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Tựa Đề: Operation lam son 719

  1. #7
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    Default Operation lam son 719

    In the Tet-Offensive, once I had seen my HU1-H crewmembers return from battlefield. Four flight crewmembers, brave-men who had given their courage, their disciplined dedication, their blood to a cause now lost. Their remains had zipped shut in four black-bags filled with too many friends who had given their lives trying to win the Red-menace. I had acquired a sense of civic duty to my country that was not deterred by the vicissitudes of poor leadership. When I looked into myself, I knew that I would remain faithful to a code of personal honor attached to what I understood as the ideals of my country’s form of government rising above the confusions of political and military leadership. This became explicitly clear to me when I was interviewed by allies-officer in my class Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air University Alabama. They asked me “What I thought of the war”, and I recall telling them that I thought it make no sense to me to try to defend South Vietnam so long as the border areas of Cambodia and Laos were conceded to the Hanoi. I had no quarrel with resisting the spread of Red menace, but I could see no strategy being applied that had prospects of success. Nevertheless, I remember telling the allies-officer students that “my patriotism was stronger than my unhappiness about poor US intervention strategic policy!”
    When I stepped down from a twice-engine transport C.119, a blue-air-force pick up truck had been waiting for picked me up to 1ts Division War-Room. I zipped up my flying-suit and flight jacket to prevent the chill and influenza when in this season fall to 45 degrees in the still darkness of the night, but this weather was another rough friend and foe in the northern I Corp region, and at the height of the monsoon when fog is heavy but usual patchy. The northeast monsoon blows a light, steady, cold rain its height called the ‘crachin’ (from the French word) for “drizzle”, the rain often lasts two or four days at the time and is frequently accompanied by a blanketing fog that stops close air support and also makes artillery hard to adjust when fog is thick enough. Northern I Corps happens to be place where the northeast monsoon is most intense it is the rainiest place in South Vietnam, the average rainfall for Hue, province is 120 inches compared to 77 inches for Saigon.
    I opened a secret envelope that a message is as verbatim order assigned me as a field-chief-commander all VNAF units included two flights, one from Queen-bee 219th Squadron, another belonging King-Star 233rd Squadron and my entire Magic-Club 213th Squadron including 6 HU1-H Gun-ships for special air cover and ground support for Airborne Division. All flight crewmembers now have to standby at the Danang Air-base for in case scrambled over to operational area [Khe Sanh]. But firstly, I must bring my two gun-ships right away to the outpost of Airborne Field Headquarter located on top a mountain right south of DMZ for a short briefing. At 9:00 A.M this morning, where all standby-combat forces were already to scramble.
    Particularly, my 213th Squadron was be chosen by General Dong, the Airborne commander as our perfect air ground support for airborne brigade to recent on rubber Chup Plantation in Cambodia last year 1970, as the same way now, General Abrams chosen General Tri with the nick-named Vietnamese Patton to a field commander for operation Lam Son 719. But Tri was killed while his helicopter took off and exploded when operation Lam Son 719 just started.
    I prepare to land on a helipad the Camp-J.J.Carroll (named for a Marine captain who died to seize a nearby ridge) Camp Con Thien, and Rockpile, each dominated by one brigade) An airborne major Khoi came and guided me to the briefing room, a big bunker with abundance sand bags staged around.
    At 9:00 A.M, at briefing room when I showed up General Du Quoc Dong hand shaken by implication for I should doing the best. He said: “I personally had had cable to President Thieu for your squadron worked with us because your squadron was the elite not only for the Vietnam War but the World War too…as you knew…I put my trust in you whereas US…they’re not deserve to be trusted!”
    I wondered that Dong was just notorious a simple combat soldier he hatred politic but now his statement too much political in his hindsight. I took command of this 213th Squadron after graduated to US Air University. In 1970s, I brought one flight detachment to engage Cambodia War as air supply and medical evacuation support to an Airborne Brigade to cover rubber Chup-Plantation. Now this manipulated action exerted by General Lam I Corps commander, thinking first of his Corps own interests, needs, without concern for III Corps in alert; He complaint to President Thieu for his selfish reasons. “Why every Corps having their own-helicopter wing and there was never coming to reinforced us at the usually hot at DMZ not sharing what I Corps has with others” President Thieu responded “All priority for Cambodia War”
    On the high relief of Carroll Camp looked down to route 9 reaching to western mountainous area, from this outpost spread along Route 9, which extended across the northern badlands from Dong Ha at the coast to Khe Sanh in the far western mountains, overlooking the Laos border. I found out a long like snack convoy of trucks heading to Khe Sanh maybe for this operation. Whereas to eastern flat terrain of the green plain and bushes I could find out some airborne soldiers appearing somewhat underneath the foliage for practical exercise. Major Khoi indicated his finger to down there and said: “Supposedly, our troops down there get trouble encircled by enemy they needed your guide how to protect them by your fire-power cover support…and the most important we never use color smokes on our location…but just a red color panel only!”
    Two gun-ships were flying over 300 feet above an airborne battalion. I tried to contact on FM 42.5 friend called sign “Dong-Da” for identified target spot and strafing two 2.75 rockets right on target and turned sharply to the right now left mini-gun continued tracing on the target. Dong-Da ground force was very pleased but I radioed next pass-prep, we will made dived prep-approach parallel left side for avoiding fired remnant cartridges didn’t fall on the troop.
    With my experience by almost as a quick reflex action I often don’t use the gun-sight instrument while firing. I trust my Sergeant Duc, he was a good gunner, sometimes his eyes were same my eyes on target. Two mini-guns were the big killer that recalled to me in the battle northwest of Chu-Lai, just only two gun-ships but killed a full battalion of NVA [lest than 150 men] which was crossing the Thu-Bon’s river. I also recalled once a smuggle boat belong to NVA Group 759 was been detected, this supplied boat was everyone on board get killed by mini-guns after 24 rockets missing by two new nervous rating-pilots prep. The ghost boat continued proceeding to the shore Phong Dien county Quang Tri province without pilot directed, a ghostly creature flitting on the surface of the sea to land at My Thuy beach; Marine Brigade 258th was welcome her with different kind of weapons, plus a platoon Tank M-48 in strafing into it with their canons. The typical of this ghost boat was carried a thousand to thousand ‘beacon pork-meat’ canned at China made, plus various supply categories of military materiel.
    The NVA troops were screwed up for everything they had leaned how to react and shot to the airplanes. Because all fighters even helicopter Cobra when they started to fire they must dive to release their fire-powers. The NVA had instructed by US counterespionage– firing only at the time their fighter-bombers raised their head to sky, then stands and freely shot at them whatever you get in your hand. A platoon of antiaircraft artillery divided three points of three equilateral triangle angles; each angle established a stronghold AAA guns. Where they dug up land for individual holes 60 decrees inclination, these shaped hole for personnel sliding when fighter dived on their top as target; meanwhile two another strongholds kept firing but a stronghold was on the target, people must gliding under the 60-degree hole, and at once, while the fighter raised the head to sky, stands in fired at him. It’s strange they haven’t heard from this tactical was only harmful by our bullets 7.62 mm at 4,000 rounds per minutes by Gunship HU-1H model. So why NVA were only get killed by our monsters in that very-moment.
    One captured AAA’ NVA officer told us, they were confident with these tactical offenses
    They were never had casualty with this method of defense. If the battle lasts longer run that meant VNAF and US aircrafts having so many chance of being risked to shot-down than destroyed them and the most we used the “Snake-Eye” bombs, 250 or 500 pounds. He said these bombs exploded on the mountainous forest as southern Laos, likely the big fire-cracker celebrated in lunar New Year spell. That meant VNAF like F-5, A-37 AD-6 dropped bombs … their efforts to strike him were futile.
    In the earlier of Lam Son operation, following the operation plan, one Airborne Brigade should take over a stronghold of a fire base with call-sign Hill-32, but Lieutenant John F Kerry of antiwar movement had let Hanoi known everything planning for this operation so why President Thieu ordered cancelled the last anticipated Hill-32 fire base support. However Hanoi skeptically if in doubt, don’t act unless allies forces in south DMZ are been certain, other word Hanoi was disregarded anything by Kerry had say, although he was a notorious antiwar activist showed up everyday in world TV. Kissinger and Yale graduated John Kerry were chosen by Harriman for his conspiracy, naturally Kerry was supported by Skull and Bone for his future presidency campaign; so coincidence with actor quarterback Kissinger in the play-game Pennsylvania meanwhile Kerry duty performance to accomplish axiom 1 – the anticipated of biggest-fiasco that I foresaw in my whole time there because it broke the back of the Saigon regime of Army forces, particularly irreplaceable were the dead ARVN “elite-officers”. I must say since ‘that’ the future leaders, they were all dead. Subsequently Skull and Bones turned in Saigon to Hanoi with a blood-leak battle instead of bloodbath one. This operation identified one of these strategy-goals. Furthermore this repeated “the bomb ends the war”: dropping the atomic bombs brought the war to a swift conclusion, saving many lives in the process, after a Big air-campaign: on the night of March 9-10, 1945, Permanent Government ordered 324 B-29s attacked right the heart of Tokyo as low level in the most destructive air raid in then history, ended by B-29s were used to drop the first atomic bombs on Japan. On August, 6, 1945 Colonel Paul Tibbets, aircraft commander B-29s, named “Enola Gay” dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima in saving many lives in prospect. War-history once again repeated – The B.52 has long been one of the main instruments of Permanent Government foreign-policy. During the Cold War it was the airborne warrior that would have dropped nuclear weapon onto the Soviet Union or maybe on China if Red China tried to overrun the southern states of Soviet Republic in its critical possibility be-collapsed-period. The special “Big Belly” B-52D could also carry a load of 108 conventional bombs, and during the Vietnam War in the “Pennsylvania’s” as Linebacker-II, 129 B-52s of several models carried out the 11 days and night attacked the so called “Christmas Bombing” which designed to force Hanoi to conference table in Paris.

