operation – Route-9 until it reached Tchepone where it met the Xe Bang Hiang River, the primary north-south waterway in the area. During the rainy season, when most ground lines of communication were inundated, the enemy used the Xe Biang Hiang River to float supplies downstream. The second prominent terrain feature was the Co Roc Highland adjacent to the Laotian border and just south of Route-9. This highland had several peaks with elevations ranging from 500 to 850 meters which dominated Route-9 to the east and west. It also provided excellent observation into the Khe Sanh area. The vegetation in the Co Roc area consisted primarily of bamboo and brushwood in which were natural obstacle that NVA used for underground shelter for ambush, offering adequate cover and concealment. The third significant terrain feature was a high escarpment whose ridgeline extended all the way to Tchepone, parallel to and south of Route-9 and the Xepon River. Several peaks of this ridgeline were 600 to 700 meters high and offered excellent observation over Route-9 and the Tchepone area. Much of the area was covered by dense jungle and thick brushwood except for a few places which had been cleared for farming. The terrain north of Route-9 was hilly and heavily vegetated against a backdrop of relatively high peaks which restricted operations in this area almost entirely to infantry. Around Tchepone, the terrain was much lower, sparsely vegetated and more appropriate for armor vehicles that favorable route maneuvers of NVA 202 Tank Regiment. Route-9 from Khe Sanh to Tchepone was a one lane, unevenly surfaced dirt road with destroyed bridges and culverts. Dominated by the high escarpment to the south, this road was easily interdicted. It also was difficult to prepare bypasses due to the river to the south and the hilly terrain to the north. In addition to Route-9, which was an old public road, the enemy had completed in the area west of the Laotian border an extensive, crisscrossing system of lines of communication. Most important of these was Route 1032 which connected with Route 92 and offered direct access from North Vietnam and the western DMZ area into base area 604, then base area 611, and from there into South Vietnam either by Route 92 or Route 616 or Route 922 further to the south. Another route, designated. Route 1039, also originating in North Vietnam passed through the Ban Raving Pass and offered access into Tchepone and base area 604 then connected with either Route 29 to go further south or with Route 914 which led into base area 611 and from there into Ashau-Valley, South Vietnam. All these routes were well maintained two lane roads practicable for large trucks at least during the dry season. Due to extensive bombings, the enemy had built several alternate routes which were well concealed by vegetation and often under double and triple canopies. In addition to main routes, the enemy also built narrow pathways crisscrossing the entire area. These areas were difficult to observe from the air and were convenient for concealing troop movements. February in the Tchepone area was the transitional period from the northeast to the southwest monsoons. The northeast monsoon, which brought rains and cloudiness to Central Vietnam above the Hai Van Pass from October to March, was the dominant weather factor. The Truong Son mountain range deflected much of this wet weather on the Laotian side but in the area of operation, the skies were generally covered. Daytimes the amount of cumulus buildup in this area depended on the strength and depth of the monsoon. Average temperature during February and March were 80 F in the lowlands and about 65 F in these mountainous regions
Captain Ferrell and Lancaster were brilliantly volunteers to help Airborne and Armor resuming a ferocious retreat. On the eerie ambushed section of Route-9, was look like a horseshoes on highlands with thick foliage-vegetations, these curves so twist and hard-rough for vehicles to proceed. The NVA/POW’s investigations let us knew a preparedness of two NVA Regiments and some PT-76s were waiting for interception with our convoy forwarding to eastern. Suddenly when the convoy slowed down right in the middle of harsh-squeeze route, from right side on the vegetation hill slop, the rainy crashed of B-41 and different categories of individual bullets showered all over the convoy from their stood out in sharp relief against the dawn haze fog sky. Our tanks couldn’t fire cover because can hit friendly forces in front curve of them. Of course, they stop to spread both side to defend. Captain Ferry and Lancaster follow the tank lead to strike east on the slop of the crest. They dived in steep approach and the most west side of the heavy forest. Fortunately, Lt Colonel Ngoc can speak English so well then directed their power ordnance right on the targets. Two Cobras strafing Rockets, mini-guns, and launched grenades to silence two antiaircraft guns 12, 7mm among of three equilaterally antiaircraft tactical for their self-covered. As a top-gun pilots, we can see the enemy red-hot bullets tracing close to our birds’ fuselage, it sound like we can extended our hands to catch them. Top gun leader, Captain Ferrell was empty his fire-power armament for three pass-preps, and let go home, but the wingman, Lancaster urged let him finished the last pass-prep. Alas! There was his real last pass-away forever. Though Captain Ferrell persuaded him go home for rearms but he’d still go ahead and make steep-diving fire. Abrupt getting hit by antiaircraft ground fire, Lancaster radioed to Ferrell, he got hit in the tail rotor component, Ferrell should escort him to safe distance. He let cover Lancaster heading to southern for forced landing on flat-terrain but fail. Instantly, second by second the vibration increased high frequency created the aircraft spin toward the anticlockwise and crashed nearby on slop of a baldy-hill. When the Dusk-tuff coming, they merely recovered two remains breaking necks, those Americans heroes were Lancaster and Jim Manthel sacrificed for our World freedom out of Red menace. “Alas! We never seem to learn from our forgiveness for what they had done. “Sacrifices often are unappreciated by those who benefit from them”

The 7th Fleet tactical fighters coming to bombard the last 12, 7mm but in lost communication while the convoy resumed to proceeding forward. Unfortunately the fighters dropped in fault on friendly force killed 12 and wounded about 100 Airborne and Armor soldier, but thank to my wingman while he saw two parallel white jet-streamlines on the wing tip of a tactical fighter, steep dive to target and radioed to me escaped right away out of the area. I saw an A-6 Intruders just flashed in front of us. Our casualties were six more tanks destroyed.
Once again, our gun-ships were scrambled rushing to hot area over Route-9. After full loaded armament, and instantly over operational area, I glanced down at the target: “Everything is been damn hot now!” I had seen the orange panel in the offense-front line of Airborne Unit from 200 meters of the convoy, as I often had to request while we prep in discrimination foe and friend in the melee. Now the spot inclined little bit in left slop, though under nowhere some trajectories of shell 130, 152mm coming exploited likely erected-mushrooms around friendly area. We must took the advantage of the free target maneuver orientated of our mini-guns in strafing traffic pattern, meant approach prep parallel or flight up sometime to assault attack enemy another side of the horseshoes hill. In this tough circumstances, we couldn’t able used our gunship dive-attack like Cobra, but only by means of a daring scared prep to the target area at a treetop level – with the intimidated noises of mini-guns barrels covering the suspect ambushed area, the enemy did know where and nowhere the deadly weapons coming. Now our combat formation of three ‘left-echelon’ and six mini-guns firstly attack-prep at low level strafing on treetop toward enemy; this tactical attack method-assault let enemy don’t know where the killer coming just raining bullets above the tree line. While over the target, I still ordered the gunners continued strafing less 2,000 round per minutes for neutralized interdiction back and forth evenly over the horseshoes-hill, in the most areas heavy foliages bushes. Suddenly the enemy running down to slop standing bold strafing down into our gun-ships fly-pattern and friend forces by B-40 and 41, instantly all our gunners react by 4,000 rounds into them and my wingmen continued strafing, in the mist of haze light fog and stinging smokes I could see the tracers at the ratio of one tracer for every fourteen standard rounds scattered evenly on the hot spot, but at the rate those mini-guns fired, the spaced tracers would look like heavy raindrops, how could they escaped 24,000 bullets rain-shower on vegetation-hill in a minute? Now number-1 [me] make left turn go little-bit higher in round circle on target continued neutralized fire, and becoming C&C bird. And number-2 took a lead turn right in gaining altitude for prep attack approaches. I detected below a high tree, on green crest appeared prominent feature of some ‘two-tracks’ red fresh earth parallel were an armored PT-76 camouflage with clover foliage. Meanwhile, number-2, and -3 gained altitude in strafing rockets and detected few others.
“Magic-2 how doing you read me over” I radioed”
“Magic-1 … I got the target at 3’oclock … one big craft …I’ll going ahead barbecue him”
“Magic-2 and -3 ... going ahead to get him…over”
I don’t blame them …number-2 missed … and number-3 salvo all rockets he carried on. I thought the time for neutralization would over, I deadly certain sure no one enemy gunner could staying bold to react but unfortunately my gunner got hit in his shoulder and I managed request authorization to leave for medivac my man. Then I managed to unload ordnance by ‘Salvo’ - Though even we didn’t to damage all NVA/PT76s, this tactical air assault mission was stranger than NVA troops killer that we never learn in training school at all, because that the first time what I have said applies only to this particularly circumstances. I rolled out my gunship started climbed up slowly behind the hill, on the left clusters of intertwining ridges hiding behind the bald hill to the higher ridge forming the crest-peak horseshoes that gave the hill target spot its designation by height in meters 650 meters (2,100 feet) then I used this tactical flight for screening their eyes to farther behind them. I suddenly ‘cow-boy’ racing high airspeed up, raised bird nose to decrease airspeed [lasting timing slow in shot rockets] over the target spot, abruptly used right rudder-pedal to lower the helo-nose, take a high angle diving approach so deep akin to plunge strafing, simultaneously four mini-guns of cover-gun-2, -3 spewing at 4,000 rounds per minute and now four by four rockets busted down into the NVA/PT-76s on a baldy hill platform. Friend and foe could feel smelling our dark stingy smoke behind my gunship after strafing; I pressed the trigger, Oh God! Please don’t jammed, knowing my gunners as the barrels on both flanks of the cockpit spat flame and buzzed like chain saws, their heavy bullets punching down to the four ambushed enemy tanks PT-76s. I don’t think destroying all of them but at least neutralization in disable by my wingmen destroyed them lately by antitank rockets after me– orbiting to air cover center target still spewing at 2,000 rounds per minute for refreshing our electronic control-box. After all, three pass-prep patterns all 114 antitank-rockets and 18,000 bullets 7, 62 of three firebirds were used for pacified the battle. The convoy continued retreat to eastern and once again left six our damaged tanks M-41, M-113 stayed. Now we have to leave for medivac my man. Three gun-ships flied back Khe Sanh at high airspeed with goddamn light weight.

(contimued)

[vinhtruong]

During a visit to Vietnam, General Haig had strewn a certain amount of Chaos in his Wake: At forward XXIV Corps on 18 March General Haig told General Sutherland that “Washington would like to see ARVN stay in Laos through April,” The following day he visited II Field Force and told General Commander there “his tentative conclusion is that the time has come for an orderly close-out of the ground operations in Laos.” Both field commanders dutifully reported these Haig observation to Abrams, who must have been somewhat bemused. I thought all U.S generals were totally bemused by all the activity around them due to operation’s objective that was blow-out and kill all two crucial-opponents for Hanoi regime take over Saigon be not a real blood-bath.
President Thieu screwed-up the plan. – Pulling out wasn’t the way General Abrams would have played it, but adversely President Thieu made decision to early-out? So consequently, the U.S forces at Khe Sanh have been to retreat back to Dongha 20th March instead of 20th April as I guessed – On earlier occasions, the venal press-corps had bias speculated that comparisons with American leadership of the time might have yielded interesting results, President Thieu was arguably a more honest and decent man than L.B. Johnson, and – given the differences in their respective circumstances quite likely a more effective president of my country. At the time, it seemed to me to point out that Thieu also probably had more freedom to move about in his country than a marionette, WIB-Bones-puppeteer L.B Johnson
“I’m just more and more convinced that what you’ve got here is maybe the only decisive battle of the war,” General Abrams concluded.
“And they’ve got a chance to – it’ll be hard – a chance to really do it.”
Assessing the ARVN assault into the Tchepone area, my concept military analyst concluded that “the General Giap forces were slow to react to this, both due to his severe losses and to the rapidity with which ARVN forces moved out after they had remained in the Route 9 area for so long waiting” [As the anticipated preplan, mediator Pham Xuan An, triple-cross let General Giap getting information ARVN will be in traps at ambushed 604 logistic cargo, and Giap was already set for the NVA/Steel/2nd Infantry Division on the game]
Later, when Sir Robert Thompson arrived for one of his periodic visits, MACV briefed that
“For approximately ten days the Giap’ force was unable to regain the initiative and mount any major counterattacks against ARVN as they were moving rapidly into the Tchepone area.”
But I deadly sure that when ARVN forces moved south of Route 9 toward Route 914, the 2nd NVA Division set up an ambush to trap from hidden stronghold position. The major battles erupted there which was the goal that Permanent Government would like to destroy both these elite forces while attacking the cargo base 604 in which all materiel just been moved to Southern. So why President Thieu, after few second military strategic meditation – “Why the powerful force with tanks, artilleries, sappers from DMZ don’t attack right close battle like Khe Sanh U.S Base but Giap manipulated moving these forces further far to Tchepone… what for? For what! [Because Giap a 1943 OSS member! Now his siblings lived in California, US – in the Axis of Evil commitment, KGB had offered a security Giap’ body guard, many times he was escaped from assassinations by his cadre-opponents, thank to KGB]
The Giap’ force was committing everything he had, just asking for it, really, given the history of the war. “When we’ve focused firepower on him, he hasn’t been able to hack it.” Already he’s lost half of his tanks, half of his antiaircraft artilleries, and 10 of his 30 battalions.
Friendly losses were heavy, too, though proportionally not as severe. U.S Army helicopters were being hit hard too, according SOG report 219 dead and 38 MIA. With my eyes witnessed that Air Cavalry had been in the Tchepone area for more 10 days before ARVN got there on the ground, and that this had been useful in acquiring targeting data later used by Arc-Light B-52s, including strikes on stores that ground forces had not been able to extract or destroy in place. This intelligence was also supplemented by what long-range reconnaissance patrols acquired, and by reports from ARVN unit commanders. As a result, in conclusion “there’s been massive destruction far beyond, I would guess, what was done in Cambodia last year”
Now I have few comments: Lam Son 719 presented General Lam with a “nearly insuperable array of new challenges.” For the first time he and his staff were working from a field command post distant from their usual fixed headquarters at Danang. They were trying to execute an operations order much of which they did not understand. Neither the corps headquarters nor subordinate units, I draw in conclusion that “truly grasped the responsibilities inherent in attachment, the differences between a zone of action and an axis of advance, or the full meaning of the word ‘secure’.” The Airborne and Marine divisions, though highly competent when operating at brigade level, had little experience in being employed as full division, meaning that “the division commanders and their staffs were totally unprepared for their tasks” Since both of these division commanders were senior in rank to Lieutenant General Lam, they were “severely miffed” at being subordinated to him. The Marine commander did not accompany his division from Saigon, and the airborne commander refused to attend General Lam’ command post in briefings. And finally Lam wasted the armor brigade by attaching it to the Airborne Division, which had no idea what to do with it!
Whatever his inadequacies, General Lam got very little cooperation and even less obedience to orders from several of his senior supposed subordinates in the operation. I must say “really the hairiest problem we have out there. We’ve got a whole bunch of units that, when they want to, they operate independently, and it doesn’t make any difference whether it’s Lam or who it is.”
On the political sphere, President Thieu’ very costly tolerance of such chaos seemed to demonstrate essential insecurity. Even so, I thought, there were positive indications for future. Thieu saw “a significant difference between the style of leadership, and the real effective leadership, of generals like Truong, Tri, Nam;” who during an earlier period “were regiment or brigade commanders and division commanders, as opposed to – take the other extreme –Generals Vinh Loc and Lu Lan. And now even getting down to a man like General Lam, who’s somewhere in between . But you’re finding these corps commanders are like the corps commanders we’d like to think we had, who understood development of a fire plan, coordination of fires, precision and all that, techniques that are so important.” I must again emphasized General Lam high marks for accomplishing as much as he did under the circumstances. “All initial objectives were seized, and the ferocious NVA regiments counterattacks, while it overran Ranger positions in the North and the Airborne Hill-31 in farther west, and the Hill-30 under-siege being overran… General Lam calmly committed the 1st Infantry Division to the east-west ridge south of Route 9 with the simple mission of seizing Tchepone.”
The poor condition of Route 9 was in the significant strategic plan of Permanent Government for the only one way dependable on the only used US helicopters. And the inability of ARVN forces keep it secure meant that virtually all re-supply mobility and medical evacuation for ARVN forces had to be done by US Air Calvary, the bulk of it by US air only. Calculating that in any given twenty four-hour period a helicopter could fly for between five and eight hours. General Abrams noted that in Laos the South Vietnamese had “18 battalions over there, and 10 batteries of artillery – and all the re-supply and everything that’s got to be done for those 18 battalions and 10 batteries in the five to eight hours every twenty-four. Well that’s not enough! There isn’t a lot of sightseeing going on.” I don’t think so that’s good enough for them. They were subjected to be damn! Practically, during the tough ferocious of weeks into the thing there wasn’t a lot of flying going on, either, at least not compared with the huge requirements the operations was generating. By about longest weeks in February it became apparent the US Air Calvary support for this operation 719 was having some problems. Not only was the intense and well-sited NVA antiaircraft weaponry making operation Lam Son extremely difficult – every mission, even “Dust-off” (medical evacuations), had to planned and executed like a full-scale combat assault.
Therefore, later General Vien chief of staffs ARVN would write that the Lam Son operation was “hampered by bad weather and insufficient air support, including helicopters.” If that judgment is correct, it is difficult to imagine what level of air support would have been sufficient. Some 600 US helicopters included CH-54 “sky-crane”CH-53 Stallion, and CH-47 Chinook were committed to the battle on a daily-time basis. And there was so much bombing, I recalled at eye witnessed “that by afternoon the setting sun would be shinning through so much smoke and dust that you couldn’t see it.”
From the beginning 8 Feb through 24 March, US tactical air flew more than 8,000 attack sorties, an average of nearly 150 sorties a day every day – the equivalent of one every ten minutes around the clock. And every night, all night, three forward air controllers, three AC.130 flare-ships, and three EC.130B gun-ships were on station, one each for the Ranger Group, the Airborne Division, and the 1st Infantry Division. Even the tactical airlift support was such that, at peak periods, there was an AC-130 arriving at Khe Sanh on the average of one every eight minutes. However throughout the operation deficiencies at high command levels continued to undermine the abilities and performance of South Vietnam’s troops. I gave one example: “Airborne was really the ‘rapid deployment force’ but let them fixed as guard of a certain out-post for defense meanwhile the 1st Infantry Division took on charge an axis of advance instead of Marine or Airborne Division.
I felt so strongly about the thrust into Laos that in my opinion the Cambodian operation and this operation are the two most intelligent moves. US forces have made since they have been in Vietnam War. This operation may end the war and may save hundred thousands of lives in the long run, and everyone here is putting out 100%. However I should closed with a big apology:
“I’m sorry for the lousy of anger exploded, but I’m witnessing these gloomed sceneries on my gunship every day-light during 45 days of this operation”
If President Johnson can make decision as soon as 1967, the U.S responsibilities had already planned a ground offensive against Laos and had estimated that if it must success it was needed to deploy a powerful forces. Now, so too late, North Vietnam had deployed in southern Laos a full Army Corps 70B with tanks, ready to repel any ARVN foray, but South Vietnam was deploy a smaller force. However, this was the WIB’ preplanned for “axiom-1” Thus, despite the intense air campaign to stop the North Vietnamese logistical flow along the Harriman highway, the NVA troop continued to reinforce their troops in South Vietnam, threatening to disrupt the Vietnamization process that the WIB expected, then the wheels must synchronized as they revolve as the gradual withdrawal of the U.S forces on board on time table of flight schedule.
Consequently, Operation Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war, but also one doomed to failure right from the start due to cooperation between the CIP and the NLF, the Axis of Evil’ craps, so the American all the written plans had to be translated and the translators were largely double-cross, and triple-cross mediator [Pham Xuan An and Russell Flynn Miller] As a result, General Giap had copies of the whole documentation in hand almost as soon as South Vietnamese and US Army commanders of participant units. Additionally, neither Americans nor the South Vietnamese knew the terrain really well, while the NVA were well-prepared for defense and counterattack.