    Phase-1 (1 Feb to 7 Feb) – On 1 February 1971, as U.S armor and mechanized forces were moving to open Route 9 west to the Laotian border in a preparatory stage of the Laotian incursion, after two weeks discussing plans for Lam Son 719 by NSC on January 18, 1971. One week later, 8 February, 1971 ARVN cross border. General Abrams cabled Admiral McCain to advise that the bulk of the enemy’s combat units in the region are located in the vicinity of Tchepone, the operation’s ultimate objective. Whatever else might happen, it was clear that the disposition and strength of enemy forces in and near the area of operations were not going to come as any surprise to the attackers.
    Lieutenant General Armor Hoang Xuan Lam, I Corps, was in command of the thrust into Laos. The U.S counterpart in Military Region 1 was Lieutenant General James W.Sutherland, an armor officer who commanded the XXIV Corps. MACV depended heavily on Sutherland and his headquarters to advisor, support, and encourage General Lam and the Vietnamese during the operation. Lam had under his command for the operation the 1st Infantry Division, the Airborne Division, the Marine Division, the 1st Armored Brigade Task Forces and a Ranger group, the best troops South Vietnam possessed, attacked spearhead by eighteen acted combat battalions
    Stated a later North Vietnamese history, “…our combat forces in the Route 9 – south Laos Front had reached 60,000 combat troops, consisting of five divisions such as 320th, 324th, 2nd, 304th, and 308th: two separate infantry regiments such as 278th, and 27th; eight regiments of artillery, three engineer regiments, three tank regiments, six anti-aircraft regiments, eight sapper battalions, plus rear service and transportation units. This campaign was our army’s greatest concentration of combined arms forces in its history up to that point.”
    On the defensive in Laos, the enemy was going to be able to amass and sustain a much larger force than he could have projected into South Vietnam.
    Phase-2 (8 Feb to 5 March) – On 8 February 1971 the ARVN forces began crossing the border into Laos and Operation Lam Son 719 had been under way. Alongside the route, a hundred yards before the border, was posted a sign that read: “Warning, No US personnel beyond this point.” This mission was to disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication and destroy stocks of war materiel – especially in Base Area 604, centered on Tchepone – thereby setting back the enemy’s timetable for aggression, protecting American forces during their progressively withdraw, and providing more time for South Vietnamese forces to develop. This ground thrust was an integral part of the larger effort to thwart enemy aggression by denying him the wherewithal to carry it out, a complement to the intensive air interdiction campaign along the entire line of communication in the Laotian panhandle and against the target box system that sought to block the entry points into the trail system.

    (Continued)

  2. #8
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    Default Operation lam son 719