(continued)

[vinhtruong]

By 18 March, by chance, the Giap’ forces had detected the withdrawal of ARVN units from the Route 9 area and directed his forces to surround, annihilate, and destroy those isolated units where they could, General Giap also told his people that some ARVN forces were rebelling against their leaders (the Axe of Evil via CIA, counterespionage-branch system, let him know; a meticulous staffs-researcher witch-hunt was a mediator between Pham Xuan An and Lt John F Kerry) that some were running away into the interior, and that the ARVN had been defeated. On the view of bird to close to the battle, it looks like to me a back-stiffening effort; also that this whole thing is one hell of a bloody battle. Certainly bloody it was. In one firefight after another the ARVN, while taking substantial casualties, inflicted disproportionately heavier ones on the Giap’ force – 37 versus 245, 85 versus 600, on and on (En route to Tchepone nine battalion commanders were killed or wounded)
In order to withdraw after President Thieu said to General Lam “let a small unit touched down and pissed at there a mess then go home” – the most ARVN forces had already left lower Laos. Unfortunately, the intended and desired goal to sustain combat until the onset of the rainy season in order to strangle the Giap’ supply route could not be accomplished. That was true, but it by no means conveyed an accurate impression of what had been achieved. Meanwhile in the earlier weeks of operation, some troop element had done conspicuously better than others. Typically, the ARVN armored units had been especially disappointing. Early in that Lam Son 719, the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Calvary had encountered NVA armored element in a fight at the feet bottom valley, southern Fire Support Base 31 and performed brilliantly, destroying 6 Giap T-54 tanks and 16 PT-76s without any friendly losses in the first major tank-to-tank engagement of the war but of course with the involvement of our Magic-Club 213th gun-ships loaded to the maximum with 2.75-inch antitank shorter-warhead in 19 rocket-pods each flank. After that, General Lam ordered ARVN forces to begin withdraw, though, the Armor floundered. Not only did they contribute little to offensive operations (basically, in the academic military institution the withdraw operation usually get to much trouble even having meticulously preparedness) Consequently the 1st Armored Brigade Cavalry came out of Laos with only a fraction of the equipment they took in, of 62 tanks only 25 tanks and of 162 armored personnel carriers only 64 were salvaged (the Axe of Evil schemed of a plan-arrangement obsolete military equipment become a rubbish, things that they does not want any more while need the new production one) The reason MACV knew these sorry statistics was that a U.S advisor intentioned met them at the border and made a personal count, an operation with plenty of scope for axe of evil original plans, had the losses been due to heavy combat, that would have been one thing, but in the main they were just vehicles that had broken down or run out of gas and been abandoned.
The 1st Armored Brigade floundered through a long wait for the ambushes. Additionally the Route 9 was constructed by French colonialist for long at best a narrow, nearly unimproved surface, twisting, or so it looked from the helicopter that Route some of those weather cuts that were in its route surface were couple feet deep. The reality was much worse in which they missed that in the readout of the aerial photography. As the result the poor condition of that Route, therefore the inability of ARVN forces to keep it secure, meant that virtually all re-supply and medical evacuation for our forces had to be done only by helicopters.
Along that Route 9, Giap’ force tried ARVN force fell right into his traps that were reorganized by interval stronghold points of each regiment. NVA troops make some huge obstacles to stop the convoy and called shelling 130mm and 152mm guns to pounding into them, meanwhile they used 120mm mortar burst of numerous shells onto ARVN troops. NVA have been living in the area secretly for quite long from 1962 in the commence building the Harriman Highway (Ho chi Minh trail) and recently in the last phase of bunker construction and there was also a huge cargo logistic-ammunitions (67,000 short tons meanwhile ARVN would essentially be out of ammunition according Cooper-Church amendment) “This force Giap to continue a protracted war strategy in the South Vietnam right in the axe of evil’s project as ‘axiom-1”.
Not too far from A-Loui Fire Support Base to the border, at northern flank was situated a 7th Squadron armored carriers and closer to A-Loui a platoon carriers, to western flank having two more carriers armored platoons. The 1st Armored Brigade commander Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat’ headquarters was encircled by armored carriers like iron shield.
Further south to the west and south west of Delta Base, the ARVN Marines were engaged in fighting that had lasted for some days. The battle was savage. The shelling was non-stop. All out units from the north to the south of Route-9 were targeted by their intimidating artillery. There were huge losses. It was impossible to receive supplies and medevac because of the intense anti-aircraft fire. Eventually, the Special Task Force [the combined 1st Armor and Airborne] was ordered to retreat back to Khe Sanh. This withdrawal was extremely difficult since the NVA had clearly expected our intentions. They intensified their attack. Under such pressure, the fighting spirit of the troops felt drastically, and the commanders had difficulty getting their orders fulfilled. Helicopters however had great trouble landing. Some panic stricken soldiers struggled with their brothers in arms to gain a spot on the helicopters which managed to land. Again this fact was grossly exaggerated by the foreign media, which never failed to harp on it whenever they had the chance.
On March 23/ 1971, at 8:00 PM, the proximate cause of these reverses was withdraw of the 7th Squadron and all platoons adjacent units surrounded gather to Route 9 at A-Loui, ordered by colonel Luat by secret order from General Lam. When all adjacent units reaching at A-Loui then the task-force headquarters was already left. Thereby those adjacent units must continued line up to the border. The bad new returned back to them, the first convoy was ambushed by NVA stronghold inflicted 17 Squadron commander and his deputy wounded and their vehicle was destroyed. The rest hurrying back reinforced with the 17 squadron and stayed on the spot to defense. Until at 8:P.M that night, the NVA regiment tried to overrun. Enemy having PT-76 fired support. But ARVN used Tank T-41 shoot destroyed two PT-76s. During the longest night AC-130 dropped flares illuminates the area, meanwhile NVA troops attacked many throng waves but failure. The friendly armored make a real good formation to counterattack killed a lot enemy by 50 calibers stopped them far out of them, although they would like engagement to ARVN force for less casualties. At dawn, 7: A.M the enemy remains were everywhere about this area created the unsurprising scenery to friendly forces; the enemy remnant retreat hidden in the virgin forest avoid tactical fighter bombers.
Fortunately that morning the weather was real good, no fog like usual and the tact air still bombing on the way enemy retreat by FAC, OV-10 Bronco spot light the targets. Two more armored carriers passed the ghost haunt A-Loui Camp by synchronized formation to self-protected; At last they encountered together with 11th Squadron. Colonel Luat joint in the Squadron ordered two platoons line up in the back of convoy. He explained to his subordinates that “in front of us the 17th Squadron was subjected a blooded attack by enemy, they stayed on the spot for counterattack and waiting two platoons advanced to reinforced. There was only one Route 9, passing through the area of operation. Bordering on both sides were continuous mountain ranges. Such terrain was difficult for heavy armored vehicles which easily became targets for ambushes. Thick forests on the mountain and hills impeded troop movements, especially in the south which was covered with huge bamboos. It was in the south that the 1st Regiment and Marine Brigade deployed. It was a disadvantage for the offensive force, which could not evolve far and wise. Instead, movement was limited to narrow trails. Observation was poor and loosing directions was a road hazard. Often, brothers in arms would mistake each other for the enemy at a distance, and would inadvertently shoot each other. Bombing and air power found it difficult to avoid hitting friendly troops. Furthermore, the terrain hampered delivery of supplies and evacuation of the wounded. Helicopters needed to facilitate these two crucial things could only land with relative case near Route 9. The strength of the troops was greatly taxed as they had to carry an additional load of food and ammunition to make up for the lack of supplies. All these factors had a significant negative effect on the morale of the troops. On the other hand, the terrain was very familiar to the enemy, as they actually lived and carried out military activities there; their personal gear was light, contrasting greatly with ARVN’ bulky loads. In summary,
In planning an operation, it is crucial to take the terrain into account.
The northern column’s withdrawal by foot along the Route from Bandong to Lao Bao could not avoid heavy casualties either. The two columns consisting of the Airborne/1st Armor and 1st Regiment did succeed in retreating with minimal losses. That the 1st Regiment, however, lose one of its best officers, Lieutenant Colonel Le Huan, a battalion commander. Once these two columns had left the battleground, the enemy concentrated their forces to assault the 147th Marine Brigade around Delta Base. The 2nd and the 4th battalion which had previously deployed further west of the base, was forced slowly back towards its perimeter. The Brigade was well supported from lime-Mt-Coroc by the artillery of the 258th Marine Brigade, and also by air support. The Arc light B-52’s were particularly effective and accurate in the close range air support.
But the enemy stubbornly stayed in their hideouts and bunkers, and so resisted ARVN attacks. The fighting was protracted, and was unfavorable to the Marines in that supplies and medevac was unattainable. The enemy artillery, including recoilless 75mm guns were positioned in vantage points opposite to Delta Base, so they were able to fire directly at the TOC bunker of the Brigade Headquarter. The antennae was shot down neighbored bunkers were destroyed, and Marine’s Howitzers were damaged. In response, the Brigade gave the order to retreat south to block the apical line along with the enemy with could approach them. The 4th Battalion was to move north east to protect the retreating route of the Brigade that led eastwards towards the direction of the 258th Brigade. The Brigade Headquarters then requested I Corps permission to pull out from the base to continue fighting in the surrounding area, rather remain at base, only to be on the receiving end of the enemy artillery. However, the proposition was not applicable as the order to retreat was issued in the afternoon, and that very morning an unforeseen event occurred. A platoon of 70B sapper had successfully infiltrated through the defense line of the 5th Battalion and had managed to occupy one bunker located at the south entrance of the base, but they were stopped there and the 5th Battalion sent a company to dislodge them out. Many of the sappers were killed or wounded and the rest surrendered. On the interrogation, they revealed they belonged to 324B Division, and that their duty was to assault the 147th Brigade. Body searches revealed a piece of paper reading. “We dedicate our lives to the annihilation of the Crazy Buffaloes”