    From the outset it was hard going. Route 9 was at best a narrow, twisting, nearly unimproved surface, or so it looked from the air. The reality was much worse. In 1962 an occasion in alert for rescue STRATA infiltration, our Queen-Bee H.34 must standby there. I had chance strode along the route 9 to hunting the peacock, recognized the surface some of those weather cuts that were in that route were fifteen feet deep. A few days after the operation commenced. They missed that in the readout of the aerial photography. The area of operation extended from Khe Sanh, in Coroc highlands situated 12 kilometers east of the Laotian border, to the city of Tchepone, 45km inside Laos. The axial center of the operation was Route-9. Parallel to Route-9 was a small river. Thick jungles of thorny giant bamboo flanked both sides of Route 9 which was 200 to 500 meters above the sea level. Mt Coroc blocked longitudinally from the North to the South, leaving only a path for Route-9 to pierce. Movement troops were very difficult and limited in such topography. Everything depended on Route-9. The high relief crests on each side were ideal places in which to launch ambushes. Troops had to move over undulating terrains, covered with thick bamboo forests that greatly blocked observation and hindered maneuvers. There was very difficult for the offensive force to assault in such terrain even if it were fully supported by armor, air force and artillery. Another disadvantage was that the NVA knew very well this area like the back of their hands, whereas the ARVN troops were unfamiliar with the operational area. It was psychological disadvantage for South Vietnam troops to the must have to fight outside their country in completely unknown terrain and mountainous area.
    In the operation plan, a trajectory called for an armor task force to drive was along route 9 toward Tchepone while – by occupying a string of fire support bases to be established paralleling on the right west mountainous flank. The 1st Infantry Division protected the southern flank, and the Marine Division constituted the reserve. Later the armor would link up with airborne elements to be airlifted to Tchepone. Leading the way into Laos was the ARVN 1st Armored Brigade Task Force, reinforced by two airborne battalions. Next an ARVN airborne brigade headquarters and one of its battalions moved into position, followed by another airborne brigade and then a Ranger battalion. Other units followed.
    Unfortunately, the cuts will have an adverse effect on all operations to win the war. Given the restricting “Cooper-Church” amendment, no advisors accompanied ARVN troops into Laos, not like in the last year incursion to Cambodia, and of course no America units participated. Air support of all kinds was allowed – however, as was artillery and logistical support from the South Vietnamese side of the Laos/VN border. This generated a massive operation in support of the incursion. Early on, General Abrams visited the primary base for all this activity, a reopened Khe Sanh. “It’s hard to believe,” he marveled, “the helicopters, the trucks, the artillery, the amount of equipment that is in that whole thing up there. I’ll tell you, I’ve never seen anything like it in the time I’ve been here. It’s quite remarkable – fifty-three CH-47 Chinooks, really something.”
    US heavy artillery lined up along the border to provide fire support including eighteen 155mm
    Howitzers, sixteen 175mm guns, and eight 8-inch howitzers But the huge amounts of aviation support were the real story of U.S support for this operation Lam Son 719. Additionally, Seventh Air Force kept up its interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, during the first week of Lam Son 719 destroying a new second high number of trucks for the dry season (but trucks were broke-down in the parking area due to all targets the CIA made decision – everything worked but nothing worked enough on strategy for protracting the war) but that was now only part of its massive efforts.
    General Lucius Clay said: “I’m flying roughly 12,000 support sorties a month in addition to this,” referring to the number of individual aircraft missions being launched for various purposes (demolished stony mountains for created a future International Indo China Highway and NVA should be ground cleared by the early pioneers, debut at Harriman Super-Highway)
    Clay continued: “I’m flying 21,000 sorties a month in airlift. I’m flying roughly 850 – 900 sorties a month in recon. That’s all maintenance capability, whether you expend ordnance or not,” meaning that every one of these flights generated s maintenance requirement. “There’s a limit to what you can do in generating sorties.”
    In the wake of a broadcast by President Thieu announcing this operation; Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma issued a formal statement of protest. The language of the statement, said a MACV analyst, suggested that “certainly the primary responsibility rests with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which, scornful of international law…began and continues to violate the neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.”
    Meanwhile, on behalf of Viet Cong National Liberation Front, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh cabled an urgent message to sympathizers in the United States: “Earnestly call you mobilize peace forces your country…check United States dangerous venture Indochina!”
    Alas! On 10 February 1971, I never seem to learn from my mistake, in the earliest of this operation, an echelon-formation of 4 UH1-Hs of my 213th squadron, but 2 were exploded in air by antiaircraft gun 14,5mm armed on PT-76 and 37mm AAA in the northeast of Tchepone for a mission reconnaissance. All crewmembers and passengers were killed including four journalists and I Corps staff officers at coordinate XD 563537 at 15:00.
    The cold air spread so low on highland ground inflicted on my back while I’m on a military-cot inside the canvas tent; under a mosquito-net I meditate on the sufferings of that terrible shock to their families. “How can I prevent that wouldn’t happened again?” I couldn’t sleep for night long due to the U.S Long Tom 175 guns at Khe Sanh, strafing to now and then waking me up. This section on Ho Chi Minh trail, from Mu-Gia Pass via Tchepone to Attopeu was familiar with me; I could know how every scenery in my heart, every relief, peaks of high mountains, creeks, rivers, streams, the virgin forests, human activities in devastated by bombs, now I looked devastating with very impressive and effective. The spot LZ that Lieutenant Hue crashed when was infiltrated landing a STRATA team in 1963 due to engine lost-power now became clear red-earth soil instead of the green dark forest; I recalled I Had had put right wheel landing gear on his Queen-Bee hub-blades for rescue all flight crewmembers. Now everywhere filled by ware-houses and POL pipe-line parallel on its. And also the AAA from here shot-down our HUI-H when this early operation started.
    After a longest night I rubbed my eyes and yawned broader, though sometimes caught an hour or two naps on the nearby duty watch’s cot, but mostly I got my shut-eye from dozing in a metal folding chair, and came out looked out across the darkness toward Dong Da stronghold base, as the token artillery fire sounded in the muffled way that artillery always seems to sound on battlefield at night and an occasional star shell from the batteries illuminated the sky.
    How can sleep? I recalled nine years ago (1962) as same place Khe Sanh quiet and peaceful I awoke early morning to the sounds of the stream. It was shrouded in thick impenetrable pea-soup fog, but its murmur reached through inside my tent as I sipped my coffee. The only sounds were the awakening, chirping, singing birds and the babbling riffles as the stream split and wove around a highland directly in front of my tent-yard. Was I in the backwoods wild of Khe Sanh or some remote distant location out west to Tchepone?
    I became obsessed with that accident. “What do I conclude from that, and what conclusions do I draw from that casualty prevention?” The most of my concerned was the new rating pilot attachment to my responsibility from brand new formed squadron 233rd King-Star. I am convinced myself from now on, I will handle a lead gunship as escorted combat formation to air cover every UH-1H slicks fly cross border to the operation area, and the rendezvous point should be a check point over the old-French-prison at Lao-Bao right on the frontier Laos where to their coming and leaving. By way of conclusion, I will having a short briefing to all ‘aircraft-commanders’ of squadron 213th, 233rd, and 219th, in the early tomorrow morning for the new tactical gunship air cover-escort with the hope ‘no one get killed’.
    At the left side of the Route 9 to Tchepone was the Xe-Pon River, but in 1962 there was very cool, I recalled that aerial photo mission I made a stupid flight when detected a sampan camouflage covered with full becoming browned leaves, I surrounded over its in the air for funning picture, suddenly from those browned leaves the submachine gun fired to my H-34 chopper, while I came back to Khe Sanh, Captain Phu (now brigadier general commander 1st Infantry Division, the finest infantry unit) told me that your helicopter blades got hit three holes by Mat P.49 equipped to French Airborne, if your hear one by one that meant Mat-36, so I told him that Mat-49. Now Phu was still his looking shape pale and thin and always the cigarette sticking in his fingers but not French-Bastos heavy cigarette. This time his face appeared frequent worry and nervous because the B.52 took off from Utapao (tactical bombardment or strategic bombardment take off from Guam) let him the shortest time when B-52 flew “Arc-Light” missions attacking the so called communist hiding beneath the featureless jungle canopy but targets depended on CIA for protracted war or demolished stony-mountains; so you known they couldn’t be killed. But CIA’s goal was pushed pressure to ARVN troop hurry up on course trajectory on ‘keyed-up-time’ to the siege-target 604 – NVA’ base cargo supply.
    In the TOC’ bunker I can hear loudly his order “Any directions clear enough for run away at once! Run away at once.” That meant pushing Colonel Diem regiment commander at southern flank to move quickly to Tchepone.
    Strangely, the NVA thrust coming from north DMZ that I could understand they crossed by our three fire-base supports but B-52 didn’t strike on them at all, but only than on ARVN infantry regiment in southern flank? Why? Because General Giap (cooperated engagement with OSS before 1943) though was an indirect apparatus of Skull and Bones but Giap help them carrying out their strategy instead used all powerful forces attacked directly in to American Khe Sanh Base (so nowadays his sibling stayed in California, USA) This plot was imagined by your simple knowledge; why don’t attack closer easy-won but attack too far at open area-dumpster, Base 604, Tchepone?
    On 10 February advance elements of the armor column linked up with an airborne battalion at A-Luoi Fire-Support Base, some twenty kilometers into Laos, despite truly miserable weather that had set in the previous day. On the same day ARVN I Corps Headquarters, already struggling with the complex tasks of coordinating a multi-division attack under difficult terrain and weather conditions, suffered a serious setback when 2 VNAF helicopters crash resulted in the deaths of two of its most important staff officers, the chief J-3 planner and the chief J-4 logistician. However the Chinooks CH-47 really something when they hook up the Howitzer 155 artillery to every FSB as Dong Da, Hill-30, 31 in the northern flank were great O.K. It’s hard to believe. In the two full days of February, two airborne brigades, one infantry regiment, Ranger, CH-47, CH-54 hanging in air heavy loads to every established Fire Support Bases back and forth; everything were fluently quite beautiful. But only 2 Huey were accident by ground fire belong to my Magic-Club 213th squadron and Colonel Diem regiment’s few slowed react soldiers were killed by our friendly B.52s bombardment from Guam, by preplanned road map in Pentagon.
    From about 12 February on, ARVN forces more or less held in place and hunkered down, not a wise tactic in an operation of this kind. Later it was asserted, by the rumor that government not among permanent government, that President Thieu had issued secret orders to his commanders to halt the advance when 3,000 casualties had been sustained. Nguyen Tien Hung, a former special assistance to Thieu, later cast doubt on that claim, writing that “Thieu insists he never gave such an order!” The next day General Vien Chiefs Staffs invited General Abrams to meet with him. General Vien described President Thieu’s visit and briefings in I Corps on 12 February, and “said that after a thorough discussion of intelligence and dispositions, President Thieu directed that the ARVN forces not advance further at this time beyond the western positions they now hold.” General Vien thought this would be a hold of three to five days and affirmed that they still intended to go to Tchepone. Abrams in turn pointed out the disadvantages of remaining in static positions, “giving the enemy both time and opportunities to reorganize his reaction in a more effective way”
    How can we know that war game between the axe of evil to its counterparts [Soviet Union and Skull and Bones] must coordinate their efforts in function together efficiently and in an organized way as ROE’ scam. I was understandably bitter about the outcome of the long years of struggle for free South Vietnam. That performance alone should serve to demonstrate that I was as stunned as any that the sometime American ally would, in a time of such crisis, turn its back on South Vietnam and of course on all the sacrifices my SOG fellows in arm had made there.
    Here is a typical case for their craps. The G.I stayed in the Main Compound at Danang Air Force Base in 1972, a certain morning at breakfast time when the loud-speaker said something but our Airmen-housewife didn’t understand what the hell they say; but they wait until afternoon and come to check the Hospital Ship [Hope or Helgolan] of Germany disembarked not still anchorage in the pier of Han’s river. They hurried back and suddenly launched into a harangue to their husbands: “Tonight Viet Cong will launch rockets into our air base. I bring the kids to downtown for escaped…if you would die try stay on here…O.K!” Prophetically, they prophesied that at night when the loud speakers said: “All G.I must go into the bunker about five minutes rockets will strafing, it also clear announcement how many rockets will hit and TOT too and it repeat one more time before rockets hit.
    In turn of ROE, on August 9, 1968 three box B.52 (nine aircrafts) “Arc-Light” took off from Guam to strike the Forward Base of 559 Group headquarters at Tam-Boi’ mountain, “Oscar Eight” call sign for SOG, northern Ashau-valley where mountain contained immense chambers hewn from solid rock and fitted with heavy iron door, so well constructed that they withstood B.52 strikes. However according to the ROE, the camouflage Soviet fishing boats nearby the Guam Island contacted with that headquarter 559 Group before long enough to TOT(Time On Target) for hidden chambers hewn escaped B.52 struck.
    The raid began with three throngs B.52, a dawn Arc Light a thousand 500 and 750-pounds bombs walk across Oscar Eight, setting off 50 secondary explosions, witnessed by our recon team Master Sergeant Billy Waugh watched. Incredibly, the bombs had barely stopped falling when he could see NVA troops running from their shelters to roll fuel barrels away from a fire. Waugh radioed SOG Lt Col Harold Rose at Khe Sanh, “I’ve got people out here scurrying around. That sonva-bitch is loaded”. All NVA troops were secure even they couldn’t hear the sound of eight jet engines flown at high at 25,000 to 35,000 feet.

    (Continued)

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    Default Operation lam son 719

    Venal Press-Corps’ Biased Reports: The nature of this operation was too stranger, “attack” was a maneuver much advantage than “defense,” but Giap’ forces don’t use this tactical for destroyed all U.S forces at Khe Sanh much closer and easier won the war, why not? And the must-fight at the ‘barbecue drill-oven’ as Base 604, Tchepone instead – this is a perfect value-plot of CIA counterespionage in collaboration between two counterparts was effect to separate the clique cadre communist Hanoi out of China- domination. B.52 killed General Nguyen Chi Thanh pro-China prior to helping Le Duan and Le Duc Tho carried out their scams by seizing the totalitarian-power at Hanoi’s regime.

    Subsequently General Sutherland provided some further insight, cabling Abrams that the South Vietnamese had modified the original plan primarily because of heavy enemy contact by the Rangers and the Airborne forces on the northern flank of the penetration, and the demonstrated inability of the armor brigade to move rapidly along Route 9. For quite some time enemy forces had remained cautions and were, in fact, somewhat slow to reinforce. Their first serious counterattack came on the night of 18 February, when two NVA battalions struck the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion northeast of Ban Dong. This 39th Ranger has to retreat to South LZ to shake hands with 21st Ranger Battalion as pressure is too strong, encircled by armor PT-76 and tank T-54 of B-70 Corps. During that night, 7 AC-130 flare-ships and 6 EC-130B Gun-ships were covered, destroyed numerous NVA tanks and troops. Subsequently the major battles of the operation took place on that northern flank of the penetration, especially at Fire Support Base 31 and 30.
    Venal Press-Corps’ Biased Reports
    (You probably heard of the story BAT 21, or worse watch...the Movie Bat 21, if the US main stream media used to ignore the role of Ranger’s effort during the Lam Son 719. The following except-paragraph is credible enough to shed light on the scenario: Sergeant-Medic Fujii (Lam-Son 219) and Lieutenant Norris (BAT-21) what their differences in at work)
    “Ask yourself, Lt Norris can’t located your bath-room when he was your first coming guest, and Sergeant Fujii was merely a man speak good English” That’s simple answer for you all.
    Warning no U.S personal beyond this point: This sign-board showed-up 100 meter from border Laos/Vietnam. General Lam authorized these strike-newsmen on board of VNAF helicopter crossing border to Laos, of course dare theirs step down on the soil-land for intrigued to illuminate the situation and the times, consequently on 10th February, 15:00 hours at the coordinated XD 563537, meanwhile, near the area of operations of the 21st Ranger Battalion, our 213th Magic-Club Squadron flight a formation of four VNAF helicopters bound for Landing Zone Ranger South was hit by enemy 37-mm antiaircraft artillery and PT-76 machine guns fire at 3:00pm. Two helicopters were downed and all passengers were presumed killed. The first helicopter carried two ARVN colonels, the G3 and G4 of I Corps. The second helicopter reportedly carried a number of foreign correspondents [in 1998, all remains recovered were testified: -Keisaburo Shimamoto; -Henri Huet, AP; -Larry Burrows, Life and -Kent Potter, News Week, but specially, Pham Xuan An, Times/UPI, triple-cross-mediator, he was on board of helicopter H-21, landed at battle of Ap Bac 1963, but in this operation Lam Son he did know how what the hell, so why he never on airborne to Laos. However, on Route-9, a Japanese journalist Akihiro Okamura worked with Times magazine accompanied 1st Armor Brigade, his point of view was the same of mine: ARVN subjected to under siege at 604- fierce ambushed-battle by NVA’ stronghold underground defender of Steel 2nd NVA Division and surrounded by others four NVA divisions. Thereby B-52 had to destroy all of two crucial opponents for guaranty turn in Saigon to Hanoi not like A “Pebble-Capital” – carried out axiom-1 at just we guessed]
    It was suspected that the I Corps G3 had carried with him an operational map of LAM SON 719 along with signal operating instructions and codes. A significant rumor that the loss of these documents to the General Giap’ hands would be extremely in viewer minds? A thorough search of the area for the downed helicopters produced no results. But in reality, Lieutenant John F Kerry, the so called “antiwar movement activist” showed it up to Hanoi via General Giap translated by Triple-Cross mediated translator, Pham Xuan An, so it seemed to me General Giap was seating side by side with General Alexander Haig in Pentagon [General Giap was OSS member recruited by Agent Number 19, Lucien Conein at Pat-Po sanctuary in 1945 photo by Allan Squiers]
    Air Calvary crew, Sergeant Medic-Fujii, Hawaiian, his helicopter got hit by mortar 120mm (these accurate mortars which inflicted almost our helicopters grounded every Forward Fire Support Base) and forced landing on the spot LZ, and fortunately he stayed with Rangers, remember not volunteer, two Pilots, Brown got killed at once, Monteith serious wounded; Crew-chief Simpco light injury, and door-gun Costello was O.K, and the rest Fujii’ crews were picked up by another chopper, except him, because he was smart guy joint-up with Rangers for survive. Now so much biased reports from many prevaricated-newsmen. Medic-Fujii was real good Advisor, he is perfect Ranger Commander, operated some excellent movement troop-maneuvers, knowing how to kill Giap’s troops, volunteer stay for help Rangers … etc … [taking an except of Battle of Ap-Bac in 1963 as … The large, dark green silhouettes of the ‘Angle Worms’ as the Viet Cong-guerrillas called the bent-pipe H-21s, and the ‘Dippers’ their nickname for the Huey, would stand out clearly in the sunshine.
    … Sgt 1st Class Arnold Bowers, 29 years old, from a Minnesota dairy farm and the 101 Airborne Division, heard the bullwhip crack of the first bullet burst through the aluminum skin of the helicopter while the machine was still 50 feet in the air, Bower’s helicopter was the second in the flight. Vietnam was his first war. During his previous eight and half months in the country he had experienced no combat beyond a few skirmishes with snipers. The whip cracked again and again over the din of the H-21 engines before the wheels of the machine settled into the paddy and Bower jumped out into the knee-high water with a squad of infantry and the ARVN first lieutenant commanding the company. His ears free of the clangor of engines, Bowers could hear a roaring of automatic weapons and rifles from the curtain of green foliage in front. The bullets were snapping all around, buzzing close by his ears and splitting the air overhead. He plunged forward the gray ooze sucking at the boots, in a reflex of his training that said the best hope for survival lay in moving and shooting until you could get on top of your opponent and kill him. The lieutenant that the ARVN infantrymen thought otherwise, they threw themselves down behind the first paddy dike they could reach about 15 yards from where the helicopter had landed.
    Sgt Bowers yelled at the lieutenant that they had to return fire and maneuver to get out of the open or they would all die in the paddy. The lieutenant said that he couldn’t understand Bowers. Back at the airstrip the lieutenant had understood Bower’s English perfectly as they had waited to board the helicopters. The Vietnamese was a graduate of the company-level officers’ course at the Infantry School at Fort-Benning. Usually all Vietnamese officers disregarded Americans fighter-men due to lack combat experience (the advisers’ job was not to give the combat-experienced-Vietnamese tactical advice because they had more fighting experience than most Americans, and it was their country; rather, the obligation of the advisers was to apply American air and artillery firepower when that became necessary, which was frequently, and to provide American logistics, coordination with American units, and American intelligence. The Vietnamese fighter-men were weakest in these areas. The job of the advisers, in other words, was to make the ARVN system work. So why all Vietnamese officers considered US advisors following combat operation likewise a “Big Drawback” for them and this was according Harriman mastermind all was be for US combat training only)

    But in fact Sergeant Fujii was solely an English-interpreter in inter-box relayed. The most these ugly-guy-writers who employ a tried-and-true methodology, firstly, they concoct an inflammatory that serves their political goals. “Are their lies pathological, or are they merely malicious for curious entertainment.” They try to push it into the mainstream media. All too often, they succeed. And we have to be more than vigilant … think about that. The 1st Ranger Group participated in the operation with two battalions, the 21st and the 39th, the 37th was in another operation in MR-I. The forward headquarters of the group moved in Ta-Bat, northwest of Khe Sanh, close to the Laos border. The 21st Ranger Battalion was airlifted into the LZ Rangers South, about 6km northeast of Fire Support Base (FSB) Hill-30. Three days later, the 39th Ranger Battalion was brought into the LZ Rangers North, 4km northeast of LZ Rangers South. The two Ranger-Battalions assignment was the sensor to detect the NVA movements and to delay the spearheads of attacks of the enemy toward FSB/Hill-30, Hill-31. If the NVA overran the two FSB’, they cut the retreating Route-9 of the ARVN forces.
    After landing, the rangers established defensive positions in the areas surrounding of the landing zones (LZ) then Ranger Companies fanned out searching for the enemy's trails and activities in their area of responsibility. The 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions, which operated around Landing Zones “Ranger-North” and “Ranger South” respectively, were probably the units most frequently in contact with the enemy. At 18:25 hours on 11th February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged the enemy four kilometers northeast of its base killing 11 Communist troops, but later, at 22:00 hours suffered six wounded from an enemy attack by fire consisting of forty 120-mm mortar rounds. During the afternoon of 13th February, the 39th Battalion engaged a large enemy force at three kilometers west-southwest of Landing Zone “Ranger-North” killing 43 enemy personnel and seizing two 37-mm antiaircraft artillery guns, two 12.7-mm machineguns, a substantial amount of ammunition and assorted types of equipment. The 39th Battalion had only one killed and 10 wounded. Meanwhile, the 21st Ranger Battalion made sporadic contacts with the enemy throughout the day without significant results. Light contacts continued during the following days. All these activities were quickly eclipsed by reports of heavy enemy troop concentrations around the 39th and 21st Ranger Battalions. Both battalions were being subjected to attacks by fire and ground attacks and the fighting lasted all night while friendly artillery, tactical air and AC-130 flare-ships, EC-130B gun-ships responded quickly in support of the embattled rangers. The next morning, enemy pressure on the 21st Ranger Battalion gradually diminished but heavy pressure persisted on the 39th Battalion in the “Ranger North” area. The battle continued over 19th February. Enemy troops here were confirmed to be elements of the 102nd Regiment of the 308th Division, all with new weapons and clothing testified this training center on spot for battle. Before launching an assault, the rangers reported, the enemy made extensive use of recoilless rifles and mortars; his fire was very accurate. The strongest enemy attacks were directed at the eastern flank of the rangers which was their weakest spot. However, the 39th Ranger Battalion continued to hold its positions with support from 42 pieces of U.S. artillery and tactical air.
    From northeast DMZ, enemy opposition grew stronger with each day around Ban Dong and the area of Route 1032B for which the rangers were responsible. On 10th February, the 21st Ranger Battalion engaged an element of the NVA' 88th Regiment. The next day, the 37th Ranger Battalion engaged a battalion size unit near FSB Phu Loc. The discovery of the command post of the NVA 308th Division on 18th February further confirmed reports that this division had joined in the fighting (the 308th Division had three regiments: 36th, 88th and 102nd) During the night of 19th February, the NVA forces continued to attack the 39th Ranger Battalion while launching uninterrupted attacks by fire to hold the 21st Ranger Battalion in check. Sergeant Medic Fujii did damn good job in communication between ground and air like Forward Air Controller officer for a longest night with Seven fixed wing EC-130B gun-ships and six AC-130 flare-ships were used in support of the 39th Ranger Battalion and, from 07:30 to 14:30 hours on 20th February, 32 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the rangers in daytime. Efforts to re-supply and evacuate their casualties were made with strong support from tactical air, gun-ships and artillery. Some helicopters managed to land in the area, ammunition was delivered and some wounded evacuated. But upon takeoff, two helicopters were damaged by enemy undirected fire. One had to land in the positions of the 21st Ranger Battalion (Ranger South) and the other managed to land at Fire Support Base Hill-30.
    (Continued)