(continued)

[vinhtruong]

The NVA batteries located west and southwest of the FSB continued to pound ARVN Marine daily. The 2nd Marine Battalion was also targeted. In the north, the 4th Battalion received remarkably light shelling. In preparation for the retreat, the Brigade Headquarters sent one Reconnaissance-Company Alpha, commanded by Captain Hien, to collect information about enemy positions so that a trajectory could be chosen for that evening. Unfortunately, the company was overwhelmed by the NVA troops and the commander and many Marines were taken. With no reconnaissance reports, the brigade was forced to decide on the route that would lead them in the direction of the 4th Battalion, from which they could cross the mountains to the east. The plan of retreat was as fellows: The 4th Battalion was pathfinder to clear the trajectory and lead the retreat; The 5th Battalion was to follow with the Brigade in tow; The 2nd Battalion was to make up the rear.
All artillery pieces were to be left in an unusable condition, most were destroyed the important parts of others were disarticulated by standard operational procedures and thrown away. Deeply distressing and regrettable was the fact that their dead could not be sent back home, as the helicopters were unable to land. The wounded, however, were all carried along by medics and friends. To make the retreat relatively safe, the Brigade requested B-52 intervention. According to the agreed plan, once the B-52 were to stop bombing. The Brigade would start pulling out of the FSB just before the scheduled-time; the 2nd Battalion reported having seen indistinct lights presumably from track vehicles to the south. At the fixed time, 4 boxes B-52s bombarded 1 mile south of the FSB, and east of the 4th Battalion’s position. As soon as the bombardment stopped, the Brigade immediately abandoned the FSB. Barely one mile away, the 4th Battalion met an NVA mortar unit. Only one volley of five was enough to repel them. The retreat was exceedingly arduous, and Marine had to cross hills and mountains covered with thick thorny bamboos in total darkness. Meanwhile the batteries of the 258th Brigade located on Mt Coroc was persistently shelling at FSB Delta and behind the 147th Marine Brigade to thwart the NVA’ Regiments/70B pursuit. They also included AC-130 flare-ship to illuminate the retreat path and to provide guidance in the darkness. The 258th Brigade was sent forth to welcome the 147th Brigade. The entire night was spent marching. Luckily, there were no engagements with enemy. The path being so rough probably hindered their pursuit. It was fortunate that after Marine left the FSB, the NVA was unsure of Marine’s exact evolution maneuver. At noon, the following day, the Brigade met the 3rd Battalion. Right away, Marine requested the Marine Division Headquarters to medevac the wounded to safe base; then Marine all moved in the direction of the 258th Brigade. Marine had covered considerable distance when the NVA began the shelling. Fortunately, the aiming was poor. By dusk, Marine reached the gathering place close to Mt Coroc, where Marines were to be airlifted to Khe Sanh in the morning. After all, the 147th Brigade managed to reach safety after a fortnight in Laos.
The NVA regiment was in the good shape in the bunkers and foxhole waiting for friendly troops to fall into their traps. So many B-40, B-41, 57mm recoil were aimed down on Route 9, if the friendly force so strong they used 152mm guns for firing support. Suddenly, an armored carrier M-113 at a middle of the convoy advanced to forward with high speed, passing 11th Squadron, and task-force headquarters, and passing the 17th Squadron. That M-113 like a craze buffalo, she used every explosive devices through out from both side flank of the vehicle with steady high speed 40 kilometers. After 30 minutes, that M-113 jointed with the element of 17th Squadron. However, far behind the 11th Squadron when reached at the ambush siege subjected the ferocity attack by NVA regiment that cut squadron a half, and almost half squadron was destroyed, or burned; the survived soldiers help rescued the wounded to the other remnant squadron carriers.
Now Colonel Luat reorganized the close distance from there to Bravo Camp, the 17th took a lead, then task force headquarters, and 11th Squadron and the final back was 7th Squadron. That convoy at last reached at Alpha Camp, meant almost closer to the Laos Viet border about 16 kilometers. When she reached everyone over here were waiting for withdraw together. The number soldiers more increased the more responsibilities of Colonel Luat was increased too. Now he ordered to take turn, “the 11th Squadron took the lead”, the convoy proceeding about three kilometers suddenly inflicting an ambush of other NVA regiment, they intended to attack and killed all ARVN soldiers. The lead captured few NVA’ prisoners, among them having one officer who said: “from here to Lang-Vei, they had two NVA regiments waiting for ARVN troops on the way back. They had only a goal killed all of ARVN soldiers” Suddenly they had a urgent order from spot plane OV-10 Bronco, must passed left that area at once, B-52 Arc-light will stroked like carpets after two hour”
Colonel Luat ordered “left on the spot all vehicles running by tires in pretentiousness, forming a half circle to west, north, and south side, engines running, putting on high beam light to these three directions, North, West, and South, and leaves direction toward east in darkness for retreated to Khe Sanh. The Airborne XO leader officer, Lt Colonel Ngoc on board of the lead; they were proceeding at night by infrared, the spaced proceed would look like stuttering beams of green. Colonel Ngoc guided the convoy to the border one by one line up smoothly moving. At 5: A.M in morning, the convoy was passed about 10 kilometers, everyone were so patiently due to hearing B-52 Arc-light from SAC took off from Guam, then Utapao Thailand struck three boxes spells on the trucks being light on that they had left there. The convoy continued proceeding to the border. At 11: A.M the convoy arrived at the Xepon River though the water level in a dry season so shallow. However must stopped there waiting U.S Sky-Crane CH-54 slings two Bulldozers D-4 for demolition. Immediately power-man Colonel James Vaught contacted with 101 Airborne division requests helicopters slings forward to operation area some D-4 bulldozers and CH-53 Sea Stallion, CH-47 Chinooks for fuel refill. Vaught also brought with him the old French operational map about Xepon tributaries in dry-season. After two express try to do platform gentle backdrop of steep road; Yet at 11: PM at midnight all chained-vehicles have passed through the other side waterfront [But when James Vaught became General and General Phu became 2nd Corps commander: The images as beautiful as this the so called perfect retreat Operation Lam Son 719 will never happened again …a painful heart pitfalls of General Phu, Oh God what’s different Route 7 and Route 9! But so dreary! In heaven, General Phu wasn’t making sense! Because time was change] General Phu committed suicide when Saigon felt.
After two hours, they carried out the job and the convoy tried crossing the river to another flank of river. At 11: P.M at night all the tracks-convoy were running until 8: A.M they reached at Lao-Bao. Thus, the Operation of Lam Son 719 ended. Early the next morning, 23 March, while Khe Sanh Base was still finishing off Communist sappers who had infiltrated earlier, the ARVN armored column crossed the Xepon River and the lines of the U.S. 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 5th Division. The convoy returned with 98 vehicles left behind, among them 22 M-41 tanks and 54 armored personnel carriers. Aerial and photo reconnaissance showed that the ARVN units had left 21 tanks, 26 armored personnel carriers, 13 bulldozers, two graders and 51 vehicles at a night bivouac area on Route-9. The SAC/Arc light B-52s, USAF/EC-130Bs gunship and artillery were used to destroy these vehicles to keep the enemy from using them, and also a wonderful WIB’ Bones objective. Khe Sanh Base, in the meantime had received four NVA retaliated-attacks by fire during the night, all by 122-mm artillery, but damage was insignificant.
General Abrams described Operation Lam Son 719 as the largest battle of the war to date
As the results of the operation began to be reflected in the enemy’s reduced level of tactical activity, diminished logistical throughput into South Vietnam, reduced rate of personnel infiltration, and concentration on restoration of his lines of communication, Abrams reached a dramatic conclusion. “I’m beginning to have a conviction about Lam Son 719 that that was really a death blow,” he said during discussion of a new assessment of the enemy’s situation in mid-August 1971. Overall, our ARVN troops have fought well under extremely difficult circumstances. There has been a mixture of effective and ineffective performance, as in any combat situation, but on the whole the effective far outweighs the ineffective. Thus our troops have prevented the enemy from achieving his major objectives. One major improvement of this battle was integration of air, armor, artillery, and infantry into a coherent whole. It seemed to me “this has been outstanding made great progress in this area in particular”. Nevertheless, later General Abrams reflected on what the US side had been doing while 1st Brigade’s armored forces were in a desperate struggle.
“And the battle was still raging,” he recalled. “We were getting on, and doing things, and – everybody was – doing pretty good .They’d got over some of the shocks. But what was the staff doing? Goddamn it, they were in there gathering photos and making charts and so on, all about the goddamn armor equipment that had been lost over there in Laos on Route 9! (Permanent Government’s planning plot, for instant Airborne was real good for the Rapid Deployment Force but let them an out-post stationed instead of 1st Infantry Division position) That was the thrust of the ‘working’ and ‘thinking’ of the damn staff. Now – there wasn’t way to get that back. The ‘bill’ had already been paid! There was a fucking disaster! But there’s no point in that being the whole damn subject of conversation, the whole subject of thought, from there on! Now there’s got to be some pos – That’s what will lick you. That’s what will lick you. The guy that doesn’t get licked is the guy that never even thinks he can be! The thought never comes to his mind! He has the patience to accept disaster and disappointment – and ‘outrage’ – but he keeps after it.”