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    Default Operation lam son 719

    In the afternoon, reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an estimated 400 to 500 enemy with most of the wounded of the 39th Ranger Battalion still stranded in the 21st Rangers' positions, this unit received intense attacks by fire, including 130, 152-mm artillery, on the night of 21st February. Plans were made to evacuate the wounded rangers the following day toward noon on 22nd February, the area around the battalion position was subjected to a heavy barrage of fire involving tactical air, air cavalry, aerial artillery and ground artillery for 45 minutes while 13 medical evacuation helicopters were airborne, ready to go in. All of them landed and successfully picked up122 wounded as well as one U.S. pilot who had been stranded there since his aircraft was shot down. The ranger force remaining in combat position at Ranger South numbered approximately 400 men including 100 from the 39th Battalion but two days later, on 24th February the battalion was ordered by the I Corps commander to withdraw to FSB 30. From there they were airlifted to FSB Phu Loc. While the 39th Ranger Battalion was holding out, numerous activities took place in other areas. U.S. air cavalry continued to search for and destroy pipelines. Units of the 1st Infantry Division moved further south, striking along Route-92 and finding a number of enemy installations, but also making numerous contacts and receiving attacks by fired The 8th Airborne Battalion and armored elements engaged the enemy two kilometers north of Ban Dong, destroying one T-34 tank and a 23-mm gun position. This was another strong indication of enemy armor involvement. On the friendly side, a number of U.S. helicopters were shot down while on supply, medical evacuation or support missions. The corps commander had concluded that the position held by the 21st Rangers and the survivors of the 39th was untenable. A maximum effort in air and artillery support was required for each re-supply and evacuation mission and he had other pressing demands for this support. The position was not an objective in itself and there was no military advantage in sacrificing a ranger battalion in a doomed attempt to hold it. The corps commander was looking toward his objectives in the west and he wished to conserve as much of his combat power as possible for the main mission.
    Beginning the 14th February, leading platoons of the 39th started exchanging gun-fires with the enemy forces, forward artillery observer called for supports. In the operation, the rangers were supported directly from a company of the 64th Artillery Battalion from Phu Loc. Until 3:00 to 4:00pm all companies engaged in fighting with the surrounding NVA units/70B. The 64th Artillery Company with six 105mm guns could not keep up with the intensity of the battle. In desperate, the forward observer broke in the working frequency of the C/44th Artillery Company on FSB/Hill-30 and requested for support. With the effects of artillery supports, the NVA had to pull back, the rangers also fell back to defense the Battalion Command Post.
    On the following days, the 39th Ranger Battalion sent its companies out on patrol in the area responsibilities – they killed 43 enemies and captured two 37mm AAA guns. The AAA guns indicated that the NVA had a large size of unit in the surrounding areas of the Ranger North. In the south, the paratroopers of 2nd Airborne Brigade, and Infantry discovered storages of foods, fuels, weapons... and dead NVA troops killed by EC-130B gun-ships strafing earlier in friendly protection. Yes we must accepted Medic Fujii was useful for contacting with Flare-ship AC-130 and Gun-ship EC-130B for air-cover, strafing during long night with 6 flare-ships and 7 gun-ships with strike accuracy to protect our forces in retreated to 21st Ranger Battalion. Finally, Medic Fujii was picked up by his Air Cavalry Huey but got hit, crashed again and forced landing near Hill-30 in LZ Ranger South responsibility.
    Until the 18th, the NVA Corps 70B moved its divisions 308th, 304th, 320th, 324B together with 202 Tank Regiment, artillery regiment to counter-attack. Meanwhile 2nd Division was setting for ambush our troop at 604 Cargo Base. On this day, they concentrated to up-root the 39th Ranger Battalion with human wave tactic. The rangers fought gallantly and with artillery supports from Phu Loc and FSB/Hill-30, the communists attacks was repulsed, left hundreds of bodies in the battlefield, the rangers more than 500 weapons of all kinds. The next morning, the NVA troops returned to continue the attack. The battle soon turned into the killing ground. The ARVN’ Artillery from the 64th Battalion and the C/44th Company fired continuously supporting the rangers. The 39th Ranger Battalion hang on for another day, when the NVA pulled back for realignment spearhead for the attack, the slightly wounded rangers were bandaged quickly then returning to the trenches. The rangers probably knew their destiny, they prepared for the last fight... 20th/February, early in the morning, the NVA was mounted a new attack with more intensity. The battle lasted into afternoon and the rangers reaction weaken... then the 64th and the C/44th artillery companies did not hear any calls for helps from the forward observer of the 39th Ranger Battalion. The NVA already swamped into the rangers positions. Aerial photos showed at least 600 NVA bodies left in the battlefield. The survivors of the 39th ran back to the defensive line of the 21st Ranger Battalion and continued to fight side by side with brothers in arms of the 21st until this battalion was also evacuated.
    During the night of 19th February, the enemy continued to attack the 39th Battalion while launching uninterrupted attacks by fire to hold the 21st Battalion in check. Seven fixed wing gun-ships EC-130B and six flare-ships AC-130 were used in support of the 39th Battalion and, from 07:30 to 14:30 hours on 20th February, 32 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the rangers. Efforts to re-supply and evacuate their casualties were made with strong support from tactical air, gun-ships and artillery. Some helicopters managed to land in the area, ammunition was delivered and some wounded evacuated. But upon takeoff, two helicopters were damaged by enemy fired One had to land in the positions of the 21st Ranger Battalion “Ranger South” and the other managed to land at Fire Support Base Hill-30, this Huey piloted by Lloyd and Nelson tried picked up Medic Fujii, just got hit and had to forced landing near FBS/Hill-30, about 4 kilometer from LZ South. In the afternoon, reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an estimated 400 to 500 enemy with most of the wounded of the 39th Ranger Battalion still stranded in the 21st Rangers' positions, this unit received intense attacks by fire, including 130-mm, 152mm artillery, on the night of 21st February. Plans were made to evacuate the wounded rangers the following day toward noon on 22nd February, the area around the battalion position was subjected to a heavy barrage of fire involving tactical air, air cavalry, aerial artillery and ground artillery for nearly an hour while 13 medical evacuation helicopters were airborne, ready to go in. All of them landed and successfully picked up 122 wounded as well as one U.S. pilot who had been stranded there since his aircraft was shot down. The Ranger force remaining in combat position at Ranger South numbered approximately 400 men including 100 from the 39th Battalion but two days later, on 24th February, the battalion was ordered by the I Corps commander to withdraw to FSB/Hill-30. From there they were airlifted to FSB Phu Loc. While the 39th Ranger Battalion was holding out, numerous activities took place in other areas. U.S. air cavalry continued to search for and destroy pipelines. Units of the 1st Infantry Division moved further south, striking along Route-92 and finding a number of enemy installations, but also making numerous contacts and receiving attacks by fired The 8th Airborne Battalion and armored elements engaged the enemy two kilometers north of Ban Dong, destroying one T-34 tank and a 23-mm gun position. This was another strong indication of enemy armor involvement. On the friendly side, a number of U.S. helicopters were shot down while on supply, medical evacuation or support missions. The corps commander had concluded that the position held by the 21st Ranger Battalion and the survivors of the 39th was untenable. A maximum effort in air and artillery support was required for each re-supply and evacuation mission and he had other pressing demands for this support. The position was not an objective in itself and there was no military advantage in sacrificing a ranger battalion in a doomed attempt to hold it. The corps commander was looking toward his objectives in the west and he wished to conserve as much of his combat power as possible for the main mission.
    News of the 39th Ranger Battalion fought until the last bullets then dispersed instead of surrendering spread out rapidly. My air-cover over FSB/Hill-30 in operational area witnessing: “We could not re-supply for them for three days. When ammunitions were about to run out, they got out of their positions, counter-attacked then continued to fight with captured weapons."
    After overran the 39th, the NVA’ Forces moved south and surrounded the 21st Ranger Battalion’s positions. In the night of the 20th February, AC-130 dropped flares lighted up the sky above the 21st Ranger Battalion location in the area of LZ Ranger South. It was the last outer shell which shielded the FSB/Hill-30 from the NVA advances from the northwest. The NVA began their attacks on the ranger’s positions since the 21st the rangers fought back and held their positions. The battle between the 21st and the survivors of the 39th with the NVA units lasted for four days and nights. When the NVA pulled back after many waves of attacks they pounded on the ranger’s positions with 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and mortar 120mm shells to weaken the ranger physicals and morals.
    Fortunately, on 22nd March when morning fog was just disappeared, 13 UH1-Hs were covered by U.S/42 pieces Long Tom 175, 8 inch Howitzer, and 155mm from border. Suddenly the formation landed on LZ Ranger South under fierce strafing air-covered by gunship Cobra. His buddy Air Cavalry abruptly showed up and picked up Medic Fujii and another flight personal in his flight-unit, both was to fly back safety from FSB/Hill-30 to Khe Sanh, included 122 wounded, where 400 rangers include 100 rangers from 39th [Major Khang 39th said Fujii was real good but Major Hiep 21st Battalion Commander expressed Medic Fujii to much scared when reached LZ South, so contacted with American EC-130B gunship for air-cover in turn by Lieutenant Nguyen Son during two last days 21th and 22th February]
    In preserving the Ranger Battalion, in the early morning of the 25th, the 21st Ranger Battalion Commander, Major Khang ordered his men cut fall trees in making a surprised landing zone, due to all LZs were preset-targeted by precision-accuracy of 120mm mortars and 152 delayed-guns preset coordinates XD 593537 and XD 550490 [120mm mortars that burst in an extremely large fragmentation pattern that inflicted our choppers force-grounded at all FSB, can’t take off again due to tail rotor failure and particularly 152mm guns, the duds from these penetrated 4 feet into the earth which damaged almost friendly artillery, and maliciously, NVA hide the real guns, mortars and rocket-launchers in deep pits and in tunnels with cleverly in camouflage]
    At Ham-Nghi, Corps Command was ordered to evacuate according to plan “Zulu-01” Again the 64th and C/44th Artilleries were directed to maximize fire-support for the rangers. About 10:00 am in the morning, four Cobra gun-ships circled above the ranger’s positions then a squadron of helicopters landed quickly in the LZ Rangers South to scoop up the rangers and brought them to FSB/Hill-30 where VNAF gun-ships responsibility for air-ground closed support to 2nd Airborne Brigade. Later another squadron arrived nearby FSB/Hill-30 picked up the rangers and transported them back to Phu Loc, accomplishing the commitment of the 1st Rangers Group in operation Lam-Son 719. However, one company of the 21st Rangers Battalion was left behind on FSB/Hill-30 – they fought together with the Airborne-men in the FSB/Hill-30 until this FSB was also forced to retreat.