However I hope that some justification below that what I say will clarify the battle situation: One regular human being could withstand extreme a thousand round-shells in various indirect pounded over his head…in every hours that lasted long enough for day by day and week by week …could you withstand? The Permanent Government had anticipated warned, had bogged down and become a blood debacle with our ARVN troops, Laotian hilltop strongholds cut-off and annihilated piecemeal. Meanwhile in United States American TV viewers witnessed the sick sight of Saigon troop-deserters mobbing Huey helicopters and hanging from skids. During the under siege emergency withdrawal stage some units panicked by inundation of shelling, naturally with able-bodied men rushing medical evacuation helicopters, seeking a place on board or, as documented in some widely circulated photos, clinging to the skids of the ships.
Because this was the Axis of Evil scam so why ARVN troops as a consequence continued to be outgunned by the enemy and thus at a distinct combat disadvantage, at Tet-Offensive enemy having automatic AK-47 riffles while ARVN having Garant M-1 firing one by one shot. Now at Lam Son 719 enemy having B-40, B-41 antitank but ARVN none! In the next year, Easter Offensive 1972 US introduced antitank weapons TOW missile. Let see what’ the hell General Abrams complaint below:
“I gave twenty to the Marine and the 1st Division because they were the only troops I knew of that had stood and fought. I don’t want these things in the hands of the enemy. And on the Airborne, I told General Kroesen [that] when General Truong will give me his personal assurance that they will not be abandoned on the battlefield, then I’ll consider it”
But in my view-point implied some insights into where things could go from there. It might be fair to say that in fact achieved the objective of getting US to withdraw ground troops at a safe fairly steady and significant rate (60,000 troops during Lam Son 719) Based on all available intelligence, the enemy had succeeded in moving of 67,000 short tons he had input overwhelming into Harriman-Highway’s corridor system. This forced him to continue a protracted war strategy for the ‘axiom-1’ accomplishment that the enemy’s next objective might be to get the US air effort similarly reduced, and to block having a residual US force in South Vietnam. After that, the Permanent Government’s goal might be to get military assistance and economic aid to Saigon regime cut off. And again, working the same way that he’s had success before, in other words to try to get US Congress to stop appropriating that kind of funds so that the Saigon would essentially be out of ammunition. Surely that was, as things turned out down-stream, pretty much the way it was going to evolve.

(continued)

[vinhtruong]

HẮC-BÁO Company and Brigadier General Sid Berry In the early morning of 31 March, in the projected area of operation, a wave of Arc Light B-52 strikes was followed by 22 tactical air sorties, all designed to prepare a landing zone south of the Laotian salient approximately 40 kilometers southeast of Lang Vey. However, at 10:30 hours reconnaissance aircraft reported continued heavy enemy antiaircraft fire. At least, an UH1-H, one round hit the engine, and it quit. This chopper executed a low-level crash landing into the trees, letting the tail boom take the brunt of the crash. No one was hurt – thank God! Everyone got out without trouble. They only had one survival radio. They saw some NVA coming toward them, so the flight-crews move off about 400 meters – They knew the NVA would have no trouble finding their bird, so there was no point in staying near it. The crews came to an abandoned underground shelter that they thought they could defend, and they set up there in counting on EC-130B gunship air-cover with call-sign “Specter” During that night, they received a pretty serious ground probe from the enemy – that in retrospect was probably intended for them to use up their ammo. Always thank for Specter covering over head. The EC-130Bs and AC-130s flare-ship, both were night vision equipped and would fire within 20 to 30 feet air ground closed support of their position. The NVA quickly learned that any serious threat against them was quickly met with a terrible air strike during daylight hours and Specter during this night too. The FAC reported that, at one time, he had eight sets of bombers stacked up waiting to put their loads in around them. Only once did they scare the crews – when the FAC from OV-10 Bronco talked to the tactical jet fighters, he would have to tune his radio to their frequency and couldn’t take to the flight-crews. Specially, the fighter bombers from Thailand put a load of CBU-24 (cluster bomb unit) in very close, and the crews couldn’t tell him just how close it was – unfortunately, their gunner was light hit in the arm from some of the shrapnel. Brigadier General Sid Berry flew over them that nothing and said. “They had a plan for “one more thing” to get them out, but after that they were on their own best. Because for their security reasons Berry didn’t tell them what they planned to do. It involved inserting “HẮC-BÁO” (Black Panther Company) to about one mile southeast of them right this afternoon. The HẮC-BÁO were considered the elite black tiger troops of the 1st Infantry Division that particularly would selected for recover downed U.S flight crewmembers in Laos. After three days and two nights, they were very much aware that the HẮC-BÁO was getting close to them. They could talk to the FAC and he had a Vietnamese “backseater” who could talk to the HẮC-BÁO. They linked up about 3pm and moved back over the same terrain and trails they had taken to get to them. It took for the crews about three hours. Finally, they passed concrete bunkers and some impressive NVA works. It was obvious that the NVA had “built to stay” in this area. Vocabulary the HẮC-BÁO were very good troops and certainly had the U.S Air Cavalry respect and appreciation - HẮC-BÁO saved U.S flight crews lives!
Though President Thieu ordered to early-out of Laos, but Pentagon, General Haig would like to “search and deployment” Thereby a preparation of the landing zone by air-strikes were resumed and at 11:30 hours a Black Panther unit of the 1st Infantry Division, about 200 men and supported by the 2/17 Air Cavalry Squadron of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division landed without problems. In the meantime, a FAC aircraft and a communication relay aircraft circled over the area. The Black Panther unit searched the area and found the bodies of 85 enemy troops killed and 18 weapons destroyed by B-52 action. Continuing their search, the troops only made light contacts with the enemy. On the night of 31 March, enemy vehicles were heard moving to the south and the information was immediately reported to the Forward Air Controller. The FAC verified the information and called for an air attack in which five enemy vehicles were destroyed. The following morning, friendly troops continued the operation and found an enemy fuel dump hit by air-strikes along with a destroyed tunnel complex housing tracked vehicles. The next afternoon, the Black Panthers were picked up by U.S. Army helicopters. In the meantime, the evacuation of Khe Sanh continued. After President Thieu's visit, the Airborne Division boarded aircraft bound for Saigon, and also my mission air close-support for Airborne Division was terminated, I flied back to Danang 51st my Tactical Wing. On 2 April, the 8/4 Artillery Battalion, the last U.S. heavy artillery unit, left Khe Sanh, heading southeast. On the night of 4 April, the entire Marine Division left the Laotian border area and red-deployed near Quang Tri¸ Vietnamese and U.S. logistical installations at Vandegrift and Khe Sanh had by now all relocated. On 5 April, the ARVN 4th Armored Squadron and the 37th Ranger Battalion were the last units to leave the border area, bound for Dongha. On 6 April, another raid of the Black Panther forces of the 1st Infantry Division was initiated against another area of the Lao-Viet border salient approximately 22 kilometers southeast of Lang-Vey¸ at 10:00 hours after preparatory air-strikes, the reinforced Black Panther Company landed unopposed. The search it conducted lasted until late afternoon without making contact with the enemy. At one location, the Black Panthers found 15 enemy bodies and 17 weapons along with large quantities of food and an intricate network of tunnels, trenches and huts, all destroyed by air-strike. In the course of the operation, U.S. tactical air destroyed three antiaircraft gun positions. The Black Panthers were extracted at 17:00 hours the same day. A few hours before the Black Panther unit ended its second raid into enemy bases on the other side of the border, the last ARVN and U.S. units were on their way out of Khe Sanh to Cam Lo where they boarded trucks to return to their respective parent units. The U.S 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry Task Force was the last unit to board helicopters leaving Khe Sanh, thereby ending Operation LAM SON 719.
CASUALTY:
Lam Son 719 as Chief MACV-SOG warned, had bogged down and become a blood debacle by 25 March, 1971.
-FRIENDLY Forces: with respectively were an United States AIRCREW [source from MAC/SOG]– 215 killed and 38 MIA; 118 wounded
-VNAF, 51st Tactical Wing: 10 killed, and 4 MIA, 14 wounded and ARVN – 1529 killed and 714 MIA 2,483 injured, as well as 96 artillery pieces and 71 tanks destroyed,
-ENEMY Forces: NVA suffered terribly in Lam Son 719 “We believe that during the operation the enemy lost the equivalent of 16 of the 33 maneuver battalions they had committed in the area of operations,” said a MACV analyst. “In addition, we believe that he’s lost at least 3,500 of the 10,000 to 12,000 rear service personnel that were operating in the area prior to the operation.” The US intelligence community concluded that the NVA lost more than 13,000 killed in action defending their supply lines, along with large quantities of tanks, ordnance, and supplies. The ARVN source put enemy losses at 19,000 killed in action, along with more than 5,000 individual weapons, nearly 2,000 crew-served weapons, more than a hundred tanks, and large quantities of ammunition. A Polish Military Advisor to the International Control Commission that “the North Vietnamese were both surprised and hurt by the Lam Son operation. He said that discussion with NVA officials showed that they had lost heavily in personnel, particularly cargo-supply.

My assessment and Comment:
Engaged this operation for 42 days of my view of bird [gunship treetop flight maneuver] based on “Oral-Reports”, “Declassified-Documents” and “After Actions Reports,” I came to the conclusion that “true brothers-enemy and hatred and bitterness have never generated anything really good in the end, because all we are the victims of the Axis of Evil’s scam” that’s the largest battle of the war to date. It’s considers this operation was very important as Korea-War, an amphibious operation at Inchon as Normandy in WW-II. As the results of the operation began to be reflected in our brothers-enemy’s the so called a reduced level of tactical activity, diminished logistical throughput into South Vietnam, reduced rate of personnel infiltration, and concentration on restoration of his lines of communication. Un-logically, “I’m witnessed on my own eyes to have a frustration about Lam Son 719 that was really a death blow for both sides plus destroyed out of date war-material: I felt so strongly about the thrust into Cambodia and Laos operation and these operations are the two most intelligent moves the U.S troops have made since allies force have been in South Vietnam. And this sooner Lam Son operation may end the war and may save hundreds may thousands of lives in the long run, in the Permanent Government’s scope!” That’s just everything not on time, on place but purposely, too late time for all NVA cargo were already moved to the Southern most for full fueling the Harriman Highway corridor in southern.

The “Permanent Government” crucial objective was dumping in blow-out all cast off WWII American and Soviet weapons on the remote spot as Tchepone, according to “Aid to Russia 1941-1946” preplanned-war: “Surplus C Rations were used in both Korea and Vietnam” (http://www.natic.army.mil/soldier/media/fact/index.htm - VietnamGear.com)

(continued)

[vinhtruong]

Below there was my preliminary evaluation of the military debacle of the summit in operational defeat and comment:
- On the topography: There was only one Route 9 passing through the area of operation, bordering on both side were continuous mountain range. Such terrain was difficult for heavy armored vehicles which easily became targets for ambushes. Thick forests on the mountain and hills impeded troop movements, especially in the south, which was covered with huge bamboos. [As I knew in Ap Bac battle 1963, the Viet Cong dug underground shelters near huge bamboos for good protection so why my priority bamboos stand for my first targets] Additional case was a disadvantage for the offensive force, observation was poor, and losing directions was real hazard. On the other hand, the terrain was very familiar to NVA, as they actually lived and carried out military activities there. Their personal gear was light, contrasting greatly with our bulky loads as U.S fashion. In planning an operation, it is crucial to take the terrain into account. But General Giap knew this operation before formed a new Front Corps 70B in last year October, 1970 by the antiwar-activists via mediator triple-cross Pham Xuan An. Giap was standby already for playing game.
On Intelligence Information: (due to Pentagon, NSC determination on January 18, 1971)
As SOP (Standard Operation Procedure) Before any operation, it is crucial to gather intelligence, G-3 would outlined the operation plan, which would then be discussed by experience staff members, ultimately the decision would be made by the commander. Accurate information, timing, and location are all important factors to considered, in order to kept the number of low cost. In general, intelligence information was inaccurate or came too late, and many operations were doomed from the beginning as this operation. Sometimes, if the information gathered was correct, the planning was poor. It was simplified this operation organized by WIB Bones via General Haig on Permanent Government’s behalf at Pentagon as his Command and Control manager. Because the Pentagon’s Goal would like accomplished “axiom-1” so prior to Operation 719, our G-2 really did not have a really clear objective of what idea was going on. During briefings, information provided was vague, ambiguous, and orders given to the Units, Brigades, Divisions, Regiments and Groups lacked co-ordination and accuracy. Thus the combat-units had to find out for themselves the true nature of things.
Before the Operation started, purposely, General Haig, Pentagon’s intelligence sources had estimated that there were only one or might be two active NVA Divisions in the operational zone. Pentagon pretended to fail to note that potential reinforcement could have at least 6 NVA divisions, in addition to tank regiments and a very strong display of anti-aircraft weapons. His information about the main target Tchepone was poorly gathered. The unusual planning of the attack was based on what those anticipations have been broadcasted by Hanoi Radio. The result was that ARVN troops were continuously overwhelmed, surrounded, counterattacked by the NVA through out the entire retreat from Tchepone back to the Laotian border.