    (Continued)

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    Default Operation lam son 719

    POW-JUBILEE: The U.S/POW was publicly humiliated in propaganda campaign by put them in the oxen-cart go around Hanoi’s Hoang-Kiem Lake for Hanoi-residents seeing; But Hà Nội didn’t mean to hurt the United States, it was just a bit of fun?

    Suddenly Hanoi played the game: In the earlier-transaction period (1970) and A Harriman challenged George H W Bush to asset his leadership, The U.S/POW was publicly humiliated in propaganda campaign by put them in the oxen-cart go around Hanoi’s Hoang-Kiem Lake for Hanoi-residents seeing. The evidence suggests that by the autumn of 1970 Communist forces had begun preparations for a spring offensive in Military Region 1, the northern provinces of South Vietnam once the dry season arrived. One indication was formation of a new corps-level headquarters, known as the 70B Front, sometime in October, 1970. Also at that time, General Abrams was told “a highly placed Viet Cong penetration agent reported on enemy plans to launch an offensive with up to four divisions to take and hold major portions of Quang Tri and Hue cities. Significantly, formation of the enemy’s new headquarters occurred well before any specific allied planning for a thrust into Laos had begun a situation that discounted the possibility that the new organization was intended primarily to conduct a defense against allied operations. However the Strategic Air Command don’t have the orders to destroy four crucial targets, each a rectangle measuring one by two kilometers and sited at one of the prime input areas used by the enemy – the Mu Gia Pass, the Ban Karai Pass, the Ban Raving Pass, and an area just west of the DMZ, Tchepone vicinity [where we’ll started Lam Son 719’s operation] Everything was safe and protected due to the goal protracted-war to the Axis of Evil craps via under umbrella Rules Of Engagement (ROE)
    For concentrated all U.S POW to one place, reacted by another way. By 1970, the US had secured the names of over 500 Americans held in North Vietnam prisons. Many more were missing and presumed captured. Reports of the cruelty suffered by these men at the hands of their barbarous captors were received along with reports of resultant deaths from various sources. Anxiety, concern and anger among the next of kin, friends of the captives, commanders and government officials were very much in evidence throughout this country. What was being done to alleviate the growing concern? Negotiations were being conducted in Paris Talk on a sporadic basis depending on the mood of the North Vietnamese representatives. An attempt was made to reach an agreement whereby an exchange of prisoners of war could be made. After over two years of such negotiations, the results were ZERO
    “The mood of the country demanded that something be done to help these suffering POWs. Was the time ripe for an initiative… feasible alternative?

    Suddenly American forces launched a surprising raid on a prisoner of war camp in North Vietnam, an operation planned and controlled in Washington by Harriman successor, George H W Bush’ strategist staffs. It was known that the Son Tay Camp had held American prisoners. By the time the raid was launched in 20-21, November 1970, however, those people had been moved elsewhere, apparently as a result of a maybe flooding that made Son Tay untenable. Later it was revealed that last-minute intelligence had revealed that fact, but the decision was made to let the raid go anyway. The operation was successful in its own terms, although of course no prisoners were rescued because none were there. Clearly another objective was to let the Hanoi know their rear area – the camp was only 40 kilometers from Hanoi – was not as secure as they might have thought. Much later it was learned that the raid benefited the American still held captive, since the Hanoi subsequently consolidated them in better facilities and their treatment improved significantly, so Hoả-Lò should be POW’ concentration. Although no prisoners were rescued, the raid focused world attention on the plight of the prisoners of war (POWs) raised their morale and resulted in improved living conditions for all U.S prisoners of the North Vietnamese. Beside, the men of the Joint Task Force earned the admiration of their countrymen for risking their lives in an attempt to bring freedom to others.
    This is the goal of Son Tay’ Operation and Hanoi Hilton appearing where the POWs sacrificed a good part of their young adulthood for their country, in pain, fear, and isolation but ironically for their greediest warlords of WIB Bones

    All troop movements were accomplished without meeting any resistance. Aerial reconnaissance and intelligence activities noticed enemy movements north of the operation area. Aircraft sorties started bombarding suspected targets. Some days later, the two Ranger positions received continuous shelling from long range 130mm artillery shelling. The vanguard units of the NVA had approached the defense lines of the 39th Rangers Battalion and skirmishes broke out. The Ranger Artillery stationed at the Laotian border Phu Loc provided supporting fire day and night. Days later, under enemy artillery barrage, the NVA regulars assaulted the 39th Ranger Battalion. The 21st Ranger Battalion positioned in the south was also harassed, making it impossible to receive reinforcements.
    The NVA' troop thrust was assisted by 202 Tank Regiment. The fighting became fiercer and fiercer, and both side suffered heavy casualties. The 39th Ranger Battalion bravely battled on, despite being low on ammunition. They resisted for one day and one night, before the position was lost. The unit had to retreat toward the 21st Ranger Battalion's position in the south. Having successfully occupied the hill, the NVA moved west and south-west to threaten the 21st Ranger Battalion and the 3rd Airborne Brigade. The 3rd Airborne Brigade was well-supported by tactical airpower and 213th VNAF/Gunship-Flight. Despite heavy losses, the NVA continued to storm FBS/Hill-31 in the face of long and short range heavy artillery. Although forewarned of enemy intentions, the 3rd Airborne Brigade failed to establish an effective defense with only 300 fighter -men/3rd Battalion, and shared the same fate of the 39th Ranger Battalion. It had fought with courage and bravado, but succumbed to the massive suicidal onslaught of the NVA. The Brigade Staff, including Colonel Tho was captured. Some evaded and ran southwards toward FSB/Hill-30 which was occupied by the brave 2nd Airborne Battalion. Even as they assaulted the 3rd Airborne Brigade Headquarters, the NVA pounded away at FSB/Hill-30 and A-Luoi Base where the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 1st Armor Brigade were positioned. These two units were unable to give assistance to the 3rd Airborne Brigade at FSB/Hill-31, although help was sought of them.