President Thieu involved on planning: He orders to General Lam “postponed the Hill-32, stationed by other Airborne Brigade as preoperational plan” [in the map, you see FSB/LZ/Hope, this is FSB-32 or Hill-32] Lack of knowledge regarding enemy activities and unfamiliarity with the terrain led to bad planning, that arrived at unsuitable requirements to in order to capture the target. Even if there were only one of two NVA divisions present in the operational zone, the fighting force of I Corps was still too weak – for an attacking force to succeed, their numbers ought to be triple or more the size of the enemies. Of course, I Corps force was nowhere near achieving this advantageous ratio [for instance Pentagon’s planning: Only One 2nd NVA Division (Sư Đoàn 2 Sao Vàng) under stronghold bunkers at Base 604, then all our three divisions will attacked this target … how much casualty of our ARVN forces, you think …and eventually we will need B-52 carpeted all over our troop in melee status, because behind us another four NVA divisions encircled (320, 324, 308, and 304) supported by 202nd Tank Regiment. So why President Thieu decided to “Early-Out,” Pissed there a mess and go home for saving ARVN’ lives this of course against Pentagon General Haig’ objective]
With the help of the Axis of Evil in keeping Secrets: The Harriman highway (Ho Chi Minh Trail) was extended to allow NVA troops and supplies to be transported to the South. These factors were the reasons why our Search and Destroy Tactic failed in the long term, though it had been so effective. The Hanoi merely hid across the border or in far-reaching province. Actually, Secrecy is a necessity for any operation. There were innumerable operations carried out under the 1st and the 2nd Republics of South Vietnam, but their results were not particularly notable, though sometimes facts were ameliorated for propaganda purposes, or to boost morale.
The ARVN was notoriously inept at keeping secret. Often operation would be launched only to find that the Viet Cong had deserted the targets a few days beforehand. Assaulting deserted targets was a waste of time and lives, as most were rigged with booby traps and land mines. In addition, such fruitless operation exhausted logistical supplies, leaving us susceptible to Viet Cong attack. The Viet Cong, by avoiding a head to head confrontation had the advantage of surprise, and good preparation time.
Regarding Operation 719, the organization took two months, during which every facet was taken into account. These included plans to move I Corps Forward Staff from Danang to Dongha, building supply warehouses in Dongha and Khe Sanh, building command bases for I Corps Staff, sending for reinforcements from Saigon. With such activity, even civilians could tell something was up. Needless to say, the NVA, with its Triple-Cross-mediator Pham Xuan An and Agent Russell Flynn Miller, CIA counterespionage in spy-system help, easily guessed the purpose of the operation. In an attempt to fool the enemy, I Corps came up with a rather banal and naïve decoy. With the useful help of above spy-system, naturally, Hanoi did not bat an eye lid, and calmly watched developments at the real target. Hanoi had plenty of time to move in more reinforcements from the north and survey the battle well set underground. Consequently, ARVN movement whether forwards or backwards the only one Route 9, that would have been easier, and the NVA would not have had the chance to cut the units into two, except if General Tri alive and Commander I Corps, Tri will not return to Khe Sanh but direct the ARVN returned along highway 914, and 922 coming out of Laos to Ashau-Valley, never attack and retreat in the same path-road like Route-9
Medevacs and Supplies were the mainstays of any operation, the larger the operation, the greater the demand. In the planning, I Corps had absolutely relied upon the air powers, [but I don’t even 100% aircraft in in commission] namely helicopters from Americans for support, supplies, medevac. Once supplies were hampered the fighting spirit of soldiers was naturally influenced. Lack of ammunition and guns caused the firepower to decrease. Shortage of water and food weakened the troops, the wounded died waiting for medevac. Thus the organization of logistics should be of primary concern.
Commanding and Staff Matters: I was frequently present at Khe Sanh, Ham Nghi Headquarters, I Corps Staff Meeting, but I never saw General Dong, Airborne Commander, and General Khang, Marine Commander at meeting…why? The key to commanding effectively is to have one unified system of command and control between commanders. This is much more effective than executing tasks separately. In Operation Lam Son 719 there was discordance at the top levels. Lieutenant General Lam the overall commander was outranked by the Marine Commandant, Lieutenant General Khang, who was his senior. General Khang instead of flying to Khe Sanh to help and advise the former, liked General Dong, stayed in Saigon, and sent his Assistant Commandant, Colonel Lan to I Corps to command the Marine Division.
However, Brigadier General Phu, 1st Division Commander was always presented at any meeting day. Throughout phase-2, I Corps itself was not in perfect accord with the 1st Infantry Division, and the Marine Division Staff and I Corps Staff had several disagreements between them, so I wouldn’t said a bitter conflict.

Operation Lam Son 719 was the largest operation into Cambodia till then, though there had been previous incursions organized by III Corps and IV Corps: This operation which was reported around the world required an experienced and talented commander at higher levels to deal with the confrontation. It needs a truly experienced military man, not someone who made his way by supporting the right political factions. General Lam had never had experienced in commanding big battles and naturally encountered big problems when he was in charge of I Corps. He surrounded himself with cronies of the same background. The picture of ARVN soldiers hanging on the skids of a helicopter which evacuated them from lower Laos and other equally dramatic photographs showing battered I Corps troops returning back across the Laotian border caused grave concern among South Vietnamese, military and civilian alike. Their concern deepened when they read the tantalizing news articles first carried by American newspapers and magazines then picked up by the foreign and Vietnamese press which all reported that the ARVN incursion into lower Laos was being terminated. The military spokesman had a hard time denying these reports. He announced that this was simply an exchange of operational forces and for all practical purposes, LAM SON 719 was still underway and that ARVN forces were continuing their destructive forays against Communist logistical bases and infiltration routes on the other side of the border. But news; about raids in lower Laos no longer interested Vietnamese public opinion which was more concerned about the real outcome of the well publicized campaign. In the absence of official announcements, rumors and speculations proliferated. Everyone wanted to know the truth about friendly losses. But when official results were later made public, no one seemed to believe that they reflected the truth.

In summary, with such a Corps Commander and Staff, the operation was doomed from the start. The operation ended hastily after more than a month of fighting, leaving on the battlefields heavy human and material losses on both sides [This is real good for the Axis of Evil’s scam] but the situation in Laos remained unchanged. So why in the tactical sphere, General Abrams suggested General Do Cao Tri (named Vietnamese like General Patton) should be taken over General Lam but unfortunately he was murdered because damaged against the ROE [Rule Of Engagement: avoiding destroyed all COSVN material cargo ammunition inside Cambodia territory] and if President Thieu stubbornly had given order “Early-Out,” the outcome should be terrible losses human and material. Moreover, Tchepone stand for where was the dumping-spot for all out of date military materials in both side Soviet and U.S cast off in WW-II, and next year (1972), once again some more of obsolete stuffs like Navy gunfire heavy-shells, Mark 52 Mine for harbor mined, Long Tom 175mm, Tank M-48, Navy ship New Jersey, Oklahoma … all out of date in various kind of aircrafts as F-105, F-100, F-8, 7, A-6 … should be putting in the garbage, and Navy ship New Jersey, Oklahoma anchored in US seaport, everyone can buy one dollar tickets for seeing the damn ugly monster before recycling.

In the end, Lam Son 719 lasted for 45 days, due to President Thieu would early-out and the never adequately dependable on U.S airpower was the only thing that saved the ARVN from a complete defeat in Laos. The North Vietnamese nevertheless did not get off unpunished: their losses were indeed heavy to a degree where their planned invasion of South Vietnam had to be extinguished for a full couple years. But the real objective of Permanent Government was obsolete war equipment must be “blow-out” by War Industries Board’s wishes.

(continued)

[vinhtruong]

In short, I came to the conclusion that war is sometimes necessary and war is at some level on expression of human feelings. American has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of its citizens and the strength of its arms. I hope the service and sacrifice of its men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Vietnam to Iraq and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans – and its actions matter, and can bend history in the direction of justice for the 21st Century as we hope.


THE END -

(Author: Vinh Truong, VNAF 51st Tactical Combat Group Commander)

[vinhtruong]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6EhN6saQ1c&feature=youtu.be

[bienhoa221]

======:41::41::41: Operation Lamson 719-:41::41::41:======


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l6EhN6saQ1c&feature=youtu.be

(Vinhtruong post)
* Xin mạn phép Anh Vinhtruong...copy lại địa chỉ -post Video A/C Em dễ xem hơn-Cám ơn anh*

[vinhtruong]

Căn cứ Video trên đây tôi thiết tưởng cũng nên lý giải cho rỏ vì phần đông các chiến hữu cho rằng hoả lực Cobra thật kinh khủng hơn hoả lực gunship VNAF? Trên lý thuyết bạn hoàn toàn đúng, hoả lực Cobra hơn gấp 3 lần hoả lực UH-1H. Nhưng sự “thất thế” của Cobra thì nhiều hơn UH-1H là khi thấy mục tiêu Cobra cần “Vòng Chờ Tác Xạ” thời gian nầy VC đã chui xuống hầm để chuẩn bị ứng phó với thế “tam giác kế” yểm trợ liên hoàn. Vòng tác xạ cần đủ độ cao để đâm đầu chúi xuống tác xạ kéo dài thời gian. Nhưng trên thực tế chiến trận khi Gunship Song Chùy với lối bay kạ càng trên cành lá như bạn thấy trên Video, nhiều cặp mắt cú-vọ phát hiện địch trước khi họ trong thấy sát thủ. Nhiều vị thế để tác xạ bao quanh từ trước ra sau coi như phát hiện tất cả xung quanh phi cơ mà địch không cách nào thấy trước cho đến khi nhắm mắt cũng không còn kịp mỡ mắt nhìn sát thủ bay lướt qua, mà tôi cho rằng gunship Song Chùy là sát thủ trong thế tao ngộ chiến. Hoạt cảnh nầy không thể có được trên chiếc Cobra khi bất chợt thấy địch. Đó là lý do gunship Song Chùy dùng tất cả minigun mưa xuống khống chế không cho phép xạ thủ chường mặt ra và sau đó từng chiếc Song Chùy nện rockets chống tăng đã đem lại chiến thắng một cuộc phục kích chiến xa lớn nhứt trên đường tiếp cứu Đồi 31 ngày 23/2/1971 trong khi chiến xa VNCH không bị trầy trụa gì như trong sách The Better War

Chuyện giết người làm tôi bị ám ảnh mải không ngủ được. Phi công khu trục giết người sao sạch sẽ quá, không thấy gì cả, chúng tôi giết người thật dã man rừng rú? nhứt là những ổ súng cộng đồng. Xạ thủ dễ nhận vì lính BV sơ hở không kịp xoá bỏ những khối đất đỏ vòng cung còn tươi rói, như ông gunship ơi chúng tôi đang ở bụi nầy!

Vũ khí lợi hại cho “Tam giác kế” lien hoàn - [ZPU-4 14.5mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery - YouTube
The ZPU-4 is a towed quadruple barreled anti-aircraft gun based on the Soviet KPV 14. 5 mm machine gun. It entered service with the Soviet Union in 1949 and ...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SDUlLbKTfM – Cached .Play Video

Hậu quả sự thất vọng của tướng Haig vì TT Thiệu không chịu khai thác chiến trường tại "lò nướng 604" nên tướng Haig nổi giận cúp hết không yểm trong cuộc rút lui mà chỉ để dành hoả lực cho quân lực Mỹ mà thôi. Cuộc rút lui hỗn loạn: Tại sao cuộc rút lui của LĐ/1/ĐN bị hổn loạn? Thống Chế người Ðức Helmuth von Moltke đã nói: “Mọi kế hoạch hành quân trên giấy tờ đều trở thành vô dụng khi bắt đầu đụng trận với địch quân". Và “theo tâm lý, cuộc hành quân lui binh nếu bị đụng-độ thật khó mà hoàn thành được tốt đẹp, nhưng đứng trên phương diện khách quan QLVNCH rút lui nhanh và hoàn thành thật đáng khen dù có lũng cũng đôi chút về lãnh đạo chỉ huy giữa Dù và Thiết Giáp
Hệ quả, sau khi tướng Haig rầy rà tướng Abrams vì TT Thiệu dở chứng ươn ngạnh kh ông nghe lời Mỹ, rồi tướng Haig quyết định giảm tối đa không yểm hoả lực cho QLVNCH trên đường rút lui rất bất lợi là độc đạo và đường rất hẹp cheo leo nơi cạnh sườn với nhiều vực thẩm khó mà chịu đựng nổi một cuộc phục kích "chốt chận"

Thế là gunship Song Chùy phải cùng phối hợp với Phi-đội Gun-Cobra thuộc 3rd Squadron, 5st Calvary, mà thay phiên yểm trợ hoả lực tiếp cận cho cuộc hành quân lui binh của LĐ1ĐN. Gunship Song Chùy được Air Calvary giúp đỡ trang bị hoả lực do Ban vũ khí của Lữ đoàn 1 Không Kỵ tùy theo tính cách yểm trợ hỏa lực khác nhau nhưng cùng chung với Cobra, khi chống tăng, khi chóng biển người, khi phả hủy hầm B-41 ... Với một nhúm Trực thăng võ trang của Phi-đội/213 chỉ có yểm trợ cho Dù thôi, bây giờ phải cán-đáng thêm công việc yểm trợ cuộc hành quân lui binh bay dưới sự đe doạ thường xuyên của Pháo binh BV bắn chụp xuống chận đầu cuộc rút quân, tệ hại nhứt là pháo 152ly tối tân của LX vào thời đó, và Cối 120ly, khi chạm nổ văng ra vô số mảnh vụn, cũng là "khắc-tinh" đối với trực thăng bay thấp. Nhưng chúng tôi vẩn cứ ở trên đầu quân bạn trong khi pháo BV cứ liên hồi bắn chận hên xui như chim mổ, dù vậy chúng tôi vẩn phải chui vào nhửng cột khói cầu-âu của pháo binh cùng dàn rockets salvo 122 ly BV theo sát chân quân bạn.
Với cao độ rà sát nầy, cũng hạn chế tầm hoạt động của phòng không địch không dễ dàng phát hiện chúng tôi, hay nếu phát hiện cũng bị triệt tiêu bởi hoả lực cũa 6 nòng pháo tháp minigun cường tập trên đầu chúng trước khi phản ứng. Dù rằng trong trò chơi trận chiến nầy quân BV bị cấm ROE, không được dùng hỏa tiễn cầm tay tìm-nhiệt như SA7 nơi đây, nhưng thí dụ chúng có dùng thì cũng chi vô dụng với cao độ thật thấp nầy, hoả tiễn cầm tay SA-7 cũng cần có cao độ và khoảng cách thì nó mới phát triển vận tốc có hiệu quả phóng nhanh vào ống thoát exhaust.
Để đi đến kết luận, chỉ có lối bay “kinh-dị” nầy mới đem lại sự sống còn cho phi hành đoàn Song Chùy - Cho đến khi chấm dứt cuộc hành quân, không có nhân viên phi hành gunship Song Chùy nào bị hy sinh, theo tôi nghĩ: “cũng chỉ là hên xui vì đạn tránh người chớ người không thể tránh đạn!”
Phi công Hoa Kỳ cũng thừa hiểu nơi đây chỉ có 6 trung đoàn phòng không AAA, gần 700 súng cổ điển, nhỏ nhứt là 12,7ly, 14,5ly, 23ly, 37ly, 57ly, đến 85ly và 100ly sơn pháo bắn thẳng trên 10 cây số. Gọi là sơn-pháo, có nghĩa là loại chạm nổ để cầm chưn quân bạn ở trên các ốc đảo CCHL rồi dùng biển người xung phong bắt sống với câu "Hàng sống chống chết",
Những lằn đạn lửa chỉ đỏ rực đuổi theo đường bay sát hai chiếc Cobra, gần đến nỗi tôi tưởng chừng chỉ với tay ra là có thể nắm được! Farrell vội liên lạc vô tuyến báo cho phi công phi công Trung úy TPC John Clark Hunter TPC và WO1 Carl Naca, jr, HTP về ba họng súng phòng không yễm trợ liên hoàn nguy hiểm đang khạc lửa từ khu rừng cây phía dưới mà chúng tôi đang theo dõi và thấy rõ lằn đạn lửa bay lên.
Hai chiếc Cobra vội bay tạt ra xa rồi dùng tất cả hỏa lực salvo vào các ổ phòng không. Sau ba vòng oanh kích, chỉ còn lại một ổ phòng không cạnh sườn đồi hoạt động, Trực thăng của Đại úy Farrell cũng đã bắn hết các hỏa tiễn mang theo nên thông báo cho chiếc Lead-Cobra dẫn đầu biết cần về Khe Sanh để tái vũ trang và bàn giao lại cho chúng tôi. Nhưng phi công Lead John Clark Hunter cho biết anh cũng chỉ còn vài trái hỏa tiễn và sẽ nhào xuống lần nữa để tiêu diệt nốt ổ phòng không cuối cùng, Đại úy Farrell trên cương vị chỉ huy, cố thuyết phục Carl Naca và Clark Hunter đừng làm như vậy vì oanh kích không có đồng đội bắn yểm trợ sẽ rất nguy hiểm, nhưng chiếc Lead trực thăng kia vẫn ngoan cố lao xuống mục tiêu.
Gần như cùng một lúc với những trái hỏa tiễn nổ tung tại vị trí địch, một loạt đạn phòng không bắn trúng vào chiếc Cobra, Carl Naca, Copilot Clark Hunter thông báo bị trúng đạn vào cánh quạt sau đuôi rồi yêu cầu Đại-úy Farrell yểm trợ cho anh đáp emergency landing. Farrell vội hướng dẫn chiếc trực thăng liều lĩnh của Lancaster bay xa hơn về hướng Nam, nơi có một bãi cỏ tranh khá rậm. Phi công Carl Naca vừa ráng bay theo vừa cố giữ cho phi cơ thăng bằng. Nhưng chiếc trực thăng vì cánh quạt đuôi đã bị hư hại nặng nên mât thăng bằng, rung chuyển tăng dần high frequency dữ dội, bắt đầu đảo lộn rồi rơi xoáy tròn xuống đất trước mắt chúng tôi. Khi phi cơ tản thương Dusk stuff tới được nơi chiếc Cobra lâm nạn, họ tìm thấy xác hai viên phi công đã chết vì bị gãy cổ khi trực thăng rơi counter clockwise xuống đất.

Nhờ vào kinh nghiệm chứng kiến và địa hình trước mặt, nãy giờ chúng tôi bay vòng chờ khuất tầm quan sát của địch, ở sau đồi trọc và trên đám rừng cây, trên đầu quân bạn. Tôi chưa chắc đã ngán họ, nhưng mục tiêu chính là làm cách nào cho đoàn quân xa được an toàn rút lẹ về Khe Sanh để khỏi bị các “Chốt-chận” cấp Tiểu đoàn hay tệ hại hơn là cấp trung đoàn, vì theo tin tù binh chúng có hai trung đoàn 29 và 812 của sư-đoàn 324B toan làm chốt chận và quyết tử với quân bạn có chiến xa yểm trợ. Cuối cùng, địch quân cũng bị đẩy lui, nhưng có thêm 6 xe thiết giáp bị cháy. Đoàn xe tiếp tục dung rủi dưới hỏa lực còn lại của chúng tôi trong khi chờ Cobra Mỹ đến thay phiên sau khi chúng tôi vừa tiêu diệt chiến xa M-41 và M.113 bị chúng cướp dùng súng bắn lên chúng tôi …