    The crucial goal of WIB Bones’ objective was the ARVN attack on wrong time and wrong place, but so late, “because all the huge cargo-ammunitions were already moved to the southern corridor” (prisoners in fact disclosed that most supplies caches had been evacuated to numerous ‘Binh-Trams’ south Laos by Molotowa-Trucks at Parking-1 that the ARVN appeared not to be surprised at all) So despite the intense air campaign to stop the North Vietnamese logistical flow along the Harriman Highway [Ho Chi Minh Trail] the Communists continued to reinforce their troops in South Vietnam, threatening to disrupt the Vietnamization program in processing, and the gradual withdrawal of the US forces. The WIB Bones and Pentagon in Washington then decided in February 1971 to launch a ground offensive to destroy the enemy logistical depots and to prevent a so called new offensive into South Vietnam. The plan became known as Lam Son 719. Whether, I think they had two options: if the North Vietnamese would fall back under the attack like they did under similar circumstances in Cambodia the ARVN would move along the Harriman Highway and destroy all the bases underway. If the North Vietnamese would put up resistance, the ARVN was to cause as much damage and inflict as many casualties as possible and then do a fighting withdrawal back into South Vietnam. Whatever the true motives behind this operation it involved only just three ARVN divisions that enough. As soon as 1967, the US responsibilities had already planned a ground offensive against Laos and had estimated that if it must succeed, it was badly needed to deploy between five and seven US-ARVN divisions. Now, Hanoi had deployed in southern Laos a full army 70B Corps with tanks, ready to repel any ARVN foray, according to Paris Peace Talk agreement, Hanoi was staying in South Vietnam 200,000 troops there. Saigon was to deploy a smaller force. But what anything WIB Bones wished in expectation to carried out axiom-1.
    Lam Son 719 was the largest air mobile operation of the war - but also one doomed to failure right from the start because the WIB Bones had planned, just for the Axis of Evil dumping all rubbish out of date military materiel in a remote spot like Tchepone, south Laos. That’s their crucial goal, in the end, Lam Son 719 lasted for 45 days, and the airpower (I means at Pentagon, as Colonel James Vaught’s suggestion, General Alexander Haig changed from Rolling Thunder to Linebacker air campaign that saved ARVN was under siege due to this Axis of Evil craps) was the only thing that saved the ARVN from a complete defeat in Laos. The North Vietnamese nevertheless did not get off unpunished: their losses were indeed heavy to a degree where their planned invasion of South Vietnam had to be postponed for a full year.

    On 19th February, eleven days into the attack, MACV J-2 was carrying just six enemy regiments committed against ARVN forces in the Lam Son 719 area of operations. Clearly that wasn’t going to last much longer. J-2 concluded that these could be reinforced immediately by three additional regiments from the south and within two days by three more regiments from the west and north. Actually the real significance of this Lam Son operation is the enemy has everything committed or en route, that he has, with the exception of the 325th Division and the 9th separated-Regiment out of the 304th. So if they’re hurt, he’s really going to be beat for long time. And to us: “Of course we’re trying to welcome them all, best we can” Meanwhile a new-rallied confirmed earlier intelligence by revealing the identity and location of a new headquarters – designated the 70B Front – controlling the NVA divisions in the Lam Son area of operations, the 304th, 308th, and 320th. This fresh 70B Front was established right after a founder Skull and Bones, A Harriman retired from public life with the election of President Richard Nixon in 1969 and gave ceded his throne dynasty to a son of his deputy Prescott Bush [George I] to succeeding his resumption of stratagem “Eurasian Great Game”. But George H.W Bush was as merely a ‘surrogate for A Harriman’ disguised and stuck away in China due he knew so well the Vietnam-War outcome.

    On 20 February, 1971, MACV analysts counted eighteen battalion-size ARVN task forces in south Laos mostly involved in search destroyed and cleared operations, with the westernmost elements still about where they had been a week earlier, roughly halfway to Tchepone. The NVA Corps 70B moved its divisions 320th, 324B, 304th, 308th together with 202nd tanks regiment, artillery regiment to counterattack. On this day, they concentrated to up root the 39th Ranger Battalion with human wave tactic. The Rangers fought gallantly and with artillery support from Phu Loc and FSB 30, the NVA attacks was repulsed, left hundreds of bodies in the battlefield the rangers more than 500 weapons of all kinds. Enemy forces were massing to attack, thereby becoming rich targets for reprisals by allied air attacks. When NVA assaults drove ARVN’ 39th Ranger Battalion off their position, thank to tactical air fell upon the massed enemy forces, killing more than 600 in the one battle. At one point, seven fixed-wing gun-ships (EC-130B) and six flare-ships (AC-130) were supporting the Rangers – All this crap about we can take whatever action’s required to protect our own forces, protective reaction. And if the ROE principle doesn’t apply here, we’ll be damned. Daytime the TAC air had a field day with enemy tank, too, destroying the most tanks and one NVA regiment/70B Corps, practically wipe out an armored regiment. Having great powers of recuperation, the NVA mounted a new attack with more intensity. The battle last into afternoon and the ranger reaction weaken … then the 64th and the C/44th Artillery Company did not hear any calls for help from the forward observer of the 39th Ranger Battalion. The NVA already swamped into the ranger position. The survivors of the 39th ran back to the defense line of the 21st Ranger Battalion and continued to fight side by side with brothers in arms of the 21st until this battalion was also evacuated.
    News of the 39th Ranger Battalion fought until the last bullets then dispersed instead of surrendering spread out rapidly. Our helicopters could not re-supply for them for 3 days. When ammunitions were about to run out, they got out of their positions, counter attacked then continued to fight with captured weapons. After overran the 39th, the NVA forces moved south and surrounded the 21st ranger position. At night, flares lighted up the sky above the 21st ranger location in the area of LZ “Ranger South.” The battle between the 39th Ranger Battalion and the survivors of the 21st Ranger Battalion with the NVA regiments lasted for 4 days and nights. When the NVA pulled back after waves of attacks they pounded on the ranger position with 122mm and 130mm shells to weaken the ranger morals and physicals.
    In preserving the ranger battalion, in daytime of the 25th February, the 21st Ranger was ordered to evacuate. According to plan “tactical-retreat”, 42 U.S artilleries at border, 64th and C/44th artilleries were directed to maximize fire-support for ranger. TOT at 10:00 am, four Cobra gun-ship circled above the ranger positions for air-cover then a formation helicopters of 20 HU-1 landed quickly in the LZ Ranger South to scoop up the rangers and brought them to FSB 30. Later another formation helicopters arrived at FSB 30 pickup the rangers and transported them back to Phu Loc. However, one company of the 21st Ranger Battalion was left behind on FSB 30, and they fought together with airborne men in the FSB 30 until this FSB was also force to retreat.

    (Continued)

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    Default Operation lam son 719

    On 23 February 1971 was the longest day not because my gunship was shot down by the enemy P.T-76 but of heavy enemy contact by the Rangers and the Airborne forces on the most northern flank of penetration, and the most U.S Army aviation support for Lam Son 719 having big problem to cause Vice President Huong cried out on TV “Earnestly, U.S stop flying supplied for our troops in the state thirsty water and ammunition for small arms”
    On same day 23 February, further south, nearest Cambodia/Vietnam border, a VNAF helicopter UHI-H carrying M.R-III Corps commander Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri – then 1970 directing the operation of some 17,000 ARVN troops in Cambodia – crashed and burned, killing him and his staff-officers; General Tri performed so well in Cambodia that U.S Permanent Government would hate like hell to think that Tri destroyed all NVA supplies cargo for protracted war and violated ROE’ craps. Said General Bill Rosson, “was a damn fine field commander. His idea was to get up where the action was” His flamboyance and bravery led one newsman to the extreme of calling Tri “the Patton of the Parrot’s Beak” General Tri was considered a fine field commander, scarce enough in the upper reaches of ARVN leadership, which made this a very serious loss. It turned out to be even more of one when it was learned that he had been slated to move almost immediately to I Corps to replace General Lam, who was proving inadequate to his heavy new responsibilities in command of Lam Son 719. General Tri was killed because he was just a great soldier, destroyer all COSVN’ cargo, a great spearhead against to CIP’s drawback.

    A pretentious Permanent Government to being on the subject:
    In the aftermath of Sihanouk’s ouster there had been a good bit of dithering in the White House about whether to mount such an operation and, if one were launched, what its dimensions ought to be, especially whether United States combat troops should cross the border. MACV was asked for ideas and submitted them. Chief of Staff, General Wheeler cabled fed-back that “Higher Authority” – He meant “High Authority,” the transparent euphemism for the President Nixon or the second generation of Skull and Bones, emperor-II [George H W Bush] – “has noted that each option involves considerable US participation.” General Wheeler then called for a detailed alternate plan for attacks into the Cambodia sanctuaries conducted entirely by South Vietnamese forces. Wheeler cable, dispatched at 2:49 PM, Washington time, closed by saying that “a preliminary outline plan submitted here tomorrow would be invaluable” After further consideration in Washington it was decided that U.S forces would participate, but only after the South Vietnamese had led off by themselves on the first day of the operation.
    In Washington, some fairly novel command arrangements surfaced. A presidential blue ribbon commission later reported that “as was widely noted by the press at the time… Defense Secretary Laird [a Bone-Man, you’d discovered at picture “discussing plans for Lam Son 719 above and seeing all Skull and Bones men encircled president and Rogers] had been bypassed by the Joint Chiefs in advising the White House on preparations to intervene in Cambodia in April and May 1970?” Clearly that had been done on orders from the Permanent Government in Washington. There were other problems, including conflicting guidance from Washington that led Abrams to state some ground rules. “I should add,” he said in a message to Wheeler and McCain, “that in these delicate times I respond only to the direction of the Chairman, CINCPAC, and the Ambassador. My staff will not respond to direction from staffs in Washington or Hawaii,”
    There were then 14 enemy sanctuaries along the borders of South Vietnam/Cambodia, 10 of them contiguous to IV and III Corps Tactical Zones in the South. The raid was going after those facilities, informed by the belief that “no guerrilla war has ever been able to reach a ‘victorious’ end without sanctuary” – This against Harriman’s standpoint, the axiom-1: “There was never a legitimate non-communist government in Saigon that was explained at all universities in 1960. Allied columns – ARVN forces on 29 April and then a combined U.S/ARVN force on 1 May – pushed into the Parrot’s Beak and Fishhook areas of Cambodia, thus targeting two of the enemy’s most important border sanctuaries. Within a few days numerous other base areas were entered, ten distinct operations in all by both U.S and South Vietnamese forces.
    Even given the restrictions imposed, the operation was for the South Vietnamese a very significant undertaking. At its peak 50,000 men were committed, the first time in history that such numbers of their troops had operated as a single force. It was a challenging new departure, radically different from the role of pacification support to which most ARVN forces had until recently been relegated. At MACV, President Nixon’s speech announcement the incursion to the nation was played on tape at a 1 May update for Abrams, who must have cringed when he heard the President say that “tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam.” Everyone at MACV knew that COSVN was a shadowy, mobile, and widely dispersed complex that would be very difficult to locate and even more difficult to put out of action. In fact, queried before the fact about prospects for capturing it, MACV had replied that “major COSVN elements are dispersed over approximately 110 square kilometers of jungle” and “the feasibility of capturing major elements appears remote at this time.” Nixon’s characterization of the incursion’s purposes shifted attention from the far more important goals of disrupting the enemy’s lines of communication and cleaning out his base areas, achievements that could set back his timetable for further aggression to the advantage of both RVNAF improvement and U.S withdrawals.
    To a surprising degree the incursion was unopposed. “When facing enemy forces,” read a typewritten directive issued by the B-3 Front Headquarters on 17 March 1970 and captured a week into the incursion, Communist forces in Cambodia “should attempt to break away and avoid shooting back. Our purposes are to conserve forces as much as we can” General Brown exulted that the enemy had “a hell of a problem.” Abrams agreed, but only to a point. “Well, that’s right, George” he responded. “But you see, he’s used to a hell of a problem. He lives in an environment where he’s got a hell of a problem. I get a certain amount of enjoyment, I must say, out of seeing the problem get complicated. But it isn’t worth much. He’s a pretty determined chap, when you get tight down to it. As a soldier, “What we need right now is another division or more – going in deep” in the wake of the initial penetrations. “We need to go west from where we are, we need to go north and east from where we are. And we need to do it now. It’s moving. And goddamn, goddamn.” This last was said wistfully, with great sorrow and regret.
    Unsurprisingly, at Pentagon the delegated author of command and control of ROE was General Haig having secret order from emperor-II to investigate the so called Power Act violation. But those at MACV had their own concerns about ambiguity, voicing an implied indecisiveness, ineffectiveness, pretentiousness. MACV have two of Haig messages. One of them says “go get them” and the other one says “hurry up and get out”. “Ah what the hell Haig really wanted?” Haig responded “It’d go get them until the end of the period.” “Well, it’s still ambiguous” (supposedly, the Permanent Government’s take on charge the whole war by stratagem ‘Everything worked, but nothing worked enough’)
    The scandal broke: became known to the public in March of 1970, Cambodian Marshal Lon Nol led a pro-Western coup, supposedly engineered by CIA operatives and military advisors, and ousted Cambodia’s recognized leader, Sihanouk who then fled to Paris, French and openly accused the United States of his ouster. The coup created the Khmer Republic, led by Lon Nol. In less than a month, South Vietnamese and U.S forces launched a clearing operation into the Parrot’s Beak and some areas of Cambodia that served as sanctuaries for Hanoi troop and Viet Cong forces; This operation also helped to bolster Lon Nol’ government against the Khmer Communists, who became known as the Khmer-Rouge.
    Antiwar movement activist, Lieutenant John F Kerry urged that Media press reports of the United States, led aerial bombing and ground combat operation in Cambodia territories, addressed the issue in a nationally televised speech. President Nixon directly stated that the United States had no advisors on the ground in Cambodia, and had no American military forces involved in any actions in Cambodia, and had no American military air assets supporting any action in Cambodia. This is an insane desire of Permanent Government in which the so called her named “Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form” violated Power Act in U.S constitution.

    What was the cause of “Cooper-Church” and “Case-Church” amendments? For WIB Bones’ original purpose, Senator Frank F Church and other members of Congress were so angered by President Nixon openly lying about U.S military involvement in Cambodia that they immediately took action to begin cutting funding for the war, as a shirttail amendment to the defense authorization bill, a watered down version of the measure finally passed. That version of the amendment only barred the introduction of American ground forces in Southeast Asia. The first volley in Congress came 1970 when Senator Church and Kentucky Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper authorized a bill that cut off funding of all military activity in Southeast Asia.
    Long ago, under the watch of President Richard Nixon, American political interests had already written off South Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords stood testimony to that fact, virtually selling the highly United States-dependent nation down the proverbial river. The Case-Church
    Amendment of 1973, specially banning all bombing in Cambodia and further banning all American military intervention by land, sea, or air anywhere in Southeast Asia, underscored that write-off. The WIB’ Bones had simply engineered a so-called Decent-Interval to distance America from its South Vietnam commitment. Given an adequate passage of time, the world would not hold America accountable. Unfortunately, the WIB’ Decent-Interval had not nearly run its course.

    Some troop elements had done conspicuously better than others. The ARVN armored units had been especially early in the operation the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry had encountered NVA elements in a fight at southern Fire Base 31 and performed brilliantly, destroying six enemy T-54 tanks and sixteen PT-76s without any friendly losses in the first major tank-to-tank engagement of the war, but of course with our gunship air cover supported joint-strafing with the both flank-side equipped two a 19-shot 2.75-inch antitank rocket pods. Today by chance we got the record shooting into the POL pipe-line at random burned all of them for a while right after NVA shut-off the pipes. The fact that I would like to train in released a new gunship pilot check-ride for operational purpose. He was so nervous pushed the button microphone instead of fired arm. This miracle button hit the rockets on the targets [pipe-lines] let our ground troops more confident to our gunship air supported.
    But unfortunately in the evening that same day, when I flied back to home base for refuel, I crossed low on the convoy that I thought those were our friendly M-113 but when I discovered their noses curb-higher like a canoe, NVA PT-76 that was too late, my gunship got many hits by 14.5 mm from gun turret with an automatic weapon and crashed half mile far away and my wingman pick all my crews up immediately. My commander at Danang Air Base would like Major Ky my squadron deputy to replace me so I could having time for R and R, but I cabled to him, “I need stay here for save our peoples!” I don’t want any our aircrews get killed again.
    We are underground of the huge bunker for the morning briefing after I got have not too bad breakfast at the field Chow-Tent. As usual General Lam and Sutherland in the front seats, second one for Division commanders, I always saw only brigadier general Phu, Colonel Ray Battreall, a very experienced officer who watched most of this firsthand from I Corps Forward at Khe Sanh, Colonel Sam Cockerham was acting commander of the 1st Aviation Brigade. And the third row for regiment commander that was my row-seat.
    I have had a sorrow meeting looked I never got before. The bad-news that the number of helicopters in commission so low 25% cast a deep gloom over the whole briefing room. A couple of weeks into the thing there wasn’t a lot of flying going on, including CH-54, Sky-crane sling to every Fire Support Base the bulldozers D-4, Howitzer 155s, water containers, either, at least not compared with the huge requirements the operation was generating. By about 23 February it became apparent that U.S Army aviation support for Lam Son 719 was having some problems. Not only was the intense and well-sited enemy antiaircraft weaponry making operations extremely difficult – every mission, even [dust-off] medical evacuations, had to be planned and executed like a full-scale combat assault – but maintenance problems were causing many helicopters to be out of service just when they were needed most. How can I do for covered support our troop, my helicopter forces was just enough for supplied or medical evacuation missions in case emergency only, we couldn’t hook artillery, water trailer container, but small arms ammunition, meanwhile NVA have had 67,000 tons of various shell ammunition was already on the operation spot-area. Thereby hangs a tale that our VNAF helicopters were shot down by indirect artillery every Fire Support Base, such as Hill 31: 2 H.34s, 1 UH1-H; Hong Ha: 2 UH1-Hs; Hill-30: 2 UH1-Hs; A-loui: 3 UH1-Hs – by direct guns: 1 gunship and 3 UH1-Hs in operational area. There was happened just a couple of weeks earlier into this operation.

    (Continued)

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